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Abstract
The literature on gender, peace and security and the growing body of critiques of 
contemporary peacebuilding have developed largely in isolation from one another. Although 
there have been some recent attempts to make linkages between the two, specific feminist 
critiques of the liberal peacebuilding consensus are lacking. This is despite the potentially 
valuable contribution that such a merging could bring to our understanding of both the goals 
and the means through which peacebuilding is understood and practiced by the international 
community. Furthermore, applying the critiques of liberal peacebuilding approaches could 
also deepen the analysis and cast light on the way that the international community integrates 
gender issues into peacebuilding processes, and the inherent problems in their approach. This 
thesis will contribute to bridging this gap by drawing on both sets of literature, and through an 
in-depth case study of Sierra Leone, will assess the UN’s efforts to integrate gender issues 
into its peacebuilding policies and programming from 2002-2007. The central argument of 
the thesis is that the international community’s gender and peacebuilding agenda in Sierra 
Leone is based on liberal feminist assumptions which inherently limit and challenge the 
extent to which the UN has been able to bring about a positive transformation in gender roles 
and relations. By contrasting UN liberal peacebuilding with the locally-rooted and context- 
specific experiences and approaches of women’s organisations and networks working for 
peace at the community and national levels in Sierra Leone, this thesis will argue that 
building on these informal activities may represent an opportunity for a more emancipatory 
and gender-sensitive form of peacebuilding.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis tells the story of the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, viewed through a 
gender lens. It seeks to make an empirical contribution to our understanding of how 
peacebuilding works in practice, and to widen the theoretical engagement on peacebuilding 
by bringing feminist approaches in from the margins. Peacebuilding seeks to restore 
democracy, provide security and create the conditions for peace and development. 
Rhetorically, there have been many commitments about how important gender issues are to 
these tasks. The reality, however, paints a less than perfect picture. This thesis is an attempt to 
capture some of this reality, hold it up against the rhetoric, and understand the deep gulf that 
lies between the two.
The literature on gender, peace and security and the growing body of critiques of 
contemporary peacebuilding have largely developed in isolation from one another. Although 
there are some recent texts (Pankhurst 2008; Porter 2008; Shepherd 2009) that have attempted 
to bring the two together, specific feminist critiques of the United Nations’ (UN) ‘liberal 
peacebuilding consensus’ are lacking. To address this gap, this thesis uses the case of Sierra 
Leone to analyse and understand the UN approach to mainstreaming gender into 
peacebuilding processes. By asking feminist questions, this analysis also seeks to contribute 
to the critiques of liberal peacebuilding by offering a gender perspective on these issues.
1.1 Theoretical and methodological approach
This introductory section will lay out die theoretical and methodological approach of the 
thesis. It will begin by providing a very brief background to the nature of feminist approaches 
within International Relations (IR), given that this body of literature provides the; theoretical 
foundation stones of this research.1 Within this body of work, it will specifically set out the
1 It is beyond the scope and focus of this thesis to comprehensively assess the contributions; and 
challenges of feminist IR theory. For more on this issue, see Ackerly, Stem and True, 2006.; Jones,
key elements and critiques of liberal feminist approaches, which will be picked up again in 
more detail in relation to the UN’s approach to gender and peacebuilding in chapter 3 .1 will 
then set out the research agenda of the thesis, presenting some of the questions that have 
guided this research. It will conclude with clarification of the key definitions and terminology 
that will be used throughout the thesis, as well as a brief note on the methodology applied.
1.1.1 Feminist approaches to International Relations
The end of the Cold War, the increasing salience of ‘identity politics’, the insights feminist 
theory brought to other disciplines, and the emerging critiques of positivist approaches all 
gave momentum and voice to a feminist vision of international relations. Thus, the 1990s 
heralded a new era of feminist re-thinking of traditional international relations theory, 
concepts, and practice that exposed the problematic nature of some of the most fundamental 
assumptions of the discipline. Since then, feminist international relations has grown and 
developed into a rich body of work encompassing many different perspectives, theoretical 
backgrounds, and diverse understandings of international relations. Despite these advances, 
feminist literature remains on the fringes of IR theory, and the continued gender inequalities 
evident in the world indicate the many battles that still remain to be fought.2
Most fundamentally, feminists argue that there are different ways of seeing, knowing, and 
being that could lead to dramatically divergent interpretations of the world than those 
presented by traditional, mainstream international relations theory (Steans, 2003: 435-6). 
Sylvester argues that in the beginning, there was a perception that gender was not only absent 
from, but also completely irrelevant to the practice of international relations (2002). However, 
the seemingly gender-neutral concepts of IR masked deeply embedded masculinist 
assumptions, and ultimately lead to the naturalization of the gender inequalities and the
2009; Shepard, 2009; Steans, 2006; Sylvester, 2002; Zalewski and Parpart, 2008; and Millennium,
Vols. 17 (3) and 27 (4).
2 Gillian Youngs makes the important point that although feminist IR is flourishing as a sub-field, its 
impact and integration within the broader field of IR has been, and remains, limited (2004, 75).
2
invisibility of women, preserving the system of patriarchy that governs both domestic and 
international relations (Tickner, 1997: 614). They suggested that the perceived ‘irrelevance’ 
of gender in fact hid a deeper bias towards male ways of knowing and being in the discipline 
(Sylvester, 2002: 161).
The slow engagement of feminist theorists with international relations, and the difficulties 
they have faced in engaging with the mainstream, has been the subject of much analysis 
(Steans, 2003; Wibben, 2004; Youngs, 2004; Zalewski et al, 2008).3 Some of this resistance 
can be understood by summarising the three key claims of early feminist theorists in IR. First, 
they disputed the alleged gender-neutrality of IR and argued that gendered relations of power 
are relevant. Second, feminist theorists contended that these power relations usually favoured 
men, or at least a certain type of ‘hegemonic masculinity’.4 Although they conceded that 
some women are more powerful than others, and some are more powerful than men, feminist 
theorists made the generalisation that women tend to have less influence in social, economic, 
and political spheres, and that there was a gender-related structural explanation for this. 
Finally, feminists emphasised the gendered concepts underpinning the discipline. Feminist IR 
theorists therefore presented a challenge to the very core of the epistemology, ontology and 
methodology of the discipline.
Of all the feminist approaches to IR that have emerged5, the one dominant within the UN and 
broader international community is that of liberal feminism.6 This approach argues that
3 See also the two special issues of Millennium that have focused on feminism, gender and international 
relations theory: Volume 17 (3), 1988; Volume 27 (4), 1998.
4 Moving on from merely looking at the marginalisation and invisibility of women in the formal study 
and practice of international relations, feminist theorists also began to examine the role of men and 
masculinities in international relations, and thus more properly began to look at gender relations 
(Hooper, 2001; Zalewski and Parpart, eds, 1998 and 2008). It became clear that there were multiple 
masculinities and femininities in society, but that a particular version, known as the ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’, is dominant.
5 There is a multitude of ‘feminisms’ stemming from the different political and epistemological biases 
of the respective theorists. Rather than talking about one ‘feminist IR theory’, the many different 
approaches to understanding the ‘gender question in IR’ should be recognised. The following useful 
definition of ‘feminist’ theory will be adopted and applied for the purposes o f this thesis: “any theory 
or theorist that sees the relationship between the sexes as one of inequality, subordination or
3
women have the right to full and equal participation in all aspects of social, political and 
economic life, and that the major explanatory variable for the persistence of gender 
inequalities in contemporary society has been their exclusion from these spheres.
Liberal feminists focus predominantly on the public realm, and take what is often referred to 
as an ‘add women and stir’ approach. This implies that if women are brought into and are 
allowed to participate in the structures of international society, eventually the spill over effect 
of their involvement will lead to changes in attitudes and as a result, inequalities between men 
and women will disappear. However, this approach ignores the unequal power relations that 
would distort women’s participation and fails to question the very structures into which 
women are being added and stirred around. Liberal feminists have also been accused of 
focusing exclusively on the public sphere and overlooking the important social dynamics and 
power relationships that exist in the private sphere. However, the two are arguably inter­
related and as such, changes in the public sphere may actually shift and shape individual 
consciousnesses ultimately leading to transformations in gendered frameworks through 
cultural and social changes. Thus, liberal feminist theory may actually have a more far- 
reaching and radical impact than it would at first appear, and may include strategies that are 
more fundamental than the negative connotations of ‘add women and stir’ would suggest. 
This is something that will be returned to in chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis.7
Some theorists argue that given that women are not invested in the status quo due to their 
oppression, their perspectives could potentially be more valid and unbiased than men’s who 
may have limitations on their objectivity as a result of their desire to preserve existing power 
relations. One of the key pitfalls of these approaches is that they run the risk of falling into
oppression, that sees this as a problem of political power rather than a fact o f nature, and that sees this 
problem as important for political theory and practice” (Bryson, 1992: 1).
6 It is important to clarify that this does not imply that liberal feminism is the most widely accepted or 
respected strand of feminist theory within IR, but rather that it shapes and forms the basis for the 
gender equality-related policies of international organisations and governments.
7 Zillah Eisenstein has defended what she terms the potential ‘radical future’ of liberal feminism 
(1981).
4
essentialist arguments where ‘women’ are lumped together into a single category that is 
assumed to be inherently more suited to interpreting the world than men. Women’s 
knowledge and way of interpreting world then becomes privileged and the same problem is 
perpetuated.8
Over the past three decades, the international community has developed a particular approach 
towards the promotion of gender equality, and this also applies in the case of the UN’s 
peacebuilding policy and practice. As a result, the principle of gender equality has become 
institutionalised within the international community’s rhetoric and practice, and is now 
considered as a norm within the international standards of development, peace, and 
democratisation. This strategy, or ‘agenda’, reflects a particular way of looking at the issue of 
gender equality, and has emerged in response to a particular set of historical and political 
factors. This thesis will argue that the liberal feminist underpinnings of gender mainstreaming 
strategies have created a technical, Western-driven concept that cannot always be easily 
translated into other languages and contexts, and does not always create the space for truly 
transformative approaches to gender equality to emerge. Why this liberal feminist approach 
evolved will be traced out in more detail in chapter 3.
This very brief introduction has served to introduce the liberal feminist approach that will be 
returned to in more detail throughout the thesis. Building on the insights of feminist IR 
scholars, there is now a substantial body of literature that offers empirically-based accounts of 
the gendered nature and impact of conflict and peace processes, and the space that violent
8 It is evident that feminist theory has developed in many directions over the past few decades, and the 
explanations given for women’s oppression are multiple and complex. Other feminist theorists, most 
notably post-modem feminists in all their guises, level a more radical critique against contemporary 
society, arguing that women’s ways o f knowing and being have been excluded from the discourse of 
IR, and that claims of one universal truth are unsustainable and, in any case, undesirable. These 
theorists argue for a major re-conceptualisation o f the discipline that would recognise difference, resist 
dichotomisation and ‘self/other-ing’, and destabilise the traditional male-biased nature of international 
relations practice and theory (Sylvester, 1994). This thesis focuses on liberal feminism as the key 
approach of the international community, and so it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider all 
these approaches in detail. For a good overview of the different types of feminisms, see Sylvester,
2002; Tong, 1998; Zalewski and Parpart, 2009.
5
conflict can open up for the renegotiation or transformation of gender roles and relations 
(Afshar and Eade, eds, 2004; Anderlini, 2007; Meintjes, 2002; Turshen and Twagiramariya, 
1998). These works make an important contribution to the theoretical literature on gender, 
peace and security by providing context-specific and empirical findings to support the claims 
being made by feminist IR theory.
These themes will be returned to in more detail in the next two chapters of the thesis, as well 
as being more explicitly analysed in relation to the literature and empirical analysis of 
peacebuilding processes. In chapter 2, I will illustrate the gaps in existing mainstream 
approaches to conflict and peacebuilding by drawing on the insights of feminist scholars who 
have questioned and analysed the different ways in which men and women are drawn into and 
affected by these processes. These points will be further developed in chapter 3, where I will 
illustrate the UN’s liberal feminist approach to gender and peacebuilding in more detail.
A focus on both women and gender is necessary in feminist approaches to understanding 
international relations. The former leads to theorising about the nature of women’s absence 
from the mainstream of the discipline and can highlight possible strategies for drawing them 
in and transforming predominant masculine structures in the process. The latter, meanwhile, 
ensures recognition of the relational, fluid, and contingent nature of gender categories, and 
allows for a deeper consideration of the power differentiations, gendered identities and varied 
experiences among, as well as between, groups of women and men (Youngs, 2004: 77). In 
order to gain a full picture of the complexities of the marginalisation and exclusion of women 
from dominant power structures and the multitude of gendered identities at play, it may be 
• more relevant to focus on women specifically as opposed to the intersection of gender roles 
and relations, and vice versa. This thesis will therefore deploy both perspectives, recognising 
that each can cast a different light on the issues being analysed and discussed. However, 
given that I will be focusing on the UN’s liberal feminist approach to peacebuilding, the
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empirical research presented in chapters 5-7 will at times emphasise women over gender, 
reflecting the dominant discourse and practice.
1.1.2 Research agenda
Feminists have recently begun to make important contributions to critical security studies and 
rethinking about conflict and peace in the post-Cold War world (Hansen, 2000; Hoogensen 
and Rottem, 2004; Hoogensen and Stuvoy, 2006; Hudson, 2005; and Sjoberg, 2009). To 
exclude feminist insights is to exclude a powerful lens for deepening understandings of the 
power dynamics, gendered identities and inequalities that underpin contemporary conflict and 
the prospects for building peace. Peacebuilding policy and practice is increasingly taking into 
consideration the specific and differentiated needs of women and men in conflict-affected 
contexts, as well as the need for a gendered approach to the implementation of peacebuilding 
programmes. Nevertheless, assumptions are made that peace is a homogenous good and 
benefits everyone equally, and critical questions such as ‘peace for whom?’ are not asked 
often enough by academics or practitioners engaging in contemporary peacebuilding.
The UN’s peacebuilding approach makes certain assumptions about what peace and security 
mean for people living in conflict-affected regions, and the processes by which they can be 
brought about. As will be explored in more detail in chapter 2, a ‘liberal peacebuilding 
consensus’ has emerged, exemplified by the UN’s attempts to create stability and foster 
democratisation and marketisation in post-conflict countries over the last two decades. As the 
literature critiquing this liberal peacebuilding consensus demonstrates, such approaches are 
problematic in conceptual, practical and normative terms (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; 
Heathershaw, 2008; Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009). Consequently, the peace they 
create may not be legitimate, inclusive or sustainable in the long-term. Applying a feminist 
analysis to liberal peacebuilding approaches can shed new light on these problematics, and
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can help expose how these approaches can particularly marginalise and exclude women from 
the peacebuilding process, exacerbating their insecurity and deepening their lack of agency.
This research has been motivated by two inter-connected areas of enquiry. The record of the 
UN in mainstreaming gender into its peacebuilding activities has not been a particularly 
positive one, and the case of Sierra Leone is no exception. More than eight years after the end 
of the conflict, the peace in Sierra Leone is arguably not only an illusion in some ways, but it 
is also highly gendered. Whilst overt violence is no longer an immediate threat, political, 
economic and social insecurities remain widespread, particularly for women and girls. 
Nevertheless, gender issues have not visibly informed the UN’s activities on the ground.
The first area of enquiry of this thesis is therefore to understand why the UN was not more 
successful in integrating gender into its peacebuilding activities, despite its rhetoric that 
indicates supporting gender equality is a priority. In parallel to the UN’s efforts, or failures, 
women’s organisations have led local initiatives and bottom-up efforts at building peace in 
Sierra Leone during and after the conflict. This thesis contrasts these activities with the UN 
approach to understand if they could offer a more emancipatory and holistic entry point for 
transforming gender inequalities and creating a more sustainable peace. By undertaking a 
feminist analysis of the UN’s peacebuilding policies and programming in Sierra Leone, this 
thesis will seek to contribute to contemporary understandings of the discourse and practice of 
peacebuilding, and the gulf that lies between the UN and local actors.
Exploring the first more empirical area of research on gender and peacebuilding in Sierra 
Leone has lead to the second focus area of this research on what these findings imply for 
liberal peacebuilding as well as the liberal feminist approach to mainstreaming gender in 
these processes. The overview of the different bodies of literature on liberal peacebuilding 
and on gender, conflict and peace indicates that there are in fact many similarities and 
complementarities between these critiques. Understanding of issues such as the disjuncture
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between external and local actors and top-down and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding, 
the questions of whose knowledge and which issues ‘count’, and the problematic nature of the 
dominant discourse on peace and security could be deepened by applying a feminist lens. 
Similarly, using the critiques of the liberal peacebuilding consensus as an entry point could 
shed some light on the limitations of the UN’s efforts to mainstream gender in its 
peacebuilding activities. This is therefore the second focus area of the thesis.
In summary, the central hypothesis of this thesis is that the UN’s gender and peacebuilding 
agenda in Sierra Leone is based on liberal feminist assumptions which inherently limit and 
challenge the extent to which the UN has been able to bring about a positive transformation in 
gender roles and relations. Furthermore, the thesis will argue for a broadening out of how 
gender and peacebuilding are understood by contrasting UN approaches to gender 
mainstreaming with the locally-rooted and context-specific experiences and approaches of 
women’s organisations and networks working for peace at the community and national levels 
in Sierra Leone. In line with Paris (2010), I also believe that there is a need to ‘save liberal 
peacebuilding’, and that despite its limitations, if applied with more critical reflection and 
greater recognition of the need to engage with and build on local approaches, it may still offer 
the best opportunity to assist countries emerging from conflict.
1.1.3 Definitions and terminology
The concepts of sex and gender are fundamental to any research that draws on feminist 
theory, and as such, merit some conceptual clarification here. In this thesis, sex is defined as 
the given biological differences between men and women’s bodies. Gender, on the other 
hand, refers to the socially constructed roles, responsibilities and identities that influence the 
attitudes and behaviour of men and women, and which can vary between cultures and 
contexts. The term ‘gender relations’ describes the social relationships, including power 
dynamics, which exist between men and women. Thus, gender is not only the static difference 
between men and women, but as a concept it incorporates the patterns of subordination
between men and women that are influenced by power and ideology (Baden and Goetz, 1998: 
19-38). These are “simultaneously relations of cooperation, connection, and mutual support, 
and of conflict, separation, and competition, of difference and inequality” (March, Smyth and 
Mukhopadhyay, 1999: 18).
As a caveat to this conceptual clarification, it is necessary to point out that the terms ‘gender’,
and ‘feminism’ are highly contested, and it can be difficult to arrive at a consensus on one
meaning. Considering both women and gender is important, since while women must be
made more visible in international relations theory and practice, it is also necessary to focus
on the gender relations between men and women and the questioning of these socially
constructed categories (Youngs, 2004: 77). Baden and Goetz point out that within the policy
and activist context, ‘gender’ is an especially problematic concept:
There is a disjuncture between the feminist intent behind the term and the ways in 
which it is employed such as to m inim ise  the political and contested character of 
relations between women and men. A problem with the concept of ‘gender’ is that it 
can be used in a very descriptive way and the question of power can easily be 
removed (Baden and Goetz, 1998: 25).
Another term that will be used frequently throughout this thesis is ‘gender mainstreaming’, 
which has become the dominant approach to promoting gender equality within donor 
agencies, including those operating in post-conflict contexts. According to the definition put 
forward by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), gender 
mainstreaming is,
The process of assessing the implication for women and men of any planned action, 
including legislation, policies, or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a 
strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral 
dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and 
programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men 
benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve 
gender equality.9
9 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/310: Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and 
programmes of the UN system. Substantive Session for 30 June- 25 July 1997.
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Gender mainstreaming is therefore based on a certain understanding of gender roles and 
relations, a certain political, economic, cultural, and social context, and certain assumptions 
about the way that gender-related change can and should be brought about. In other words, 
gender mainstreaming characterises a particular way of knowing and encourages particular 
ways of being in development contexts, largely based on a liberal feminist approach to gender 
inequalities. Indeed, the contingent nature of definitions must be kept in mind, and the 
possibility of terms such as sex, gender, or mainstreaming being used, abused, and co-opted is 
a reality in post-conflict settings, as in any other development environments.
Thus, rather than simply being a straightforward issue of ‘bringing women in’ and making 
them count, the pursuit of gender equality involves multiple and contested ideas about both 
the means and ends of achieving it. Furthermore, the motivations and assumptions driving 
this agenda in post-conflict contexts merit some closer examination.
This thesis will also frequently use the terms ‘post-conflict’ and ‘peacebuilding’ in discussing 
both the evolution of the UN’s approach to building peace as well as the case study of Sierra 
Leone. These terms are also problematic, implying that there is a finite end to violent conflict 
and encouraging one-size-fits-all approaches to countries that are emerging from civil war 
(Moore, 2000). As these concepts are unpacked in more detail in chapter 2, it will also 
becomes clear that they serve a discursive function for the international community, where 
terming a country as ‘post-conflict’ can also signal the opportunity to begin and solidify 
liberal peacebuilding interventions.
1.1.4 Methodology
There are many actors involved in defining, implementing and perpetuating the liberal 
peacebuilding consensus, and many of those same actors also, in theory, should be 
responsible for mainstreaming gender into their work. To compare all actors, with their 
differing mandates, structures and priorities, would indeed be an interesting research topic,
but would be far beyond the scope of what is possible in this thesis. As chapters 2 and 3 will 
show, the UN and its various agencies have played a defining role in setting the parameters of 
not only liberal peacebuilding but also the gender agenda within these processes. Whilst I 
could have focused on bilateral donors, international NGOs or other multilateral 
organisations, instead, I have chosen to focus on the UN for several reasons.
First, given that the UN is composed of different agencies, funds and programmes, it is able 
to play a role across the full range of peacebuilding activities covered by the security, 
governance and economic reforms addressed in this research. In particular, the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and subsequently the UN Integrated 
Office (UNIOSIL), were very important actors in supporting the peacebuilding process in the 
country. Second, at a policy level, the development of the gender and peacebuilding agenda 
was partly driven by and played out at the UN level, particularly following the adoption of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) by the Security Council. This makes it the 
logical organisation to explore when looking at the degree to which the policy has turned in to 
practice. Finally, the UN’s approach to gender and peacebuilding can be assumed to be 
broadly representative of a consensus, with most member states and other organisations 
adopting similar policies and procedures, and can therefore be considered as a representative 
case study.
To explore the limits of the UN’s approach to gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding, I have 
chosen to use the single case study of Sierra Leone from 2002-2007. During any empirical 
research, a choice must be made between broadening or deepening the scope of work. In this 
case, I have chosen to carry out a deep analysis of one case, focusing in detail on the different 
aspects of peacebuilding policy and practice which has enabled me to draw conclusions and 
make comparisons between the security, governance and economic reform processes in the 
country. In sacrificing the breadth, the following chapters present a richer and more nuanced 
analysis than would have been possible in a multiple case study. However, at the same time
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the findings and learning will be applicable to other contexts, because of the similarities in the 
type of gender mainstreaming and liberal peacebuilding approach that the UN adopts across 
the range of post-conflict contexts.
Sierra Leone is an instructive case study for this topic for a number of reasons. First, during 
the height of UNAMSIL’s operations it was the largest peacekeeping operation ever, 
indicative of the major UN involvement in the country. Second, the timing of the 
peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone dovetails with the period when the gender and 
peacebuilding agenda was beginning to take shape, and therefore it provides insight into the 
extent to which the headquarters-level rhetoric actually translated into concrete action on the 
ground. It also coincides with the timing of reforms of the UN’s peacebuilding responses and 
architecture, and the evolution of the liberal peacebuilding consensus. Third, high levels of 
gender inequality permeate all aspects of political, economic and social life in Sierra Leone, 
and the conflict itself had specific gender-related elements, dimensions, impact and 
consequences. At the same time, women played a critical role in bringing about the end of the 
conflict, although much of their actions took place at the community level and went 
unacknowledged by the international community. It therefore follows that the peacebuilding 
process in Sierra Leone was characterized by gender differences, and the evidence shows that 
men and women did not benefit equally from the process of security, governance and 
economic reforms that were launched following the conflict. The case of Sierra Leone is thus 
an interesting one in which to explore how the UN’s peacebuilding efforts addressed and 
mediated these gender inequalities.
The time period that has been selected to limit the analysis in this thesis is the period from 
2002 until 2007. This covers the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone from the official end 
of the conflict in January 2002, through the drawdown of UNAMSIL, and continuing until the 
second post-conflict elections in August 2007. This also includes the transition to UNIOSIL 
and the beginning of the Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC) engagement in the country, both
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important elements of UN engagement in the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone. By 
selecting this timeframe it is possible for my analysis to cover the full range of security, 
governance and economic reforms that were supported, and at times initiated by, the UN, as 
well as incorporating the first seven years after the adoption of SCR 1325.
Similar to Cohn’s findings during her research on national security discourse, I have found 
that “my subject has been a moving target” (2006: 92). Some of the research design was clear 
from the beginning of the project, but at times a more opportunistic approach was adopted as 
the research progressed and new questions and areas of enquiry came to light allowing more 
flexibility and reflexivity (Baines, 2005: 144). Consequently, I have drawn upon a range of 
different methods that have included fieldwork in Sierra Leone, formal and informal 
interviews with policymakers in New York, London and Brussels, documentary analysis and 
participant-observation during four years working as a gender and peacebuilding specialist at 
International Alert.
The analysis in this thesis is based on over 100 personal interviews with UN, bilateral donors 
and Sierra Leonean government officials, academics and non-governmental organisations 
(NGO) representatives, as well as Sierra Leonean men and women who have been affected by 
the conflict and peacebuilding process in the country.10 As noted above, I sought a balance in 
the characteristics and identities of the people interview for the research, in Sierra Leone and 
elsewhere. In Sierra Leone, I adopted the ‘snowball sampling method’ as the most appropriate 
and effective way to access individuals and organisations to whom I was perceived as an 
outsider. Through initial contacts with UNICEF officials and several women’s activists I was 
introduced to an ever-widening group of people with whom I was able to discuss the issues 
pertaining to my research focus. This methodology was also well-suited to this research 
project given that I spent an initial period of five months followed by a further one month 
based in the country, allowing some key interviewees to get to know me over a period of time
10 For a full list o f interviews conducted, please see the appendix.
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(Cohn, 2006: 100). As a result, I was able to interview a wide cross-section of individuals 
involved in the relatively small peacebuilding community in Sierra Leone, as well as others 
who existed outside of the gender and peacebuilding circle.
I adopted a semi-structured approach to the interviews to enable flexibility and to allow 
interviewees to focus on issues that they perceived as most relevant to gender relations and 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Some of these interviews were recorded if permitted, and 
where possible complete attributions have been made in the text. In some cases, interviewees 
asked to remain anonymous or provided their insights off the record and in the references are 
not attributed by name. The majority of interviews were conducted in Sierra Leone 
(Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Kono), during several separate trips to the country from 2005- 
2009.11 Some interviews, observations and research were also carried out in New York, 
Brussels and London, and some in the context of workshops and seminars on gender and 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Whilst efforts were made to ensure diversity, 
representativeness and credibility across the various interviewees, as Cohn notes, “There was 
an ‘I* who asked the questions, and inevitably, who I am shaped not only what I noticed and 
was able to hear, but also what people what [sic] would say to me and in front o f me” (2006: 
97). Some interviewees were quite open about discussing aspects of gender and 
peacebuilding, including their own personal experiences, whereas others were more guarded, 
although even in these cases their evasion of the topic was useful evidence of their attitudes 
and understanding of the issues under consideration in this thesis.
Clearly my own subjectivities, in particular the power dynamics between myself as the 
researcher and the subjects being researched have affected the research process itself 
(Ackerly et al, 2006: 7), but efforts were made to acknowledge and control these biases as 
much as possible. While those people encountered and interviewed during the course of my
111 lived in Sierra Leone from January-June 2005 and June-July 2006, and undertook several shorter 
trips in July 2007, January 2008 and March 2009. During the period February-May 2005 I was 
employed as a consultant with the UNICEF Child Protection team.
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fieldwork may not be representative of the population as a whole, I sought to ensure a balance 
between men and women, those working within UN/NGO structures and the beneficiaries of 
or participants in their activities, women who were agents for peace, victims of violence or 
passive observers, women living in urban and rural settings, and those who were inside and 
outside of the specific dynamics of the Sierra Leonean context. This has generated a rich 
source of qualitative data that cuts across many of the issues and dynamics that are under, 
consideration in this thesis.
The research in this thesis also draws on my experiences as a consultant with UNICEF Sierra 
Leone in the child protection section from February-May 2005 and at International Alert from 
2006-2009, where I managed the gender and peacebuilding programme. These positions gave 
me the opportunity to work on these issues at a policy and practical level, that complemented 
my academic researcher’s perspective. I carried out a number of focus group discussions and 
workshops on gender and peacebuilding issues in the course of this job, and these have been 
listed separately in the annex. They also constituted a valuable source of insight into the 
situation in Sierra Leone as well as gender and peacebuilding policy more generally. Some of 
these workshops and meetings involved UN actors, as well as women peacebuilders from 
other countries, which provided an opportunity to validate my findings across a wider range 
of contexts. This position of being a scholar researching these issues at the same time as being 
to some extent an ‘insider’ and part of die international community’s efforts to integrate 
gender into peacebuilding has given me a unique perspective on these issues. There are 
tradeoffs in objectivity/subjectivity, depth of knowledge and emotional and physical 
proximity to the issues being researched associated with both these statuses, and I sought to 
maintain awareness of these issues throughout the research process (Smyth, 2005: 17-21).
To supplement the findings from my field research, I also carried out in-depth archival 
research and analysis of documents relevant to the processes of security, governance and 
economic reform in Sierra Leone. Many of these documents were passed on to me by the
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interviewees or were obtained from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) archives 
held at Fourah Bay College in Freetown. I was then able to triangulate across the interviews, 
archival research and workshop discussions to identify trends or patterns pertaining to my 
research questions and focus, in doing so also reducing the selection bias, subjectivity or 
limited representativeness of my interview sample.
1.1.5 Measuring success
This thesis seeks to evaluate the extent to which gender issues were integrated into the UN’s 
peacebuilding activities in Sierra Leone, and whether or not a more emancipatory approach to 
both gender mainstreaming and peacebuilding based on the approaches of women’s 
organisations is possible. Therefore, a key challenge of the research is in identifying and 
measuring what constitutes either success or failure in this regard. Given that both 
peacebuilding and gender mainstreaming should be seen as processes rather than end goals, 
measuring success and failure can be problematic and unhelpful if it encourages a focus on 
discrete and technical factors.
Nevertheless, there has been a push towards demonstrating impact and results in terms of 
international peacebuilding interventions, particularly by the donors who are increasingly 
investing funds in this area (Bush, 2003: 39). Measuring impact can be challenging, not only 
because of the standard problems of measurement in the social sciences, but also due to other 
reasons such as difficulties in reaching consensus on the core elements of peacebuilding, the 
fact that changes at the societal level may only be noticeable after a very long period of time, 
and the issue of isolating impact to a specific dimension of a given peacebuilding intervention 
(Menkhaus, 2004: 4-8). The context-specificity of peacebuilding processes also poses a 
challenge to ‘tick-box’ approaches to evaluation or measuring success. Furthermore, few of
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the existing evaluation or impact assessment methodologies incorporate indicators to measure 
gender-sensitivity.12
As will be repeatedly argued in this thesis, peacebuilding and gender mainstreaming are not 
problems to be solved, but transformational processes. Furthermore, the length of time 
required for these societal shifts to occur precludes, or at the very least makes difficult, a final 
judgement on either peacebuilding or gender mainstreaming in Sierra Leone given the limited 
time period of the case study. Clearly the cessation of armed violence or die existence of a 
policy on gender equality do not in themselves indicate the success of either process, but at 
the same time they can be useful indicators of progress towards more gender-sensitive and 
sustainable peacebuilding. As Paris points out, although establishing absolute success is 
difficult, most of the countries that experienced peacebuilding missions were better off than if 
there had been no international intervention (2010: 352). Therefore, in order to be able to 
respond to the research agenda laid out in this chapter, some attempt to clarify the meaning 
and criteria for success and failure is necessary.
Moser and Moser (2005) have proposed a three-stage framework for assessing the success 
and limitations of mainstreaming gender in international institutions. They identify the three 
stages as: adoption of gender-related terminology, putting gender-related policies into place, 
and implementation of these policies. This framework could be extended to gender and 
peacebuilding specifically, although I propose adapting it by including a fourth element of 
legitimacy, incorporating both input and output legitimacy (Keohane, 2006; OECD 2010),
12 In April 2010, the Secretary-General presented a set o f indicators on women, peace and security that 
were developed in response to increased calls for monitoring and accountability in implementation of 
the commitments of the UN and Member States on these issues. Similarly, some of the National Action 
Plans on SCR 1325 that have been developed by various governments include some efforts at 
measuring the success and impact o f integrating gender issues into peacebuilding. These documents 
propose measures such as the number of women signatories to peace processes or represented in the 
police force and the allocation of financial resources to gender-related peacebuilding activities as 
indicative of the effective implementation o f SCR 1325. Whilst useful, these indicators will not be used 
as the framework for assessing success and failure in this thesis, given that they focus on specific areas 
of activity or action rather than a holistic assessment of the sustainability and equality o f peace as a 
whole.
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since this is particularly relevant to peacebuilding interventions. These two terms are taken to 
encompass the extent to which the peacebuilding efforts incorporate and enable the 
participation of the local population (input or internal legitimacy) and the extent to which the 
efforts to mainstream gender in peacebuilding process have resulted in an improvement in the 
lives of the local population (output or external legitimacy). The data and insights gathered 
throughout the course of research for this thesis can be assessed against this framework, 
focusing the analysis on the extent to which gender issues have been incorporated into the 
discourse around peacebuilding, how the UN has incorporated gender issues into its policies 
and structures in Sierra Leone, how gender issues have been integrated into the security, 
governance and economic reform processes, and finally to what extent the liberal 
peacebuilding process can be seen as legitimate in terms of gender-sensitive local ownership 
in meeting the needs and engaging the participation of both men and women.
Documentary analysis will provide important insights about the evolution of the terminology 
and discourse around gender and peacebuilding (chapters 2 and 3), the policies and internal 
processes adopted by the UN agencies (chapter 5), as well as the evidence relating to the 
extent of implementation and legitimacy of these policies (chapter 6). This analysis will then 
be compared and contrasted with the findings from the fieldwork interviews, workshops and 
other observations in an iterative fashion, with each set of data providing material with which 
to make a judgement on success or failure against the framework outlined above. It is also 
important to recognise that the gender and peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone could be 
perceived as a success in terms of the liberal agenda, whilst still being a failure in terms of 
being legitimate and sustainable at the national and local levels. Contrasting the evidence in 
chapters 2-6 with the alternative terminology and approaches used by women’s organisations 
in chapter 7 will therefore provide a further area against which to assess the peacebuilding 
process in Sierra Leone, and will highlight ways in which some of the failures of the liberal 
peacebuilding and liberal feminist approaches could be addressed.
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In the conclusion, which consolidates the analysis presented in the thesis, it will bepossible to 
determine which aspects of the liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminist approaches have 
been effective and could be retained. Furthermore, assessing the evidence against this 
framework may point to entry points for local actors to influence this success, aid identify 
how women’s organisations might be able to work with UN agencies in pursuit of a more 
sustainable, and successful, peacebuilding process.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
In this final section of the introduction, I will briefly map out the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 begins by setting the scene for the UN’s involvement in peacebuilding, providing a 
historical narrative of its evolution during the 1990s and 200s outlining the key characteristics 
of the liberal peacebuilding approach. This is followed by an overview of the liberal 
peacebuilding consensus and a discussion of some of the main critiques that have been 
levelled against it. The chapter then addresses a gap in much of the mainstreaming 
peacebuilding literature by asking some feminist questions of these processes. Doing so, I 
argue, helps to expose how women are marginalised and excluded from the process of 
building peace and security, and flags some of the issues that will be returned to later in the 
thesis.
In chapter 3 ,1 turn to an analysis of how gender issues have been integrated into the UN’s 
peacebuilding policy. While gender issues have been largely marginalised from liberal 
peacebuilding in both discourse and practice, a separate ‘gender and peacebuilding agenda’ 
has emerged, particularly since the adoption of SCR 1325. The chapter concludes by 
outlining the key pillars of the liberal peacebuilding consensus (justice and security sector 
reform, governance reform, and economic reform) from a gender perspective. From the 
evidence presented, I argue that although this separate agenda has brought some limited 
progress in recognising women’s roles in conflict and peacebuilding, it has been inherently
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limited due to its liberal feminist nature, which can be understood as an extension of the 
liberal peacebuilding model. Importantly, this may constrict the possibility of peacebuilding 
processes to support a transformation in gender roles and relations.
With chapter 4, the thesis turns from looking at the theory and policy underpinning gender 
and liberal peacebuilding to setting up the case study context of Sierra Leone. I present a brief 
overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone, highlighting in particular the gendered impact of the 
conflict and the arrival of the LIN during the final years of the conflict from 1999-2001. The 
chapter also outlines in detail the role of women’s organisations in bringing the violence to an 
end and mobilising for peace within their communities. The chapter ends by setting out some 
of the key themes that inform the remaining three chapter of the thesis, which provide an in- 
depth analysis of gender and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.
Chapter 5 begins with an analysis of how gender issues figured in the UN’s peacebuilding 
discourse in the country, as demonstrated through the key policy documents developed by the 
UN. These policies reveal the gendered assumptions and concepts that underpin the UN’s 
peacebuilding work in Sierra Leone, and reveal the failure to integrate gender-related 
priorities into the policies guiding the security, governance and economic reform processes. 
The chapter continues with an analysis of the structures and mandates of the key UN agencies 
and programmes operating in Sierra Leone, providing further evidence of the failure to 
provide adequate staff, resources and operational support to mainstream gender in the 
peacebuilding process. The chapter will conclude by suggesting that the failure to prioritise 
the integration of gender into the peacebuilding policies and structures of the UN agencies in 
Sierra Leone is linked to the problematic aspects of both the liberal peacebuilding and liberal 
feminist approaches that they adopt.
Building on the assessment of how gender issues played into the peacebuilding discourse in 
Sierra Leone, chapter 6 considers the implementation of the UN’s peacebuilding activities in
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the areas of security, governance and economic reforms. The chapter looks not only at the 
different impact on men and women but also the extent to which these programmes 
influenced gender roles and relations. This chapter illustrates the limitations of the gender and 
peacebuilding agenda through the empirical findings which clearly show that none of the 
reform processes integrated gender effectively or systematically, and nor were they able to 
address gender inequalities in the social, political or economic spheres in a meaningful way. 
The UN’s liberal feminist approach resulted in limited and ad hoc efforts to integrate women 
into gender-blind reform processes. Instead of recognising the critical and transformative 
elements of gender mainstreaming, it was reduced to a technical process, thereby doing little 
to challenge and address gender inequalities in post-conflict Sierra Leone.
One of the striking findings of this research has been the extent of informal activities being 
undertaken by women’s organisations in Sierra Leone that exist alongside but are not 
supported by the UN-led peacebuilding process. Chapter 7 explores and analyses these 
informal peacebuilding activities in more detail, highlighting the type of peacebuilding work 
done by different local, national and regional women’s organisations. The chapter argues that 
their peacebuilding work differs from the liberal feminist approach of the UN, and the liberal 
consensus in general, allowing them to take a more holistic, transformative and sustainable 
approach to building human security, gender-sensitive governance and economic 
empowerment in their communities. The implication of chapter 7 is that the possibility for a 
more inclusive, sustainable and emancipatory peace exists, but the UN has failed to draw on 
and create the space for these alternative processes to emerge and influence its approach.
In the concluding chapter I draw together the different threads of the analysis, relating the 
theoretical and empirical insights about gender and liberal peacebuilding against the 
background of post-conflict Sierra Leone. The three main findings of the thesis are as follows. 
First, the UN’s conceptualisation of a universal, ideal peace as embodied by the liberal 
peacebuilding consensus ignores and marginalises gender-differentiated needs and interests in
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relation to peace and security. Second, the problem-solving liberal feminist approach to 
gender and peacebuilding does little to challenge the gendered power relations and structures 
that exclude women, resulting in what I term a “gendered virtual peace”. Finally, bridging the 
gap between the formal, UN-led peacebuilding process and the informal activities of 
women’s organisations could present an opportunity for pushing the boundaries of the liberal 
peacebuilding consensus, reinscribing it in more emancipatory terms. These findings relate to 
the four dimensions of the framework that I outlined in the previous section, and this will be 
referred to as a tool for measuring the success -  or not -  of the UN’s gender and 
peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone.
The next two chapters will lay the theoretical and policy-related groundwork for the first part 
of the thesis. Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the emergence of peacebuilding and an 
analysis of the liberal peacebuilding consensus, drawing on the growing body of critiques of 
this approach. Subsequently, it will lay out the case for applying a feminist analysis to liberal 
peacebuilding exposing some of the gender dimensions of these processes. I will build on this 
in chapter 3 by focusing specifically on the emerging gender and peacebuilding agenda, 
thereby contributing a dimension that has been lacking from the literature to date. As 
Bendana points out, “gender relations research forcefully provides us new ways of looking at 
structural power relations and the role of relational transformations in the process of 
peacebuilding,” and therefore is a powerful tool for increasing the theoretical knowledge that 
is so lacking in the peacebuilding literature (Bendana, 2003: 27).
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CHAPTER 2. LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AND ITS 
CRITICS: BRINGING A GENDER PERSPECTIVE TO 
THE DEBATE
The proliferation of civil conflicts at the end of the Cold War and a sense of donor fatigue and 
disillusionment with conventional relief and development models prompted a fundamental 
change in the international community’s engagement with the developing world in the early 
1990s. It became evident that donor programs and policies designed to alleviate poverty and 
under-development were failing to adequately address the social, economic, and political 
inequalities that fuelled violent conflict around the world, and at the same time, were equally 
unable to deal with the aftermath of these wars. Against the backdrop of these emerging 
challenges at the beginning of the 1990s, the UN, unhindered by the ideological obstacles that 
had constrained action in the previous decades, sought to adopt new approaches to ‘ending 
the scourge of war’. However, not only did the UN face difficulties in operationally adapting 
to the dual challenges of violent conflict and underdevelopment with any consistent success, 
but Cold War informed, state-centric academic thinking around issues of conflict, 
development, and security was also found to be lacking in its explanatory ability. As it 
became apparent that the international community’s traditional tool-box of frameworks and 
strategies for addressing conflict was no longer appropriate, theorists and practitioners alike 
began to search for new ways of approaching contemporary conflict. This signalled the 
beginning of the UN’s forays into peacebuilding.
This chapter will chart out the process that led to the emergence of the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus, as well as presenting some of the main critiques that have been levelled against it. 
The chapter will then cast a feminist eye on this literature, pointing to some of the gendered 
dynamics that have been overlooked by scholars engaging with liberal peacebuilding. In so 
doing, it will add some nuances to their critiques, and prepare the groundwork for chapter 3 
which explores the gender and peacebuilding agenda in more detail.
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2.1 The evolution of the UN’s approach to peacebuilding
Following the changes in the post-Cold War world, the concept of peacebuilding quickly 
gained currency and was embraced in both the policy and practice of the United Nations.13 
Indeed, the breakdown of many countries into civil conflict and the new global challenges 
and threats in the post-Cold War era demonstrate the limited capacity of the state to protect its 
population from new security threats. Furthermore, recent conflicts also show that state 
structures and institutions themselves can in fact be the source of deep and ongoing insecurity 
and violence. Kaldor has persuasively argued that the new forms of warfare challenge the 
traditional divide between local/global and internal/external, where globalisation and 
modernity bring new actors and forms of violence to bear on civilians (Kaldor, 1999).14
Responding to these conflicts required a re-evaluation of assistance strategies and heralded 
the reorientation of the international community towards peacebuilding, and broader, less- 
traditional notions of security. The fact that complex emergencies often occurred in ‘failed 
states’ further reinforced the idea of an inter-relationship between conflict, development and 
security (Milliken, 2003). These states were rarely perceived to possess the institutional 
structures or capacity necessary for effective governance and peacebuilding, factors that are 
exacerbated, or some have even suggested are causally linked, to their underdevelopment, 
poverty and marginalisation (Collier et al., 2003).
More recently, the literature surrounding fragile states and state-building reinforces die 
dilemmas the international community faces in engaging with and supporting development in 
poverty-stricken countries with ineffective and potentially unstable governance structures 
through which assistance must flow (Debiel with Klein, 2002; Milliken, 2003; Chauvet and
13 Although peacebuilding as a concept was new, it is important to acknowledge that the West had been 
engaging in major post-conflict reconstruction programmes since the launching of the Marshall Plan in 
post-World War II Europe (Williams, 2007).
14 Whilst Kaldor’s arguments received prominence, other authors such as Kalyvas (2001) have 
challenged this view and argued that in fact the distinction between old and new wars is somewhat of a 
false dichotomy.
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Collier, 2004; DFID, 2005). Before exploring the nature of the peacebuilding agenda that 
began to take shape from the mid-1990s onwards, this section will trace the evolution of the 
UN’s peacebuilding efforts.
2.1.1 Peacebuilding in the 1990s15
At the same time as the political winds of change of the early 1990s presented new challenges 
to the international community in relation to global peace and security, there were also new 
opportunities to resolve violent conflicts and proxy wars that had been exacerbated by the 
Cold War, such as those in Angola and Cambodia (Cousens, 2001: 1). The UN and other 
international actors sought to support many of these countries in making the transition to 
peace and viable statehood. However, despite the ideals of sustained, long-term, and 
coordinated UN action in the areas of conflict prevention, development and peacebuilding, 
the legacy of their involvement in peace operations in the early 1990s was inconsistent.
Some degree of success was achieved in places like El Salvador and Mozambique, but there 
were more visible failures such as Somalia and Rwanda, where there was little peace to keep 
and the resources allocated for the job were glaringly insufficient. This mixed record 
reinforced the need for a reconceptualisation of contemporary peace operations, as well as a 
transformation in the structures and methods used by the UN to undertake these kinds of 
activities. At this time, the UN’s approach to peacebuilding also began to more explicitly 
entail the replication of the liberal principles of democracy, economic liberalisation and 
human rights; principles that the UN itself was founded on in the years following the end of 
World War n. These changes also reflected the post-Cold War liberal optimism as embodied 
in Fukuyama’s claim of ‘the end of history’ (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 19).
The first elucidation of the UN’s new role and potential reform agenda came in the form of 
UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report entitled An Agenda for
15 Parts of this section have been adapted from Barnes (2006).
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Peace, which set out the beginnings of a blueprint for international interventions in wartom 
countries.16 Coined in this report, ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ was loosely defined as efforts 
“to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense 
of confidence and well-being among people [...] Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; 
post-conflict peacebuilding is to prevent a recurrence” (United Nations, 1992a: para 55 and 
57).17
The term is used expansively in the report, encompassing a wide range of goals and activities, 
but it contained few concrete recommendations about exactly how peace could be ‘solidified’ 
and the roles and timeframes of the various organs of the UN system intended to be involved 
in this process. Indeed, this reflects the ongoing challenge the UN faces in dealing with 
questions of sequencing, coordination, spheres of responsibility, and other tensions that 
reflect a lack of understanding of how best to respond, which too often leads to a failure to 
respond at all.
The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding essentially broadened the remit of the UN to a 
wider range of roles. At the same time, security assumptions based on the state were 
destabilised by events such as the genocide in Rwanda and the growth in critical security 
studies within IR literature.18 It recognised the reality that states, the supposed guarantor of 
people’s rights and freedoms within the international system, either through negligence or 
through direct actions, could in fact contribute to their citizens’ insecurity. Indeed, despite 
alluding to the need for an ‘integrated approach to human security’ and a changing context 
that is making international security more complex, the Agenda for Peace failed to make
16 Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared this report in response to a request from the Security Council that he 
recommend ways to strengthen the UN’s capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
was one of four key roles that the Secretary-General envisaged as being 
the core of the UN’s future involvement in peace and security issues. The other roles were preventive 
diplomacy, peace making, and peacekeeping.
18 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to outline the development o f critical security studies in any 
detail. For more information, see Krause and Williams, 1997; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998; 
Williams, 2008; Booth, 2004; Fierke, 2007; Buzan and Hansen, 2007.
peacekeeping.
7 Post-conflict peacebuilding
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explicit the important connections between democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in 
conflict-affected regions (United Nations, 1992a: para 16; Chinkin, 2004: 29).
Despite these and other limitations, Boutros-Ghali used the Agenda for Peace as a basis for
instigating changes in UN policy, structure and procedures related to peace and security
issues, and it remained the most important conceptual framework guiding UN conflict-related
policy in the first half of the 1990s (Muller, 2001: 51; Lund, 2003: 2-3). Its publication was
the first stage in a shift away from traditional national security discourse that ultimately led
towards more inclusive, and interventionary, approaches focusing on human rights and
collective action based on liberal principles (Peou, 2002: 52-54). In short, the Agenda for
Peace set out a vision for the international community’s role in ending violent conflict that
rested on fundamental liberal principles as a means to create the conditions for peace.
According to Barnett,
we can consider these documents to be liberal to the extent that their narratives are 
informed by a belief in progress: that modernization and interdependence are 
transforming the character of global politics; that institutions can be established to 
help manage these changes; that democracy is a principled issue and can enhance 
peace and security; and that the UN has an obligation to protect individuals, promote 
universal values, and create institutions that can encourage political and economic 
freedom (Barnett, 1997: 539).
In mid-1994, Boutros-Ghali released another report, An Agenda for Development, that 
provided little in terms of practical recommendations but did begin to advocate for a more 
holistic approach, arguing that development was the most important foundation stone for 
peace (United Nations, 1994a: para 3). These two documents together represented the 
acknowledgement that to address violent conflict effectively meant addressing its root causes, 
and that neither peace nor development could be achieved without the other: “[e]mergency 
relief and development should not be regarded as alternatives [...] Peacebuilding means 
action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in
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order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (United Nations, 1994a: paragraph 21-22).19 In an 
attempt to refine and expand upon the original ideas in the two previous reports, A 
Supplement to the Agenda for Peace was released in 1995. The scope of what was considered 
relevant to conflict and security was broadened even further in this document, to recognise 
the fact that “only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and 
humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation” (United 
Nations, 1995a: para 22).
Throughout this time of conceptual repositioning, expectations of what the organisation 
sought to achieve on the ground, namely extending its involvement to ensure the foundation 
of a stable, legitimate and long-lasting peace, were also growing. For example, the 
peacekeeping budget of the UN increased from $230 million in 1987 to $3.6 billion in 1994, 
and the number of peacekeeping operations it authorised tripled (Doyle, 2001: 534). 
However, the Supplement, whilst expanding on the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, 
still failed to offer operational guidance on how it could be integrated into peacekeeping 
mandates and structures, or to set out a truly comprehensive framework for reforming the 
peace and security operations of the UN.
While engagement in conflict-affected regions increased, the mandates and resources of these 
peacekeeping missions were rarely extensive enough to achieve the broad aims of post­
conflict peacebuilding, and the UN found itself frequently, and problematically, engaging in 
countries where consent was non-existent or where there was in fact little peace to keep, and 
often with inadequate resources to carry out the mandated tasks. Taken collectively, these 
documents and the actions that resulted can be seen to be an attempt at legitimating a liberal 
international order, reflecting the belief that the solution to many of these problems lay in the 
promotion of liberal democratic and economic reforms (Paris, 2002; A. Williams, 2007).
19 The other key dimensions o f development that were emphasised were the economy as the engine of 
progress, the environment as a basis for sustainability, justice as a pillar of society, and democracy as 
good governance.
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However, the documents and the subsequent peacebuilding activities of the UN failed to 
question the tensions and contradictions inherent in this liberal approach, which as will be 
argued later has contributed to the problematic nature of liberal peacebuilding (Barnett, 1997: 
549-550).
By the mid-1990s, the new era of multidimensional peace operations had begun, on a 
rhetorical level at least. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was 
established in 1992 in response to the increased demand for complex peacekeeping in the 
post-Cold War world. The UN launched some thirty-five peacekeeping missions during the 
1990s that provided an opportunity to put these new concepts into practice. In addition to the 
UN’s own conceptual shift, the rest of the donor community and other humanitarian actors 
were also developing operational guidelines and best practices to improve their ability to 
assist countries emerging from conflict.20 As the international community’s peacebuilding 
activities increased, both policy-makers and academics attempted to determine a taxonomy of 
post-conflict peacebuilding, covering the vast range of activities that were included within 
this term.21
Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the UN had established new structures, tools and frameworks 
through which to address the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding. By the end of the 
decade, the UN was engaged in 15 peacekeeping operations around the world, at an 
approximate cost of $2.5 billion.22 However, the UN’s ability to deliver effective responses to
20 For example, see OECD, 1997 and OECD, 2001a.
21 It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a detailed discussion o f the various issues and 
activities that can be considered part of post-conflict peacebuilding. For useful overviews see Ball, 
2002 and Keating and Knight, 2004. Given that every conflict has a particular context and dynamics 
that need to be taken into account, the range and sequencing of the activities undertaken in post­
conflict peacebuilding operations varies widely but attempts were made to condense these operations 
into phases or ‘pillars’ to make operationalising the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding within the 
context of UN peace operations a more manageable task. However, it is important to note that these 
efforts did not fully address the challenges of effectively engaging in post-conflict contexts, or in 
dealing with the complex and multi-faceted challenges of political, economic and social reforms 
needed to build a sustainable peace.
22 United Nations Peacekeeping from 1991 to 2000, Statistical Data and Charts, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm
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violent conflict was still being questioned, and despite the renewed commitments and 
resources for the UN to support peacebuilding and conflict prevention around the world, in 
practice it had a very mixed record.
2.1.2 The Brahimi Report: Reassessment and reorientation at the UN 
Following on from Boutros-Ghali and the vision set out in the Agendas, under its new 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the UN launched the most ambitious reform agenda in the 
organisation’s history in 1997 (United Nations, 1997a). This introspection was designed to 
refocus the UN in the face of criticisms about its conduct, purpose and capabilities, and 
sought to breathe new life into the organisation. The UN’s reputation had been tarnished by 
the peacekeeping disasters of the early 1990s, and after the exuberance of the post-Cold War 
years, many were beginning to take a jaded view of the organisation’s ability to meet its 
overarching goal of promoting peace and security throughout the world. One of the ‘core 
areas’ of UN activity that Annan identified for reform was peace and security, specifically to 
develop the UN’s institutional capacity for preventive diplomacy and post-conflict 
peacebuilding (United Nations, 1997a: para 63-66). As part of this broader, institution-wide 
reform process, Kofi Annan commissioned a group of high-level experts to make “frank, 
specific and realistic recommendations” on how to improve the performance of the UN in 
carrying out peace operations. The result was the release of the Report o f the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations, more commonly known as the “Brahimi Report” after the panel’s 
chairman, Lakhdar Brahimi, in 2000 (United Nations, 2000c).
According to the report, the key requirements for successful peace operations are “political 
support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy” 
(ibid, para 4). A peacebuilding strategy is later defined in the document as the process of 
“reassemb[ling] the foundations of peace and providing] the tools for building on those 
foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (ibid, para 13). This is
31
further elaborated upon to include a range of activities incorporating rule of law, respect for 
human rights, DDR and the holding of elections (United Nations, 2000c). As the report itself 
points out, “United Nations operations [...] did not deploy into post-conflict situations but 
tried to create them,” even though neither the mandates and resources that were provided nor 
the institutional structures and coordination mechanisms that were in place were appropriate 
or adequate for this purpose (ibid: para 2). The concept of ‘creating’ itself is problematic, 
implying that the international community could or should enter into a conflict-affected 
country, rebuilding institutions from scratch with little regard for existing structures and 
processes (Paris, 2004). It also implies that the UN and other actors possess the knowledge, 
expertise and legitimacy to define what the new institutions should look like.
By significantly broadening the scope of action linked to peacebuilding even further, the 
Brahimi Report also opened the UN up to criticism of over-extension, continued impotence, 
ongoing institutional impediments, and the use of rhetoric in place of concrete action (Luck, 
2002: 256-268; Lund, 2003). Critics have also suggested that the report failed to really ‘think 
anew’ about how peacebuilding is defined and problematize how peace operations relate to 
increasingly inter-connected global politics. By the end of the 1990s, the concept of 
peacebuilding was therefore broadening laterally in terms of the policy sectors engaged in 
implementing it; deepening in terms of increasing involvement in the domestic affairs of 
conflict-affected countries; and lengthening in terms of the timeline of interventions (Lund, 
2003: 5). One could also argue that the beginnings of the liberal peacebuilding approach were 
becoming increasingly evident: “a consensus exists on what constitutes a crisis, the elements 
of the solution, and the most appropriate strategies to achieve it” (Bellamy and Williams, 
2005a: 2).
During this time of shaping a new reform agenda, the UN began to benefit from the rapidly 
growing body of academic literature on the key limitations in the UN’s structures and 
practices related to peacebuilding (Cousens and Kumar, 2000; Crocker, Hampson and Aall,
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1996; Sriram and Wermester, 2003). Most of the analyses of peacebuilding in the 1990s, both 
academic and policy-related, focused on the technical or practical aspects of these 
interventions, such as how to support the relief-to-development continuum, the optimal 
sequencing of post-conflict activities, or how to ensure more effective coordination among 
donors (see Kumar, 1997; Forman and Salomons, 1999; Patrick, 1998). Whilst an important 
dimension of reform, these concerns have tended to shield the political nature of 
peacebuilding from closer scrutiny, and have buried questions of power dynamics, conflicting 
interests, and hidden agendas beneath the ‘techno-speak’ of sectoral disbursements, funding 
cycles, and inter-agency coordination mechanisms.
Much of the policy and academic literature at the time was therefore well suited for informing 
the reform of the UN’s activities, as analyses of the practical side of peacebuilding inputted 
more readily into the Brahimi Report than overt political critiques would have done. At the 
time, very few critics from the policy or academic spheres questioned the underlying liberal 
values of the UN’s approach. However, throughout the evolution of the UN’s approach to 
peacebuilding in the 1990s, the underlying liberal assumptions became increasingly apparent. 
The idea of liberalisation as a solution to violent conflict is not new, and the ‘liberal peace 
thesis’ can be traced back to Woodrow Wilson (Paris, 2004: 40-41).
The notion of the liberal peace refers to the argument that democratic states are less likely to 
go to war with one another, and therefore an international system composed of liberal 
democracies will be inherently more peaceful (Doyle, 1986; Levy, 1988; Rummell, 1987). At 
the end of the Cold War, this principle was extended to the growing incidence of civil 
conflict, and led many to argue that supporting the process of transforming failed states into 
effective liberal democracies was the most effective way to bring about peace. Indeed, the 
Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi Report in effect are attempts by the UN to conceptualise 
and legitimise interventions by the international community to restore or create democracy 
into situations of internal conflict (Lund, 2003).
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2.1.3 Building peace in the 21st Century: Consolidating the links between peace, 
security and development
Although the number of civil conflicts, which had spiked in the early post-Cold War years, 
was declining by the end of the twentieth century, peacebuilding was undeniably becoming a 
growth industry. In the early 2000s, theorising around the so-called ‘security-development 
nexus’ grew markedly, building on the insights of critical security studies and the ongoing 
experience of international involvement in peacebuilding. This research and policy agenda 
explored both how security and development agendas are linked through peacebuilding, but 
also the tension that can exist between the two agendas where their outcomes can in fact 
undermine, rather than reinforce, each other (Tschirgi, 2003).
Traditionally, military or security aims were separated from socioeconomic development 
objectives, with different actors carrying out projects in isolated spheres. However, the role of 
aid in sustaining and even contributing to conflict, the increasingly recognised links between 
security sector reform (SSR) and governance, and the inability to address poverty in a context 
of violence and instability made it clear that some kind of policy coherence between the 
supposedly discrete fields of security and development was in fact necessary (OECD, 2001b). 
Tcshirgi states that “lying at the nexus of development and security, peacebuilding requires a 
willingness to rethink the traditional boundaries between these two domains,” and she argued 
that the post-Cold War world provided the opportunity for the international community to do 
so (Tschirgi, 2003: 2).
Initiated with the Carnegie Commission’s report, Prevention o f Deadly Conflict, there was 
also a move towards recognising the importance of conflict prevention and early warning, and 
identifying the reasons behind the emergence of failed states, with the aim of preventing 
conflicts before they start (Carnegie Commission, 1997). The central assumption was that
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addressing the structural, underlying causes of conflict was critical to avoid repetitions of 
Rwanda or Bosnia as well as being a more cost-effective approach to peacebuilding. These 
ideas were also linked closely into emerging norms around humanitarian intervention as well 
as human security issues (Baranyi, 2008: 11-15).
One of the main developments at the beginning of the twenty-first century was the 
articulation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine that emerged from the report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. R2P 
essentially encapsulates many of the issues that had been on the international agenda for a 
number of years: namely when, how, and under what circumstances the right to intervene is 
acceptable. However, by changing the terminology the members of the ICISS hoped to 
prompt a reconceptualisation of the responsibilities, as well as the rights, that sovereignty 
brings, at the same time as avoiding many of the pitfalls previous discussions about 
intervention had encountered.
The idea of human security is strongly reflected in the report, in which security is extended to 
people as well as states. As the report points out, “the traditional, narrow perception of 
security leaves out the most elementary and legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding 
security in their daily lives” (ICISS, 2001: 15). The report also echoes the UN’s call for an 
integrated approach where emphasis is not solely on intervention, but also on the 
responsibility to prevent conflict (conflict prevention and peace-making), to respond 
appropriately when it occurs (peacekeeping), and to take action to rebuild societies when 
conflict has occurred (post-conflict peacebuilding). The Commission’s report is in no way 
binding, and its subject matter makes consensus at the international level difficult, but it was 
important in that it presented an alternate framework for looking at the issues behind the 
justification of a growing UN responsibility for action in conflict-affected countries. The 
ICISS report and associated R2P doctrine further reinforce the liberal underpinnings of 
peacebuilding, emphasising the need to protect individual rights and democracy, good
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governance and the rule of law, through ‘tough and punitive measures’ if need be (ICISS, 
2001: para 3.3).
The somewhat limited progress that was made to strengthen peacebuilding operations in the 
1990s and expand understandings of peace and security was further challenged by the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath. The ‘terrorist threat’ prompted a 
retrenchment, particularly in the United States (US), back towards conventional security 
strategies, and this was also played out within the UN. Human rights, good governance and 
the rule of law, previously considered to be the linchpins of effective peacebuilding, began to 
be deprioritised in the face of a renewed interest in national security. Furthermore, the UN’s 
role as leader of international peacebuilding efforts was increasingly challenged by the 
growing unilateralism of the US in the early 2000s, and faced difficulties in terms of 
maintaining its capacities and resources in line with the growing security and development 
needs of the international community (Tschirgi, 2003: 10-13). Therefore, despite the need for 
integrated approaches suggested by the experiences from the field, the development agenda 
became increasingly subsumed within the security imperatives of the international agenda.23
However, the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the UN provided space and an 
impetus to reconsider how the organisation could be reformed to better promote global 
collective security. In response to this opportunity, the final two reports released as part of 
Kofi Annan’s system-level UN reforms, A More Secure World and In Larger Freedom, 
reflect some of these challenges and make proposals on strengthening the UN’s peacebuilding 
response, among other issues (United Nations, 2004a; United Nations, 2005a). The High- 
Level Panel Report (HLPR), A More Secure World, is based on the concept of collective 
security, and far from allowing the post-9/11 fallout to undermine the linkages between 
security and development, it continues to reflect the view that the two concepts are 
inextricably linked.
23 This point has been argued by scholars such as Duffied (2001).
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One of the most important outcomes of this report was the recommendation for the 
establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to unify the fragmented and ad-hoc 
approach that characterised much of the international community’s peacebuilding efforts, as 
well as a Peacebuilding Fund of $250 million to rapidly mobilise the resources needed for 
sustainable peacebuilding in specific country situations.24 The HLPR stressed the long-term 
and multi-dimensional nature of peacebuilding: "Deploying peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long­
term recovery. Serious attention to the longer-term process of peace-building in all its 
multiple dimensions is critical; failure to invest adequately in peace-building increases the 
odds that a country will relapse into conflict" (United Nations, 2004a: para 224). This call is 
echoed in In Larger Freedomt which reiterates the need for the PBC to assist countries 
attempting to make the transition from war to peace.
Despite difficulties in agreeing on the design, composition and institutional home of the PBC, 
it was finally established by the UN on 20 December 2005, with the concurrent adoption of 
General Assembly Resolution 60/180 and Security Council Resolution 1645/2005. Since its 
creation, the PBC has been an important body in mobilising and coordinating actors around a 
peacebuilding framework for the countries on its agenda (initially these were Sierra Leone 
and Burundi), collecting lessons learned on various aspects of peacebuilding, and playing an 
advisory role to countries that request its assistance.
However, in the immediate years following its creation, the workings of the PBC, PBF and 
the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)25 were constrained by difficulties, including 
differing perspectives of the Member States, a lack of clarity over the role and timing of
24 For more details about the proposed Peacebuilding Commission see United Nations, 2004: paragraph 
261-269.
25 The PBSO was established to enhance the coordination of the different UN agencies’ peacebuilding 
work, and to assist and support the PBC and the administration o f funds through the PBF.
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assistance from the PBC and procedural aspects of how the PBC itself should operate (Berdal, 
2009; Jenkins, 2010: 9-13). According to the UN Secretary-General, the UN’s role is to “help 
countries emerging from conflict build democratic institutions and entrench democratic 
norms. Today, the UN’s efforts to promote democracy are inseparable from our broader work 
for security, development and human rights” (UN Secretary-General, 2007, quoted in NUPI, 
2009: 2). This sums up the thinking that lies behind and shapes the UN’s response to 
contemporary challenges, and that has shaped and defined the dominant, liberal approach to 
peacebuilding over the past two decades.
2.2 The emergence of liberal peacebuilding
It has already been noted that the existing literature on peacebuilding in the early 1990s 
focused on the more technical or practical aspects of these processes. There was little 
attention given to analysing how peacebuilding fit into the global order, the normative 
assumptions held by the key peacebuilding actors, or the nature of the type of peacebuilding 
that began to emerge. The early analyses of post-Cold War peacebuilding efforts attempted to 
isolate the factors that could help the international community to effectively bring war to an 
end in places such as Angola and El Salvador (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 1996 and 2001). 
Although these studies led to many useful policy recommendations and were the beginnings 
of a literature on peacebuilding, they also had many limitations (Baranyi, 2008: 9), and failed 
to fully question the assumptions, means and ends inherent in the newly emerging liberal 
peacebuilding consensus.
The UN’s approach to peace operations has gone through several different generations, 
transforming from traditional peacekeeping in the 1960s into the liberal peacebuilding 
approach that is evident, and arguably dominant, today (Lund, 2003: 15). Since the end of the 
Cold War the international community has continued to be engaged in various complex 
peacebuilding processes around the world from Cambodia to Angola to Haiti. These
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processes involve complex political, economic and social transitions and have become 
increasingly interventionist, in some cases even involving long-term UN-led transitional 
administrations.
Over the past decade, peacebuilding has received a growing amount of attention from 
scholars of international relations, and a body of work on the ‘liberal peacebuilding 
consensus’ has now emerged. This consensus has grown out of the UN’s policy that was 
outlined in the previous section, as well as critical analyses of the dozens of conflict and post­
conflict operations that have been carried out by the international community. Although 
frequently cited as a consensus, peacebuilding is a complex concept and there is by no means 
agreement on the nature, process or ends of these interventions (Heathershaw, 2008). 
Nevertheless, this thesis adopts the concept of liberal peacebuilding as used by many scholars 
to describe the dominant approach to peacebuilding undertaken by the UN. This section of the 
chapter will consider liberal peacebuilding in more detail, as well as providing an overview of 
the main critiques and limitations of this approach highlighted in the existing literature.
2.2.1 An overview o f the liberal peacebuilding consensus
Liberal peacebuilding approaches are rooted in the historical experiences of Western Europe, 
and the belief in the universality of the liberal democratic thesis (Paris, 2004: 40-51). Indeed, 
peacebuilding, as it has developed throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, seeks to not just 
replicate Western norms and values but also the Western concept of the state-centric system: 
“There is a clear underlying liberal discourse that unites all attempts by liberal states acting in 
supposed unison in the international community to ‘reconcile’, ‘reconstruct’ or otherwise 
intervene in order to transform ‘rogue’ or ‘failed’ states, going back to at least 1914, and 
arguably well before that” (Williams, 2007: 542). The main values or principles underpinning 
the liberal approach to peacebuilding are democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
development, and free and globalised markets. These principles reflect the values that formed 
the basis of the UN documents of the mid-1990s, and illustrate the widely-held belief that die
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solutions to violent conflict could be found in the application of these fundamentally liberal 
assumptions (Baranyi, 2008: 6).
Indeed, one of the underlying tenets of the liberal peacebuliding approach is that by spreading
democracy and good governance, violent conflict can be reduced or avoided all together. By
adopting marketisation and democratisation as the building blocks of the liberal peace, these
approaches assume a one-size-fits-all approach to security, governance and socioeconomic
reform.26 According to Paris, the key elements of the liberal peacebuilding approach are,
promoting civil and political rights [...]; preparing and administering democratic 
elections; drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; 
training or retraining police and justice officials in the appropriate behavior for state 
functionaries in a liberal democracy; promoting the development of independent 
‘civil society’ organizations and the transformation of formerly warring groups into 
democratic political parties; encouraging the development of ffee-market economies 
by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and goods within and across a 
country’s borders; and stimulating the growth of private enterprise while reducing the 
state’s role in the economy (2004: 19).
Obviously the range, combination, and sequencing of peacebuilding projects is unique to each 
particular post-conflict context, but the above categorisations help to illustrate the breadth of 
activities undertaken by the UN in the liberal peacebuilding mold. Through its activities, the 
UN is able to institutionalise certain approaches, values and priorities through the provision of 
expert advice on how to implement peace negotiations and peace agreements; through 
conditionalities for continued post-conflict assistance that require certain types of actions and 
reforms; and through proxy governance and engagement in various aspects of the 
democratisation and marketisation process (Paris, 2002: 642-646). It is notable that southern 
or conflict-affected countries did not play a significant role in the articulation of the liberal 
peacebuilding approach or its emergence as a consensus within the UN.
Despite its relatively limited record of success, this continues to be the dominant way in 
which the international community responds to the challenge of contemporary conflict.
26 These three areas will be explored in more detail both from a gender perspective (section 3.4) and 
subsequently in the context of the case study of Sierra Leone later in the thesis (chapter 6).
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However, as this thesis will later argue, the reality is that even if not intended, this approach 
has consequences that are not always positive and it may in fact be inherently unable to 
deliver the kind of transformation to sustainable peace envisaged by many of its proponents. 
Although liberal peacebuilding has emerged as the consensus around which international 
actors shape their peacebuilding interventions, it should not be assumed to be an uncontested 
or ‘ideal’ form. Bellamy argues that although the underlying liberal agenda is not necessarily 
explicit and peace operations are presented as ‘value-free’, the reality of the past two decades 
reveals explicitly political, normative and culturally-relative assumptions about conflict and 
the building of peace (Bellamy, 2005: 19).
2.2.2 Critiquing liberal peacebuilding
As already stated, most of the early analyses on peacebuilding have focused on how it could 
be done better or more efficiently. What has not received enough attention are the 
assumptions, discourses, and normative values that underpin it, and indeed in whose interests 
peace is being built, and what kind of peace is being built. The lack of critical reflection and 
self-reflexivity is clearly one of the limitations of contemporary peacebuilding practice. As 
Bellamy states, “its instrumentalism causes it to overlook the role that politics plays in the 
construction of peace operations, leads it to portray a particular historical narrative which 
obscures many of the unlearnt lessons, simplifies the genesis of peace operations, and limits 
discussion of what role peace operations ought to fill in global politics by focusing on the 
classification of the roles they do fulfil” (Bellamy, 2005: 34).
One of the first main critiques of liberal peacebuilding was that although the ideas are 
essentially sound, the methods by which it is implemented are fundamentally flawed (Paris 
1997; 2004). The core of this argument is that although the international community’s 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions have at times been useful in terms of actually 
ending the fighting and violence in civil conflicts, in many cases they have had adverse side 
effects, even undermining the very peace that the interventions are designed to support. This
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is due to the inherent conflictual tendencies within the shift to democratic and capitalist 
systems, which can exacerbate social tensions and continued (or renewed) instability as post­
conflict countries are often unable to deal with the polarisation and increased inequalities that 
such transitions can bring. Paris uses eight case studies (Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia) to illustrate his argument that in all 
but one (Namibia) the reforms introduced as part of the peacebuilding intervention actually 
contributed to the further destabilisation of these countries (Paris, 2004).
Currently, the international community favours the rapid implementation of democratic 
reforms such as holding post-conflict elections and multi-party or inclusive decision-making 
structures, believing that these contribute to the consolidation of peace and eventual post­
conflict stability. Elections, in particular, serve an important symbolic purpose, as well as 
beginning to plant notions of competition and legitimacy in the political institutions of the 
wartom country.27 However, in order for political democratisation and economic 
liberalisation processes to achieve these goals, it is essential that there is a corresponding 
institutional capacity to manage the societal tensions and conflict that may arise during the 
transition phase. In post-conflict contexts, this capacity is often sorely lacking, and 
liberalisation may therefore lead to polarisation, social cleavages, and disruption in the fragile 
peace. The international community, therefore, may need to play a role as a form of caretaker, 
or undertake a ‘temporary directorship’, which although potentially imperialistic, is, 
according to Paris, the short-term price of effective peacebuilding (Paris, 2001: 781).
Paris furthermore argues that, “successful peacebuilding, then, requires that the international 
community not shy away from acting ‘illiberally’ by constraining civil liberties and political 
activity in the short run, in order to build the institutional foundations for more peaceful and 
democratic societies in the long run” (2001: 766). He suggests that institutionalisation, not
27 For a discussion of post-conflict democratisation, see Sisk, 2001: 785-800; Kumar, 1998; Lyons, 
2002:215-235.
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liberalisation, should be the key priority in the post-conflict phase. In arguing for 
‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ (IBL), Paris suggests that in fact what may be 
necessary is a certain degree of illiberalisation while democratic and market values are being 
institutionalised which would keep possible conflicts in check, and only later should elections 
and free markets be brought in. However, the ‘illiberal’ peacebuilding that he suggests is 
necessary has serious political and ethical implications for many, especially marginalised 
groups, including women, whose rights may be even further curtailed and unrepresented. 
Furthermore, this approach would not necessarily address the problem that (neo)liberal 
approaches tend to prioritise economic growth at the expense of distributional equality, which 
can contribute to the underlying causes of conflict in the first place.
The experiences of interventions in countries such as El Salvador and Mozambique have 
illustrated the challenges donors face in terms of finding a balance between their desire to 
push for liberalisation and democratisation and the need to rebuild the institutional capacity of 
recipient governments to manage these transitions. As Carbonnier points out, “often critically 
short of expertise in macroeconomic management, domestic authorities have to wrestle with 
the competing demands of economic stabilisation and peacebuilding requirements. While the 
former requires drastic cuts in government expenditure, the latter implies increased public 
spending to cope with pressing requirements of the peace agenda” (1998: 14). The liberal 
economic agenda pushed by donor agencies often underestimates and simplifies the 
institutional limitations of wartom countries in adequately managing the consequences of 
these stringent policies (Dzelilovic, 2000). The same goes for democratic reforms, where the 
pressure to promote inclusive polities may actually exacerbate societal conflicts. It could be 
argued that “the liberal peace is pursued by peacebuilding actors based on an unproven link 
between liberal modes of governance and peace, and that often ‘illiberal’ practices are 
employed to secure such a peace, which in turn actually reduces the potential for progressing 
towards a sustainable positive peace” (Peterson, 2010: 518).
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Other scholars have adopted a more critical approach to liberal peacebuilding, arguing that 
the approach itself, rather than just the way it is applied, is problematic, or even illegitimate, 
and that the assumptions and priorities of the liberal approach need to be fundamentally 
reconsidered (Bellamy and Williams, 2005a: 6-7). Many critics argue that peace operations 
have been dominated by problem-solving approaches that privilege certain knowledge and 
experiences as relevant, and fail to reflect on or challenge the global structures that contribute 
to the problems the peace operations are designed to address in the first place.28
Peace operations do not operate in a vacuum or exist in isolation, but rather they are part of a
wider context of global politics, and acknowledging this is central to a reconceptualisation of
peace operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2005a: 2). The key implication of any dominant
approach, in this case liberal peacebuilding, is that through its continued replication certain
practices are rendered legitimate and others are not. Heathershaw claims that,
Peacebuilding is overworked and under-theorised. Despite being used to mobilise 
significant political and economic resources for increasingly intrusive third-party 
interventions, peacebuilding is apparently little more than a composite of neoliberal 
problem-solving strategies -  a form of praxis rather than a theory or concept (2008: 
598-9).
While terms such as conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding have been continually debated, the nature of ‘peace’ is rarely discussed 
(OECD, 2001a: 86; Kumar, 1997: 2-4; UN, 1996). Thus although much work has been done 
on analysing how peace can be brought about or what prevents peace from being preserved or 
built, there is much less written about how peace itself as a concept should be understood. A 
discursive link is apparent between peace and liberal democracy in much of the policy 
documents that inform the liberal peacebuilding approach (Heathershaw, 2008: 601). Indeed, 
there is a far richer body of literature in international relations concerning the nature of war, 
as opposed to the equally (or arguably even more) relevant concept of peace. This is despite
28 Cox’s seminal article published in 1981 outlines the difference between problem-solving and critical 
approaches. The edited volume by Bellamy and Williams (2005) is a useful reference point for 
examples of critical approaches to peace operations.
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the rich discipline of peace research that began with the work of Johan Galtung and his 
concepts of negative peace, positive peace, and structural violence, which are clearly relevant 
to peacebuilding strategies.29
An important contribution in this regard is the work of Oliver Richmond, who has deepened 
the analysis of the concept of peace. His starting point is the problem that most analyses focus 
on the ways or methods through which peacebuilding is carried out, rather than what kind of 
peace is built or the motivations of those who are doing the peacebuilding (Richmond, 2005.). 
In short, for Richmond, peace is an unproblematized concept. His model outlines three 
different understandings of peace rooted in the various theoretical traditions predominant in 
international relations, ranging from the realist tradition of viewing the balance of power and 
presence of a hegemonic state power as central to peace towards more critical approaches that 
argue for an emancipatory understanding of the concept rooted in social justice and 
interdependence. The three ‘models’ of the liberal peace project are conservative, orthodox 
and emancipatory (Richmond, 2005a). The latter in particular will be returned to in chapter 7 
when looking more closely at women’s peacebuilding work in Sierra Leone.
These three approaches can be present during any one peacebuilding operation to different 
degrees depending on the power, interests and capacities of the main peacebuilding actors, 
however he cautions that the competing approaches can actually undermine each other 
causing a breakdown in peacebuilding. The conservative end of the spectrum is more top- 
down, interventionist and state-focused, whereas the emancipatory model focuses on local 
ownership and bottom-up approaches, and has a stronger concern for social justice. Orthodox
29 Galtung, 1969: 167-191. Galtung argues that the absence o f ‘personal violence’ does not imply the 
existence of any kind of positive condition. The absence of ‘structural violence’, on the other hand, 
implies the existence of social justice and egalitarian distributions of power or, in other words, a 
positive peace. Although in their policies, donors discuss the need for ‘sustainable peace’ and often 
imply a concern to eliminate all sources of conflict within society, their activities are rarely designed to 
challenge societal power structures. Thus, although donor agencies emphasise positive peace at the 
conceptual level, in practice the focus is usually on the establishment of negative, rather than positive, 
peace. See also Banks’ four concepts of peace (1987: 269).
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models, where most current peacebuilding interventions lie, fall somewhere in the middle 
where there is still a certain normative assumption about the universality of the liberal 
approach (Richmond, 2005a: 211-219).
The essence of Richmond’s argument is that peace needs to be explored in more depth, and 
should not be assumed to be a universal or ideal end-state. Rather it is subjective and political, 
and even a ‘liberal invention’ (2005a: 9). Indeed, the way that peacebuilding is approached by 
policymakers within the international community reflects this idea that peace has “an 
ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined, and thus created” (ibid: 5). In 
reality, “one must take note of who describes peace, and how, as well as who constructs it, 
and why” (ibid: xii). This is a key point that will be returned to later in the thesis, where it 
will be argued that what the international community calls peace may in fact not be peace for 
everyone, and particularly not for women.
In extending his discussion of peace to the practice of liberal peacebuilding, Richmond argues 
that the result is in fact a ‘virtual peace’. This virtual peace is more visible to those who are 
imposing it from outside than to those who are experiencing it on the inside. The virtual 
liberal peace arises because the reality of implementing liberal peacebuilding fails to result in 
a successful transformation towards security, rule of law, economic opportunities, respect for 
human rights and good governance. Richmond argues that the virtual peace stage is 
temporary but indefinite, and can result in the capture of state institutions by an elite and 
ongoing illiberal rule for the remaining masses (Richmond and Franks, 2007: 30-1). The 
result is that the dominant liberal peacebuilding approach fails to bring about long-term 
sustainable governance and peace. Indeed, according to Richmond, the control over resources 
for liberal peacebuilding is a new source of power and domination in post-conflict societies 
and thus these processes can ultimately drive and contribute to ongoing inequality and 
conflict. This concept of virtual peace is particularly useful, and later in the thesis I will
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borrow and adapt this terminology to argue that what is in fact built by the UN in Sierra 
Leone is a gendered virtual peace.
Another important dimension of the critiques of the liberal peacebuilding approach is that as 
it is currently practised it fails to prioritise local ownership and bottom-up strategies. 
Engagement with local actors, both to build on and improve their capacities, as well as to 
ensure a sense of ownership and legitimacy, is an important dimension of peacebuilding. 
There is a large body of literature demonstrating the importance of participatory development 
processes to long-term development success, and this remains true for attempts to build peace 
in wartom societies (Chopra and Hohe, 2004). Nevertheless, the majority of peacebuilding 
operations have, in fact, been donor-biased and dominated by the interests of external actors 
(Haugerudbraaten, 1998: 6-7). Bringing in local actors requires time and considerable effort 
and expertise on the part of donors, and can be made extremely difficult in the context of 
weak or repressive governments that do not favour wide participation. Nevertheless, local 
actors may have knowledge and expertise that could lead to an alternative model or path to 
sustainable peace.
Indeed, experience of past peacebuilding interventions has shown that if inclusive 
peacebuilding processes are adopted early, then it is more likely that they will be continued 
throughout the transition, ultimately leading to more sustainable advances towards peace 
(OECD, 2001a). The need to integrate a wide cross-section of the population is often forsaken 
in the interests of ‘efficiency’ or ‘stability’, or simply because it is easier for donor officials to 
work with the government representatives or other leaders who are already in place. 
However, to do so can have long-term effects on how the aid is used, which groups within 
society it helps, which needs are addressed over others, and who ultimately has a stake in the 
reconstruction process. As Boyce points out, “to speak of ‘aid to postconflict countries’ is to 
use shorthand that obscures the fact that aid flows not to countries as a whole, but rather to 
specific groups and individuals. Any influx of external resources invariably affects the
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distribution of income, wealth, and power in the recipient country. The distributional effects 
of aid can ease social tensions or deepen them, reinforce the peace process or undermine it” 
(2000: 372).
Some of the peacebuilding failures of the past two decades can be attributed to the failure to 
promote local ownership and to be sensitive to the local contexts. In contemporary 
peacebuilding there is a tendency to value universal knowledge over local knowledge, and 
international legitimacy over domestic sources of this legitimacy (NUPI, 2009). From the 
analysis of the key UN documents it is evident that legitimacy for peacebuilding stems from 
the normative frameworks that exist at an international level which in turn inform the liberal 
model. It then becomes problematic that local perceptions, beliefs and norms are expected to 
fit into this mold rather than themselves shaping the agenda and nature of the peace being 
built (Sending, 2009: 3). The liberal model is then what provides peacebuilders with the 
legitimacy -  it becomes self-reinforcing. In peacebuilding, “external actors assume the 
position of experts, and legitimacy is believed to follow from the assumed normative force 
and universal acceptance of the international standards that underpin peacebuilding. This 
leads to a relative marginalization of local knowledge and of local sources of legitimacy” 
(Sending, 2009: 3). These issues of ownership and legitimacy will be returned to later in the 
case study of Sierra Leone in relation to how gender issues are considered.
There are also critics who question the very legitimacy of the liberal peacebuilding approach. 
They have argued that the international community has used peacebuilding as a means to 
transmit the norms and principles of liberal market democracy to wartom countries. While the 
record of liberal peacebuilding has not been very positive over the past decades, “the absence 
of credible, coherent alternatives leaves the basic tenets of liberal internationalism 
unchallenged to such an extent that peacebuilding often comes to resemble a bureaucratic 
exercise in installing the basic pillars of the liberal democratic state” (Donais, 2009: 7-8). In 
the quest to recreate or reconstruct a liberal model, and peacebuilders themselves are
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constructed as the experts with the knowledge of how to build peace. It is this knowledge 
claim which serves to reinforce the legitimacy of the liberal peacebuilding consensus, leading 
it to be defined in top-down liberal terms (Sending, 2009: 2).
In order to be institutionalised, liberal democratic principles first require effective states, a 
task which then requires the support of the peacebuilding industry, and further serves to 
legitimate its involvement. This ‘pathologisation’ of post-conflict societies (Hughes and 
Pupavac, 2005) then entrenches the liberal approach to peacebuilding. By portraying and 
reinforcing these societies as dysfunctional, irrational or unstable, external actors are able to 
determine the parameters for rescuing and reconstructing them along liberal lines. To this 
extent, it may also entail an explicitly transformative agenda (Munro, 2001: 44). Therefore, 
what is being built, by whom, and why, become extremely important questions.
More radical critiques of current approaches to peacebuilding do exist. There are many 
scholars who assert that the current approach is something akin to neo-colonialism or the 
attempted globalisation of Western political and economic order at the expense of the 
conflict-affected countries themselves.30 Some of these critiques are similar to those informed 
by Southern perspectives and the post-colonial literature that suggest globalisation and the 
spread of capitalism further marginalises the developing world and weakens those 
governments’ capacities for self-governance and peaceful development (Bendana, 2003: 
Duffield, 2001; Moore, 2000).
In summary, there are several reasons why the liberal peacebuilding consensus has been 
found to be problematic. First, peace and security are conceptualised in a certain way that 
informs what and who is prioritised. Reflecting this, the UN’s approach to liberal
30 Given that it focuses on liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminism, it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to consider these radical critiques in more detail, but I would suggest consulting Barkawi and 
Laffey, 1999; Chandler, 2004; Duffield 2001 and 2007; Jabri, 2006 for a general overview of some of 
the main points that they raise.
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peacebuilding is based on the notion that a universal, ideal peace rooted in Western liberal 
assumptions can be recreated in conflict-affected contexts. It must be remembered that 
peacebuilding “is inextricable from a larger regime of knowledge, power, interests and 
normative considerations that infuse development agencies and provide the dominant visions 
of the future into which populations emerging from conflicts -  or simply living in the South -  
must fit” (Munro, 2001: 3). Unpacking these regimes is essential to understanding why 
donors behave as they do.
Second, as a result of the top-down, one-size-fits-all way that peacebuilding is conceptualised 
and practiced, the resulting ‘peace’ is often virtual, and does not allow space for critical 
reflection of power dynamics, the input of local actors, or any questioning of the kind of 
peace that is being built. The liberal peacebuilding consensus entails specific measures to 
restore security, establish democracy and create a liberal market economy, where these 
processes are seen as ‘solutions’ to the ‘problem’ of violent conflict. These approaches fail to 
acknowledge the context specificity of conflict-affected regions or the inherent tensions and 
challenges to existing power dynamics that can result from their implementation. While 
problem-solving approaches can help to address issues of effectiveness, they obscure the fact 
that it is usually the interests, values and priorities of the interveners that shape peace 
operations.
Finally, following on from this last point, the legitimacy of the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus itself is questionable. The top-down and outside-in nature of the UN’s liberal 
peacebuilding approach means that there is rarely space for the empowerment and 
involvement of local actors. This is despite the valuable peacebuilding work being done at the 
community level, and outside of the UN sphere of influence and awareness.
In later chapters, this thesis will develop these points by exploring how the interests, values 
and priorities of the UN in relation to gender issues have shaped the possibilities, boundaries
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and potential for addressing gender inequalities in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, it will look 
beyond the UN, to explore what local actors are doing and what insights could be gained from 
their bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding. A feminist perspective on peacebuilding may be 
a step forward in this direction given the ability of these approaches to ask unconventional 
questions, seek explanations in unconventional places, and their underlying objective of 
challenging unequal power relations within society. It is to this that the next section now 
turns.
2.3 Bringing a feminist approach to conflict and peacebuilding
From the previous analysis it is clear that the development of peacebuilding, both in practice 
and in theory, has been almost exclusively gender-blind, and has done little to engage 
feminist theorising despite the potential explanatory value that such approaches offer. 
However, this does not mean that there are no analyses of the gendered assumptions or 
consequences of these processes. Despite the marginalisation of gender issues in international 
relations theory, since the 1990s, feminist theorists and women’s rights activists have been 
drawing attention to how men and women are drawn into conflict differently, through their 
various roles, responsibilities, and access to resources and power (Goldstein, 2001; Moser and 
Clark, 1998; Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank, 2000). This section will introduce some of the 
insights from feminist theorists to draw attention to the gender dimensions of conflict and 
peacebuilding that have been largely marginalised from the theory and analysis of 
peacebuilding presented thus far.
Feminist theorists tend to apply a more bottom-up approach to understanding violence, 
insecurity and peace, and take social relations as one of the principal categories of analysis 
(Porter, 2008; Hamber et al, 2006). This positions feminist theory well to provide additional 
insights to the critiques of liberal peacebuilding. Feminist analyses can lead to more nuanced 
understandings of peace and security that challenge the binary discourses of
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passive/victim/domestic woman and aggressive/warrior/statesman and the way that 
masculinities and femininities are shaped by the gendered peace and security discourse. The 
experiences of conflict-affected contexts around the world provide ample evidence that 
although the sources of insecurity facing men and women often differ, these gender-related 
differences are rarely acknowledged. Despite the broadening and deepening of the study of 
conflict and peacebuilding, they are still not considered as legitimate issues (Blanchard, 2003; 
Hansen, 2000; Hudson, 2005; McKay, 2004).
In examining the concepts used in peacebuilding, it is important to be constantly aware of 
whose experiences are being included in their definition, and what kinds of gendered 
assumptions are hidden in supposedly neutral concepts. The public/private, male/female 
dichotomies that exist in all societies reinforce the perception of women as objects and of 
certain issues affecting women as non-political, and post-conflict contexts are no exception 
(Enloe, 2002: 26). Feminist approaches force us to the see the people and issues that are there, 
but not always visible through the lens of traditional approaches to conflict, peace and 
security.
The impact conflict has on both men and women is complex, multifaceted and often negative, 
and scholars and practitioners have sought to demonstrate how and why women are often 
disproportionately affected by violence and its aftermath. It is, however, important to stress 
that although women suffer during conflict in specific ways, this is not due to an inherent 
weakness, but rather a consequence of their position in society and gendered power 
inequalities that can exacerbate their vulnerability (Pankhurst, 1999: 7). Several volumes of 
feminist analyses and empirical studies of the experiences of women in conflict-affected 
regions have drawn attention to the way that the gendered impact and experiences of conflict 
are manifested (Bouta, Frerks and Bannon, 2005; Byrne, 1996; Cockbum, 2003; Goldstein, 
2001; Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank, 2000; Lindsey, 2001; Lorentzen and Turpin, 1998).
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Firstly, as a result of their gender roles and relations and the mobilisation of gender identities 
during conflict, men and women are drawn into and are affected differently by conflict in 
complex and multiple ways (El-Bushra and Mukarubuga, 1995; Mazurana and McKay, 1999; 
Sorensen, 1998; Cockbum and Zarkov, 2002; Meintjes et al, 2002; McKay and Mazurana, 
2004; Moser and Clark, 2002, Lindsey, 2001: 23-32). Historically, women have mainly been 
perceived as passive victims of conflict, whereas men are viewed to play active roles as 
combatants, leaders or protectors. However, the reality is clearly more complex, and there is a 
need to challenge essentialist assumptions about the roles of men and women in conflict if 
peacebuilding processes are to be effective in supporting the real needs and interests of the 
population.31
An important contribution of the literature on gender, peace and security has therefore been to 
explore the reality of men and women’s multiple roles and identities before, during and after 
violent conflict. Just as women and men can both become victims of conflict, through injury 
and death, displacement, disempowerment and in particular, through sexual violence, both 
can play a range of different roles in relation to violent conflict including as combatants, 
freedom fighters, bush wives, spies and couriers, peacekeepers, inciters of violence or heads 
of households (Porter, 2007: 3). These multiple roles also exist in the peacebuilding phase.
Both women and men play another key role that is often overlooked in the literature, which is 
simply that of survivor. While some individuals are involved directly or indirectly in carrying 
out or supporting violence, and many more others personally experience different forms of 
victimisation, the overwhelming majority of people just need to find a way to survive in 
conflict-affected contexts. Women in particular need to continue to go about their daily
31 In many conflicts, such as those in Eritrea, Sri Lanka and El Salvador, large numbers of women have 
served in the military and in rebel movements, in some cases making up as much as 30% of fighting 
forces (Anderlini, 2007: 93-99). Women may take up arms by choice or by force, and in addition to 
direct combat roles they can also play a variety of roles in support of the fighting forces such as cooks, 
porters, spies or sex slaves. Many o f these roles have been invisible or undocumented, with the result 
that they are not acknowledged when fighting comes to an end and women fall through the gaps of 
peacebuilding initiatives targeting former combatants (McKay and Mazurana, 2004).
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business, be that travelling to the marketplace, working in the fields, engaging in petty trade 
to earn a subsistence income, or caring for children or other household members. One of the 
important elements of acknowledging the diversity of roles women and men play during the 
conflict is to avoid the pitfall of viewing them as homogenous groups. For example, women 
who were combatants during the war have very different needs and interests from women 
who were displaced by the fighting, and so acknowledging the complexity and multitude of 
these roles is critical to avoiding blanket policy prescriptions or projects that are then 
designed for the peacebuilding phase (Heidi Hudson, 2009: 296).
Secondly, violent conflict can challenge traditional gender relations, in particular the division 
of labour. Women’s responsibilities as carers and heads of households often grow as a result 
of conflict, and this extends into the peacebuilding phase (Kumar, 2001: 15-17). These 
increased responsibilities come about as a result of men being displaced or fleeing the 
violence and risk of abduction, being drawn into the fighting, or as a result of them being 
injured and killed. This can lead women to become the main breadwinners, and to take on 
new forms of waged labour in both the formal and informal sectors, adding a further burden 
on top of the domestic responsibilities that they may have already had pre-war (Bouta, Frerks 
and Bannon, 2005: 89).
Whilst these new economic roles can at times be empowering for women, there is also die 
risk that men’s identities as the ‘provider’ are undermined. This is particularly the case where 
there is high unemployment during or following the conflict, and this can lead to increased 
levels of domestic violence and violence with small arms when men return to their 
communities (Bouta, Frerks and Bannon, 2005: 148-150). Furthermore, the additional roles 
that conflict can bring to bear on women are not always empowering and are often an 
additional burden on their lives, as they often take these roles on in addition to their existing 
responsibilities (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002: 2).
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In circumstances of displacement and instability, although both men and women have to 
adapt to the loss of social networks and the destruction of traditional coping strategies, 
women can feel this loss more acutely due to their greater involvement in and responsibility 
for the day-to-day demands of family and community life (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 
1998; Lindsey, 2001). Indeed, the ability of individuals to survive and adapt to changing 
circumstances during and after conflict is influenced by the degree of their access to power 
structures and resources. It is in this respect that women are particularly disadvantaged, as 
they face more difficulty than men in adapting to transformed social, political, and economic 
relations due to the fact that they are often excluded from decision-making processes and 
have fewer rights and access to resources (El-Bushra, 2004: 169).
Finally, gender identities and particularly the forms of militarised masculinity that become 
prevalent in conflict settings, can have extremely negative impacts on women. One of the 
most visible forms this takes is in the high rate of sexual violence, and in particular rape, that 
women often have to endure.32 Rape has now been recognised as a weapon of war, and 
although it is rhetorically considered as an issue of international peace and security, the 
paucity of the prevention and response to the horrific rates of sexual violence in conflict- 
affected countries indicates otherwise.33 It can be understood as a manifestation of the 
unequal power relations that exist between men and women, where women’s bodies become 
objectified and become ‘territory’ during violent conflict (Kelly, 2000: 50). Too often, 
women are offered little assistance to deal with the consequences of sexual violence, and the 
general failure to prosecute those responsible for the majority of human rights abuses 
committed against women during times of violent conflict results in little accountability for 
these crimes. Sexual violence is used as a way of harming and instilling fear not only in 
individual women but also in whole communities, and is linked to the destruction of social
32 It is important to recognise that men and boys can also be, and are, victims of sexual violence during 
conflict; however the scale on which women experience rape during conflict far exceeds this.
33 In June 2008, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1820 on sexual violence in conflict, which 
is one of the strongest statements on this issue. As a result, some action is being taken and the issue of 
sexual violence has moved up the policy agenda in the past few years.
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order (Sideris, 2001; Kelly, 2000). That peace can be said to exist in contexts where such 
cultures of violence exist even after the fighting ends is one of the paradoxes of the UN’s 
approach to peacebuilding.
It is critical that the potentially negative impacts of conflict on both men and women are 
understood. Taking a narrow gender approach that only focuses on women can not only 
disadvantage men themselves, but also has knock-on effects for efforts to support and 
empower women. Displacement and unemployment can be particularly dislocating 
experiences for men, and can challenge their sense of identity within their communities 
(Bouta, Frerks and Bannon, 2005: 91). While men make up the overwhelming majority of 
combatants, they too face serious challenges in reintegrating into society after conflict, and 
often experience marginalisation and disempowerment. Involvement in fighting forces during 
conflict can influence the underlying levels of violence in ‘post-conflict’ times and the ways 
in which masculinities and femininities are understood, and so is particularly relevant to 
understandings of gender, conflict and peacebuilding.
By the same token, the post-conflict or peacebuilding phase is also gendered, and men and
women experience peacebuilding in specific and different ways as a result of socially
constructed and assigned gender roles. However, these should not be seen as fixed, and in
throwing gender relations into flux, conflict can potentially open up new spaces for
(re)negotiation of these roles. As social constructions, gender identities, roles and relations
can be transformed, and importantly for feminists, this creates the possibility for the
empowerment and emancipation of women. Men and women can face both costs and
opportunities when they cross the boundaries of what are perceived to be appropriate gender
roles, but peacebuilding can potentially open up the ‘political space’ for a new gender order
(Pankhurst, 2004: 12-19). As Cockbum asks,
[t]he militarization of a country during war, and the differential impact of armed
conflict on women and men, in some ways deepens traditional gender
complementarity and inequality, while in others it can be observed to disturb old
56
patterns, forcing new roles and capabilities in women. In the postwar moment, does a 
society revert to the status quo ante? Or does the hegemony of militarised 
masculinity perpetuate the gender relations of wartime? Or, in the social turmoil of 
the postwar moment, is an opportunity seized to transform gender power relations in 
the interests of women? (2002: 68-9)
Given that peacebuilding itself is a relatively new field, the scholarly literature has only 
recently begun to analyse women’s contributions to peacebuilding processes around the 
world.34 Much of this work has emerged from empirical studies of contemporary peace 
operations, where it became apparent that women were being left out of some of the most 
critical peacebuilding processes such as DDR and post-conflict elections. Many of these 
studies were based on the work and research being done by the UN, NGOs and women’s 
rights activists (Anderlini, 20001a; International Alert, 2002 and 2004; Pankhurst, 1999; Rehn 
and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002; UN, 2002a).
The few academic studies that do exist on gender and peacebuilding have tended to approach 
the issue from specific perspectives such as issues related to gender justice (Pankhurst, 2008a; 
Chinkin, 2004), feminist ethics, justice and reconciliation (Porter, 2008), gender and 
peacekeeping (Olsson 1999; Cockbum and Zarkov, 2002) or more generally on how women 
and gender issues can be involved in the different aspects of building peace such as elections, 
DDR or peace processes (Anderlini, 2007; Corrin, 2000; Puechguirbal, 2004). Some studies 
have also considered the structural obstacles to women’s participation or the gendered biases 
of the peacebuilding process and actors (Karame, 2004; Kandiyoti, 2005; Rees, 2002;
34 However, there is a strong tradition of feminist writing on peace, ethics and more recently, security 
studies, as well as the gendered discourses of the state and nationhood that have informed the emergent 
literature on gender and peacebuilding (Brock Utne, 1989; Cockbum, 1998; Elshtain, 1987; Hoogensen 
and Rottem; Sjoburg, 2010). For example, some scholars and activists suggest that women possess 
certain qualities that make them inherently suited to fostering peace within their communities. These 
works draw on the rich literature on women’s roles as ‘natural peacemakers’ linked to maternal 
instincts or the ethics of care (Reardon, 1993; Ruddick 1989). There is therefore a perceived affinity in 
some of the literature between a feminist and a peace politics, but this risks essentialising women and 
potentially further marginalising them from the security discourse. These arguments can however 
undermine the empowerment of women by laying them bare to the counter-argument that if they are so 
suited to informal peacebuilding, then perhaps they are not so suited to formal political negotiations or 
security issues. In traditional IR literature, the emphasis that is placed on women as victims and the 
gendered discourse around masculinity and ‘protecting the nation’ has historically devalued the 
important roles that women also play as actors and positive change agents in their homes, communities 
and countries (Enloe, 2000).
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Strickland and Duvuury, 2003; Whitworth, 2004: 119-150), as well as the ways in which 
peacebuilding could intentionally or unintentionally reinforce gender inequality or have 
negative impacts on women (Olsson et al, 2004).
The policies and decisions that are made by peacebuilding actors are informed by certain 
gendered assumptions, and peacebuilding processes themselves also necessarily have a 
gendered impact on the context in which they are applied. This occurs both in terms of their 
different consequences on individual men, women and communities, and in terms of their 
potential to intentionally or unintentionally influence the gender roles and relations of those 
communities (Chinkin, 2004: 32). The ways that men and women are affected by and 
involved in peacebuilding processes will be explored in more detail in chapter 3 and in 
relation to Sierra Leone in chapter 6, building on some of these analyses but making a more 
direct and explicit link with the liberal peacebuilding literature.
An important factor to note is that women may not necessarily benefit from, or be seeking, a 
‘re’construction of the previous state, and they may not be able to access and therefore 
influence the formal spaces where these decisions are being made. Much of the peacebuilding 
work that women do is pushed into the informal sector, and they are too often seen as victims 
or objects rather than subjects (Porter, 2008: 7). Nevertheless, this work constitutes a valuable 
resource for women’s individual empowerment, those living alongside them, and also the 
international community and other actors who seek to support and end violent conflict. 
Women’s organisations in particular can be a valuable resource in terms of their knowledge 
about community-level needs and in the access that they have to rural or marginalised 
populations, as well as being a mechanism through which to empower women (Kumar, 2001: 
205).
Feminists working in the peacebuilding field have long emphasised the need to involve 
women who are active at the grassroots level as well as the benefits that building on local
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capacities and resources brings (Pankhurst with Piza-Lopez, 2000; Marshall, 2000: 9). 
Women are actively engaged in myriad forms of active peacebuilding during times of violent 
conflict, from initiating early warning mechanisms in the Solomon Islands to negotiating with 
warlords and government forces in Liberia, to developing their own recommendations for 
peace negotiations in Sudan and Somalia (Anderlini, 2007).
Women can successfully mobilise other groups of women or members of their communities 
more broadly, in demanding an end to violence or to bring about peace. In many contexts, 
they have also effectively led peace movements that bridge across religious, ethnic or other 
identity divides (Cockbum, 2003). In essence, therefore, the critical point emerging from this 
body of evidence is not to suggest that women are inherently peace-loving or that their own 
peacebuilding approaches are unproblematic, but rather to assert that women must be seen as 
subjects, not victims or objects (Porter, 2008: 7). Feminist theorists and activists argue that 
women should be acknowledged as active players and agents for change during peacebuilding 
processes. Indeed, peacebuilding and development processes can offer opportunities for those 
who suffered during conflict, and can present a space to support the more equitable 
redistribution of power, resources and influence in households, communities and society as a 
whole.
2.4 Conclusion
Many of the critiques of liberal peacebuilding centre on its failure to incorporate local 
perceptions and needs, and the fact that it tends to be administered in a ‘top-down’ way by 
international peacebuilding experts. The failure to involve women in reconstruction may be 
explained by the need to engage with recipients quickly to ensure rapid disbursal of funds, 
and the fact that it is usually men who hold leadership and decision-making positions, thereby 
providing a ready-made structure for engagement. Women (and men) may also lack the 
capacity or skills to enable them to engage effectively, and donors are often reluctant to invest
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in the longer-term capacity-building of the local population. However, beyond issues of 
convenience, it also becomes a question of who has the authority to influence peacebuilding 
processes: “to what extent do those people who wield militarised power become, in everyone 
else’s eyes, the people to whom one must gain access if one is going to have an impact on 
public affairs?” (Strickland and Duwury, 2003: 10). Therefore, when considering questions 
of ownership and participation, it is important to examine whether or not both men and 
women have the opportunity to engage in peacebuilding. To consider the ‘local population’ as 
a homogenous group risks overlooking these important issues, and exactly who is included in 
the mainstream reconstruction processes is something that deserves closer scrutiny.
Critiques that point to the need to build on local capacities and to include both men and 
women in peacebuilding processes are crucially important in terms of exposing gender biases 
within donor agencies’ post-conflict strategies. Although this is usually a stated priority, in 
practice it tends to fall by the wayside. The failure to see inclusiveness as an essential 
ingredient in peacebuilding means that the resources, expertise, and time required to foster 
truly participatory approaches are rarely found (Pearce, 2004: 254-260).
Thus not only do the gendered biases in the liberal peacebuilding consensus lead to limited 
impact in empowering women and addressing gender inequality, it can actually have 
detrimental effects due to the fact that when the international community fails to turn a 
critical eye on gendered structures and power relations, problematic assumptions about the 
construction of and role of gender result. While violent conflict can destabilise gender roles 
and relations, peacebuilding processes can also contribute to their reconfiguration, both 
positively and negatively. These effects can happen either intentionally or unintentionally, 
and therefore it is critical to apply a gender perspective to the design and delivery of 
peacebuilding programmes.
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Women often do not necessarily benefit from the peace dividend that can arise at the end of 
violent conflict, and may be overlooked in peacebuilding programmes or prevented from 
accessing and participating in them. This creates the ‘gendered virtual peace’, where not only 
is the peace itself an illusion, but the peace is said to exist despite the continuation and at 
times, exacerbation, of gender-differentiated insecurities and needs. This concept will be 
returned to throughout the thesis as a helpful conceptual tool for illustrating the many and 
complex ways that the UN’s approach to peacebuilding fails to acknowledge the reality of 
men and women living in conflict zones.
The next chapter will trace the policy developments related to gender and peacebuilding in 
order to understand the liberal feminist assumptions that lie at the root of these approaches, 
and to situate the UN’s gender and peacebuilding agenda within the context of the broader 
liberal peacebuilding consensus.
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CHAPTER 3. GENDER AND PEACEBUILDING IN 
POLICY AND PRACTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
LIBERAL FEMINIST APPROACH
The previous chapter outlined some of the policy developments and events that led to the 
development of the liberal peacebuilding approach, as well as the theoretical literature on 
peacebuilding and gender, conflict and security. The purpose of this chapter is to pick up on 
the final section on gender and peacebuilding and trace the evolution of the UN’s approach to 
mainstreaming gender in policy and practice. Although it is only within the last decade that 
gender issues have been explicitly on the international community’s peace and security 
agenda, there is a much longer history of advocacy and momentum on these issues.
The first section of the chapter will briefly explore the early efforts to integrate gender into 
the development and human rights fields, also outlining the relevance of the human security 
approach to the gender and peacebuilding policies that began to emerge in the late 1990s. The 
second section traces the process that led to the adoption of SCR 1325, which represented the 
first time the UN had taken issues relating to gender and peacebuilding seriously and still 
represents the most extensive articulation of the UN’s approach to these issues. The final two 
sections analyse developments following the adoption of SCR 1325 through to the end of 
2007, making the case that a particular kind of gender agenda has emerged. This agenda is 
based on liberal feminist assumptions, similar to many of those evident in the liberal 
peacebuilding approach, illustrated in the way that gender issues have been integrated into 
security, governance and economic reforms.
It is reasonable to argue that at the outset, the various actors within the emerging 
peacebuilding industry showed little concern or sensitivity to the role of gender issues in 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Gender equality is not mentioned as one of the 
‘essential complements’ to effective peacebuilding in the Brahimi Report, and indeed the
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word ‘gender’ features only eight times in the 74 pages. Seven of these times it was in 
reference to the need to ensure ‘fair geographical and gender distribution’ in the various UN 
operations, and once was to emphasise that all UN personnel should be sensitive to gender 
and cultural differences.35 There is no mention of gender at all in the Agenda for Peace, and 
women only feature once in their ‘traditional’ place of being lumped with children as the 
‘more vulnerable group’ in society (United Nations, 1992a: para 81). Additionally, only two 
of the ten Brahimi Report panel members were women.
Nevertheless, the emphasis that human security places on the individual, coupled with the 
broadening definition of peacebuilding that was laid out in UN policy during the 1990s, in 
theory provided a potential opening to improve the integration of gender issues into the UN’s 
peacebuilding operations. Increased sensitisation to the structural causes of conflict and the 
multiple sources of insecurity that exist in the contemporary global context should logically 
justify bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding that are sensitive to gender-differentiations in 
experience, needs, opportunities, resources and rights. Although many non-governmental 
organisations, women’s groups and feminist theorists appreciated this and produced countless 
documents that reaffirmed the fundamental importance of gender equality to sustainable 
peace, as this chapter will show, the impact on the mainstream of UN peacebuilding policy 
was minimal, despite the gradual (and marginal) development of a gender and peacebuilding 
agenda.
3.1 Women, gender and development
In order to properly understand the evolution of the ‘gender and peacebuilding agenda’, it is 
necessary to put it in the context of a process that began several decades before with the first 
UN World Conference on Women in 1975, and the early efforts to integrate first a focus on 
women and then a gender perspective into the development and human rights fields. SCR
35 UN, 2000c. These references occur on pages 11, 32, 33, 39,41, 62, 71, and 72.
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1325 and the policy frameworks that have built on it did not emerge spontaneously, rather 
they represented the culmination of ongoing advocacy, research, activism and field-based 
evidence that argued for the need to recognise the myriad and complex ways in which gender 
relations affected and were affected by armed conflict and efforts to build a sustainable peace.
3.1.1 From WID to GAD to gender mainstreaming
Although women and gender issues have been historically marginalised from peace and 
security issues, bodies of the UN such as the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 
and the General Assembly (GA) have taken on the advancement of women as a critical 
concern from the organisation’s earliest stages, albeit in an ad hoc and limited way. From the 
early 1970s onwards, and particularly during the UN Decade for Women (1976-1985), 
academics, policy-makers and development practitioners all began to look for explanations 
why economic growth and productivity were lagging despite the concerted development 
efforts of the previous decade.
Poverty appeared to be widespread, and increasing rather than diminishing; and even where 
development projects had had some degree of success, men consistently benefited more than 
women (Anderson, 1993: 7).36 It was posited that women could play a productive, as well as 
reproductive, role in society, and that the main impediment to them doing so was their 
unequal access to resources (Razavi and Miller, 1995a). A new strategy dubbed the ‘women 
in development’ (WID) approach emerged which aimed to make women more visible, 
through targeting them at the field-level with specific projects and training staff to be more 
gender-sensitive, while institutionalising these changes within organisations through the 
creation of WID units.
However, despite its initial momentum as a new development strategy, WID was criticised 
for simply creating special programmes targeted towards women that did not help them to
36 Two of the seminal works on these issues are Boserup, 1970 and Elson, 1991.
64
overcome marginalisation from the mainstream of development work and for neglecting to 
assess the power inequalities and gendered social relations that limited the opportunities and 
choices that women had (Razavi and Miller, 1995a: 5-10). In response to these limitations, 
focus shifted to gender and development (GAD) as a new mechanism for improving on WID 
theory by examining and questioning existing social structures, and how these led to 
differentiated development outcomes for men and women (Connelly et al, 2000). In other 
words, it focused on the position, as well as the condition, of women, opening up new 
opportunities to re-examine gendered power structures. It also signified a movement away 
from women as a target group and towards gender equality as a new strategic goal for 
sustainable development. In this sense, it extended beyond the ‘add women and stir’ approach 
of the WID years, and opened up the possibility of addressing issues related to power, 
inequality of resources and opportunities, and discriminating social structures.
Also linked to the development of gender and peacebuilding approaches is the concept of 
gender mainstreaming, as defined in chapter 1.1.4. It evolved in the 1990s largely as a result 
of the GAD policies that had been adopted by the international community and was an 
attempt to bring gender issues to the front and centre of all development policies and 
programs. Theoretically, mainstreaming can involve both integrationist as well as more 
transformative agenda-setting goals, and ideally the strategies work in tandem (Jahan, 1995). 
However, despite the strategy’s potentially more radical approach, the reality is that in 
practice, gender mainstreaming has been interpreted as a largely integrationist approach by 
the UN. When thinking about gender mainstreaming it is necessary to be realistic about what 
such a strategy can achieve. As a concept it lacks clarity, and within the UN there has been 
little attempt to define ways to measure or assess it as a process. Gender mainstreaming is 
also often criticised for leading to the ‘adding in’ of women or gender issues at the end, rather 
than gender becoming a lens through which to understand and design projects (Hafher-Burton 
and Pollack, 2002; von Braunmuhl, 2002).
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The way that gender is applied often means that the critical intent of the concept is lost, and it 
becomes a ‘technocratic’ exercise that is more concerned with the process than the more 
transformative end goal to which many feminists adhere (Baden and Goetz, 1997). Gender 
mainstreaming can also lead to gender becoming a synonym for women, where the focus is 
on adding in women’s needs, losing the relational aspects of gender, power and ideology and 
the roots of the structural subordination of women. Southern feminists have often accused 
WID and GAD of being Western concepts that bear little relevance to the reality of and the 
challenges facing men and women in developing countries (Afshar, ed, 1991; Marchand and 
Parpart, eds, 1995; Mohanty, Russo and Torres, 1991). Certainly, gender and women are not 
uniform groups. Therefore the question of whose vision of gender equality to mainstream, 
and how to mainstream it (if mainstreaming even is the answer), are issues that will be 
returned to later through the lens of the case study of Sierra Leone.
3.1.2 Contributions from the human rights fie ld
In addition to the contributions from those working on gender and development issues, 
advances related to women’s human rights were also important precursors to the more recent 
work on gender and peacebuilding. Although equal rights for men and women are enshrined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the adoption of the Convention for the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 marked a 
turning point for the inclusion of women’s rights within the human rights framework. 
CEDAW focuses in particular on discrimination against women, encompassing a range of 
issues from addressing violence against women to alleviating the barriers to women’s 
participation in the public sphere.
There is one striking element in particular in the content of CEDAW that is worth briefly 
mentioning, as although challenges in implementation and lack of accountability for full 
domestication of the principles set out in CEDAW remain, there are some precedents in the 
convention that could be usefully applied to efforts to integrate gender into peacebuilding. In
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Article 5, CEDAW calls for a quite radical transformation of the acknowledged/accepted 
gender relations within society, suggesting that State parties should modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women with the aim of eliminating prejudices and 
stereotypes. This would seem to suggest something more transformative is needed, rather 
than just giving women equal rights and integrating them on an equal footing into existing 
structures and institutions.
Another important shift in the human rights discourse that relates to the emergence of the 
gender and peacebuilding agenda was the move towards rights-based, or people-centred, 
approaches to development. Human rights are often separated into two different categories: 
civil and political, and economic, social, and cultural rights. Rights-based approaches were 
intended to be a more holistic approach to the challenges of development, and these 
approaches focused on empowering people, protecting and respecting their human rights, and 
using ‘human development’ as opposed to pure economic development as an indicator for 
countries’ and individuals’ well-being.37 As Molyneux and Razavi point out, however, the 
growth in civil and political rights has not been matched by a similar improvement in social 
justice, which can then lead to a negative impact on the lives of women (2003).
Regardless of the new protection women’s rights began to be afforded on paper, many states 
remained resistant and women were not able to exercise these rights, voiding them of 
substantive meaning and limiting their ability to fight for equality. In particular, paper rights 
have not always translated into protection under the rule of law or access to justice in the case 
of violations, both of which are necessary for the protection and promotion of women’s 
rights. Despite the limitations, the opening up of the human rights discourse in the latter half 
of the twentieth century to new issues, such as domestic violence, has created the space to
37 See the United Nations Human Development Report 2000. Accessible at:
http://www.undp.org/hdr2000/english/HDR200Q.html. The human capabilities approach elucidated by 
Sen and Nussbaum is also linked to this idea of individual rights and the actual capabilities of people, 
rather than merely looking at utility or preferences which may be tempered by other factors such as 
deprivation. See Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; Nussbaum and Glover, 1995.
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theorise about the place of women’s rights and to mobilise and petition for the inclusion of 
gender equality as a fundamental, although not always respected, right within the 
international community’s development approaches. This has been an important contribution 
to the work on gender and peacebuilding, given the close links between human rights, legal 
protection, violence and gender identity.
While the emphasis on accountability, empowerment and participation is an important 
element of rights-based approaches, some have criticised them as being defined in terms of 
Western values and assumptions (Cornwall and Molyneux, 2006; Mohanty, 1991; Molyneux 
and Razavi, 2003). Many of these criticisms mirror those made of the gender mainstreaming 
literature, and of liberal peacebuilding, and reflect the fact that although these approaches 
have emerged as the dominant human rights discourse within the UN they do not necessarily 
reflect the reality of men and women’s lives in developing and conflict-affected contexts. 
Some of the local alternatives to gender mainstreaming in Sierra Leone will be picked up on 
in more detail in chapter 7.
3.1.3 The concept o f  human security
Another area that has influenced the development of the gender and peacebuilding agenda, 
although its potential to widen the discourse was to a large degree unrealised, was the 
emergence of the concept of human security. Human security has been subject to intense 
criticism since its inception for being vague and ‘all-encompassing’, and for diluting the 
important traditional security agenda of protecting the state from external threats (Paris, 2001: 
88-90). While the ambiguity can be problematic, it nevertheless serves a useful purpose in 
terms of enabling a wide range of issues and actors to fall within its parameters that were 
outside the purview of the traditional approaches to security, including specific human rights. 
A human security perspective necessitates a long-term focus, and in doing so, it is an 
important conceptual bridge between the objectives of peacebuilding on one hand, and 
sustainable development on the other. It therefore became an important link in the discussions
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around how to link the security and development agendas of peacebuilding, and provided the 
rationale for ensuring that these two separate goals did not undermine each other (Tadjbaksh 
and Chenoy, 2007; Thomas, 2001).
One of the most frequent sources of insecurity facing women, girls and some men and boys in 
conflict-affected regions is the threat of sexual violence. Their bodies often figuratively and 
literally become the battleground during contemporary conflict, with gender inequalities 
contributing to their vulnerability in these contexts (Sideris, 2001). Given the focus on the 
individual and the emphasis on freedom from fear and the need for protection and 
empowerment, there is potentially space within the human security discourse to incorporate 
issues related to sexual and gender-based violence, thereby giving them the status of security 
threats.
However, feminists have drawn attention to the fact that human security can mask gender- 
differentiated insecurities by encouraging a gender-neutral approach (Hudson, 2006; 
Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 155-171; and Hansen, 2000: 285-306). Feminist theorists with 
a critical security studies perspective argue that, “girls and women experience human 
insecurity differently from men and are subject to gender hierarchies and power inequities 
that exacerbate their insecurity [and] because of their lower status, girls and women are less 
able to articulate and act upon their security needs, as compared with boys and men” (McKay, 
2004: 153).
There is clear evidence from around the world reinforcing the argument that those with the 
least power are typically those who are least secure. For example, women and girls often have 
to live off less food than men and boys in the same families and receive less education or 
access to opportunities to secure a living (McKay, 2004: 154). This weakens their coping 
mechanisms and leaves them more exposed to the negative effects of conflict and instability. 
Even whilst emphasising the importance of an individual-level focus, the male experience is
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often prioritised over the female by human security approaches, and the experience of 
‘universal man’ dominates.38 At the same time, insecurities that are experienced by men in 
specific ways, such as the impact of the increased militarisation of society, can sometimes be 
over-looked.
Therefore, differentiating between each individual’s experiences of (insecurity becomes 
important, and it becomes problematic to assume that human security as a concept will 
automatically or inherently do this.39 Indeed the way in which human security has been 
operationalised is limited due to the failure to incorporate the insights a gender perspective 
could bring (Gibson and Reardon, 2007). However, the events around 9/11 and the 
subsequent move away from human security approaches meant that it was not as central a 
part of the early years of the gender and peacebuilding discourse as it might otherwise have 
been. Instead of building on these linkages, women’s activists tended to draw on the women’s 
human rights discourse, emphasising women’s roles in decision-making and the need to 
provide them with civil and political rights. Nevertheless, although it has not really been 
applied to advance the gender agenda within peacebuilding, the concept of human security is 
still an important piece of the foundations on which later policy developments are based.
3.2 Building momentum around women, peace and security issues
The previous section has outlined some of the policy advances in the development, human 
rights and security fields that laid the groundwork for the emerging policy on gender and 
peacebuilding that began to take root in earnest from 2000 onwards. Although not directly 
applied to gender, conflict and peacebuilding, policymakers and practitioners who sought to
38 It is important to note that security is not only mediated by gender, but also by other factors such as 
ethnicity, age or class. In turn, Western, liberal notions o f security are often prioritised over other local, 
culturally-mediated ones. These are some o f the complexities that underlie the notion of a universal 
concept of ‘human security’.
39 Whilst some have argued for an integration of women, peace and security issues within the concept 
of human security, others have raised concern at the possibility that important gender issues could then 
be marginalised or overshadowed by this broader concept. For an interesting overview of issues related 
to gender and human security see Gomariz and Garcia, 2003.
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focus attention on the gender-specific dimensions of conflict and peace were able to draw and 
build on the progress made in bringing a gender perspective into development and human 
rights.
By the mid-1990s, some degree of change was becoming evident, even if this was not 
reflected in Boutros-Ghali’s or Annan’s reform agendas. The 4th UN World Conference on 
Women held in Beijing in 1995 was the largest ever conference organised by the UN, and the 
parallel NGO forum attracted more than 30,000 women from around the world. The Beijing 
Platform for Action (BPfA) was the outcome document of the conference, and it addressed 
twelve critical areas of concern, incorporating strategic objectives and recommendations. One 
of these twelve areas of concern was identified as women and armed conflict (United Nations 
1995b).
The preamble to this section explicitly linked peace to gender equality and recommended that 
a gender perspective be mainstreamed into all policies and programs (United Nations, 1995b: 
paras 131 and 141). Beijing provided a focus for the global women’s movement and played 
an important role in creating new networks and mobilising civil society organisations working 
on peace and security issues (Anderlini, 2001a). The BPfA emphasised the need for the 
increased participation of women in decision-making and also further institutionalised the 
concept of gender mainstreaming (Krook and True, 2008) which was seen as critical to 
advancing gender issues within international politics. As a UN document, the BPfA 
represented a compromise between member state delegations, but it still sets out an ambitious 
call for reform and the integration of gender issues into all aspects of social, political and 
economic life.
Following from Beijing, in 1996 the UN Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) launched its “Women’s Contribution to a Culture of Peace” project. The aims of 
this initiative were the empowerment of women and support for their peace initiatives, as well
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as gender-sensitisation with a focus on fostering an ethos of non-violence.40 At the same time, 
academics and policy-makers were also beginning to recognise that gender relations and 
power dynamics influenced the effectiveness (in terms of design, delivery, and impact) of 
humanitarian assistance in emergency and conflict situations, and that women’s needs were 
often overlooked in aid programs (Byrne with Baden, 1995; GTZ, 1996; Turshen and 
Twagiramariya, 1998; Vickers, 1993).
In 1998, the African Women’s Report published by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) was devoted to presenting a gender perspective on post- 
conflict reconstruction in Africa (UNECA, 1998). This report affirmed the importance of 
gender to conflict and the need to recognise that “women in post-conflict situations are not 
mere passive sufferers and aid-dependent beneficiaries specially [sic] vulnerable to abuse, but 
have been and should be very much part of the solution” (UNECA, 1998; v). These 
documents were published by two UN agencies, demonstrating some progress in advancing 
gender issues in the UN context, However, they do display a tendency to treat women as a 
homogenous group, and to essentialise their role in peacebuilding and post-conflict 
reconstruction. Furthermore, the emphasis tends to be on women’s socioeconomic roles, 
rather than considering their need to engage and participate in security and political issues in 
the aftermath of conflict. They also remained on the fringes and failed to penetrate the 
evolving mainstream UN peacebuilding discourse.
The advocacy of women’s groups throughout the previous decade and the increased level of 
public awareness about gender issues due to the large-scale crises in Rwanda and Bosnia 
gathered pace at the end of the 1990s (Byrne, Marcus and Powers-Stevens, 1996; Mertus, 
2000). At the same time, the failure to fulfil the various objectives of declarations such as the 
Platform for Action became increasingly evident, and the voices of feminists and others who
40 See http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/proiects/wcpinfo.htm. For a more detailed discussion o f the 
objectives of this initiative, see Report o f  the Expert Group Meeting on Women's Contribution to a 
Culture of Peace UNESCO Consultative Committee on Women, Manila, 25-28 April 1995.
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were critiquing gender-blind approaches to addressing conflict became louder. It was at a 
debate on the BPfA and Women and Armed Conflict during the annual Commission on the 
Status of Women (CSW) in March 1998 that the group of NGOs who had been informally 
working together as the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus started to discuss the possibility 
of raising these issues in the Security Council, given its role as the main organ of peace and 
security policy-making at the UN (Cohn, 2008: 187).
In 1999, International Alert, a London-based peacebuilding NGO launched a global 
campaign, Women Building Peace: From the Village Council to the Negotiating Table.*1 
Through this campaign, a coalition of 200 civil society organisations supported by certain 
actors at the UN such as UNIFEM, advocated for the adoption of a Security Council 
resolution on women, peace and security to address the absence of women and gender 
perspectives from formal peace processes such as peacekeeping, peace negotiations, justice 
and reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction. Beijing had provided an important forum 
for women’s groups to network and collectively strategise, and some of these linkages and 
collaborations continued (Anderlini, 2001a), especially at the global level. Indeed, it is 
notable that “the international women’s movements’ most important political strategies and 
objectives have always been located below and above the nation-state level” (Ruppert, 2002: 
148).
3.2.1 The Path to a Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security 
Despite the advocacy and research being done by civil society organisations in the late 1990s, 
it was still difficult to get gender issues on the table at the Security Council. A significant step 
forward was in March 2000, when Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh who held 
the presidency of the UN Security Council at the time, used the opportunity of International 
Women’s Day to make a statement linking the role of women to conflict prevention and
41 For a description o f some of this work see Anderlini, 2001a.
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peacebuilding (Hill et al, 2003: 1257). In his statement, Ambassador Chowdhury said that
Security Council members,
affirm that the equal access and full participation of women in power structures and 
their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are 
essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security [...] Members of 
the Council note that although women have begun to play an important role in 
conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building, they are still under-represented 
in decision-making in regard to conflict. If women are to play an equal part in 
security and maintaining peace, they must be empowered politically and 
economically, and represented adequately at all levels of decision- making, both at 
the pre-conflict stage and during hostilities, as well as at the point of peacekeeping, 
peace-building, reconciliation and reconstruction (Chowdhury, 2000).
NGOs were able to draw on this powerful statement issued by the President of the Security 
Council as efforts to get women, peace and security issues on the table intensified throughout 
2000. At the end of the CSW in March 2000 six of the members formally came together to 
establish the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO Working Group).42 
The new NGO Working Group took advantage of the momentum and commitment articulated 
by Ambassador Chowdury and organised several different events and meetings with members 
of the Security Council and UN entities, and began the push for a Security Council resolution 
on women, peace and security issues in the months following the CSW in 2000.
A further important policy development was the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of 
Action of 31 May 2000 that was issued following a seminar on ‘Mainstreaming a Gender 
Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations’ hosted by the Government of 
Namibia and the Lessons Learned department of DPKO. This declaration highlighted the 
need to include a gender perspective in all aspects of peacebuilding.43 The report states that, 
“Women’s presence improves access and support for local women; it makes men 
peacekeepers more reflective and responsible; and it broadens the repertoire of skills and
42 The initial founding members of the NGOWG were: International Alert, Women’s International 
League for PeaCe and Freedom, International Women’s Tribune Centre, Hague Appeal for Peace, 
Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice.
43 Declaration at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/windhoek declaration.pdf.
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styles available within the mission, often with the effect of reducing conflict and 
confrontation. Gender mainstreaming, then, is not just fair, it is beneficial” (UN 2000b: 4).
The Windhoek report is one of the most comprehensive case studies of these issues prior to 
the adoption of SCR 1325 (Carey 2001: 54), and lays out an in-depth assessment of the 
changes needed to ensure that men and women are able to participate equally in peace 
operations. Subsequently to the meeting in Windhoek, the 23rd special session of the General 
Assembly from 5th-9th June 2000 was devoted to discussions on “Women 2000: Gender 
Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century”, also known as Beijing +5. 
The outcome document of this session was intended to address the concerns around the delays 
in implementation of the BPfA, as well as highlight progress made and remaining obstacles 
for each of the critical areas of concern.44 The Women and Armed Conflict Caucus continued 
to ensure these issues were part of the agenda of Beijing +5 (Porter, 2007: 14).
In advance of the open debate in the Security Council an ‘Arria formula’45 meeting was held 
on 23rd October 2000, during which members of the Security Council heard testimonies from 
four women from conflict-affected areas.46 The Namibian presidency of the Security Council 
also agreed to sponsor the open session on Women, Peace and Security on 24th-25th October 
2000 47 In a press release issued prior to the Security Council session, the NGO Working 
Group highlighted three key recommendations: to consult with and include women in peace
44 For details o f this outcome document, see United Nations General Assembly (2000) 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/ress233e.pdf [accessed 29/11/09].
45 Arria formula meetings are named after Ambassador Arria of Venezuela who used the mechanism 
for the first time in 1992 to enable a Bosnian priest to speak to members o f Security Council. The aim 
of Arria formula meetings is to provide an informal space for Security Council members to hear from 
civil society representatives on issues or from contexts o f interest to the Council’s work. This formula 
for meetings has been used repeatedly by those working on women, peace and security issues to 
advance specific advocacy messages with Security Council members in advance of the annual open 
debate.
46 The four women who addressed the Security Council were: Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika from the 
Organisation o f African Unity African Women’s Committee on Peace and Democracy, Isha Dyfan 
from WILPF-Sierra Leone, Luz Mendez from the National Union of Guatemalan Women, and Faiza 
Jama Mohamed, a Somali from the Africa Office of Equality Now in Kenya (Hill, Aboitiz and 
Poehlman-Doumbouya, 2003: 1259).
47 Open sessions in the Security Council are notable in that during these times, non-Security Council 
members are also permitted to make statements.
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negotiations, to train and raise the awareness of peacekeepers to the special situation of 
women, and to promote more women to senior positions where the UN is working in conflict 
areas (NGO Working Group, 2000).
These requests were represented as quite radical ideas, given the historic marginalisation of 
women from peace and security issues and the work of the UN Security Council. However, 
already in these early recommendations the emphasis was placed on the role of women and 
the need to integrate them into existing structures to make them more gender equal, rather 
than an emphasis on gender roles and relations more broadly, perhaps in recognition of the 
big challenges that these advocates were up against.
According to observers and participants in the process leading up to the adoption of SCR 
1325, it was outsiders rather than those working within the UN who saw and acted upon the 
opportunity to bring about the resolution.48 Many on the inside of the UN felt that the timing 
was not right to raise these issues on the floor of the Security Council. Ultimately, it was the 
Ford Foundation, who provided resources to fund the networking and advocacy of NGOs, and 
a few non-permanent members of the SC (who are not really insiders either due to their 
temporary status) who enabled the resolution to be adopted.
The adoption of SCR 1325 was therefore the result of an effective collaboration between 
international and grassroots NGOs as well as between these NGOs and the UN entities and 
member states (Hill, Aboitiz and Poehlman-Doumbouya, 2003: 1256). The decades of efforts 
by feminist activists, scholars and practitioners and the ‘femocrats’ working in international 
organisations and national government machineries in the 1980s and 1990s also played an 
invaluable role in laying the groundwork and creating the discursive and actual space for 
merging women’s rights with peace and security policy and practice. Finally, the brutal and
48 This was confirmed by several members o f the NGOWG at a strategy meeting of group members, 
held in June 2007.
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violent conflicts that played out across the globe during the 1990s also served to focus 
attention on the specific ways in which women were affected by and also influenced conflict 
and peace, providing an even more urgent rationale for tackling these issues at the 
international policy level.
However, while all of these documents and processes were important and made significant 
contributions to the eventual adoption of SCR 1325, it must be remembered that at the same 
time, negotiations were underway on a number of key issues, such as those covered in the 
Brahimi report. It is notable that there was little to no cross-over of the gender-related issues 
into these more ‘mainstream’ policy-making processes (Whitworth, 2004: 127). While the 
reports and declarations surrounding the adoption of SCR 1325 were all important in terms of 
advocacy and raising awareness, their impact on the mainstream of conflict and security 
issues at the UN was negligible. Considerable resistance to gender issues was still evident 
both within the UN and within the governments of conflict-affected countries, and this was 
reflected in their early forays into peacebuilding. International actors consistently failed to 
consider how stereotypical conceptualisations of men, women and gender relations shaped 
their actions in conflict zones, and rarely conducted any kind of gender analysis of their 
programs (Corrin, 2000; Pankhurst, 2004: esp 17-20). Before exploring the development of 
the ‘gender and peacebuilding agenda’ at the UN, the next section will first offer a brief 
analysis of SCR 1325 given its integral role in framing the discourse and policy relating to 
gender and peacebuilding that has developed in recent years.
3.2.2 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 
The historic adoption of SCR 1325 took place on October 31, 2000 (United Nations, 2000d). 
This resolution was the first official recognition by the UN body of the need to address gender 
issues in conflict prevention, management and reconstruction mechanisms. As Cohn points 
out, “although ‘gender mainstreaming’ has been official UN policy since 1997, Resolution
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1325 represents the first time that gender has been mainstreamed in the armed conflict and 
security side of the UN” (Cohn, 2008: 185). Indeed, SCR 1325 was a watershed and signaled 
a real change in the UN in the sense that the resolution sought to make gender relevant and 
mainstreamed in all aspects of peace operations, placing responsibility (in theory at least) 
squarely on the shoulders of international community.
The Resolution recognises the “important role of women in the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts and in peace-building, and stress[es] the importance of their equal participation and 
full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security” 
(United Nations, 2000d). However, not only does it acknowledge the vital role that women 
can play in peacebuilding and suggests that their inclusion is an important dimension of these 
processes, it also recognises that it is their right to participate (Cohn, 2004: 8). The text of the 
resolution begins with a reiteration and reaffirmation of previous Security Council resolutions 
and other commitments and declarations made by the international community relevant to 
women, peace and security. The eighteen operational paragraphs of the resolution cover a 
wide range of issues, ranging from women’s roles in decision-making for the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflict, to recognising the needs of women and girls during 
repatriation and the need for consultation with local and international women’s groups 
(United Nations, 2000d).
The provisions of SCR 1325 have often been summarised into the “3 Ps”: the protection of 
women, the prevention of conflict, and the increased participation of women.49 Some activists 
also add prosecution or punishment for sexual violence and the promotion of a gender 
perspective as the 4th and 5th ‘Ps’ of the resolution. SCR 1325 concluded that the Security 
Council would remain actively seized of the matter, and the Secretary-General was requested 
to produce a report on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in
49 The 3 Ps framework was first developed by the NGO Working Group. See NGO Working Group, 
2004.
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peacebuilding, and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution. The 
resolution is targeted at different actors, including the post-conflict authority, international 
and regional bodies, international NGOs and the local population (Chinkin, 2004: 29). There 
is some mention of the role of women’s organisations and the need to support their work, but 
the text focuses mainly on the key actors in national and global governance, and the emphasis 
is on the formal aspects of peacebuilding processes.
The resolution successfully raises a number of important issues and highlights the 
disproportionate effect that conflict can have on women, their right to be involved in 
decision-making around peace and security issues and the important role they play in 
peacebuilding, particularly at the community level. It also specifies the urgent need to protect 
women from gender-specific forms of violence during conflict, in refugee camps and in other 
situations where they may be vulnerable to attack Although SCR 1325 also refers to the need 
for the integration of gender perspectives in peacebuilding and the provision of gender 
training to military and civilian personnel, the emphasis is still on women’s needs and 
interests. This is not unexpected given that it is a resolution on women, peace and security 
rather than gender, peace and security but it has led to some ambiguity about how gender 
issues relate to the provisions called for within the resolution.
Despite being the central policy framework and reference point for many of the subsequent 
developments of the gender and peacebuilding agenda, SCR 1325 itself has been subject to 
criticism. The language of the resolution is weak with most of the operational paragraphs 
beginning with the phrases ‘urging’, ‘expressing’ or ‘calling on’. It therefore fails to mandate 
or require specific actions of Member States or other parties, rather leaving the 
implementation of the resolution open to interpretation and the political will of the key 
stakeholders. Although it is almost certainly a reflection of the necessary compromises that 
were made among the member states to arrive at a document that was universally acceptable, 
this language is somewhat ambiguous and is gender is couched in liberal feminist terms. SCR
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1325 also covers a much broader range of potential interventions than can realistically be 
implemented, and it is not clear where the key stakeholders should invest their limited 
commitment and resources in furtherance of these objectives. This ambiguity opens up the 
Resolution to a myriad of different interpretations, a problem that is even further exacerbated 
by the failure of the member states and UN entities to specify priorities amongst the different 
recommendations.
Some argue that SCR 1325 fails to fully take into account the complexities and nuances in 
women’s roles in conflict prevention, reconstruction and peacebuilding. Rather, the resolution 
can be read in a way that affirms essentialist notions that including women will inevitably 
lead to peace, due to their inherently peaceful nature (Shepherd, 2008: 117-119). Importantly, 
SCR 1325 also fails to challenge some of the more entrenched, fundamental constructs linked 
to notions of masculinity, military/ised power, and gender inequalities that are tied up in the 
discourse of international peace and security institutions (Cohn, 2008: 197-198). Indeed, “the 
references to ‘gender’ in the international vocabulary of peace-building are almost invariably 
references to women, circumventing the more radical implications of the concept, which 
would draw attention to masculine identities that are implicated in conflict and peace­
building” (Chinkin and Charlesworth, 2006: 939). This links back to the assumptions of 
liberal feminism that focus more on adding women in to peace and security processes, as 
opposed to questioning the gendered structures and practices that underpin them.
Finally, by failing to mandate any specific accountability or monitoring mechanisms and 
without leading to increased resources and capacity within the UN agencies and national 
machineries of Member States, actual implementation of the resolution was going to be 
challenging from the outset. Although not unique to this Security Council Resolution, this 
lack of accountability risks rendering the resolution impotent to a considerable extent 
(Magwaza, 2003: 34-38).
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Another limitation in SCR 1325 is that it entirely excludes economic issues from 
consideration, the implications of which will be analysed in more detail in chapter 6.3. One of 
the reasons for this relates to the tension between the members of the Security Council and 
the General Assembly, where each body seeks to input into and decide on key issues of 
international interest. Traditionally, the latter has a remit over all UN issues with the 
exception of matters of international peace and security that fall under the mandate of the 
Security Council. However, the growing trend of the Security Council deliberating on 
thematic issues such as the protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, and women, 
peace and security, led to the question of what counts as a peace and security concern 
becoming somewhat blurred.
In 2000, as a Security Council resolution, many UN Member States did not believe that SCR 
1325 should address issues that would normally fall within the remit of the General 
Assembly. In particular, socioeconomic issues were perceived to fall more clearly under the 
mandate of the Economic and Social Council within the GA, and so were not seen as directly 
relevant to the issue of women, peace and security. As a result, compromises on scope were 
made during the drafting of the resolution. While the resolution covers other areas relevant to 
peacebuilding such as political and security reforms, the important area of economic 
development was therefore left out. The text of the resolution is what provides the mandate, 
or entry point, for working on women, peace and security issues, and as a result, much of the 
subsequent advocacy, research and programming linked to SCR 1325 has failed to prioritise 
economic issues.
Furthermore, there are many structural and cultural obstacles that exacerbate gender 
inequalities that would need to be addressed as part of the process of implementing SCR 
1325:
In other words, Resolution 1325, while emphasizing the significance of women’s 
participation in transition processes, does not address the root causes of their 
frequently lacking participation or structural problems such as the access of women to
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economic and financial resources and education [...] Additional strategies such as 
capacity building for women and long-term policies to counter cultural stereotypes 
and proactively implement affirmative action will be needed to effectively enable 
women to participate in the political, legislative, judicial, electoral, and economic 
reconstruction and reform processes of their countries (Binder, Lukas and Scbweiger, 
2008: 25).
In thinking about the limitations or omissions of SCR 1325 it is critical to remember just how 
significant it was to put issues relating to women’s rights and gender issues on the agenda of 
the Security Council. “Understanding this policy outcome requires analysis of political 
motivations, institutional structures, and discursive framings -  all the while being attentive to 
the serendipity of personal relationships, upon which much of this rests” (Cohn, 2008: 195). 
Despite the shortfalls, SCR 1325 did represent a turning point and created the space and the 
possibility to put women on the peace and security agenda of the UN. Somewhat ironically, it 
was in a sense the perception of women’s vulnerability and victimhood in relation to armed 
conflict that gave women agency at the UN, and enabled activists and advocates from within 
the UN system and member state governments to raise these issues up the agenda. While SCR 
1325 is broad and specifically includes issues relating to participation and empowerment, the 
victimhood and protection dimensions of the resolution have in some ways been easier to 
advance and indeed, these issues received the most priority in Member State statements 
during the initial open debate prior to the adoption of the resolution.
3.3 The emergence of the UN’s ‘gender and peacebuilding agenda’
Although SCR 1325 placed attention on women, peace and security issues and has led to 
some policy developments and rhetorical commitments by the UN and its entities, there has 
been little impact in terms of getting gender onto the mainstream peacebuilding agenda. 
Although in practice non-binding, the adoption of SCR 1325 provided the international 
community with a concrete framework that could be adapted and incorporated into existing
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peacebuilding policies and programs.50 Indeed, in response to SCR 1325 and the mobilisation 
of civil society surrounding it, the majority of donors have indicated support for the 
provisions within the resolution, and by now, gender equality has become a ‘cross-cutting’ 
issue within most of their peacebuilding policies.51 Each member of the international 
community, including bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental actors, has internalised 
and operationalised the gender agenda differently, although rhetorically, most tend to adopt 
the stance that the equal inclusion of women in existing peacebuilding processes is essential.
In addition to forming the basis of donor policies related to gender and peacebuilding, SCR 
1325 has also played an important role in awareness-raising, education, and advocacy, and 
has become the centre of a global civil society movement dedicated to promoting the 
inclusion of women in building peace around the world. For example, groups have emerged 
in countries such as Sweden, the UK and Canada with the central purpose of lobbying their 
governments to include women and/or gender issues in their peacebuilding and foreign policy 
agendas more broadly. These organisations also conduct research at the grassroots level to 
build up knowledge in the area of gender and peacebuilding and to provide national 
governments as well as multilateral and bilateral donors with proven strategies to improve 
their capacities in this field. More and more local and national NGOs in conflict-affected 
contexts are also using the Resolution in their advocacy and research. It is also an important 
part of the international legal framework that recognises the particular rights and protection 
needs of women and girls (Inglis et al. 2006). As such, it offers an important tool to persuade 
a range of actors such as the UN agencies, Member States, parties to armed conflict, NGOs, 
peacekeepers and others to place increased priority on the inclusion of gender issues within
50 SCR 1325 does not invoke Chapter VII of the UN charter which would make it binding and 
enforceable upon all member states, however the charter does require that Member States act in 
accordance with and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
51 This applies to both bilateral and multilateral donors. CIDA, USAID, UNHCR, UNDP, World Bank, 
and others all have either dedicated departments for gender and peacebuilding or at the very least, 
comprehensive policies outlining their commitment to including gender issues (often as a ‘priority 
issue’) in their peacebuilding programs.
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their policies and programs. This section will illustrate some of the changes that have been 
brought about as this gender and peacebuilding agenda has emerged during the 2000s.
3.3.1 Implementation o f SCR 132552
Following SCR 1325, the UN began, at least at a rhetorical level, to take issues of women, 
peace and security more seriously. As mentioned previously, the adoption of SCR 1325 led to 
a plethora of policy recommendations, research reports, conferences and other meetings, and 
networking between women’s organisations in the West and in conflict-affected countries. In 
2002, UNIFEM appointed two special representatives to conduct an in-depth assessment into 
women, peace and security issues. In carrying out this research, Their report, Women, War, 
Peace, covers various thematic issues linked to SCR 1325 such as violence against women, 
peace operations, and justice and accountability providing an overview of the key challenges 
and anecdotal evidence of the ways in which women around the world are affected (Rehn and 
Sirleaf, 2002).
SCR 1325 invited “the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict 
on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace 
processes and conflict resolution” (UN Security Council, 2000: para 16). To this end, Kofi 
Annan commissioned a study, Women, Peace and Security, which was published in 2002 and 
takes a similar thematic approach to the UNIFEM-led report, but with an emphasis on how 
the various agencies have integrated gender into the UN’s peacebuilding work (UN, 2002a). 
Both of these reports illustrate the breadth of gender and peacebuliding issues, as well as 
some of the challenges to ensuring that women benefit and engage in peacebuilding.
52 Whilst SCR 1325 remains the central and over-arching articulation of the women, peace and security 
agenda, the international community recently renewed its commitment to these issues with the adoption 
of three new Security Council resolutions: SCR 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009). Given that 
the time period o f this thesis is from 2002-2007, discussing the implications of these new resolutions is 
beyond the scope of this thesis but it is important to recognise that these resolutions, along with the 
upcoming 10th anniversary of SCR 1325 have provided new momentum to these issues.
84
Interestingly, both reports draw attention to the economic dimensions of reconstruction and 
the important roles that women play in the informal sector not just economically, but also 
politically. In reviewing the policies and progress that has been made since 2000, other than 
these early mentions very little attention has been given to economic issues, and indeed they 
are not even mentioned in the resolution itself. Similarly, the focus has been on bringing 
women into formal peacebuilding, rather than exploring how formal peacebuilding could be 
strengthened by bridging the gap and supporting the many informal peacebuilding activities 
that women are engaged in: “their skills and capacities, which have been almost totally 
neglected, are one of the greatest untapped resources for stabilizing and rebuilding 
community life” (Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002: 129). Again however, the important findings of 
these reports initially failed to have an impact on the UN’s broader peacebuilding policies.
Annual open debates in the Security Council during the last week of October have also been 
an important aspect of follow-up to SCR 1325. They have provided an opportunity for 
member states to articulate their commitments and progress made in supporting and 
implementing SCR 1325. The NGO Working Group has also taken advantage of the 
opportunity provided by the annual debates to sponsor women from conflict-affected contexts 
to travel to New York and address the Security Council.
However, despite the annual focus on SCR 1325 and the rhetorical commitments of the UN 
entities and its Member States, gender issues are not being mainstreamed within the broader 
ongoing work of the Security Council, although slowly some change is becoming evident. As 
an example, “from October 2000 to August 2008, 102 out of 309, or 33 percent, of country- 
specific Security Council resolutions include language on women and gender. The number of 
resolutions even mentioning women prior to 2000 is negligible” (N. Hudson, 2009). The 
emphasis placed on SCR 1325 at the UN during the ‘anniversary week’ in October of each 
year also risks marginalising the issue even further, and encourages UN entities and member 
states to only consider women, peace and security issues at this time instead of mainstreaming
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them within their work throughout the year. There is a tendency towards tokenism in the UN 
efforts to address SCR 1325, with systematic integration of gender issues in peacebuilding 
being cast aside in favour of once-a-year statements of commitment from the key actors that 
result in little structural changes.
In parallel to these debates, the NGO Working Group has continued to organise annual Arria 
Formula meetings with the support of UN Member States to inform the discussions in the 
formal session. These meetings are important in that they provide a link between 
policymakers and the field level. Whilst bringing local perspectives to headquarters is 
important in raising awareness about the reality of women’s experiences in conflict-affected 
regions the difficulty of turning this awareness into concrete action remains. Furthermore, the 
types of advocates invited to attend these sessions are often well-educated and elite-level 
within their countries and so cannot be assumed to represent the interests of all women in any 
case. Nevertheless, these statements have given civil society actors an opportunity to 
influence the key decision-makers in the Security Council, as well as to advance specific 
recommendations around women’s participation and agency and the need for significant and 
meaningful structural reform to address these issues at the UN.
Since 2000, the Security Council has also issued annual reports that provide an update to 
actions taken by the different agencies of the UN to implement the resolution. These reports 
highlight progress that has been made and ongoing gaps that remain in areas such as gender 
training, deployment of gender experts in peacekeeping missions, recruitment of women in 
peace operations and UN decision-making structures, supporting the participation of women 
in peace processes, and preventing and responding to SGBV. Most UN agencies also now 
have policy statements on women, peace and security issues, and several also have dedicated 
staff or focal points working on these issues.
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For example, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has been an important body in 
mobilising and coordinating actors around a peacebuilding framework for the countries on its 
agenda. There has been some success in getting gender on its agenda, including in its original 
mandate, which can be attributed to ongoing advocacy by women’s advocates and the fact 
that shortly after its establishment, a UNIFEM official was seconded to the Peacebuilding 
Support Office (PBSO).53 The integration of gender issues into early recovery and post- 
conflict reconstruction processes has been slow, but since 2008, the PBC and PBSO have 
played increasingly important roles in mobilizing support in this area. The role of the PBC in 
relation to gender and Sierra Leone will be returned to and discussed in more detail in chapter 
6.
Overall, the amount of resources allocated to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is still 
insufficient, reflecting the overall marginalisation of gender issues within the UN. Whilst 
there is more reporting, information-sharing and data available on women, peace and security 
issues than there was in 1999 prior to the adoption of SCR 1325, this is still not systematic. 
Between 1948 and 2008, only 17 women have ever held the position of Special Advisor to the 
Secretary-General. Despite various country-specific projects funded by UN agencies and the 
efforts of UNIFEM and OSAGI to spur action at the UN level, there is still no systematic 
monitoring of the implementation of SCR 1325. Women’s advocates have also repeatedly 
critiqued the lack of leadership and accountability within the UN system for implementation, 
citing it as one of the major obstacles to effective action on women, peace and security issues 
at the UN level (Beetham and Popovic, 2009).
Despite all of the policy guidelines, anecdotal evidence and rhetorical commitments 
indicating the centrality of gender equality to sustainable peacebuilding, the UN’s track 
record in actually integrating gender into its peacebuilding policies and programmes
53 For example, see Gina Torry, ed, Six Years On Report: SCR 1325 and the Peacebuilding 
Commission, New York: NGO Working Group, 2006.
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following the adoption of SCR 1325 is somewhat limited. However, from the section above, 
it is possible to identify the five key areas where change is evident. First, there has been a 
proliferation of policies, guidelines and checklists, strategic frameworks and action plans both 
at a UN-wide level, as well as in specific UN entities in Member States and NGOs. Second, 
structural changes are evident in the creation of gender units, focal points and task forces that 
theoretically provide a focus for gender-related activities and expertise.
Third, many UN entities at headquarters and in the field have contracted gender training for 
their staff, although not always with a peacebuilding focus. This training is intended to equip 
staff with the skills necessary to carry out gender analysis and apply it to all stages of 
programme design, implementation and monitoring. Fourth, there has been a proliferation of 
case studies and anecdotal evidence that seeks to demonstrate the critical role women play in 
supporting peacebuilding, the specific and different ways that men and women experience 
conflict, how and why women are marginalised from peacebuilding processes, and the 
potential costs of failing to integrate a gender perspective into these activities. Contributions 
to this research have come from the key UN stakeholders themselves in the form of annual 
reports and statements during the SCR 1325 annual debate, but mostly from academics and 
practitioners working in the field of gender and peacebuilding.
Finally, there has been a modest increase in the resources available to support women’s peace 
initiatives in conflict-affected contexts. Several governments, most notably the Norwegian, 
British, Danish and Swedish, actively support INGOs working in this area, but it still 
represents a small proportion of aid budgets, and gender issues are not necessarily integrated 
into the other security, governance and economic reform projects that these countries are 
supporting.
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3.3.2 Integrating gender and peacebuilding into the work o f DPKO, UNDP, UNIFEM 
and the World Bank
In response to SCR 1325 and the mobilisation of civil society surrounding it, the UN and the 
majority of donors have indicated support for the provisions within the resolution, and by 
now, gender equality has become a ‘cross-cutting’ issue within most of their peacebuilding 
policies.54 Each member of the international community, including bilateral, multilateral and 
non-governmental actors, have internalised and operationalised the gender agenda differently. 
However, rhetorically, most tend to adopt the stance that the equal inclusion of women in 
existing peacebuilding processes is essential, reflecting the liberal feminist bias that will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. Four international entities which are particularly 
relevant to the case study of Sierra Leone are the Department of Peackeeping Operations 
(DPKO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the associated United 
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the World Bank. These entities are 
also relevant to the liberal peacebuilding agenda, given the roles that they play in establishing 
security, governance and economic reform. This section will provide a brief overview of their 
efforts to incorporate gender issues into their structures and processes.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Of all the UN entities, DPKO has probably been the slowest to acknowledge the role of 
gender equality in its policies and practices (Olsson et al, 1999; International Alert, 2002). 
Peacekeeping is a central element of peacebuilding operations, although its security and 
military mandate is often (mistakenly) seen as separate to other political, social, and 
economic aspects of these interventions. This has allowed the UN to sideline gender issues in 
DPKO, arguing that they are irrelevant to its area of concern. As a result, women have been 
and continue to be under-represented in peacekeeping operations, and the gender-
54 This applies to both bilateral and multilateral donors. CIDA, USAID, UNHCR, UNDP, World Bank, 
and others all have either dedicated departments for gender and peacebuilding or at the very least, 
comprehensive policies outlining their commitment to including gender issues (often as a ‘priority 
issue’) in their peacebuilding programs.
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differentiated impact of peacekeeping and peacekeepers themselves on local communities and 
the potential contribution women can make to these processes were not recognised until the 
end of the 1990s.
Momentum was gained with the adoption of SCR 1325 which made explicit reference to “the 
urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations” and “the 
importance of the recommendation [...] for specialized training for all peacekeeping 
personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in 
conflict situations” (United Nations, 2000d). A senior gender advisor position within DPKO 
headquarters was finally established in 2004, after almost four years of trying to get the 
necessary funding. The position was however established at two ranks below the senior (D-l 
level) position that had actually been recommended, with obvious consequences for the 
perceived seniority and authority of the individual in the position.
Another sign of progress is that a number of ‘best practices’ documents have been released by 
DPKO and other actors, which offer detailed strategies for the successful mainstreaming of a 
gender perspective in all aspects of peacekeeping operations (DPKO, 2004).55 Analyses and 
studies of the gender approaches of various peace operations have also more recently been 
carried out. However, despite these seemingly positive measures, much discrimination against 
women remains and abuse of women’s rights during peacekeeping missions occurs all too 
frequently (Graybill, 2002).
In addition, the negligible amount of resources and authority given to the DPKO gender 
advisors severely limits their ability to implement extensive programs to address gender 
inequality, suggesting that the gender agenda has not been very thoroughly institutionalised 
within this agency. It is particularly problematic that gender advisors have few resources such
55 See DPKO, 2004; and the “Gender and Peacekeeping Training Course” designed by the British and 
Canadian governments, available at:
http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.org/references-contact-e.asp.
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as a designated budget, however small, or adequate staff to meet the demands of the workload 
implicit in being tasked with mainstreaming gender throughout a peacekeeping operation 
(Keaney-Mischel, 2006: 5).
However, DPKO appears to be currently hying to amend this situation by extensive research 
into training, removing barriers for more women to participate in peacekeeping missions, and 
analysing the interplay between gender issues and peacekeepers’ multiple tasks and 
responsibilities in post-conflict situations. In large part in response to the much-publicised 
scandals involving UN peacekeepers over the past decade, since the mid-2000s, DPKO has 
focused significant attention on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and the 
measures it has taken to address the issue. In reality, it is not clear that the resources accorded 
to dealing with SEA are proportional to the scale of the problem and may risk overshadowing 
the gender dimensions of DPKO’s work with other issues finding it difficult to get on the 
radar.
UNDP and UNIFEM
UNDP has a number of policies and frameworks that provide operational guidance for its 
peacebuilding work. UNDP explicitly links its approach to gender equality with rights-based 
approaches to development: “equality between women and men is just, fair and right. It is a 
worthy goal in and of itself, one that lies at the heart of human development and human rights 
[...] when development is not ‘en-gendered’ it is ‘en-dangered’” (UNDP, 2002b: 5). It also 
has the comparative advantage of being closely linked to the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which has a specific mandate to promote women's human 
rights, political participation and economic security through financial and technical 
assistance. Previous research has also shown UNDP to be more successful in mainstreaming a 
gender perspective in its activities, as compared to other agencies such as the World Bank 
(Razavi and Miller, 1995).
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UNDP was one of the first agencies to release a specific policy document outlining its gender 
agenda in post-conflict situations (UNDP, 2002a). It is a very operationally-focused 
document, with clear guidelines on how to conduct a gender analysis, use a gender checklist, 
and engender the project cycle. More recently, UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery (BCPR) launched a major review of its gender mainstreaming efforts, and in 2007 
developed its Eight Point Agenda: Practical, positive outcomes for girls and women in crisis, 
which sets out a comprehensive approach to responding to women and girls needs, and giving 
them a voice in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes.56 As part of this 
agenda, UNDP has committed human and financial resources to achieving its gender 
mainstreaming goals, although the extent to which this has trickled down to impact on the 
ground is negligible, as will be seen in chapters 5 and 6.
UNIFEM is a UN fund focused on women’s empowerment and gender equality, and was 
established in 1975 after the first World Conference on Women. It provides financial and 
technical assistance in four strategic areas: reducing feminised poverty, ending violence 
against women, reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS among women and girls, and achieving 
gender equality in governance, peace and security. It only works in developing countries, and 
despite its broad mandate, it has a tiny budget representing a fraction of the resources 
available to other UN agencies such as UNICEF (Hill, Cohn and Enloe 2004: 2). UNIFEM 
has, since 1999, been working increasingly on issues related to peace and security and now 
has programmes in several conflict-affected countries. Within its activities under the 
governance, peace and security programme UNIFEM focuses on using CEDAW as a basis for 
legislative reform, working with women’s organisations to increase their participation in 
governance, working to ensure that gender is mainstreamed in post-conflict reconstruction, 
and promoting gender justice. Of all the UN agencies, UNIFEM comes the closest to pushing 
beyond a liberal feminist approach to gender mainstreaming, but its impact is limited by the 
nature of the UN bureaucracy and its own marginal position in the UN architecture.
56 For more on UNDP’s Eight Point Agenda, see http://www.undp.org/cpr/we do/8 pa.shtml
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The World Bank
The World Bank has engaged for many years on gender and developm ent i issues, over time 
switching its rationalisation for addressing gender from the efficiency, welfare, equity, and, 
most recently, to the empowerment approach.57 The World Bank’s ‘gender £ agenda’ has been 
institutionalised in a series of operational policies (BP/OP 4.20) most ieccently updated in 
2003, and appears to demonstrate at least a surface commitment to mainstreaming gender 
issues within the broad range of Bank programming. The Bank also lHas a gender and 
development programme.
With respect to how the Bank has institutionalised the gender agenda in its operations in post- 
conflict contexts, what has been most noteworthy is the total absence of aany such process. 
The Bank’s gender mainstreaming policy fails to assess the consequents conflict has on 
gender relations and the situation of women especially, and all the rese r^cch done on post­
conflict operations draws attention to the fact that the needs of women i are never given 
adequate attention. An exception would be the volume published in 2004 Iby the Bank that 
focuses on the links between gender, conflict and development. While thte findings of the 
book confirm that “gender was an important missing dimension ahdl did not figure 
systematically in its conflict work [and]; conversely, rarely if at all did cPHiflict figure in the 
gender mainstreaming agenda” (Bouta, Frerks and Bannon, 2005: 7), it d<oes not appear to 
have led to any new policy commitments or significant reforms at the Banfc-
The few gender-related programs the Bank has implemented in post-cohflict settings have 
been specifically targeted at women, especially in the social sectors §utch as health and 
education, focusing on addressing their practical needs as opposed to theif Strategic interests. 
The bureaucracy of the Bank and its neoliberal approach to economic development and
57 For more detailed discussion of the Bank’s changing approach to gender during thje 1970s-1990s, see 
Buvinic, 1995 and Murphy, 1995.
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growth have made it resistant to mainstreaming efforts, and the perceived pressures of post­
conflict contexts have provided a justification for this resistance. The emerging rhetoric at the 
World Bank, therefore appears to be rarely implemented in practice (Zuckerman and 
Greenberg, 2004).
3.3.3 Civil society advocacy around SCR 1325
In addition to the developments at the UN entities during the 2000s, international NGOs such 
as International Alert began to generate large amounts of field-based research demonstrating 
the gender dimensions of various aspects of peacebuilding, as well as documenting and 
drawing attention to women’s voices and experiences in relation to peacebuilding (El-Bushra, 
2003; International Alert, 1999). In addition to supporting the work of many women’s 
organisations in conflict-affected regions, INGOs also provided policy advice, training and 
technical expertise to the UN agencies and other stakeholders (International Alert and Women 
Waging Peace, 2004).
For example, the UN office of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
(WILPF) established the PeaceWomen website as a resource for policymakers and 
practitioners, providing links, analysis and documentation on issues related to the 
implementation of SCR 1325 and gender and peacebuilding more broadly. Following the 
adoption of SCR 1325, the NGO Working Group consolidated its role as the key network of 
organisations working on these issues, and played an important role in providing expert 
advice and information to UN policymakers and acting as a ‘connector’, providing a channel 
through which women peacebuilders were able to access the UN and get their voices heard 
through initiatives such as the annual Arria formula meetings on SCR 1325 held in advance 
of the resolution’s anniversary on October 31st each year.
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Due to the adoption of SCR 1325, some national and regional networks and organisations 
based in conflict-affected regions were also able to gain profile and support for their work.58 
However, most of their efforts remain unacknowledged and their contributions to 
peacebuilding processes are below the radar of the international community. An invisible 
barrier exists between the political, security and socioeconomic reforms supported by the 
international community focusing on the public sphere, and the community-based efforts of 
women to provide physical and economic security to their families and to gain a voice and 
authority at all levels, enabling them to make decisions about their own lives.
Clearly, linking up with and building on the insights and activities of women peacebuilders at 
the community-level would strengthen peacebuilding efforts overall. However, until women 
are perceived as legitimate and valuable actors in the eyes of the UN and other peacebuilding 
actors it is unlikely that this gap between the formal and informal spheres of peacebuilding 
will be bridged. The problem with the conventional approach to peacebuilding is that it 
focuses on the formal level, and as a result “miss[es] the informal practices of mediation, 
advocacy, conflict management and reconciliation in which many women are involved 
informally” (Porter, 2007: 8). These issues will be returned to in more detail in chapter 7.
Porter takes the view that peacebuilding is a process, and much of that process occurs 
informally, in marketplaces, homes and local communities rather than in the corridors of high 
politics and the containers of a UN peacekeeping mission. She further argues that “while 
women are active peacebuilders, their contribution often is informal, behind-the-scenes, 
unpaid, collaborative and unrecognized as actual peacebuilding, and thus they consistently are 
excluded from formal peace negotiation processes and public, political decision-making” 
(2007: 5). However, there is the risk that while they undoubtedly are doing valuable and 
under-recognised work, the emphasis on women’s informal roles can be counter-productive in
58 For example, in 2003, the UN General Assembly awarded the Mano River Women’s Peace Network 
(Marwopnet) the UN Prize for Human Rights in recognition o f their work to support human rights and 
conflict resolution across the Mano River region.
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reinforcing perceptions that they belong in or are most suited to the informal sphere (Helms, 
2002; H. Hudson, 2009). One of the problems is “how to make the formal peace process 
benefit from the efforts of women at the informal grassroots level without the latter being 
subsumed by contestation at the elite level (H. Hudson, 2009: 294).
Having presented die evolution of the gender and peacebuilding agenda, largely embodied 
through actions around the implementation of SCR 1325, the final section of this chapter will 
now turn a more critical lens on this agenda. Through an analysis of how gender issues have 
been integrated into the three main pillars of the liberal peacebuilding consensus, it will cast 
light on the liberal feminist nature of these efforts.
3.4 A ‘liberal feminist consensus’ on gender and peacebuilding
As was argued in chapter 2.3, feminist approaches to conflict and peacebuilding are useful 
and can shed much light on the different impact that these processes have on men and 
women, as well as some of the reasons why there is often a failure to integrate gender. 
However, they fail to directly engage with the liberal peacebuilding critiques that explore 
very relevant issues such as tensions between local ownership and external, top-down 
approaches; the assumption of universally applicable Western ideal types; and the nature of 
the peace that is being built.
Given that the liberal peacebuilding consensus shapes the nature and practice of 
peacebuilding processes, it is important to understand the gendered nature of this consensus, 
as well as apply a feminist lens to it to better understand the power dynamics, assumptions 
and questions of legitimacy that influence the nature of the peace being built. By assessing 
each of the three liberal peacebuilding pillars (security, governance and economic reform) in 
turn, this final section of the chapter will argue that a liberal feminist agenda has emerged.
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Critiques that can be made of this approach resonate with many of the critiques of liberal 
peacebuilding that have already been highlighted in chapter 2.2.
3.4.1 Establishing security
Stability and security are particularly key issues in post-conflict contexts. Unlike traditional 
military conflicts, in cases where the UN deploys peacekeeping missions there is often little 
security to keep and violence may be ongoing on a large or small scale. Despite the rhetoric 
demonstrated in the many UN documents relating to peacebuilding, the reality in practice is 
that security is often understood as ‘negative peace’ as opposed to the more all-encompassing 
approach of human security. The concept of security sector reform (SSR) only began to enter 
peacebuilding discourse in the late 1990s, as donors had previously been reluctant to directly 
address issues of security in peacebuilding interventions.59 This shift to embracing SSR 
within the broader post-conflict peacebuilding agenda was based on a development rationale, 
as well as evidence of the very real social and political problems that ex-combatants and an 
unreformed security sector pose for a post-conflict country (Colletta, Kostner and 
Wiederhofer, 1996). The key multilateral actors implementing reforms in this sector are the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNDP and the Department for 
Disarmament Affairs (DDA).
SSR typically involves the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and the 
restructuring of the army and police forces. These reforms often occur in the context of the 
extreme militarisation of society, ongoing regional instability, and weak institutional capacity, 
which can further complicate efforts to secure post-conflict stability. Increasingly, justice 
sector reform is being linked with SSR, including a range of activities such as holding 
perpetrators accountable for past abuses, strengthening the rule of law, promote reconciliation
59 Donors had been involved in activities that are now considered part of SSR for several years, but 
mostly in an ad-hoc and non-institutionalised manner (Brzoska, 2003).
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and peacebuilding at the community and national levels, establishing an official truth about 
past events, and compensating and addressing the needs of victims.
DDR and SSR are two of the main strategies that the international community uses to re­
establish security and to create the space for and bolster parallel governance and economic 
reforms. Increasingly, justice reform is also seen as part of the SSR process, both in terms of 
transitional justice and legislative reforms as well as removing barriers to accessing justice. 
Gender inequalities can mediate access to security and justice, and in turn the processes of 
reforming the justice and security sectors can have significant gendered impacts (Barnes, 
2009a; Valasek, 2008). The main area where gender has been integrated into security reforms 
is through the creation of opportunities for women and girls to benefit from DDR processes 
and the recruitment and training of women to enter the police and the military. In both these 
cases, the emphasis is on bringing women into the existing structures.
Feminist critical security scholars question how security is defined, and draw attention to the 
multitude of gender-related insecurities that are frequently overlooked in the post-conflict 
phase (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004; H. Hudson, 2005), but few of these insights appear to 
have been integrated into the UN’s approach to security reform. Ongoing sexual violence is 
one issue that has received some attention (Kelly, 2000; Pillay, 2002; Sideris, 2002), but there 
are also other issues relating to security such as economic obstacles to accessing justice, the 
link between the proliferation of small arms and domestic violence, the lack of respect for 
human rights, and the balance between justice and reconciliation that merit, but rarely receive, 
attention in the post-conflict phase. As Kandiyoti argues, “gains achieved in women’s formal 
rights are condemned to remain dead letters in the absence of security and the rule of law” 
(2005: 22).
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3.4.2 Governance reform
The liberal peacebuilding consensus prioritises democratisation as one of the key processes 
through which peace can be rebuilt in a country that has experienced civil conflict. However, 
political and institutional reform is one of the most difficult and controversial of donor 
activities, as well as being the least measurable, due to the nature of reforms necessary and 
the length of time it takes for them to be consolidated. Institutional capacity in post-conflict 
countries is weak, and corruption, mismanagement, and undemocratic governance styles are 
often rife. In addition, governments are often unable or unwilling to deal with the frequent 
and widespread human rights abuses that occur during civil conflict.
Donor agendas for political and institutional reform are influenced by the principles of good 
governance and democratic values, and include activities such as capacity-building of 
governing institutions, support for post-conflict elections, human rights monitoring, and anti­
corruption training. The key multilateral donor agencies involved in these activities are the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), and the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA).
The international community has made token attempts to include women in peace 
negotiations, such as those held to discuss the Burundian peace process in Arusha in 2000, in 
an attempt to redress this balance.60 However, since women were only accepted as observers, 
and faced considerable resistance from other male delegates, it is questionable what the 
impact of such initiatives can be.61 In addition, these kinds of activities play little more than a 
symbolic role, demonstrating to the public the ‘dedication’ of donor agencies and 
governments to the goal of gender equality, without ever requiring any real commitments or 
compromises. Indeed, “despite solid arguments by feminist activists that sustainable peace
60 UNIFEM (2000) “Breakthrough for Women at Burundi Peace Negotiations”, Press release, June 27. 
Accessible at:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf70/4d4d3607bd05fdfacl25690d004364dc?QpenDocument.
61 Personal communication (November 2001) with Burundian refugee woman who attended the Arusha 
peace talks.
99
also requires more permanent transformation of social norms around violence, gender and 
power, this broader agenda has received little attention in intergovernmental forums and in 
most peace processes” (Baranyi, 2008: 11).
Women are frequently excluded from the formal political process in times of peace as well as 
during conflict. Recent research from UNIFEM (2009a) demonstrates that fewer than 1.2% of 
women are signatories of official peace negotiations, which has consequences for their future 
political participation as well as the terms of the peace agreements themselves. The reasons 
for this are many: women are often not perceived as ‘parties to the conflict’ or are not in 
positions of political leadership, their insights may not be seen as relevant to the brokering of 
the peace, and they may not have the skills or experience necessary for them to be seen as 
legitimate actors. They may also have difficulties in running for office during post-conflict 
elections, or in participating in elections as voters. Puechgirbal argues that there are many 
ongoing obstacles to the participation of women in peace processes and in the political space 
which is created, such as: lack of political strength and vision; lack of experience, exposure 
and skills in negotiation, advocacy and lobbying techniques; lack of visibility; lack of 
financial and material resources; their participation in politics is rarely sustainable; and, the 
modes of expression that women use reinforce gendered assumptions about what women 
should and should not do (2004: 58-9).
Whilst many civil society organisations are often run by women and they play an important 
role in forging reconciliation and peace at the community level, these roles often do not 
translate effectively into the formal sphere. Social norms and the predominant discourse on 
gender roles as well as the possibility of a ‘post-war backlash’ (Pankhurst, 2008a: 3-7) can 
also make it difficult for women to assume public roles during peacebuilding, even where 
governments have signed up to international commitments in this regard. Furthermore, 
women who are involved in politics and governance reform may not necessarily promote
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gender-sensitive reforms or may not be sensitive to the different needs of men and women in 
their constituencies.
Decentralisation, which involves the transfer of legal, administrative and political power 
from the centre to lower levels of government, is often portrayed as good for women. First, 
it is assumed that it will be easier for them to participate in government at the local rather 
than national level, and second, because they have a specific stake in local service delivery 
such as housing, primary schools and sanitation (Goetz, 2009a: 16). However, these local 
structures can replicate patterns of power and exclusion visible at the level of national 
government, and can therefore still marginalise women. International human rights and 
specifically rights for women may also be more difficult to advance at the local level where 
traditional and informal networks and alliances can influence the political process, further 
entrenching discrimination against women (Beall, 2008: 190-2). The issues that are 
prioritised in local governance may also fail to benefit men and women equally, for 
example if preference is given to rehabilitating road or rail infrastructures over the 
provision of health and education facilities.
In terms of integrating gender into governance reform, the international community has 
placed some attention on the need for more women to participate in the formal political 
spheres. The success of quotas in post-conflict countries such as Rwanda that now has the 
highest number of female parliamentarians in the world is testament to this fact. However, 
this again illustrates the liberal feminist trap of the gender and peacebuilding agenda, where 
the UN has focused on adding women in rather than questioning the underlying power 
dynamics that keep women out of the political sphere. Too little attention has been paid to 
transforming decision-making structures at the community and local levels, or ensuring that 
women’s needs and interests are being adequately met in terms of service delivery and the 
accountability of the government to its people.
101
3.4.3 Poverty reduction and economic reform
Given that it often focuses on the macroeconomic level, the liberal approach to market reform 
does not necessarily acknowledge the specific socioeconomic challenges facing the 
population in post-conflict countries, and these measures can at times exacerbate vulnerability 
and inequalities. Issues such as employment opportunities, land and property rights, and 
economic security are critical to the viability and sustainability of peace at the household and 
community level. Economic reform in post-conflict environments can incorporate a wide 
range of reforms such as community reintegration of ex-combatant and displaced populations, 
employment generation programmes, reform of public finances, natural resource 
management, private sector development and poverty reduction. It is questionable how much 
aid and the benefits of economic reform actually trickle down to the local population, as 
opposed to the elites who benefit from these processes (Pugh, 2005b). According to Rehn and 
Sirleaf, “aid for reconstruction has stuck to a rigid framework that requires public sector 
downsizing, reduced government and the expansion of a free-market economy. This has had 
negative effects on women and the entire peace process” (2002: 134).
There is an extensive literature on the links between gender equality and development 
(Boserup, 1970; Elson, 1991; Jackson and Pearson, 1998; Kabeer, 1994). These works 
demonstrate the clear connection between advancing women’s rights and a reduction in 
poverty and improved welfare of households and communities, as well as the empowerment 
of women themselves. Several critiques of the gendered impact of neoliberal macroeconomic 
reforms, particularly relating to structural adjustment policies and, more recently, PRSPs, 
have also been made. These critics argue that economic reforms inhibit efforts to achieve 
gender justice, and that the quest for economic efficiency can in fact work against women’s 
human rights (Zuckerman, 2002). Where women’s economic needs have been addressed, it 
tends to have been by including some women in microcredit initiatives or in training them in 
stereotypical trades such as weaving and soap-making. Again, the liberal feminist approach of
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giving women some limited access to economic opportunities without questioning the 
structures that continue to marginalise them is visible in the UN’s approach.
The feminisation of poverty and the economic vulnerability of female-headed households 
have also been widely acknowledged, although the linkages are still debated (Chant, 2008; 
Jackson, 1996; Pearson, 1978). However, in contrast to the literature on women’s political 
and social roles and needs, the gender-differentiated impact of socioeconomic reforms has 
received relatively little attention in the literature, and as has been argued earlier in this 
chapter, these issues have been largely absent from the development of the gender and 
peacebuilding agenda. “Peace agreements written or supervised by Western diplomats often 
bestow civil and political rights on African women, while failing to pay attention to their 
priorities, which would often rank social, economic and cultural rights before those civil and 
political rights” (Heidi Hudson, 2009: 297).
Kandiyoti questions what empowerment can mean in the context of neoliberal reforms that 
restrict access to basic services and social safety nets (2007: 191), drawing attention to the 
impact that socioeconomic insecurity can have on other aspects of political and social 
security. Given that the principles of the neoliberal economic agenda have largely been 
incorporated into the liberal peacebuilding consensus, it would therefore be expected that 
many of the same critiques would have been made of economic reforms in post-conflict 
countries. However, contrary to this assumption, in fact relatively little research has been 
done on the links between gender equality and economic reform and the differential impact of 
economic insecurity on men and women in post-conflict contexts or how economic issues are 
integrated into the international community’s gender and peacebuilding agenda.
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3.4.4 Explaining the emergence o f the liberal feminist approach to gender and 
peacebuilding
Before exploring how the liberal feminist approach to gender and peacebuilding has played 
out in the case study of Sierra Leone, it is important to consider why this particular way of 
addressing gender issues has emerged as the dominant discourse and practice at the UN. 
Firstly, despite the now significant numbers of women from developing countries who are 
mobilising around gender issues, particularly in relation to peace and security, the formative 
years of the gender agenda were clearly dominated by Western feminists and Western 
concepts. Dating back to the ‘first wave’ of feminist theory in the nineteenth century that 
focused on women’s suffrage and equality in education, until the beginning of the UN 
Decade, the dominant voices were those of Western women.62 As a result, the majority of the 
documents and policies that emerged during this period reflect Western notions of women, 
gender, and equality, often focusing on the rights of the individual and universalising the 
position of ‘woman’, relegating the experiences and insights of Southern women to the 
margins.
Eventually, concurrently with the attention the WID/GAD and women’s movement attracted 
to the plight of women in developing countries, critiques began to emerge that challenged the 
universal theorising that informed the early development of the gender agenda (Mohanty, 
Russo and Torres, 1991). Regardless, these new critiques were unable to exert much influence 
over international organisations that were characterised by male-dominated bureaucracies, 
neoliberal agendas, and constrained by the interests of the strong member states. As a result, 
in practice, these organisations adopted a form of ‘gender mainstreaming’ that was mostly 
focused on the need to remove barriers to women’s participation and often avoided the more 
difficult issue of transforming gendered power relations and structures. Thus, the dominance
62 For a good general overview of feminist thought see Tong, 1989.
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of Western actors and ideas in the process of creating a gender agenda seems to have created 
a predisposition for an integrationist, liberal feminist approach.
Second, although some policies (e.g. the Beijing Platform for Action) may appear to indicate 
a major commitment to the issue of gender equality, the political reality remains that this goal 
is subsidiary to many other key concerns of the international community. There is significant 
resistance to change within many of these organisations, and bureaucratic obstacles to gender 
equality remain an important factor with which to contend.63 In addition, even where gender 
issues have been taken on board, they have most often been phrased in a way that ensures 
their compatibility with the other key mandates or approaches of the organisations. For 
example, the first chapter of the World Bank’s 2002 strategy for gender mainstreaming begins 
with a chapter entitled ‘the business case for mainstreaming gender’, and describes “the 
evidence linking gender to poverty reduction and economic growth”, explicitly framing 
gender equality in the neo-liberal language of efficient economic growth that characterises 
this organisation (World Bank, 2002a). Thus, internal resistance coupled with the range of 
other priorities in international development limits the range of potential options for 
promoting gender equality. A liberal feminist approach often tends to dominate as the most 
viable strategy due to the fact that it does not present a major challenge to the status quo, and 
measures can be implemented ‘on the side’ or as token gestures that do not require any 
significant changes in structures or attitudes. The political nature of the issue of gender 
equality constrains the options that committed individuals both within and outside of these 
organisations have to press for change.64
63 The bureaucratic explanations for the gap between gender-related policy and practice have been 
discussed in detail elsewhere and remain outside the focus of this thesis. For example, Staudt, 1997; 
Goetz, 1997; Kabeer, 1994.
64 For a discussion of the roles o f insiders and outsiders in influencing the gender policies and 
programs of development institutions, and the obstacles they face in doing so, see Miller and Razavi, 
1998.
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Another reason for the predominance of the liberal feminist approach could be operational 
difficulties encountered in actually trying to implement a more transformative agenda. Gender 
units are usually under-resourced, under-funded, and are almost always marginalised within 
the structure of organisations. For example, only 0.07% of all the funds requested as part of 
the $1.7 billion UN-sponsored Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for 
Afghanistan in 2002 were earmarked for women-specific projects (Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002: 
129).65 With such limited, and project-cycle dependent, funding it is difficult to implement 
the long-term programs that are needed to address gender equality in a more fundamental 
manner, beyond measures such as increasing girls’ enrollment in school and increasing 
women’s access to non-traditional employment. This is despite the very prominent place that 
gender issues have assumed within the rhetoric of the international community during the 
reconstruction process. Furthermore, gender focal points (common within international 
organisations seeking to delegate the job of being ‘responsible’ for the promotion of gender 
equality) are often junior staff members with little influence or opportunity to challenge 
gendered practices. Other ‘on the ground’ problems in operationalising gender agendas 
include time pressures that make gender-sensitive participatory approaches difficult, cultural 
obstacles, and a limited knowledge of the gender context of any given situations amongst 
programme staff.
Critiques of liberal peacebuilding have been made which question who has the knowledge, 
legitimacy and ability to set the priorities and agenda of peacebuilding processes. Whilst these 
critiques tend to make the distinction between external and local actors, they assume a certain 
homogeneity among these groups, and tend to assume that the liberal peacebuilding process 
will impact on a community in the same way. Applying a feminist analysis can help to expose 
whose knowledge counts, who has access to and control over power within a society, and
65 Although it is recognised that other, non-women specific projects may have had positive effects on 
gender equality, this statistic is still indicative of the lack of priority that is accorded to these issues. 
Furthermore, although gender issues featured prominently in the discourse, it is unsurprising that this 
was not reflected in the practical reality.
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how men and women are differently affected and involved in processes of security, 
governance and economic reform. It is often the case that women are not perceived to be 
legitimate peacebuilding actors, and therefore end up marginalised from these processes 
despite the specific contributions they can make, and their right to benefit from the peace 
dividend.
This chapter has outlined the intersection of global-level changes that created the space and 
provided the momentum for the emergence of a gender agenda within the international 
community’s peacebuilding work. Using the case of Sierra Leone, the remainder of this thesis 
will argue that the gender and peacebuilding agenda has been shaped along the contours of a 
liberal feminist model, in much the same way that the UN’s peacebuilding efforts can be 
understood to be part of a liberal peacebuilding consensus. International organisations 
frequently make assumptions about the roles men and women play, or should play, in 
peacebuilding processes, which leads them to make program decisions that can have intended, 
or at times unintended, consequences on the gender order within post-conflict contexts.
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CHAPTER 4. THE GENDER DIMENSIONS OF THE 
CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the causes and consequences of the war in 
Sierra Leone, in particular the different impact that it had on men and women and the 
different ways in which they were drawn into the conflict and efforts to build peace. Gender 
inequalities have been characteristic of everyday life in Sierra Leone, and women have 
traditionally been marginalised from formal politics and economics. Linked to this gender 
inequality are endemic forms of discrimination and gender-based violence that pervade the 
lives of most women and girls and are particularly exacerbated by customary laws and 
traditions that give them few rights and little personal security. This chapter will present a 
brief overview of the causes and consequences of the conflict, with a specific focus on the 
gender dimensions and the important role that many women’s organisations, in particular the 
Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace, played in advocating for a peaceful end to the 
conflict and the resumption of democratic governance. It will also cover the immediate post­
war years and the arrival of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, before setting out some of the key 
themes and issues that will be addressed in chapters five to seven, tracing the evolution of the 
UN’s efforts to integrate gender into the peacebuilding process and contrasting this with the 
work being done by local women’s organisations.
4.1 Brief historical background to the conflict
According to Keen, civil conflict is often forced to fit into traditional models of warfare, 
involving two sides fighting each other. He criticises this model as being ‘old-fashioned’ and 
incapable of incorporating the ‘perverse and destructive nature’ of contemporary civil wars 
(Keen, 2005: 2). Indeed, much has been written on the so-called ‘new wars’ of the post-cold 
war years and the challenges they pose to existing frameworks of international relations and 
war (Berdal, 2003; Kaldor, 1999; Kalyvas, 2001; Duffield, 2001). The case of Sierra Leone
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would qualify as one of these conflicts; it broke out of the traditional boundaries given the 
extent of the war economy, regional instability, and sheer extent of brutality that were 
characteristic of the years from 1991 until almost a decade later. One of the first academic 
studies of the conflict was by Paul Richards (1996) in the mid-1990s, and since then, Sierra 
Leone has featured as an infamous case study in numerous volumes on failed states, rebel 
movements, and peacekeeping as well as being studied in more detail by those involved in 
and removed from the conflict. This section does not seek to reinvent the wheel by attempting 
to provide a more detailed account than already exists in those given by first-hand observers 
and regional specialists, but rather to merely give an overview of the key events to situate the 
subsequent case study chapters in context.66
During its colonial heyday, Sierra Leone was an African success story.67 Fourah Bay College, 
in Freetown, was the first university established south of the Sahara, and the country’s 
socioeconomic indicators were relatively healthy for the region. However, the historical 
legacy of this era was not benign. Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle argue that the instability in 
post-independence years was due, in part, to “the inherited disjuncture in state-society 
relations largely responsible for the woeful lack of legitimate, efficient, and well developed 
institutions that can transcend and weld together the parochial ethnoregional and class 
interests of Sierra Leone society” (1999: 75). Indeed, it is true that while colonisation had 
ensured a certain degree of institutionalisation of political structures, it contributed to the 
latent inequalities and rivalries that were simmering beneath the surface waiting to erupt. 
Some of the key divisions and tensions exacerbated during this period were between the Krio 
descendants in Freetown and indigenous groups in the rural provinces; the Mende/South and 
Temne/North division; the wealthy expatriate elite and the poverty-stricken indigenous 
population; and finally the urbanised, Westernised elite and the traditional chieftaincy
66 For detailed accounts of the origins of the conflict see Abdullah, ed. (2004); Gberie (2005); Richards 
(1996).
67 For useful studies of pre-colonial and colonial Sierra Leone see Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 
(1999); Koroma (1996).
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structures in the provinces (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, 1999: 76). Upon their departure 
from Sierra Leone in 1961, the British left behind a largely functioning multi-party system 
and decent infrastructure, but a society that was already fragmenting along ethnoregional 
lines.
In the immediate post-independence years, Sir Milton Margai and his Sierra Leone People’s 
Party (SLPP) came to power with the support of the country’s elite in 1961, and until his 
death in 1964 did little to erode the structures set up by the British. However, when power 
passed to his brother, Albert Margai, the era of patrimonialism began in earnest as he sought 
to benefit from corrupt policies and to cement ethnic divisions between his Mende supporters 
who benefited from SLPP rule and other groups such as the Temne and Limba in the north 
(Hirsch, 2001: 28). When Siaka Stevens emerged as a viable and ultimately successful 
challenger in the 1967 elections Margai tried to prevent Stevens from assuming power first 
through parliamentary means and then subsequently by endorsing a military coup.68 
Eventually, Stevens took over as prime minister in 1968 and the path to rapid and sustained 
decline was truly set in stone.
During Stevens’ rule (from 1968-1985) the inequalities and rivalries that were first stirred up 
by Margai were even further entrenched as a result of Stevens’ patrimonial political style that 
served to enrich him and his cronies at the expense of the state. Although impoverished, the 
Sierra Leone that Stevens inherited upon coming into power in 1968 was essentially a 
functioning state (Chege, 2002: 151). However, through policies of intimidation, corruption, 
mismanagement, self-interest, and greed he succeeded in eroding the ability of the state to 
perform its intended duties. Stevens, according to Chege, “[was c]onsumed with ambition and 
the desire to create a one-party state under his personal control, he gradually emasculated the 
once-vigorous parliament, finally banning opposition parties and dealing harshly with bona
68 See Koroma (1996) for a discussion of Margai’s attempts to subvert the democratic process and the 
coup staged by Brigadier David Lansana in 1967.
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fide political opponents” (Chege, 2002: 151-2). However, the international community 
adopted at best a tolerant approach to Stevens’ excesses, and at worst, a benevolent approach 
to his misrule. The international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors gave millions 
of dollars in loans to the government; money which subsequently ended up in the pockets of 
patrons and clients of the Stevens regime. The increasingly repressive rule and patronage 
networks within the country set the stage for the economic downturn and social crisis that 
ultimately paved the way to the RUF invasion of 1991.
Stevens selected Joseph Momoh as his successor in 1985, although despite his retirement he 
continued to hold influence over Sierra Leonean politics. Momoh proved to be a relatively 
ineffective leader and exacerbated the significant economic, social and political problems that 
were already beginning to confront the state by the early 1980s. The country was extremely 
indebted, corruption and graft were rife throughout the elite, the majority of the population 
was impoverished, unemployed, and increasingly discontented with self-interested rulers, and 
the funding supplied by the international community continued to line the leaders’ coffers.
Aside from the inappropriate domestic policies due to patrimonialism, the decline in overseas 
development assistance (ODA) and export value of minerals and agricultural products due to 
illegal mining, an overvalued currency, and the neglect of infrastructure and social welfare 
programs contributed to the dire situation facing the country (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon- 
Fyle, 1999: 92-94). There was another attempted coup in 1987, and the continuing economic 
decline and lack of political control meant that Momoh was unable to satisfy his patronage 
networks. These eventually began to break down as different groups started competing for 
power and exploiting the state to ensure their own survival (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, 
1999: 123-125).
Clearly, the high unemployment and lack of opportunities for (particularly male) youth 
provided a fertile breeding ground for disaffection. According to Abdullah and Muana, the
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‘lumpen youth’ began to form into groups in the years running up to independence, and 
although often uneducated and with little political consciousness they were soon manipulated. 
The ranks grew to include more politicised, middle-class urban youth who brought a certain 
social legitimacy to the previously marginalised group (Abdullah and Muana, 1998). The 
economic downturn of the 1980s exacerbated the problems of unemployment and under- 
funding of social services and fuelled calls for revolution amongst the youth. It is also 
important to note the particular divide that had been deepening between Freetown’s urban 
elite, and the majority rural population who suffered at the expense of the government’s over­
centralisation of the state in the capital. This lack of equity in resource allocation also 
contributed to the growing disconnect from and grievances against the state system (Alie, 
2000: 20).
The war in Liberia was from the very beginning entangled with the demise of Sierra Leone.69 
Taylor and Sankoh also had a common background, having both been trained by Qaddafi in 
Libya during the 1980s. Therefore, it was with the assistance of Charles Taylor’s National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), that the RUF invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia on 23 
March 1991, and seized control of numerous border towns in the Kailahun and Pujehun 
districts (Abdullah and Muana, 1998: 178). The strategy of the RUF was to infiltrate the 
border regions, whose residents were long-term opponents of the All People’s Congress 
(APC) regime in Freetown, to gamer support and build bases allowing for the extension of 
RUF advances further into Sierra Leonean territory, especially the areas around Bo and 
Kenema which were the main regional centres in the south and east.
Initially, the RUF numbered only about 100 fighters, composed of Sierra Leonean exiles and 
Burkinabe and Liberian mercenaries (Richards, 1996: 5).70 The government immediately
69 The regional context has been an important element in understanding both the conflict and the 
subsequent peacebuildng process.
70 Keen (2005) mentions that there is some discrepancy regarding the actual numbers o f RUF fighters 
at the outset of the conflict, but most estimates are between 100-300.
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launched a counter-attack and tried to present the rebellion as Liberian-led to detract attention 
away from Sankoh and his possible threat to Momoh’s regime. However, the heavily armed 
RUF fighters, who by this point numbered closer to 300, had captured most of Kailahun 
province in the eastern part of the country within a month, and could no longer be ignored 
(Gberie, 2005: 59-60).
As of July 1991 the APC government began to attack the RUF bases, with a combination of 
army regulars, Liberian refugees (who were anti-NPFL and some of whom had experience 
fighting in Liberia), Nigerian troops supporting the ECOMOG mission in Liberia, and 
disaffected youth who either wanted revenge against the RUF or joined the military due to 
lack of other educational or social opportunities (Abdullah and Muana, 1998: 180). In 
addition, due to the defence pact that the country had with Guinea, extra troops were available 
for the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) from this country as well. The SLA itself did not have a 
great deal of legitimacy, and was seen by the population as a tool of colonial repression, 
known for its brutality as much as anything else. Facing pressure from the RUF insurgency, 
the ranks of the army grew, but the mainly uneducated and undisciplined youth that took up 
arms to defend the state did not do much to improve the record of the SLA (Gberie, 2005: 40 
and 64). Although neither side had particularly strong military training, the bush warfare was 
particularly suited to the RUF’s style of operations and it was able to make gains due to its 
fighters’ knowledge of the area.71
In April 1992 there was a coup by young military officers that began as a revolt over pay and 
conditions of those fighting the RUF in the front lines but turned into a more general call for 
total revolution and overhaul of the political and economic system. The coup brought into 
power Captain Valentine Strasser to replace Momoh as leader under the name of the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC); he became the youngest-ever state leader at the age of
71 See especially Richards (1996) for a discussion of the role of the bush in sustaining the RUF’s 
insurgency in Sierra Leone.
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only twenty-six. Strasser had previously served with the ECOMOG force in Liberia, but had
little political experience or ability to prepare him for the task of ruling a country in the midst
of a rebel insurgence (Richards, 1996: 9). Although the coup was widely supported by
(especially urban) youth throughout Sierra Leone, Strasser, who was a Krio, concentrated on
issues affecting the capital and on reconstructing those elements of the state that were
‘visible’ to the donor community (Richards, 1996: 52). According to Gberie,
Strasser announced the junta’s aim to be a quick end to the war, rehabilitation of the 
battered country, and a return to civilian rule. In fact, his regime would see the war 
escalate beyond everyone’s comprehension, and the RUF grow from a marginal band 
of bush guerrillas dismissed by almost everybody as common bandits into a very 
destructive and indeed decisive force in the country (Gberie, 2005: 69).
Attempts were made for a ceasefire between the RUF and the NPRC, but this did not hold. 
The coup was problematic for the RUF given that the defining purpose of their struggle was 
to overthrow the corrupt APC government -  now that this had been done, albeit by 
disaffected SLA soldiers, one of their justifying reasons for the conflict had been removed. 
According to Gberie, RUF representatives rejected Strasser’s suggestion of unconditional 
surrender in return for amnesty on the basis that they believed the NPRC coup was successful 
in part because of the RUF struggle and its role in weakening the government, and they 
wanted a piece of the governmental pie in return (Gberie, 2005: 74). In the immediate 
aftermath of the coup the situation in Sierra Leone improved for many as artificial shortages 
of essential goods were ended, and the Strasser regime appeared at first to be a welcome 
change from the cronyism and incompetence of Momoh. However, this popular goodwill was 
squandered as the NPRC reneged on its promises to relieve the country of its poverty and 
corruption and the RUF continued to attack civilians throughout the country.
Despite suffering initial losses in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the NPRC coup, 
by late 1993 the RUF had managed to establish a network of bush camps and was launching a 
number of increasingly brutal attacks on civilian villages. Hirsch points out the irony that 
while the RUF declared a war against government officials and their business associates, the
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main victims were the rural peasantry who ultimately had little ability or opportunity to 
influence the leaders in Freetown (Hirsch, 2001: 31). The army and the RUF were also 
recruiting from the same groups of disadvantaged, dissatisfied youth, and ultimately it 
became difficult to differentiate between the sides as both terrorised civilians and exploited 
the spoils of war -  it is from this reality that the term ‘sobel’ became widely used.72 This 
period witnessed a mass exodus of civilians from war-affected areas, as entire towns and 
regions were razed and pillaged by the RUF, but also by the NPRC soldiers who wanted to 
preserve their own survival.
In early 1994 the tide seemed to be turning in the RUF’s favour, with foreign workers being 
evacuated in expectation of a rebel onslaught in Freetown, and Sierra Leoneans becoming 
increasingly discontented with the way that the NPRC rulers seemed to be prolonging the war 
for their own personal benefit (Abdullah and Muana, 1998: 184). The RUF had achieved their 
long-desired international attention through hostage-takings, and also served to emphasise the 
lack of control of the NPRC in the face of die ever-encroaching rebel threat. According to 
Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, the NPRC failed to defeat the RUF primarily as a result of 
military indiscipline, disloyalty, and insufficient resources (1999: 134).
Essentially, the Sierra Leonean state no longer had a monopoly over the use of force by the 
mid-1990s, and rebels, government soldiers, and mercenaries were all implicated in violence. 
Indeed, Keen has written extensively and persuasively of the collusion that existed between 
the various actors in the conflict (Keen, 2005). Strasser appealed to various international 
bodies to send mediators to assist in resolving the continuing crisis, and he also turned to 
Executive Outcomes (EO), a private South African military company to provide additional 
support. However, by the end of 1995 there was virtually no formal economic activity in
72 ‘Sobel’ is a short-hand term to describe the emergence of individuals who were ‘soldiers by day, 
rebels by night’, switching between the different sides of the conflict in order to maximise their 
personal gain and interests at the expense o f civilians.
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Sierra Leone and the country was in tatters with the state increasingly unable (and perhaps 
unwilling) to provide security and welfare to its people.
During this phase of the conflict, a fledging civil society movement began to take form and 
started to pressure Strasser to live up to his initial commitment to relinquish the NPRC’s 
power and turn the country over to civilian democratic rule. Women’s groups were at the 
forefront of this process and ultimately contributed to pushing for the decision to hold 
elections and work towards a ceasefire. However, despite this, civil society representatives 
were notably absent from the negotiations in Abidjan.73 In the run-up to the elections that 
were scheduled for the spring of 1996, Strasser was ousted in a peaceful internal coup by 
Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio.74
The weeks prior to the elections was also when the brutal strategy of amputating limbs was 
first systematically implemented in an attempt by the RUF to disrupt the polls. However, 
despite this and last minute attempts by Maada Bio to postpone them, the elections went 
ahead as planned. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a former UN employee and SLPP candidate won the 
elections and negotiations between the new government and the RUF continued. This 
culminated in Kabbah and Sankoh signing a peace agreement on 30 November 1996 in 
Abidjan.75 The growing success of EO and the other actors on the ground in terms of pushing 
back the RUF was largely responsible for their apparent willingness to negotiate. One of the 
RUF’s terms was that external actors, including the all-important EO, were required to leave 
Sierra Leone. Seemingly faced with few other options and under pressure from the 
international community who were underwriting the peace agreement, Kabbah eventually
73 FAS, 2000: 23. The peace talks held in Abidjan in 1996 brought together the leaders of the RUF and 
first the NPRC and then the newly-installed government of Ahmed Kabbah. Sponsored by the UN, 
ECOWAS and the OAU, the Abidjan Accords set out a process of political transition that would have 
seen the RUF transformed into a political party. The main provisions of the Accords were a ceasefire, 
DDR, an amnesty for the RUF and the withdrawal of all foreign forces (Gberie, 2005: 11-12; Hirsch, 
2001:54-55).
74 Strasser was ineligible to run as a candidate in the 1996 elections, and the coup occurred when he 
attempted to bend the rules enabling him to do so.
75 The accord can be viewed online at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidianaccord.html [accessed 
18/11/05].
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consented.76 This would turn out to be a major mistake with enduring consequences for the 
future trajectory of the conflict in Sierra Leone.
Ultimately the Abidjan Accords failed in all senses, most fundamentally in their inability to 
put a stop to the violence. Kabbah’s government believed that Sankoh was stalling on 
fulfilling his part of the agreement, in particular to support demobilisation.77 For the RUF, 
there was dissension in the ranks about whether or not to push for peace, and as a result the 
RUF leadership splintered. Not all members of the leadership were in favour of a negotiated 
settlement with the government, and finally at the beginning of 1997 Sankoh’s followers 
incarcerated some RUF officials accused of treason due to their attempt to appoint a new 
leader for the movement (Hirsch, 2001: 54). Sankoh, meanwhile, was arrested in Nigeria in 
March 1997 where he had allegedly travelled to negotiate an arms deal. He would not return 
to Freetown until July 1998.
Thus, by mid-1997, Kabbah’s government had succeeded in making some progress in 
combating the RUF largely through the efforts of the Civilian Defence Forces (CDF), but the 
departure of EO gave the rebels the time and space needed to regroup and re-arm.78 Gberie 
reports that Kabbah had begun rehabilitating the economy, with the country registering a 
positive growth rate of 6.4%, and the civilian population welcomed this respite (2005: 100).79 
However, at the same time, dissension within the SLA was growing as poorly-paid soldiers 
saw little improvement in their lot and fears about their future after the planned 
demobilisation grew. According to Keen, while donors had promised vast sums of
76 Another important condition of the peace agreement was that the RUF were to be given amnesty and 
no judicial action would be taken against them.
77 Hirsch reports that in December 1996, the SLA intercepted a radio message from Sankoh to his field 
commanders confirming that he had only chosen to enter negotiations because of the military pressure 
that the RUF was under at the time, and that he intended to purchase more arms and keep fighting. 
Sankoh was especially bitter that he was not given a role in the new government, despite having been 
promised the vice-presidency by the previous regime of Maada Bio (Hirsch, 2001: 54).
78 According to Abdullah and Muana, the two main decisive factors that sustained the attempts to ward 
off the RUF was the presence of Executive Outcomes (EO) in the country and the efforts o f the Civil 
Defense Forces, the ‘Kamajors’.
79 It is likely that that this growth rate can largely be attributed to donor-led post-conflict investment 
projects, as well as tighter regulation o f the diamond trade thereby increasing government revenues.
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reconstruction money to Sierra Leone, little of this seemed destined to off-set the social costs 
of military down-sizing, fanning soldiers’ fears about their post-war lives (Keen, 2005: 
198).80
Another simmering issue was that while in power (and even after he was ousted in the coup 
of May 1997), Kabbah had increased support for the Civilian Defence Force. Despite being 
the constitutionally recognised defenders of the state, the government did not believe in the 
loyalty of the military, and therefore gave more resources to the CDF who it was believed 
would ultimately be more effective in defeating the RUF.81 Kabbah had also selected Chief 
Hinga Norman, a Mende, to be his Deputy Defence Minister, which cemented the links 
between the government and the Kamajors. This caused further outrage amongst the already- 
troubled army, and observers believe this contributed to the decision of some members of the 
military to cooperate with the RUF in the AFRC junta that took power following the coup in 
1997 (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, 1999: 136-8; Gberie, 2005: 100-101).
On May 25th, 1997, a group of young army officers stormed Pademba Road Prison releasing, 
among others, Major Johnny Paul Koroma who was an ex-SLA officer imprisoned for his 
role in an attempted coup in 1996. While some members of the armed forces did have 
legitimate grievances, “the coup was particularly anti-state, driven by criminal impulses, 
wholly self-serving and predatory, and carried out by people who had no conception of 
governance, let alone aiming at it” (Gberie, 2005: 98). Indeed, for all observers and analysts 
of the Sierra Leonean conflict, this coup was a major turning-point. Not only did the newly 
formed regime of Koroma, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), have control of 
Freetown but the RUF was invited to join the junta.
80 This argument is also supported by Gberie (2005): 102-106.
81 It is also important to point out that the SLA was largely dominated by northerners who, following 
the lines of ethnic rivalry, were opposed to the prominent role being assumed by the Mende (and 
therefore southern) dominated CDF.
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President Kabbah was whisked away to Guinea and the (legitimate) government called on 
ECOWAS to reverse the coup. Since ECOMOG already had a base in the country from which 
it was running its peacekeeping mission in Liberia with mandate that included regional 
stability, ECOWAS, with the support of the United Nations Security Council, accepted this 
request for assistance. Foreigners were evacuated in a massive operation and several hundred 
thousand Sierra Leoneans went into exile as the rebels moved toward Freetown. Initial 
attempts at negotiation were made, but when these failed to bear fruit an ECOMOG military 
invasion became the only perceived option. The junta attracted many political opportunists 
who saw the coup as a chance to gain retribution for grievances against the Kabbah regime, 
despite the fact that the regime was not recognised by any government and did little other 
than plunder the state and terrorise the population (Hirsch, 2001: 62). The fact that Charles 
Taylor came into power in neighbouring Liberia was also an important boost for the 
illegitimate junta, but did little to give them a credible political agenda to rebuild the country 
and bring the war to an end.
The period of the AFRC/RUF junta rule from 1997-1999 was one of the most brutal times of 
the war. Despite this fact, the international community was slow to respond and Sierra 
Leone’s troubles were still seen as ‘marginal’ to the rest of the world. While the collaboration 
amongst these two groups -  former government soldiers on the one hand and the rebels with 
whom they were supposed to be fighting on the other -  appeared surprising to many, 
according to Keen it reflected a different reality of the conflict. Namely, that the Sierra Leone 
war did not fit into the ‘good side fighting bad side’ model previously expected. In fact, the 
rebels and some groups within the army had been covertly collaborating with each other for 
several years, and the junta simply provided an opportunity to make this public (Keen, 2005: 
193).
Civil society was largely unanimous in their resistance to the junta’s rule, which almost 
immediately carried out offensives against CDF-protected areas and adopted policies of
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harassment and abuse against any potential political opponents (Gberie, 2005: 109-111). 
Eventually, the junta was forced to sign the Conakry Peace Plan on October 23rd, 1997 due to 
sustained domestic civic and international pressure (Gberie, 2004: 162-163). Although it 
called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, it was never fully or successfully 
implemented.
Hirsch alleges that from early on there were fractures between the different elements of the 
AFRC/RUF junta. He suggests that Johnny Paul Koroma was keen to negotiate an end to their 
rule and the return of Kabbah’s exiled government, whereas other members were pushing for 
the reduction of Nigerian troops in the ECOMOG force and the return of Sankoh from exile 
so that he could assume the role of vice president which the junta had awarded him in 
absentia (Hirsch, 2001: 64-5). Furthermore, Keen also describes the tensions between the 
RUF and the AFRC over lucrative diamond mining revenues and the difficulty in taming the 
unemployed men who made up the rank and file of the AFRC/RUF alliance and were 
accustomed to a life of violence (Keen, 2005: 212-213). These rifts would eventually lead to 
the two groups fighting each other, with renegade soldiers and rebels all fighting for the same 
spoils and regional power.
During this time, the ECOMOG Nigerian-led force was ultimately unable to succeed in its 
peacekeeping mission.82 Lacking the resources, leadership and the logistical capabilities 
required to defeat the rebels, Kabbah tried to bolster ECOMOG through enlisting another 
private security company, Sandline International, this time with British connections. In July 
1998, Sankoh also made his long-awaited return to Freetown to stand trial for treason, and 
was eventually sentenced to death in October of that year. This raised the stakes and there 
was a renewed push for negotiations with the RUF who were still wreaking havoc upcountry,
82 According to Adebajo, Nigeria provided 80% of ECOMOG’s troops and 90% of the funding for its 
missions in Sierra Leone, therefore effectively determining the force’s policies (Adebajo, 2004: 170).
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while Kabbah, who had by now returned to a devastated Freetown, started the process of 
rebuilding the ravaged country.
However, when rebels invaded Freetown in January 1999, ECOMOG and the SLA again 
failed in their attempts to fend off the RUF through guerrilla tactics and a military stalemate 
resulted. The invasion, dubbed ‘Operation No Living Thing’, caused untold human suffering, 
and images of drug-crazed young rebels and ex-SLA soldiers looting and killing in the streets 
of the capital were relayed around the world. Significantly, the UN had still failed to provide 
the peacekeepers promised at Abidjan in 1996, and the major international response prior to 
the rebel onslaught in Freetown was to withdraw the staff from the country. Even the UN 
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), created in July 1998, pulled out a few days 
prior to the invasion in January 1999 (Keen, 2005: 225). In the end, political accommodation 
and the appeasement of local warlords at Lome was the only option for a war-weary 
population and an impotent leadership in exile (Adebajo, 2004: 168).
The Lome agreement was signed in May 1999, although at the outset was largely ignored. 
The merits of Lome were contested, with critics arguing that it gave too many concessions to 
a brutal, rebel force, rewarded violence with political power, and the amnesty it granted 
would enable the rebels to await ECOMOG’s expected exit from the country before staging 
another coup.83 The proponents, on the other hand, believed that negotiation was crucial in 
order to end the mass-scale civilian suffering caused by the war and that this priority was 
paramount. It also contained provisions for political reform and ideally would institutionalise 
a form of good governance in Sierra Leone that was designed to counter any continuing 
belligerent tendencies of the newly empowered rebel leaders (Cook, 2003: 23).
83 Another pressure placed on ECOMOG’s operations in Sierra Leone came with the sudden death of 
Nigerian President Abacha in June 1998. The new civilian government came under pressure to reduce 
the costly and ineffective ECOMOG operation, despite Kabbah’s pleas to remain.
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Another off-shoot of Lome was the creation of UNAMSIL, the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Mission in Sierra Leone, with the passing of Security Council Resolution 1270 on October 
22nd, 1999. Finally, restoration of the government of President Kabbah was a critical step 
forward in political terms. Despite the signing of Lome, fighting still continued sporadically 
between the RUF and the government-led forces, as well as ECOMOG and the new UN 
peacekeeping force. Furthermore, the rebels were making a resurgence in certain parts of the 
country, continuing to terrorise the population and take hostages from amongst the various 
groups fighting the conflict. This interrupted the process of disarming and demobilising the 
various combatants scattered around the country, and real progress was not really made until 
after the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Abuja in late 2000.
4.2 The gendered impact of the conflict: Legacies of violence and 
insecurity
Historically, rates of education and literacy in Sierra Leone have been very low amongst 
women, particularly in rural areas. Cultural traditions have also prevented women from taking 
on active roles in formal political and economic life, although there have been some 
exceptions (Campaign for Good Governance, n.d.: 200-1).84 The marginalisation of women 
also extends to the economic sphere, where women tend to carry out 60-80% of agricultural 
work but are often unable to retain control of the economic resources they generate within 
their households and communities (TRC, 2005: 108).
Problems of economic insecurity, unemployment, poverty, and a general lack of social, 
political and economic opportunities for the majority of the population are widespread in 
Sierra Leone and affect both women and men. However, because of the customary traditions 
and patriarchal social relations that are prevalent throughout the country, women face 
particular challenges in overcoming these obstacles. Access to land and property is critical to
84 Sierra Leone has witnessed some female paramount chiefs and Freetown had its first female mayor, 
Agatha Constance Cummings-John, from 1966-7 (Lamin, 2007: 115).
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building a sustainable livelihood, but discriminatory laws mean that women have had 
difficulty securing their rights to property and land, making them dependent on male family 
members or the discretion of community leaders. The knock-on effects of this mean that 
women may not be able to obtain credit or loans, or be able to cultivate food to feed their 
families and to sell for additional income. The protracted poverty in Sierra Leone has thus 
affected women and girls disproportionately, making them less able to escape exploitative 
relationships or to take advantage of training and educational opportunities.
The discriminatory context facing women in Sierra Leone was exacerbated by the conflict, 
when women had to deal with increased poverty, displacement, ongoing insecurity and the 
breakdown of social services. Given their roles as carers and providers of food for the family 
and their subordinate position in society, women were disproportionately affected by the 
conflict. The destruction of social networks and structures, the breaking up of families and 
communities, and the mass displacement of half of the population all resulted in the 
destabilisation of traditional value and cultural systems. Whilst this offers the opportunity to 
renegotiate traditionally held beliefs, it also potentially facilitates a culture of violence where 
there is little accountability and few inbuilt structures to regulate behaviour, since ties to 
family and community were so often broken. This section of the chapter will give a brief 
overview of the gendered impact of the conflict, focusing specifically on the consequences it 
had for women.
4.2.1 Sexual and gender-based violence
There is growing recognition of the myriad ways that women and girls were involved in the 
conflict in Sierra Leone; as cooks, porters, sex slaves, heads of households, combatants and 
income generators to name a few (TRC, 2005). Regardless of the different roles they played, 
women and girls from all parts of the country were subjected to extensive sexual violence
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throughout the duration of the conflict.85 Indeed, the war in Sierra Leone was characterised by 
extreme brutality, and it is widely estimated that up to 250,000 women and girls in Sierra 
Leone were victims of GBV during the ten-year war.86 Many of these women experienced 
multiple and gang rapes (Physicians for Human Rights, 2002: 2-4).
The report of the TRC finds that “all of the armed factions, in particular the RUF and the 
AFRC, embarked on a systematic and deliberate strategy to rape women and girls, especially 
those between 10-18 years of age, with the intention of sowing terror amongst the population, 
violating women and girls and breaking down every norm and custom of traditional society” 
(TRC, 2005: 162). Few women were able to protect themselves from these violations, but 
those affiliated with the fighting forces were sometimes able to use their position to gain a 
certain degree of security for themselves and other vulnerable people around them. Although 
estimates vary, according to one Sierra Leonean female activist, “all in all, 72 per cent of the 
country’s women have suffered human rights abuses” (Dyfan 2003: 3).
In addition to the evident physical and psychological effects on the individuals, the social 
impact of this sexual violence on both the victims and their communities has been equally 
damaging. Women in Sierra Leone have historically had little control over their sexuality, and 
a premium is placed on girls’ virginity which is perceived as ‘belonging’ to the family. When 
a woman is violated, particularly if she is virgin, it is not seen just as an individual act but as a 
violation of the male members of her community. The prevalence of rape and other sexual 
violations during the war were a direct challenge to many of the norms associated with 
virginity and women’s sexuality (TRC, 2005: 196-7). Much of the violence was carried out 
either in front of or by immediate family members, thereby undermining societal and familial
85 A report on the violations that occurred during the conflict found that “all o f the armed factions, in 
particular the RUF and the AFRC, embarked on a systematic and deliberate strategy to rape women 
and girls, especially those between 10-18 years of age, with the intention o f sowing terror amongst the 
population, violating women and girls and breaking down every norm and custom of traditional 
society” (TRC, 2005: 162).
86 For an overview of sexual violence during the war in Sierra Leone see Human Rights Watch, 2003; 
TRC, 2005.
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ties (TRC, 2005: 197).
Consequently, after the war many women faced stigma, ostracism and shame, and they were 
often rejected by their husbands for being raped or having been ‘rebel wives’. This stigma 
was particularly marked in cases where women were pregnant or had given birth to children 
borne from rape during the war. In some cases, the stigma experienced by women affected by 
gender-based violence has led them into prostitution as a means of survival, since there are 
few other options available for women considered to be ‘tarnished’ by sexual violence. In 
other cases, women simply chose to remain silent about the abuses they had endured.87
Despite the knowledge about the specific insecurities women were facing, the UN did little to 
address them. SCR 1270, while highlighting the specific protection needs of children and 
refugees makes no specific reference to the widespread and extreme sexual violence that 
women were being subjected to daily throughout the country. As will be seen in chapter 6.1, 
the failure to prevent and respond to sexual violence has continued in the post-conflict phase 
with consequences for the broader peacebuilding effort.
4.2.2 Women in decision-making and the legal system
Sierra Leone is a highly patriarchal society, where the institutional structures that currently 
exist discriminate against women. These institutionalised gender inequalities are exacerbated 
by discriminatory traditions and customs, and by the high levels of illiteracy and poverty 
amongst Sierra Leonean women that prevent them from upholding many of their 
internationally recognised rights. Their marginalisation from decision-making processes 
further limits their ability to redress these gender inequalities.
The legal environment in Sierra Leone is made particularly complex by the co-existence of
87 Personal interview with Viktoria Jarr, Caritas Makeni, 14 March 2006. Human Rights Watch, 2003: 
52-3; Physicians for Human Rights, 2002: 78-81. It is important to note that some boys and men were 
also victims of sexual violence during the conflict, and also faced extreme levels o f stigma.
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three different legal systems: general law, made up of statutory and codified law inherited 
from the era of British colonial rule; customary law, made up of unwritten traditional codes 
and practices; and Islamic law, where statutes related to marriage, divorce and inheritance law 
are differentiated from those within customary law. Customary law is protected in the 
Constitution and is defined as “the rules of law by which customs are applicable to particular 
communities in Sierra Leone” (HRW, 2003: 15). Because most of the population of Sierra 
Leone lives outside of the Western Area where Freetown is located, up to 85% of the 
population falls under the jurisdiction of local courts and the system of customary law.
Each system has specific implications for women’s rights, and the differing practices adopted 
by each can lead to confusion and the failure to provide protection. The result is that even 
though women have certain rights in Sierra Leone under general law, the majority of the 
population follows the practices of the customary system which can result in the 
predominance of discriminatory attitudes and behaviour. There is also a tendency for 
communities to resort to informal law, where decisions are made by the Chiefs or other 
traditional leaders rather than going through Local Court authorities who are mandated to 
adjudicate on matters of customary law. Discrimination and human rights abuses against 
women are even more pervasive in the informal legal sector (Amnesty International, 2006).
According to Amnesty International, “not only do Chiefs act outside their jurisdiction, at 
times they collude with men in the community to forcibly evict women and children from 
their homes or subject them to arbitrary detention and other forms of gender based violence” 
(Amnesty International, 2006: 1). Families often resort to the informal legal system due to 
ease of access, lower costs, and the traditional view that violence against women is something 
that occurs within the private sphere and should therefore be resolved informally.88
88 For an extensive analysis of the parallel systems of formal and customary law as well as the 
coexisting formal and informal structures see Amnesty International, 2006.
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Women themselves are also socialised into acceptance of harmful attitudes and practices, and 
are often unaware about their rights and how they can be protected. Many women indicate 
that physical violence perpetrated against them by their male partners is permissible, as they 
have been socialised to see this behaviour as acceptable and expected. Pursuing recourse 
against the perpetrators is rarely an option due to stigma, social pressure, expense, lack of 
awareness and generally prohibitive legal structures. As a result, few women have the ability 
to challenge the discrimination that they face on a daily basis. Changing these patriarchal 
attitudes is a gradual and long-term process, yet it should be a central element in any holistic 
strategy to ensure security for women and girls and the building of a broader peace in Sierra 
Leone.
4.2.3 Economic insecurity
Poverty in Sierra Leone is endemic and entrenched and affects all men and women, both 
young and old. During this research poverty was repeatedly identified by civil society 
organisations and donor agencies as one of the key issues impeding the consolidation of 
peace. The war exacerbated poverty, resulted in a halving of GDP per capita, displacement 
and physical injury leading to reduced productivity, widespread corruption, and the 
destruction of social, economic and political infrastructure (GoSL, 2005a: viii). The 2005 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) reports that approximately 3,360,000 people (70%) 
in Sierra Leone live in poverty, with 73% of this poverty being concentrated in the rural areas 
(GoSL, 2005a: 20). According to the PRSP profile, poverty is more marked amongst women, 
of whom 74% live on less than 50 cents a day, compared to only 54% of men. Women in 
Sierra Leone earn only 42% of male-eamed income (United Nations, 2003a). The resulting 
economic insecurity increases the overall vulnerability of women.
Sierra Leonean women have historically constituted the majority of the rural labour force, 
often as informal agricultural workers or petty traders. They have played a key role in food 
production and in providing basic goods for the family, but despite this, women are also
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frequently economically insecure (TRC, 2005: 100). The conflict, particularly the consequent 
widespread displacement, affected the division of labour within society with the result that 
women assumed new economic roles, in addition to their traditionally held domestic 
responsibilities. At the same time, the incidence of female-headed households and widows 
also increased in the aftermath of the conflict and women frequently had to take on the added 
economic burden of caring for extended families, making them more vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of resource scarcity. Furthermore, “the disproportionate spread and depth of 
poverty amongst women results from their long hours of work, lack of access to productive 
assets and the very low rate of financial returns of the income generating activities in which 
they engage” (LAWCLA, n.d.: 4).
Discriminatory laws and attitudes compound women’s low economic status and 
independence, and poor social indicators for women such as school enrolment and literacy 
rates. In cases where they are not the household head, women tend to have limited decision­
making power within the home, which can make them economically dependent and unable to 
control even the resources that they themselves contribute to the household. This lack of 
ownership of their own reproductive rights and productive assets further limits their capacity 
to combat poverty. While economic insecurity is experienced by both men and women in 
Sierra Leone, “gender based violence impairs women’s economic activities and income 
generating strategies in the formal and informal sectors [...] thus, gender-based violence 
intensifies the feminisation of poverty” (Funk, Lang and Osterhaus, 2005: 6).
4.3 The UN, gender and peacebuilding at the end of the conflict: 
1999-2001
The establishment of UNAMSIL in late 1999 was a belated attempt by the UN to provide the 
peacekeeping force that had been promised, but never delivered, in the Abidjan Accords of 
1996. Originally limited in size, it was given a broad mandate that ranged from facilitating the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to aiding the government with implementing the DDR
128
process.89 Nevertheless, the international peacekeeping force at first proved unable to dispel 
the rebels who were continuing to receive illegal financial and logistical support that filtered 
through the porous regional borders, and the security situation remained fragile.
The UN perceived the continued role of ECOMOG in providing security in the country as 
critical to the success of UNAMSIL, but following the sudden death of Nigerian president 
Abacha in June 1998 the subsequent civilian government came under pressure to reduce the 
costly and ineffective ECOMOG operation. According to Annan, given ECOMOG’s 
repatriation of its troops by the beginning of 2000, there was “no alternative to expanding 
UNAMSIL in order to keep the peace process in Sierra Leone on track” (United Nations, 
2000e: 6).90 In addition to an increase in size, UNAMSIL’s mandate was also significantly 
broadened, and major efforts were made by the international community to relieve the 
immediate suffering of the population. Nevertheless, gender-related insecurities and needs 
continued to be ignored by the peacekeeping mission.
In May 2000, the rebels were once again able to close in on Freetown, and UNAMSIL’s 
attempts to repel them proved futile as the RUF took approximately 500 peacekeepers 
hostage, and continued to terrorise humanitarian workers. In the end, British forces were sent 
in to evacuate foreigners and secure the airport, and were ultimately responsible for restoring 
security in the capital. It was only by the beginning of 2001 that the peacekeepers were able 
to deploy throughout the rebel-held parts of the country following the signing of the Abuja 
ceasefire agreement in November 2000. During its six-year presence in the country, 
UNAMSIL fulfilled a variety of crucial roles, and importantly was able to stabilise the 
security situation and support elections and the reintegration process in the country.91 “At its
89 United Nations (1999a) Security Council Resolution 1270. S/Res/1270.
http://daccessdds.un.Org/doc/UNDQC/GEN/N99/315/02/PDF/N9931502.pdf?QpenElement [accessed 
on 6/12/05].
90 The force was to be increased to 11,100.
91 For a good overview of UNAMSIL, see Olonisakin, 2008. UNAMSIL’s activities in Sierra Leone in 
relation to gender issues will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
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2002 peak, it was the largest and most expensive UN mission on the ground, with over 17,000 
troops and a large civilian staff, at a total cost of nearly US$700 million a year” (Olonisakin, 
2008: 111).
Several UN agencies were active in Sierra Leone prior to and during the onset of conflict in 
the 1990s. They had historically been engaged in development programming such as 
immunization programmes, technical support and infrastructure rehabilitation, but as the war 
progressed their programming shifted to emergency humanitarian assistance. Prior to 1999 
when the UN presence in the country began to increase markedly with the arrival of 
UNAMSIL, few gender-related or women-focused activities were being undertaken by the 
international community. According to the mission report of a UNHCR gender advisor 
deployed to Sierra Leone from January-July 2001, “there was no strongly established 
implementing partner focusing on gender-related activities [...] This limitation also worked to 
slow the level of responsiveness to some of the gender-related problems in the field” 
(Lamptey, n.d.: 5).
Disarmament was able to move forward in earnest following the signing of the Abuja II 
Ceasefire Agreement in May 2001, and over the next year approximately 72,000 ex­
combatants were disarmed. During this time, the RUF also transitioned into a political party. 
Given the destruction that the war wrought on the country, another immediate priority was to 
relieve the humanitarian suffering of the population. The annual Consolidated Appeals (CAP) 
Process, spearheaded by the UN, raised money to finance a wide array of socioeconomic and 
infrastructure recovery projects. For example, the 2000 CAP launched on 23rd November 
1999 appealed for $71 million from donors in support of humanitarian activities in the 
country. Priorities at this time were to address the needs of displaced people, provide an
130
alternate coping mechanism for the poorest people, and to provide immediate relief from 
illness and malnutrition.92
Gender issues were not at all mainstreamed in any of the CAPs from 1999-2001, and again, 
women were only mentioned in the context of being particularly vulnerable to the negative 
effects of conflict, such as food insecurity and sexual violence. Clearly, despite the 
proliferation of literature and lessons learned about the link between gender issues and 
humanitarian assistance, such understandings were not effectively institutionalised in donor 
policy and practice in Sierra Leone.
During this immediate post-war phase, the gender-differentiated socioeconomic needs of men 
and women should have been clearly acknowledged and addressed. One of the contributing 
factors to the war was the vast number of unemployed, impoverished male youth (Richards, 
2006: 206-210). The lack of viable alternatives made joining the army or one of the rebel 
forces an attractive option for these men, and therefore providing them with the ability to earn 
a livelihood needed to be a central part of any peacebuilding process (Weiss, 2005).
At the same time, the impact of years of conflict took a great toll on girls and women in terms 
of their health and education, requiring that special programs be targeted at them. These 
problems were both compounded by the huge number of displaced people, who did not have 
traditional social networks on which to rely and whose coping strategies were even more 
compromised. Most importantly, women should have been actively engaged in the 
humanitarian and immediate post-conflict planning, as well as the negotiations around the 
process. However, the early documents guiding the first years of the humanitarian and 
peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone do not demonstrate recognition of these issues.
92 UNOCHA (2000) Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone. Geneva: OCHA: 1. Available 
at: http://www.reliefweb.int/librarv/appeals/slemtOO.pdf [accessed on 17/12/05].
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Instead, during 1999-2001 as the peacebuilding process was beginning to get undervay 
despite the ongoing violence, a very liberal agenda became apparent. The initial focus on 
DDR, and the desire of the UN to begin setting the groundwork for governance reforms wd 
in particular post-conflict elections illustrates the types of actions familiar to the libtral 
peacebuilding consensus. Despite the massive socioeconomic challenges, the ongoing 
prevalence of GBV and the inequalities between populations living in rural and urban ar«as, 
none of these issues figured at the top of the UN’s agenda. While understandably ending the 
armed violence had to take priority, the focus on stabilisation and negative peace did little to 
create the space or conditions for anything other than a limited liberal peace to emerge 
(Taylor, 2009).
4.4 Women mobilising for peace in Sierra Leone
At the same time, and despite this entrenched discrimination, women in Sierra Leone have a 
history of involvement at the local levels within their communities and households, 
performing a range of economic, social, religious and political roles. They continued to 
assume these roles during the conflict, but the shift in the traditional gendered division of 
labour and patterns of gender relations during wartime blurred the lines between formal jnd 
informal, public and private. For example, many women assumed new roles such as being the 
sole family breadwinner, and had to develop mechanisms to cope without traditional 
networks and support structures as the conflict destabilised civilian life throughout the 
country. At the same time as it changed their daily lives, the war also offered opportunities for 
women to organise around shared issues, in particular to foster peace within their 
communities.
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As the previous section demonstrated, it can be argued that women were affected by the 
conflict in both empowering and in disempowering ways.93 Although the experience of 
women and girls as victims of sexual violence is the most documented of their war 
experiences, to see women only as victims is to ignore their role as agents in processes of • 
violent conflict and peacebuilding. In addition to, or perhaps in spite of, their vulnerability 
and insecurity, women played a key role in mobilising civil society to demand peace. Whilst 
women’s organisations have a long history in Sierra Leone, the conflict provided a unifying 
purpose and became a focal point for activism during the 1990s enabling many women’s 
groups to work collaboratively for the common goal of restoring peace to their communities.
Representatives from women’s organisations in Sierra Leone such as the Sierra Leone 
Women’s Forum (SLWF) attended meetings including the Fifth African Regional 
Consultation on Women in Dakar in 1994 and the Fourth World Conference on Women held 
in Beijing in 1995.94 Following these meetings, they returned to Sierra Leone and scaled up 
their networking, bringing together organisations working on issues as diverse as domestic 
violence, women’s access to decision-making, and education of the girl child. Given the 
continuing conflict in the country, they found a common thread in their activities based on the 
need for peace and security.
Following the beginning of the conflict, women became involved, intentionally as well as
unintentionally, in peacemaking efforts within their communities and at the national level.
According to Thorpe, “at the onset of war, women were indeed not prepared. At
organizational level they were nominally weak, and many organizations figuratively speaking
93 While this chapter frequently refers to ‘women in Sierra Leone’, it is important to note that this is not 
assumed to be a homogenous category, and each individual’s experience of their gender varies. Women 
are also differentiated by whether or not they remain behind or flee conflict, or are actively involved in 
combat, community-based peacebuilding, or any other activities. Other factors such as religion or their 
access to income also influence the hardship experienced by women during conflict, as well as their 
position in society and the opportunities that have been available to them since the end of the war.
The development of the SLWF was initiated by the Sierra Leone Association of University Women 
(SLAUW) who proposed that women’s groups in the country should meet regularly. It was established 
in mid-1994 and involved a range of different women’s organisations based in Freetown (Jusu-Sherrif, 
2000).
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were dormant. However the organizational potential was there awaiting the catalytic effect of 
the war” (Thorpe, 2006: 21).95 Although this activism in large part emerged due to the 
socioeconomic and security threats facing women at the time, it was also influenced by the 
growing momentum of the international women’s movement.
The Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement (SLWMP) was established in January 1995 as a 
member organisation of the SLWF, and was founded on the basis that women as ‘natural 
peacemakers’ could make a vital contribution to the peace process. The SLWMP sought to 
influence the parties to the conflict through non-conffontational strategies including protests, 
marches and demonstrations, such as those held in January 1995 in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, 
Makeni and Kabala involving women from throughout the country (Jusu-Sherrif, 2000; 
Steady, 2006: 43). The movement was non-partisan and initially shied away from direct 
involvement in politics, but in order for the women’s peace campaign to have an impact it 
became clear that engagement with the political establishment in Sierra Leone would be 
necessary. As the conflict in Sierra Leone became more protracted and neither side seemed 
likely to achieve an outright victory, the SLWMP subsequently became involved in actively 
calling for and participating in national consultations around the issue of elections.
Women activists played key roles during Bintumani I and II, as the public consultations that 
took place in 1995 and 1996 on elections came to be known, and are largely considered to 
have been leaders of the civil society movement calling for “elections before peace” (Hirsch, 
2001: 40-41). These conferences represented the beginning of women’s participation in 
national politics through organised groups, and as well as leading the public campaigning on 
the issue, they also advocated in their communities for women to participate in the elections 
of March 1996 (Thorpe, 2006: 40). Their actions had important knock-on effects that may not
95 Thorpe reports (2006: 77) that prior to 1990 there were only ten NGOs headed by women throughout 
the entire country, but that after the war more than 100 organisations run by women have been 
established.
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have been planned at the time but that contributed to the strengthening of women’s
peacebuilding roles at the national and local level:
Women NGOs conducted a door to door campaign, ignoring threats to their security, 
to persuade other women to vote. Apart from directly influencing the outcome of the 
elections, their political action also generated a sense of solidarity among women, 
who were encouraged to organize themselves on a number of conflict prevention 
issues relating to social justice, economic and cultural development (Nzomo, 2002: 
11).
In addition to their role in publicly campaigning for elections, delegations of women also 
sought to meet with the rebels to convince them to lay down their arms, although they were 
not always successful.96 The catalytic effect of their participation in the Bintumani 
negotiations also led women to call on leaders to address issues such as 30% representation 
for women in politics, improved literacy, health care and business training for women, and 
reform of discriminatory legislation on marriage and divorce, property and inheritance (Dyfan 
2003: 4). Women’s organisations used a variety of different strategies such as private 
lobbying with key community leaders, sending messages of peace and reconciliation through 
the media to both government and rebel fighters, rallying support amongst other civil society 
organisations, and public advocacy for peace (Solomon, 2005: 175).
The SLWMP was extremely active during the middle of the war, but eventually disintegrated 
as a result of internal conflict and as many of the organisation’s key members fled the country 
following the coup of May 1997.97 However, by continuing to use the strategies pioneered by 
the SLWMP, many Sierra Leonean women played a critical role in the process of bringing the 
conflict to an end. The achievements of these women leaders reflects their ability to influence 
and play an active role in peacebuilding, despite the notable exclusion of women from the 
country’s previous formal peace processes in Abidjan (1996) and Conakry (1997).98
96 In one particularly bad incident, a group of women were gunned down in Kenema when they tried to 
approach rebel bases, killing several activists. Personal interview with Gladys Gbappy-Brima, 
Freetown, 26 June 2006.
97 International Alert and AAWORD, 2000; Jusu-Sherrif, 2000.
98 To view the texts of the various peace agreements, see http://www.daco- 
sl.org/encvclopedia/8 lib/8 3Agov.htm.
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Indeed, a clear impact of these achievements was that for the first time, during the discussions 
and negotiations leading up to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement some women were 
invited to be present." It has been suggested that their presence resulted in some attention to 
women’s issues reflected in Article 28 of the Agreement which states, “given that women 
have been particularly victimised during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their 
needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction 
and development programmes to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and 
physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone.”100
However, this commitment was never really fulfilled, and more crucially it failed to mention 
the potential of women to play political and economic roles in post-conflict Sierra Leone. 
Involving women and ensuring gender issues are incorporated into peace negotiations is key, 
given that the ensuing peace agreements are the basis for the future legal framework and the 
foundation of legitimacy for reforms in the post-conflict phase (Chinkin, 2004: 28). If gender 
issues are left out, then ensuring their inclusion at a later date can prove to be extremely 
difficult. The lack of any gender-specific recommendations in the context of the structure and 
mandates of post-conflict institutions is also problematic, as the legacies of these institutions 
will continue for many years (Dyfan 2003: 6).
Despite the signing of Lome, fighting in Sierra Leone continued, and many people were 
disillusioned with the government roles that were granted to members of the RUF during the 
negotiations, particularly in the case of Foday Sankoh who was appointed as vice president
99 There is some discrepancy in accounts of the Lome negotiations regarding the number o f women 
present. According to a report by Femmes Africa Solidarity, four of the nine key negotiatiors at Lome 
were women (Femmes Africa Solidarity, 2000: 23-4). However, the TRC reports that only two women 
were involved in Lomy, and one was an OAU representative and not Sierra Leonean (TRC, 2005: 194), 
whereas Mazurana and Carlson indicate that two women were present, one as part o f the government 
delegation and another as an RUF representative (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:16). Isha Dyfan reports 
that of the government delegation of 10 people, two were women, and that the rebel delegation of 10 
included one woman. Furthermore, some women participated in the civil society observer groups that 
were also present during the negotiations (Dyfan 2003: 5).
100 The Lomy Peace Agreement can be viewed online at http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.
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and minister in charge of natural resources. The situation for the majority of the population 
was not improving, and women were again at the forefront of calls for peace and 
reconciliation.
On 6 May 2000, the SLWF mobilised women to march on Foday Sankoh’s house in Freetown 
to demand an end to the fighting and the release of UN staff who had recently been taken 
hostage by the RUF. Although Sankoh refused to see the women, they continued up towards 
the junction near his house on Lumley Road and a representative from the Sierra Leone 
branch of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom read aloud a statement 
prepared by the SLWF.101 Following the abuse and derision they experienced from Sankoh’s 
guards and the refusal of the leader to meet them, a group of older women in the delegation 
representing churches and mosques took a radical step: the women lifted up their skirts and 
bared themselves. According to the beliefs and traditions in the region, in committing this act 
they put a serious curse on Sankoh and his compatriots, which the community at large then 
had an obligation to uphold.102
Seeing that women could face up to the political issues and a feared rebel leader, other 
members of civil society were galvanised to take action to resist the violence and terror. On 8 
May, a second, larger march involving thousands was held. This demonstration was not 
carried out peacefully, and at least 20 demonstrators were killed outside Sankoh’s residence 
by RUF fighters. Despite this tragic turn of events, the protests sparked by the women’s 
actions were important in bringing about the subsequent arrest of Sankoh and other RUF 
leaders, and ultimately were one of the factors that contributed to tipping the balance towards 
an eventual durable peace agreement in the country.103 In April 2001, many Sierra Leonean
101 Personal interview with Lucinda Asmara, Freetown, 20 June 2006.
102 For an account o f this incident, see Mazurana and Carlson, 2004:17.
103 Although Sankoh fled from his house following the shootings of innocent civilians, he was 
subsequently captured and arrested by British troops on 13 May 2000.
137
women also participated in a march for peace in Freetown, initiated by UNAMSIL and Sierra 
Leonean civil society organisations (Puechgirbal, 2004: 57).
Illustrating the importance of the civil society networks of women peacebuilders, from 1997- 
1999, Sierra Leonean women were able to provide updates and briefings on the situation of 
women affected by the conflict to members of the UN Security Council through contacts at 
the UN office of WILPF (Dyfan 2003: 4). This was also in part enabled by the connections 
Sierra Leonean women had with international civil society. Their activism and advocacy was 
also strengthened by the sub-regional women’s peace networks of WIPNET104 and 
MARWOPNET, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network. The Commonwealth Secretariat 
supported a workshop held in May 2001 on “Women and men in partnership for post conflict 
reconstruction”. This workshop provided an opportunity for key stakeholders and priorities to 
be mapped out, major gaps identified, and a plan of action on how different actors, 
particularly the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children’s Affairs (MSWGCA) 
could ensure that gender issues were properly integrated into the post-conflict reconstruction 
process (Dyfan 2003: ll) .105
The case of women’s organisations in Sierra Leone is indicative of how women in conflict- 
affected regions actively build peace at the community level outside of ‘formal’ 
peacebuilding or conflict resolution structures. Notably, in Sierra Leone, women were also 
doing this long before the UN began to develop its women, peace and security agenda. The 
conflict was a catalytic experience in many ways, exposing women to new responsibilities 
and requiring them to acquire new skills that changed their perceptions of themselves and 
their role as women in society. As Thorpe puts it, “the survival skills and sense of 
responsibility consequently developed during the process provided these women with basic
104 WIPNET, the women in peacebuilding network, is a sub-regional project that was initiated by the 
West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in 2002. See www.wanep.org.
105 For copies of the conference papers as well as the main outcomes and recommendations, see Baksh- 
Soodeen and Etchart, 2002.
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developmental tools, a sense of independence, and the desire for social advancement on their 
return to their areas of origin after the war” (Thorpe, 2006: 36).
4.5 Gender, peacebuilding and the UN in Sierra Leone: Key themes
Whilst the liberal peacebuilding consensus as applied in Sierra Leone and elsewhere has been 
subject to much criticism, little of this has focused on the gendered impacts of these 
processes. The following case study chapters will therefore shed light on the way in which 
gender has, or has not, been mainstreamed into the UN’s peacebuilding efforts in Sierra 
Leone , and with what consequences for the overall peacebuilding process. Before turning to 
the next chapters, it is useful to summarise three of the key themes that have emerged from 
the preceding analysis and will be discussed in more detail throughout the remainder of this 
thesis.
First, the UN has articulated and developed a specific idea of how to build peace and create 
the conditions for a return to normal life and sustainable development based on liberal 
assumptions (UN 2000c; 2004a; 2005a). As demonstrated by chapters 2 and 3, this consensus 
has emerged with little concern for gender dynamics or the different roles that men and 
women can play in these processes, despite the importance of recognising how individuals 
experience security and peace at the community levels. Globally, levels of violence against 
women are extremely high, and in conflict-affected contexts it is endemic. To assume that a 
culture of peace can coexist with the daily gendered insecurities and threats that women 
experience is problematic. By unpacking the policies of the UN in relation to peacebuilding in 
Sierra Leone it will be possible to see what issues are prioritised and valued in relation to the 
peacebuilding process, and therefore how peace and security are conceptualised by these 
actors.
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Second, there are a number of challenges that emerge as a result of the implementation of the
peacebuilding programmes in the areas of security, governance and economic reform. It is not
clear that these processes result in anything other than a ‘gendered virtual peace’. Gender
issues tend to be marginalised from the implementation of peacebuilding, and issues of
immediate stability can dominate broader concerns of societal transformation, preventing the
gains from peace reaching the population as a whole. As Pankhurst argues,
Actors in the ‘international peace industry’ have no common agenda of what post- 
conflict societies should be transformed to, and many have no agenda to support 
transformation at all, because hanging on to conditions of negative peace dominates 
all other agendas. In this context, different discourses and values, shaped locally and 
internationally, tend to collide, rather than interact; to co-exist, rather than transform. 
For the moment at least, it is unclear what major policy shifts might be possible in 
this area in the foreseeable future, even if we regard the ultimate transformation of 
gender relations as inevitable (Pankhurst, 2002: 134).
Finally, the very legitimacy of the liberal peacebuilding consensus itself has been questioned 
for failing to prioritise local ownership and bottom-up approaches. Inclusive approaches are 
more likely to be sustainable, but for a variety of reasons highlighted in chapter 2, too often 
the agenda is defined and carried out by donors, and peacebuilding programmes tend to focus 
on the formal, state level. Without more explicit acknowledgement of local initiatives, the 
divide between UN-led, formal peacebuilding processes may undermine or marginalise the 
informal strategies being adopted and the space for a real peace to be fostered.
In Sierra Leone, civil society organisations and women’s networks in particular played a 
central role in ending the conflict, largely without the support of the international community. 
It is therefore important to explore how the UN has subsequently built on or engaged with 
these groups as a resource for the transformation towards peace, and what alternative 
understandings of peacebuilding they brought.
Although the liberal peacebuilding approach has emerged as the consensus, the considerable 
insight and context-specific knowledge of women’s organisations operating in Sierra Leone 
could shed light on the gaps and limitations of these approaches. Women’s organisations at
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the community-level offer an important alternative to the dominant discourses and practices 
of peacebuilding and gender mainstreaming and thereby bring the possibility for more 
engendered peace and security processes. Bridging this gap between the formal and informal, 
the international and the local, may represent the real challenge in transforming the liberal 
peacebuilding consensus into an approach that is more gender-sensitive.
This chapter has outlined the development of the conflict in Sierra Leone, its gendered 
consequences and the important role that women played in ending the fighting. The next three 
chapters of the thesis will build on this and discuss the evolution of the peacebuilding process 
in Sierra Leone in three parts, building on the three themes highlighted above.
Chapter 5 will present an overview and analysis of the main peacebuilding frameworks of the 
UN and the structures and mandates of the key agencies operational on the ground, to 
determine the extent to which gender was integrated into their structures and policies. As has 
already been argued in chapter 2.2, the UN has a specific way of defining and constructing 
peace based on the idea of it as a universal, liberal end-state. It will therefore conclude with a 
critique of both the liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminist underpinnings of the UN’s 
discourse around peace in Sierra Leone. Chapter 5 will focus on the first theme relating to 
how peace is defined and which issues are prioritised in the process.
Chapter 6 will then turn to the implementation of peacebuilding activities within the three 
central pillars of establishing security, good governance and economic reform. As the main 
priorities of the liberal peacebuilding approach, this chapter will analyse how the UN carried 
out its reforms in these areas to determine the different impacts they have had on men and 
women in Sierra Leone. This chapter will also critique the liberal feminist approach the UN 
has taken to gender and peacebuilding, arguing that this can explain some of its inherent 
limitations. Chapter 6 elaborates specifically on the idea of the gendered virtual peace, linked 
to the second theme described above.
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Finally, linked to the last key theme identified in this section, chapter 7 will turn to the local 
level and explore what alternative, informal peacebuilding efforts have been undertaken by 
women’s organisations in Sierra Leone. It will provide examples of organisations working on 
gender and peace-related issues at the local, national and regional levels and explore what can 
be learned from their activities. The purpose of this chapter is to contrast the UN-led, liberal 
approaches to both gender mainstreaming and peacebuilding with the alternative strategies 
and approaches used by local actors, largely marginalised into the informal sphere. In so 
doing, possible openings for moving towards a more emancipatory version of peacebuilding 
may become evident.
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CHAPTER 5. THE UN AND GENDER 
MAINSTREAMING IN SIERRA LEONE: POLICY 
DISCOURSES AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES
As already outlined in earlier chapters, one of the major critiques of the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus has been the way in which problematic concepts such as peace and security are 
understood and framed. This has particular implications for gender-sensitive efforts, in terms 
of how the role of women and gender equality are incorporated into policy and framed 
discursively in the post-conflict environment. Furthermore, the liberal feminist approach to 
mainstreaming gender into the peacebuilding process adopted by the UN leads to a tendency 
to highlight the importance of addressing women’s participation and ensuring that they are 
integrated into processes such as DDR and post-conflict elections. Much of this is done 
without questioning the gendered structures and multiple and complex roles that they play in 
post-conflict societies. As result the full opportunities for transforming gender inequalities in 
the post-conflict space are not always realised.
The UN is one of the key actors shaping and implementing the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus, and through UNAMSIL and other agencies it was an important actor in shaping 
the peacebuilding discourses and practices in Sierra Leone. The purpose of this chapter is to 
understand the UN’s underlying policy frameworks relevant to gender and peacebuilding and 
the institutional and structural context of their gender mainstreaming efforts in Sierra Leone, 
before assessing how their gender and peacebuilding efforts unfolded in practice in chapter 6.
This chapter will analyse the key peacebuilding policies developed during 2002-2007, and 
assess how these priorities were reflected in the structures and mandates of the agencies with 
responsibility for carrying out the peacebuilding agenda. Drawing on the critiques of liberal 
peacebuilding and liberal feminism already presented, the chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of the UN’s discourse around gender issues and some of the specific internal
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challenges and obstacles that may have impeded their efforts to gender-sensitise the 
peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone.
5.1 Identifying the peacebuilding priorities: where does gender fit in?
Following the Lome peace agreement signed in 1999 and the immediate post-war emergency 
phase, there were a number of key strategies and policies that set out the priorities for 
peacebuilding phase in Sierra Leone. These documents are important because in addition to 
highlighting the peacebuilding priorities, they were also the basis from which the LIN 
developed its programming in the country. Understanding how these policies were developed 
and the key actors involved is therefore critical to understanding why the peacebuilding 
process unfolded the way it did in Sierra Leone.
Furthermore, which issues were included and excluded also reveals much about the discourse 
around gender, peace and security and the perceived relevance of gender equality to the 
overall process. Several key documents have been identified and each of these will be 
examined in turn, thereby unpacking the assumptions and concepts that guided the UN’s 
peacebuilding actions in Sierra Leone. Collectively, these policies outline priorities that are in 
line with the liberal peacebuilding consensus and liberal feminist approach to gender outlined 
in chapters 2 and 3, and reflect the emphasis on democratisation and liberalisation coupled 
with the restoration of stability and security throughout the country.
The key strategies and frameworks from the case study period that will be expanded are: the 
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP), the National Recovery Strategy (NRS); 
the UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (PBRS) 
and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF); the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP); the Peace and Consolidation Strategy (PCS) and the Sierra Leone 
Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework (Compact).
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5.1.1 The I-PRSP and the National Recovery Strategy (2001-2002)
The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) was approved by the Joint Executive 
Board of the IMF and the World Bank in September 2001. The I-PRSP outlines the 
government’s interim strategy for enhancing growth, reducing poverty and increasing access 
to services for the population in the immediate transition phase (GoSL, 2001a). According to 
the executive summary of the I-PRSP, “The strategy will emphasize the continued 
implementation of sound economic policies to attain macroeconomic stability within an 
overall framework of good governance” (GoSL, 2001a: 8). This statement clearly reflects die 
liberal peacebuilding emphasis on democratisation and liberalisation.
In terms of gender issues, the I-PRSP does not perform very well. According to an official 
working in the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning, “there was no gender in the 
I-PRSP.”106 Analysis of the document itself would appear to uphold this perception. The 
poverty data on households underlying the analysis is based on data from 1989/1990 which 
reports that only 2.3% of households are female-headed, an unlikely figure given the research 
that demonstrates how the conflict transformed gender relations and led to many women and 
girls taking on new responsibilities for their families and other dependents (GoSL, 2001a: 
17). There is a short section on women and children (GoSL, 2001a: 21) that highlights the 
many burdens and vulnerabilities facing women, and importantly mentions their lack of 
access to productive assets and formal employment, as well as the customary and religious 
practices that increase their vulnerability.
The I-PRSP suggests that since the GoSL has adopted two policies on the advancement of 
women and on gender mainstreaming this indicates a commitment to social justice and gender 
equality (GoSL, 2001a: 33). However as analysis of the GoSL’s efforts in chapter 6 will
106 Interview with Hawa Musa, Ministry of Economic Development and Planning, Freetown, 23 March 
2005.
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demonstrate, these policies may well be empty rhetoric. Finally, in the policy matrix for the I- 
PRSP, there is no gender disaggregation of indicators for activities such as demobilisation, 
food aid and farming inputs or access to markets. There is some effort to gender disaggregate 
the indicators under the social sector programmes, namely health and education, and the only 
other relevant indicator is the percentage of women in senior public and political positions.
Under the leadership of UNDP, the UN developed the NRS to support the I-PRSP. As access 
to the country was restored following the end of the conflict in January 2002, it was possible 
to move from humanitarian and emergency response into peacebuilding programming. Based 
on a series of nationwide needs assessments led by the National Recovery Committee107 
following the end of the DDR process, the NRS is a joint UNCT, UNAMSIL and government 
strategy developed in May 2002 (GoSL, 2002a). The NRS’ objective is to provide an 
overview of national recovery needs to lay the foundations for the PRSP, combining a focus 
on a short to medium-term recovery strategy with the longer-term dimensions of the transition 
to peace.
It was a far-reaching plan and aimed to the link the transition and development phases, (UN, 
2002b: 4), and its importance cannot be over-estimated given its centrality to the conduct of 
post-conflict peacebuilding operations in the country. The timeframe of the NRS was 
envisaged to be from October 2002 until the end of 2003, when the PRSP was to come into 
effect.108 The four key priority areas outlined in the NRS are the consolidation of state 
authority; rebuilding communities; peacebuilding and human rights; and restoration of the 
economy.
107 The National Recovery Committee was established in 2001 and was chaired by the Vice-President. 
Its mandate was to drive forward the restoration of civil authority and broader recovery process in 
Sierra Leone (GoSL, 2002a: 10).
108 In fact, there were significant delays in developing the PRSP, and ultimately the draft was not 
finalised until March 2005.
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Despite being largely driven by the UN (GoSL, 2003a: 107), the NRS does emphasise the 
importance of local participation in the rebuilding of communities: “social reintegration in 
post war Sierra Leone is as much about empowering individuals by giving them the 
opportunity to become involved in community processes, as it is about the provision of 
materials or services. To this end, all recovery interventions should be designed to maximize 
their potential for participation” (GoSL, 2002a: 25). This indicates some space for local actors 
to inform the peacebuilding process, but the overall policy still follows the liberal 
peacebuilding formula of democratisation and liberalisation as the strategy for reaching 
peace.
While the NRS emphasised gender equality as a cross-cutting issue, it tended to be discussed 
in terms of improved socioeconomic indicators at the household level through investment in 
women, rather than linking gender-differentiated needs into the overall recovery strategy. In 
one of the few mentions of women or gender in the NRS, in the context of the civil society 
component of the recovery process, the document stresses, “youth and women in particular 
need encouragement and support to activate their own groups in order to contribute 
effectively to the recovery process” (GoSL, 2002a: 13). Specific mention is made of the needs 
of women and girls in relation to access to education, sexual violence as a specific issue 
linked to child protection, the need for broad sensitisation about women’s rights, and in the 
context of small microcredit loans programmes where women make up the majority of 
recipients.
Extensive data in relation to recovery needs is included in the NRS, but this is not sex- 
disaggregated and no distinctions are made about the needs of different groups in relation to 
infrastructure, shelter and sanitation, access to healthcare or roles in local level governance. 
This lack of data implies that the needs assessments and context analyses done as part of the 
NRS did not pay specific attention to the different needs and experiences of men and women. 
Without such an analysis and the resulting data, it is therefore unsurprising that the
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programme design and implementation phase failed to take gender roles and relations and the 
resulting power dynamics into account.
In terms of the financial requirements for implementing the activities outlined in the NRS, a 
total budget of $212 million was requested. Of this, only $820,000 was for activities with a 
specific women’s rights or gender dimension, with a further $1 million allocated for 
microfinance activities, the majority of which according to the document would support 
women entrepreneurs.109 While many of the other activities would also have a positive impact 
on women and girls, it could be argued that it was unrealistic for gender equality to ‘cross­
cut’ through the recovery strategy with a specific budget of only 0.08% of the requested total.
Despite the existence at the time of comprehensive gender-related policies within all the 
different UN agencies110, this document fails to effectively integrate gender objectives 
throughout. In the case of health, some specific needs of women in relation to their role as 
mothers is made, and the need to pay attention to gender issues is highlighted a few times. 
However, every single one of the target objectives or key benchmarks that comprise the 
actions to be taken by the UN agencies is gender-blind. This leads to problems of the lack of 
accountability, tokenism, and the continued deprioritisation of gender issues, symptomatic of 
the limitations of the UN’s approach to gender mainstreaming.
5.1.2 The UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peacebuilding in Sierra 
Leone and the UN Development Assistance Framework (2002-2004)
The UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (PBRS) 
was drafted in October 2002 and was intended to pave the way for the eventual adoption of a
109 For full details of the financing for activities under the NRS, see GoSL, 2002a: 100-116.
110 For example, UNDP’s manual on gender approaches in conflict and post-conflict settings was 
released around the same time as the NRS; SCR 1325 had been around for two years; and other 
operational agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP) were also releasing guidelines.
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UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) in 2004.111 According to the PBRS, the 
causes of the conflict stemmed from a combination of “bad governance, denial of 
fundamental rights, economic mismanagement and social exclusion” (UN 2002b: 7). The 
PBRS was prepared by the UN country team and UNAMSIL, and reflects the national 
policies and priorities identified by the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) as set out in the 
I-PRSP and the NRS (UN 2002b: 4).
The PBRS aimed to provide a framework to guide the UN and its various agencies in 
supporting the transition from humanitarian relief to longer-term recovery and peacebuilding 
in Sierra Leone, and has five focus areas: strengthening the security framework and regional 
collaboration; facilitating reintegration; reducing poverty; fostering good governance; and 
promoting human rights and encouraging reconciliation. These focus areas emphasise 
assistance for those groups who suffered the most during the conflict, as well as targeting the 
more widespread issues of poverty and weak governance (UN 2002b: 8). The intention was to 
update this strategy annually until the UNDAF was in place, and provide a framework to 
“focus [the UN’s] dialogue, advocacy and operational activities during the period 2003-2007” 
(UN, 2002b: 4). In strategic terms, it is therefore an important document in relation to the 
UN’s activities in the country and the identification of key priorities to focus on in the 
peacebuilding phase.
In terms of supporting the security situation in Sierra Leone, the PBRS identifies three key 
areas for UN assistance: providing area security; strengthening capacity of the Sierra Leone 
Police (SLP); and contributing to addressing the causes and consequences of regional 
instability (UN 2002b: 9). There is no mention in the PBRS of the kind of ‘human security’ 
concerns that at this time were continuing to affect hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leonean 
women. There is however mention that “the needs of women and children should be carefully
111 The UNDAF is a planning framework for the UN system, intended to bring greater coherence 
between the activities of the different UN bodies at country level. It outlines common objectives, 
timeframes and resources for the achievement of development goals. See UN, 1999b.
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monitored to ensure that their situation does not worsen during the period of resettlement” 
(UN 2002b: 11) in the section on resettlement, as well as an acknowledgement that “the most 
vulnerable [children] are the child girls (sic) who were abducted and became fighters, sex 
slaves or “wives” to commanders or camp followers (UN 2002: 12).
In recognition of the critical role that poverty plays in contributing to human insecurity, the 
PBRS acknowledges that “reconciliation and the rebuilding of a peaceful community will be 
greatly enhanced when basic household needs are met and economic disparities are reduced” 
(UN 2002b: 14). Gender and regional inequalities are mentioned as key determinants of 
poverty in Sierra Leone, although the only gender-specific measures that are mentioned in the 
UN activities under this focus area relate to girls schooling and health issues, in particular as 
they relate to pregnancy and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Unemployment has been a significant 
challenge in Sierra Leone since the end of the conflict, and the PBRS highlights three areas to 
which it will respond: income generation (with special attention to women and girls to ensure 
gender balance), infrastructure and access to food.
The PBRS does not explore the roots of the governance crisis in Sierra Leone, or offer any 
analysis of which segments of the population in particular lack any meaningful role in 
decision-making and governance structures. Similar to the priorities in the NRS, the 
restoration of civil authority and the decentralisation process are highlighted as the two key 
UN priorities in the PBRS (UN 2002b: 22). The monitoring of human rights abuses and 
promotion of reconciliation are the final UN priorities listed in the PBRS. Although it 
suggests that addressing abuses is critical to avoiding a resumption of violence, it does not 
clearly link ongoing human rights abuses to the immediate security and stability of the 
population. The PBRS has an annex of key objectives and benchmarks for its activities in 
Sierra Leone, but none of these make any reference to gender-differentiated impacts or 
effects. As the basis for dialogue, advocacy and operational programming then, the PBRS
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does not offer much analysis or prioritisation of gender issues to the central peacebuilding 
issues it identifies.
The UNDAF was drafted by the UN in close collaboration with the GoSL and its partners, 
and similar to the PBRS, is based on already identified national priorities. The UNDAF 
translates the key dimensions of the PBRS into a common operational framework on which 
the various UN agencies active in Sierra Leone could base their work in the period from 
2004-2007, and was intended to also contribute to the development of the PRSP (UNCT 
2003a: 2). The four focus areas of the UNDAF were: poverty reduction and reintegration; 
human rights and reconciliation; good governance, peace and stability; and economic 
recovery (UNCT 2003a: 3). Importantly, the UNDAF also forms the basis of the country 
programmes for the different UN agencies and funds operational in Sierra Leone, which were 
harmonised into a cycle for 2004-2007.
In keeping with the focus on results emphasised in the document, the UNDAF contains 
benchmarks and a monitoring and evaluation framework. The indicators developed for the 
UNDAF were in line with those already in place for the I-PRSP. With the exception of two 
lines of action, one under the human rights and reconciliation pillar focusing on “promot[ing] 
the rights of women and children as expressed in international conventions” and one under 
good governance, peace and security on “supporting] the Government to officially adopt and 
fully comply with international laws (refugee, women and child rights conventions in 
particular)”, women’s rights and gender equality are not specifically mentioned in the 
programme framework (UNCT, 2003a: 11 and 12). They are acknowledged as cross-cutting 
issues for poverty reduction and reintegration, human rights and reconciliation, and good 
governance, peace and security but are notably absent under economic recovery. In this pillar, 
the cross-cutting issues are capacity building, empowerment and anti-corruption initiatives 
which could in theory involve a gender dimension, however this oversight reinforces the 
perception that gender issues are not central to economic recovery.
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The UNDAF also includes a programme resources framework which notably does not 
allocate any resources to UNIFEM, despite mentioning it as an implementing agency for 
several of the programme outcomes. It could be assumed that as a fund of UNDP, UNIFEM 
would instead receive resources allocated through UNDP and that this perhaps explains the 
lack of specific funding for its activities. However, UNFPA, which is in a similar position of 
also being a UN fund, does have its own budget allocation. According to a member of the 
UNCT in Freetown, although the UNDAF was to be drafted by the UNCT, in reality it was 
the people closest to the Resident Coordinator (seconded from UNDP) who were able to 
influence the documents. This perhaps played a role in making decisions about resource 
allocations, and is indicative of the lack of prioritisation of gender issues by the senior 
management of the UN agencies.112
5.1.3 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2005-2007)
The extreme poverty in Sierra Leone has both direct and indirect effects on the stability of the 
country. Direct effects are such that “countries affected by conflict face a two-way 
relationship between conflict and poverty -  pervasive poverty makes societies more 
vulnerable to violent conflict, while conflict itself creates more poverty” (World Bank, 2004a: 
14). At the same time, poverty is indirectly linked to social unrest and dissatisfaction, 
increasing inequality among social groups, and reducing the opportunity cost in resorting to 
violence. Poverty reduction has, by necessity, been a focus of all government and donor 
interventions in the country. Approximately 80% of the population in Sierra Leone live below 
the poverty line (expenditures of less than $1 per day), and in 2005 only Niger ranked below 
Sierra Leone on the UN’s Human Development Index (GoSL, 2005a).
After publishing the I-PRSP in 2001, work began on drafting the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP). The preparation of the PRSP was led by the Poverty Alleviation Strategy
112 Interview with Bauke van Weringh, Transitional Support Team, UNDP, Freetown, 4 May 2005.
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Coordinating Office (PASCO), and the government established the Poverty Reduction 
Steering Committee (PRSC), which was further divided into sectors.113 The PRSC was tasked 
with providing direction, guidance and technical inputs into the drafting of the paper, as well 
as with raising awareness about the PRSP and the government priorities (Canakiah, n.d.). The 
committee received extensive capacity building support and financing from various donors 
such as the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat. The PRSP covered the period 
from 2005-2007, a critical time for consolidating the gains from the peace process and 
preparing the country for elections in 2007 and the broader transition to longer-term 
development. The Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) was then 
established by the GoSL and was tasked with coordinating implementation of the PRSP.
The Commonwealth Secretariat provided funding for an international gender consultant to 
work with the government in providing the needed gender-related input into the draft PRSP 
(GoSL, 2005a). The consultant conducted rapid assessments within each sector and ministry 
and held workshops and training for focal points working on gender issues.114 However, the 
participatory poverty assessments (PPA) that were held in 42 communities across Sierra 
Leone to assess local perceptions about the causes and consequences of poverty and the key 
issues that needed to be addressed were not gender-sensitive and participants were not 
disaggregated by sex (Canakiah n.d.). Although gender issues and the specific needs of 
women are mentioned in the PRSP, according to a Sierra Leone civil society representative, 
although women were included and consulted, “there isn’t really anything reflected in the 
document that offers them anything”.115
113 The five sector working committees were: governance and national security; macro-economic 
policy and private sector development; resettlement, reconstruction and reintegration; agriculture, 
natural resources and environment; and social sector development. Gender, HIV/AIDS and preventive 
health, youth and the environment were all specified as cross-cutting issues across the sectors.
1,4 Interview with Hawa Musa, Ministry of Development and Economic Planning, Freetown, 23 March 
2005.
115 Interview with Yasmin Jusu-Sherriff, Marwopnet, Freetown, 26 May 2005.
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The PRSP was largely endorsed by the donors, although it was criticised for the fact that little 
effort was made to prioritise amongst the many objectives and goals outlined in the 
document. While efforts were made to be inclusive and participatory, many groups, such as 
rural women, were left out of the process. While the review of the civic engagement process 
found that it had been broadly successful in terms of a moderately high understanding of the 
PRSP process throughout the country and a perception that civil society perspectives had fed 
into the PRSP, the results on women’s participation were not so positive: “Men of all social 
groups have been involved in the process. Even young men have been able to participate 
meaningfully. Women were poorly represented at facilitation level. Even men who hold 
senior positions in [ActionAid’s] implementing partner organisations at national level have 
displayed disregard of women’s contributions. Very few women participated in the review” 
(McKeown, 2005: 20).
Amidst allegations of corruption donors tempered their initial enthusiasm for the PRSP and 
much of the funding necessary for implementing the proposed reforms was not immediately 
forthcoming. Given that much of the gender-related input came from an externally-sponsored 
consultant, there was also less ownership over these issues than may have resulted from 
closer engagement of the different line ministries in the GoSL. Key donor agencies in Sierra 
Leone including the World Bank developed a programme to build the capacity of the GoSL 
and its ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) to implement the PRSP, as the lack of 
capacity, resources and expertise were identified as major obstacles (World Bank, 2005a).
While the PRSP highlights the need to work with and strengthen women’s organisations, in 
the outline of the training, staffing and technical assistance needs to be provided to MDAs, 
the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs (MSWGCA) is notably missing as one of 
the targets for this assistance. According to one official working with the National
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Commission for Social Action, “the PRSP failed to bring gender out in a way that will allow 
implementers to have an impact.”116
Following the successful completion of the PRSP, another Consultative Group meeting was 
held in London from 29-30 November 2005. This meeting was intended to provide an 
opportunity for multilateral and bilateral donors to pledge funds to the government for the 
next stages of its recovery, and in particular for implementation of the PRSP. However, the 
fact that the PRSP was a description of the situation in Sierra Leone rather than a clear 
strategy of how to move forward was problematic for the donors who require goals to be 
operationalised and measured.117 Some of the documents released in advance of the CG 
meeting mention gender as a cross-cutting issue but there is little evidence of a more gender- 
sensitive approach by the LIN.118 In any case, more rhetoric does not necessarily mean more 
change. What is important is how the gender-related rhetoric is turned into practice and 
implemented within Sierra Leone. There is no attempt at gender budgeting in any of the 
government or UN documents related to Sierra Leone’s transition, and this is one area where 
real changes could be made. But again, it is an issue of a lack of training and capacity, as well 
as of political will.
5.1.4 The Peace and Consolidation Strategy and the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding 
Cooperation Framework (2006-2007)
The Peace and Consolidation Strategy (PCS), finalised in September 2006, is a joint strategy 
of the UN and GoSL and was intended to guide the transition to long-term development in 
Sierra Leone. The PCS focuses specifically on the key threats to ongoing peace consolidation 
in the country that at the time and if not managed properly, threatened to disrupt
116 Interview with John Ngebeh, NaCSA, Freetown, 24 May 2005.
117 Interview with Bauke van Weringh, UNDP Transition Support Team, Freetown, 4 May 2005.
118 For the documents submitted in advance of the 2005 CG meeting, see
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SIERRALEQNEEXTN 
/0..contentMDK:20485493~menuPK:1102797~pagePK:l497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:3 67809.00. 
html.
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implementation of the PRSP and the run up to the planned national elections in 2007 
(UN/GoSL, 2006: 5). The PCS includes a context analysis outlining these threats, however 
there was a failure to ensure that a gender analysis was also undertaken.119
Although the PCS hints at the exclusion of women from decision-making and the 
discriminatory justice sector, it does not make any direct reference to gender inequalities or 
the important role that women can play in the consolidation of peace. National consultations 
took place in December 2005 involving civil society and other stakeholders, but it is not clear 
how die outcomes of these consultations fed into this document. There is no mention of issues 
such as the endemic gender-based violence and continued socioeconomic vulnerability of 
women, despite the fact that these factors were clearly linked to the consolidation of peace at 
the community level.
Given its focus on short to medium-term ‘threats’ to peace, the fact that gender issues do not 
merit a mention in the PCS is probably due to their not being prioritised in the face of more 
(perceived) immediate concerns. The fact that there was no gender advisor in place during 
UNIOSIL’s development of the Peace Consolidation Strategy with the government also 
contributed to this oversight and meant that critical opportunities and entry points for 
supporting gender equality were not capitalised on.
With the establishment of the PBC, there was a new opportunity for the international 
community to provide strategic guidance to the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, as one 
of the first two countries on its agenda. The negotiation of the Strategic Peacebuilding 
Framework with Sierra Leone began on 23 June 2006 with the first meeting of the PBC to 
discuss the situation in the country. This was followed by a series of formal meetings,
119 The main threats identified are: continuing challenges to internal security; challenges to a national 
dynamic o f reconciliation; perceptions of a lack o f accountability by national institutions; the need for 
a culture o f respect for human rights; a widespread sense o f economic disempowerment; and a lack o f a 
national infrastructure for peace.
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informal briefings and in-country consultations to identify the key peacebuilding priorities 
and themes. There were doubts about the appropriateness of Sierra Leone being selected as a 
country by the PBC given its supposed focus on immediate needs in countries emerging from 
war, since Sierra Leone was largely perceived to be beyond the post-conflict phase (Street, 
Smith and Mollett, 2007: 12). Nevertheless, dialogue continued, and on 3 December 2007, the 
Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Compact was adopted by the GoSL and the UN.
The priorities identified in the Compact are youth employment and empowerment, 
consolidation of democracy and good governance, justice and security sector reform, 
capacity-building, and energy sector development (UN PBC, 2007a: 4). Thus the Compact 
reflects the liberal peacebuilding pillars evident in the documents presented above. Gender 
equality and human rights are highlighted as cross-cutting issues to be taken into account in 
the analysis of the other priorities. Notably, however, the Compact specifically reaffirms the 
UN’s commitments in relation to SCR 1325, and women’s needs, particularly in relation to 
access to justice and political participation, are highlighted several times in the document.
The Compact demonstrates significantly more gender-sensitivity than the other UN 
peacebuilding policies highlighted in this section for a number of reasons, some of which 
have already been covered in chapter 3. In relation to Sierra Leone specifically, there were a 
number of consultations organised by the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP)120, UNIFEM and other INGOs such as International Alert on gender issues and the 
role of women in the peacebuilding process that identified a number of the gender-related 
issues that informed the development of the Compact. For example, in 2007, International 
Alert organised a roundtable meeting in New York with PBC members, UN agencies and 
member states to discuss how to integrate gender issues into the PBC’s priorities relating to
120 WANEP is one of the key civil society organizations engaging with the PBC, and eventually took 
on the coordinating role of the civil society partnership (CESPEC) for the PBC and was nominated as 
one o f the representatives from civil society to sit on the PBF National Steering Committee.
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security and rule of law in Sierra Leone and Burundi.121
Civil society representatives were also invited to participate in the country-specific meetings 
of the PBC in New York, and each time they highlighted gender issues. Additional technical 
support for gender issues was also provided by the Sierra Leone desk officer (initially 
seconded by UNIFEM as a gender focal point) within the Peacebuilding Support Office in 
New York, and who made several trips to Freetown to support the PBC’s work in-country. 
This facilitated links with women’s organisations and provided an entry point in New York to 
ensure that the final draft of the Compact included some gender language.
Women’s organisations had much greater visibility and presence throughout the development 
of the Compact than had been the case with any of the other policies developed in post­
conflict Sierra Leone. This is largely due to the support that these organisations received from 
UNIFEM and INGOs who were advocating for the inclusion of gender issues into the work of 
the PBC at the international level. Marwopnet, a leading women’s peacebuilding network, 
was also selected as one of the civil society representatives on the PBF Steering Committee. 
This position was particularly important since prior to finalising the Compact, the PBF also 
had an allocation of $35 million that could be rapidly disbursed to support specific 
peacebuilding activities. UNIFEM, along with the MSWGCA and Marwopnet developed a 
project to support women’s empowerment and gender equality. However due to delays in 
agreeing the project design and bureaucratic hurdles, it was not ultimately approved until July 
2008.122 This project, initially envisaged with a budget of $3 million eventually only received 
an allocation of $800,000.
Despite these promising developments, a report on civil society perspectives on the PBC’s
121 For more details on this roundtable, see International Alert, 2007a.
122 For full details on the project supported by the UN PBF, including “Supporting Gender Capacity, 
Women’s Rights Protection and Child Protection in Recovery and Peacebuilding”, see 
http://www.unpbf.ore/sierraleone/sierraleone-proiects.shtml
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work found that in Sierra Leone, “the PBC work was seen as ‘Freetown-centric’, owned by 
elite, mainstream peacebuilding umbrella organisations, and not by the grassroots 
communities most affected by conflict” (Street, Smith and Mollett, 2007: 16). This claim 
caused significant problems in Freetown, with local civil society organisations including 
WANEP and Marwopnet refuting it and suggesting that in fact it was the INGOs who were to 
blame for not working constructively with local communities.123 This illustrates some of the 
challenges the international community faces in supporting the work of local civil society 
organisations and the difficulty of accessing rural-based networks, even if the intentions are 
sound.124 Nevertheless, the Compact demonstrates some progress in terms of integrating a 
gender perspective from the earliest stages of policy formulation. This progress can be 
understood as the result of a combination of factors including stronger international support 
for integrating gender into the policy document, the active engagement of women’s 
organisations in Sierra Leone, and technical support and gender expertise available to those 
drafting the Compact.
5.2 Gender mainstreaming and the architecture of the UN in Sierra 
Leone: Mandates and structures
Whilst the policy discourse frames the key priorities and issues relevant to the UN’s 
peacebuilding efforts, the mandates and structures of the agencies themselves also play major 
roles in determining the extent to which these priorities are internalised and translated into 
concrete actions. The main UN bodies relevant to a study on the integration of gender into the 
peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone are UNAMSIL (and subsequently UNIOSIL), UNDP 
and UNIFEM, the UNCT Gender Theme Group, and the World Bank.125 This section will 
provide a brief overview of the mandates and structure of each of these bodies vis-a-vis
123 Focus group discussion with members o f CESPEC, Freetown, 20 July 2007.
124 This issue will be more fully discussed in chapter 7.
125 Several other agencies such as UNICEF and WFP also dealt with gender issues either directly or 
indirectly, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into their mandates and structures in detail.
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gender issues in order to understand the internal dynamics that had an impact on the extent to 
which they prioritised women’s rights and gender equality.
Despite the tokenistic approach to integrating gender issues into the majority of the 
peacebuilding policies from the signing of Lome until the end of 2007, there is the potential 
for the UN agencies to establish structures and develop specific programmes to ensure that 
both women’s rights and gender mainstreaming inform their actions on the ground. However, 
as this section will show, with some exceptions, again these issues were sidelined, under­
resourced and deprioritised in the structures and mandates of the organisations. The reasons 
for this are linked to the liberal peacebuilding approach of a top-down, one-size-fits-all 
approach to building peace and the liberal feminist nature of gender mainstreaming processes 
which leaves little space for a real reconfiguration of gender roles and relations.
5.2.1 UNAMSIL and UNIOSIL
The original mandate of UNAMSIL did not specifically mention gender issues, either 
separately or in the context of the mission’s other priority areas. The only passing reference to 
gender issues in UNAMSIL’s mandate is in paragraph 15 in relation to gender training (UN, 
1999a). Given that SCR 1325 had not been adopted at the time UNAMSIL’s mandate was 
drafted, which would have provided more impetus to the issues, this is not necessarily 
unexpected. However, other instruments relating to women’s rights and gender equality could 
have been referred to. For example, in East Timor, the mandate of the UN-established 
Transitional Administration (UNTAET) was explicitly linked to the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which provided an 
important tool to guide the work of the gender affairs office (Whittington, 2004: 5).
Subsequent resolutions on UNAMSIL did not demonstrate much improvement, with only a 
few mentions of the ‘special needs of women’ mentioned from 2002 onwards. In 2004,
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resolution 1562 provided UNAMSIL with a revised mandate to guide its work as the mission 
drew down, and again an opportunity to integrate a gender perspective into the work of the 
peacekeeping mission and to recognise the needs, interests and contributions of women’s 
organizations was overlooked. The Resolution highlights the role of the UN mission in 
continuing to monitor and support the restoration of security, public services and state 
authority and in promoting human rights, but there is no specific reference to gender-related 
insecurities or needs.
Following on from its largely gender-blind mandate, the structure of UNAMSIL also 
reflected a marginalisation of gender issues from the central preoccupations of the 
peacekeeping mission. During the early years of the mission, UNAMSIL’s human rights 
section officially had the position of a ‘gender specialist’, although the section was under­
staffed and it was therefore not always filled (Human Rights Watch, 2003). In addition to a 
gender specialist, there was also a focal point for women to assist with gender balance within 
the mission. However, according to a mid-mission report, this position was ineffective and the 
focal point did not have enough information or access to senior management to effectively 
carry out her job (Date-Bah, 2006: 79).
However, following the adoption of SCR 1325 and largely as a result of the continued 
lobbying of civil society groups at the UN who repeatedly called for gender advisory 
positions to be placed within peacekeeping missions, such a position was established within 
UNAMSIL in 2003.126 The gender advisor (GA) was placed within the human rights section; 
however the fact that no independent budget and only limited authority was attached to the
126 The first gender position created within a UN peacekeeping missions was in Kosovo in June 1999. 
A gender unit was planned for East Timor at the outset o f UNTAET, but it was cut due to budgetary 
reasons and instead two focal points were assigned in October 1999. By mid-2000, a full-scale gender 
unit had been established in UNTAET and was the first o f its kind in a peacekeeping mission.
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position was a serious limitation. This resulted in a reactive rather than proactive response to 
gender issues within the mission.127
Eventually, at the beginning of 2005, the position was moved to the office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General. This made the gender advisor a member of senior 
staff, and gave her greater access to the higher decision-making levels within the organisation 
(UN DPKO, 2005a: 33). Previously, the GA had had to report to the head of the human rights 
section who would then feed back any issues to the SRSG, resulting in a circuitous line of 
reporting and accountability for gender issues. However, at one year prior to the drawdown of 
the mission, this move came too late to have any real sustainable impact on the ability of 
UNAMSIL to mainstream gender throughout its activities.128
UNAMSIL itself was divided into eight functional areas responsible for different aspects of 
the mission such as public information, planning and political affairs, and civilian police.129 In 
an evaluation of gender mainstreaming within UNAMSIL conducted for DPKO, it is noted 
that the degree to which each of these divisions accorded attention to gender mainstreaming 
varied significantly (Date-Bah, 2006: 22-23).130 Separate to the role of the gender advisor, the 
scandals around sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) at the hands of peacekeepers in West 
Africa prompted UNAMSIL to begin paying more attention to these issues. As a result, strict 
codes of conduct were instituted, and a staff member within the human rights section was 
designated as the SEA focal point. She initially undertook these duties in conjunction with a 
broader role, but eventually confronted the management of the mission with an ultimatum that 
to continue covering SEA issues would require the establishment of a full-time post of SEA
127 Interview with Theresa Kambobe, UNAMSIL gender advisor, 25 May 2005.
128 Personal interview with Theresa Kambobe, UNAMSIL gender advisor, Freetown, 25 May 2005; 
Multi-donor review, 2006.
129 These areas are: the SRSGs office (incorporating DDR, child protection, civil affairs, HIV/AIDS 
and legal advisors unit); planning and political affairs; human rights; military; DRSG’s office; civilian 
police; personnel; and public information. See Date-Bah, 2006: 22.
130 This impression was confirmed in an interview with the UNAMSIL gender advisor, Freetown, 25 
May 2005.
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advisor.131 This post was eventually established and the SEA advisor subsequently 
collaborated with NGOs and other agency staff to take action on the issue of SEA, as well as 
playing an important internal role in training, sensitisation and awareness-raising.
At its peak, UNAMSIL was the biggest ever peacekeeping mission and to expect a single 
person to be able to effectively fulfil a gender mainstreaming mandate was simply unrealistic 
(Date-Bah, 2006: 17). The fact that gender issues were not included in the mandate of 
UNAMSIL from the outset also served to restrict the potential for succeeding in 
mainstreaming, given that decisions about funding and authority are frequently made at the 
earliest stages of a mission’s life-cycle. For mainstreaming to be successful it requires the 
actual incorporation of gender into all policy and operational areas from the earliest planning 
stages of the mission, which in turn necessitates the allocation of funds and personnel capable 
of undertaking the task. Including mention of gender issues and SCR 1325 in the mandate of 
peacekeeping missions is critical since it lends legitimacy, articulates and shares 
responsibility and provides the potential for the allocation of resources that all help to ensure 
that the job is done (ibid: 40-42).
Although UNAMSIL had a difficult beginning it has largely been seen as a success story by 
the international community.132 Following repeated extensions, the Secretary-General 
recommended that UNAMSIL end its operations in the country by the end of December 2005. 
Over a period of months, the peacekeepers began to withdraw, and the mission was 
eventually downsized to a few hundred personnel to be integrated into the new UN Integrated 
Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) as of January 1st, 2006. The drawdown of UNAMSIL and 
the creation of UNIOSIL resulted in a smaller UN presence than the previous UNAMSIL 
mission. There was an opportunity to consolidate the limited advances towards gender 
equality that had been made by UNAMSIL by ensuring that the new integrated office accord
131 Interview with Lory Dolar, UNAMSIL SEA Advisor, Freetown, 17 February 2005.
132 For example, see “UNAMSIL: A Success Story in Peacekeeping”, 2005. 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeDing/missions/past/unamsil/Overview.pdf.
163
sufficient attention and resources to the issue, however, the gender advisor position was 
terminated. The lack of gender expertise within UNIOSIL was a major weakness of the 
peacebuilding effort in 2006, and reflects the failure of the mainstreaming project by the UN 
in Sierra Leone.
Had gender issues genuinely been prioritised by the senior management of the peacekeeping 
mission or seen as relevant to the ongoing peace and development process in the country then 
it would not have been possible to eliminate this role. It also indicates a lack of continuity in 
UN programming, since the gender advisor had already shown herself to be key to the efforts 
at supporting women’s organisations, raising the profile of gender issues and providing 
gender training to UN and government staff. Although the UNAMSIL gender advisor 
completed an end of mission briefing, the majority of files and reference materials pertaining 
to the mission’s gender work were left on the hard drive of the GA’s computer and were lost 
at the time of drawdown. The fact that there are no detailed records of what activities and 
projects were undertaken related to gender during UNAMSIL’s tenure in Sierra Leone is a 
serious loss of institutional knowledge.133
In preparation for the handover from UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL, a detailed strategy was 
developed, outlining the priority areas for the transition and the roles of the different UNCT 
actors in carrying out these tasks. In the preamble to the activities chart of this document, 
emphasis is placed on the continued need to consolidate and support a durable peace in Sierra 
Leone (UNCT, 2005). However, no mention is made of the role of women in this process, or 
of the relationship between peace and gender equality. Gender is only mentioned specifically 
in four of the twenty-seven issue areas of the transition strategy (public information, women, 
education, and gender mainstreaming) despite the many opportunities to integrate a gender 
perspective throughout the entire document. Furthermore, separating ‘gender mainstreaming’
133 Personal interview with member of UNIOSIL senior management who had also held a senior 
position within UNAMSIL, June 2006.
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as a stand-alone task in the strategy is not necessarily constructive towards achieving a 
successful integration of gender issues throughout the country strategy.
Attempts were made by the UNCT Gender Theme Group (GTG) to lobby senior management 
within the UNCT to revise the Transition Strategy so that a gender perspective could be more 
fully integrated in accordance with SCR 1325, but several layers of resistance were 
encountered. Furthermore, by the time the draft Transition Strategy was discussed in the GTG 
meeting it was too late to make any significant changes.134 Thus, the future UN priorities in 
the country were to be framed by a document that did not incorporate a gender perspective, 
further jeopardising attempts to build a sustainable and inclusive peace in the country.
The mandate of UNIOSIL includes “developing initiatives for the protection and well-being 
of youth, women and children,” but does not mention SCR 1325, support for gender 
mainstreaming, or the important roles of women in the consolidation of peace (UN, 2005b). 
The Human Rights and Rule of Law section within UNIOSIL did have a gender focal point in 
2006, and the gender advisor from the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi was seconded to 
UNIOSIL for one month in June 2006 to support the office to engage women in the run-up to 
the elections in 2007. A gender advisor was eventually hired on a six-month contract in June 
2007 (eventually extended), providing important support to efforts to integrate gender issues 
into the work of UNIOSIL. However, the lack of dedicated gender expertise during the initial 
stages of the integrated office had the result that a gender sensitive approach was not 
institutionalised from the outset.
According to a multi-donor review of the implementation of SCR 1325 across four UN 
peacekeeping missions, the failure “to prioritise the role of the gender advisor by the 
UNAMSIL and UNIOSIL missions was highlighted as having a negative impact (Multi-donor
134 This information is based on numerous interviews as well as first-hand experience of GTG meetings 
during March-May 2005 in Freetown.
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Review, 2006). This was particularly stark following the drawdown of UNAMSIL and before 
the recruitment of a gender advisor to UNIOSIL, when the review team found that “there was 
an absence of a mission-wide gender strategy, a lack of ownership and a lack of leadership on 
gender.” (ibid: 6).
5.2.2 UNDP and UNIFEM
UNDP has played a key role in the post-conflict recovery of Sierra Leone. Because UNDP is 
not a specialised agency with a narrow or specific mandate, it has a wide remit of 
programmes in Sierra Leone that cut across a range of issues. Some examples of UNDP 
programming in Sierra Leone include an innovative community-based programme on ‘arms 
for development’, support for elections and capacity building of elected local council 
officials, and strengthening of the rule of law and access to justice. UNDP was therefore 
active across the different thematic areas of the peacebuilding process that fell under the 
purview of the United Nations.
Since 2002, UNDP Sierra Leone’s (UNDP SL) programmes have covered three practice 
areas: recovery and peace-building; governance and democratic development; and poverty 
reduction and human development. In addition to support staff and the senior management, 
UNDP’s programme staff is allocated to these three thematic areas. The main focus of 
UNDP’s work has been on recovery and peacebuilding, and in 2004 more than 50% of its 
budget of $25 million was allocated for projects under this programming area (Kaldor with 
Vincent, n.d.: 20).
As stated in UNDP’s own documents, a gender perspective should be mainstreamed 
throughout all its operational and advocacy work.135 Although UNDP did not have a specific 
gender advisor or gender focal point in Sierra Leone, its link to UNIFEM theoretically could
135 See background to UNDP at http://www.daco-sl.Org/encvclopedia/5 part/5 3undp.htm [Accessed 
27/9/08]
have provided it with a certain degree of internal expertise, especially as the UNIFEM 
programme officer was located in the same building. Nevertheless, a review of its work in 
Sierra Leone indicates that it has been less than successful in this area: “UNDP’s gap-filling 
role has been rather effective because it has been demand driven rather than donor driven and 
because of the efficiency of local staff. However, more attention needs to be paid to civil 
society and gender” (Kaldor with Vincent, n.d.: 5).
This view was supported by various interviews carried out in Freetown in 2005, where the 
lack of integration of a gender perspective into UNDP’s recovery activities was noted. 
According to one UNDP official, “there is more said than done when it comes to gender 
issues, but the concern is there. It just doesn’t follow through all the time. UNDP needs more 
indicators and yardsticks to assess gender dimensions, we also need more vigorous 
monitoring and assessment but there isn’t really any money or time.”136 The fact that more 
was said than done in relation to gender issues by UNDP is unsurprising. As the policy 
documents in the previous section demonstrated, beyond token mentions of gender in passing, 
the UN did not make the connections between recognizing the gendered impact of 
peacebuilding with the broader sustainability of these processes. This may partly be due to the 
many competing priorities and limited resources, but it is also due to the fact that peace in the 
UN’s eyes was no different for men or for women, reflecting the one-size-fits-all liberal 
consensus.
The UNIFEM office in Sierra Leone opened in 2002, and for the majority of the time since 
then has only been staffed by one locally-recruited programme officer who also focused on 
HIV/AIDS issues.137 Much of UNIFEM’s work in Sierra Leone has focused on access to 
justice and addressing the extensive legal discrimination facing women. Some examples of 
projects that UNIFEM has initiated include: providing gender training to the commissioners
136 Interview with Loma French, UNDP, Freetown, 28 June 2006.
137 There have at different times been one or two locally-hired programme assistants, and an 
internationally-hired programme manager arrived in 2009.
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on the TRC; facilitating and enabling women organisations and individual victims of violence 
to testify and deliver statements before the TRC; and working with Conciliation Resources, 
an international NGO, to hold a workshop on gender justice issues. The UNIFEM 
representative played a key role in the UNCT Gender Theme Group (see below), the 
Coordinating Committee on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CCSEA)138, and in supporting 
the work of the MSWGCA and Freetown-based women’s organisations.
Due to the poor reporting and lack of transparency about budgets, it is difficult to assess the 
financial resources of the UNIFEM office in Sierra Leone. However, it is clear that resources, 
both financial and human, were limited and that this restricted the ability of the UNIFEM 
office to fulfil the need for gender-related programming in Sierra Leone.139 According to a 
UNDP official in Sierra Leone, UNIFEM’s role is marginalised and under-utilised, and the 
fact that they have such a small budget and therefore require other agencies to assist with 
funding activities makes them unpopular within the UNCT.140
Despite the limited resources available, the UNIFEM programme officer was still able to have 
some impact and was a useful resource and contact in the UN system for the women’s 
organisations based in Freetown. Similar to the situation in UNAMSIL and UNIOSIL, the 
fact that the UNIFEM programme officer worked mainly alone, it was difficult for her to have 
any sustained presence or activities in the rural parts of the country. Nevertheless, the 
UNIFEM office was an important entry point for women’s organisations in Freetown to 
engage with the UN, and it also provided ongoing support and technical input to the work of 
the MSWGCA. It is clear that while having a UNIFEM presence in-country is crucial, there is
138 For more information about the international community’s response to issues of sexual abuse and 
exploitation see Higate, 2004: 37-57.
139 This is not a problem specific to Sierra Leone. Although UNIFEM's budget was doubled in 2007 to 
$115 million (up from $57 million) this figure still represents a fraction of the budget available to 
UNICEF, which in 2006 was over $2 billion. See “New-Improved Women's Agency Vies for U.N. 
Priority”, Women’s E-News, 6 March 2008. http://www.womensenews.org/storv/intemational- 
policvunited-nations/080306/new-improved-womens-agencv-vies-un-prioritv.
40 Interview with Loma French, UNDP, 5 March 2005.
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an institutionalised failure to adequately resource and engage with the agency on the part of 
the other UN agencies represented in Sierra Leone (Multi-donor Review, 2006: 10).
5.2.3 UNCT Gender Theme Group
The UN Country Team (UNCT) approach originated in response to calls for increased 
coordination and communication amongst the various agencies, funds and programmes that 
work in developing and conflict-affected contexts. In Sierra Leone, the UNCT is led by the 
UN Resident Coordinator, and is composed of several different UN agencies, funds and 
programmes: FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA, WFP, WHO, and 
the World Bank. Additionally, the UNAMSIL Human Rights Unit and Political Affairs units 
and UN Field Security Coordination Officer (UNFSCO) are also represented (UNCT, 2004b: 
1). Throughout the post-war years, the UNCT held weekly meetings at which decisions were 
made on the role of the UN and its activities in relation to the post-conflict recovery in Sierra 
Leone. This was done in close collaboration with UNAMSIL and the government.
The UNCT has a Gender Theme Group (GTG) that aims to provide analytical and advocacy 
support for the inclusion of a gender perspective in the work of the various UN agencies 
operating in Sierra Leone. In theory, each agency has at least one gender focal point who 
attends the monthly meetings of the GTG. However, the meetings are quite irregular and as 
the gender focal points are usually junior and not always present at meetings, they rarely have 
the authority or the resources to take any of the recommendations back to their organisations 
and implement them.141 From 2005 onwards, the GTG was being chaired by the UNIFEM 
program officer, who works within the UNDP office.142 Previously the GTG was chaired in 
rotation, although was often led by WFP. According to the terms of reference of the GTG, the
141 Discussion with members of the UNCT GTG, Freetown, March 2005.
142 It has been agreed that in line with the UNDP Gender Action Plan, UNIFEM will take the lead on 
coordinating gender equality issues in the UNCTs where it has a presence through a UNCT gender 
theme group. See UN, 2006a: 13, para 82.
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group was to provide technical support to the UNCT, act as a forum for dialogue around 
gender issues, and provide strategic leadership on gender mainstreaming.143
This was an ambitious programme of work, all the more so given the fact that the GTG had 
no fixed budget, and relied on the efforts of the individual agency representatives to follow 
through on the activities listed in the workplan. As an example, in 2003, the budget for the 
GTG was only $45,000.144 In 2005, the workplan included activities such as technical support 
to the partners responsible for implementing the UNDAF, a mapping assessment of how the 
UN agencies have supported gender equality and the empowerment of women in Sierra 
Leone, recruitment of an expert to identify gender training needs and design and carry out 
training workshops with UN staff, and carry out advocacy activities around violence against 
women. A lack of resources and commitment from the various member agencies prevented 
the full implementation of the plan, although certain activities were undertaken.
According to the Multi-donor Review of gender programming in Sierra Leone, there was little 
evidence that the GTG was active or successful (2006: 20). A lack of coordination and 
collaboration amongst key donor governments on gender issues was also a significant 
obstacle to a more holistic and effective approach by the international community. Reasons 
cited by two donor government representatives were that nobody had the time or resources to 
lead on the coordination issue, and that the GTG should be leading on this.145 The 2005 
workplan of the GTG did include a proposal for the expansion of the GTG to include the 
MSWGCA and other development partners, but this was not realised.
143 Proposed Terms of Reference: Gender Theme Group for the UN System in Sierra Leone (n.d.). 
http://www.undg.org/archive docs/43 85-Gender Theme Group TOR Sierre Leone .doc 
[Accessed 27/9/08]
144 “Results o f the UN Coordination System in 2003”, Resident Coordinator Annual Report. 
http://cfapp2.undp.org/dgo unct report/reports/index.cfm?fuseaction=show report results&ctv id c= 
M  [Accessed 27/9/08]
145 Interview with two regional gender advisors for the MSWGCA, Freetown 22 June 2006.
170
By mid-2007, the GTG had continued to regain its momentum, and by this point the head of 
UNIOSIL, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) and the heads of 
the various UN agencies were more involved in the work of the group.146 Whilst this indicates 
some progress, gender issues were still being pigeon-holed and seen as the remit of the GTG, 
rather than being relevant to the peacebuilding process.
5.2.4 The World Bank
Whilst the World Bank was one of the key donor organisations operating in Sierra Leone 
throughout the peacebuilding process, its presence on the ground was fairly light. The Bank 
office in Freetown was staffed by a country manager and assistants, and additional technical 
support was provided from the West Africa office based in Ghana and country specialists in 
Washington, DC. The Bank also engaged consultants and other staff to assist with 
implementation of specific projects. The World Bank developed a Country Assistance 
Strategy (CAS) for the period 2006-2009 that was intended to support the implementation of 
the PRSP.
It is encouraging that the CAS made specific reference to gender issues (2005b: 27), but it 
was in relation to socioeconomic issues only, and also emphasised women exclusively as a 
vulnerable group in need of social protection and safety nets. It is unsurprising that the World 
Bank did not have a gender advisor or gender focal point in the Sierra Leone, reflective of the 
Bank’s poor record in this area as already discussed in chapter 3. While the country manager 
acknowledged that “women are 50% of the population so you can’t ignore them” and that 
“gender is integral to development”, he also suggested that gender issues should not be 
highlighted but rather addressed in the context of other initiatives, and that “people are not 
interested in challenging gender stereotypes in Sierra Leone. You can only begin thinking 
about these things when you have an income, when you have choices”.147 Given that the
146 Interview with Jebbeh Forster, UNIFEM, Freetown, 16 July 2007.
147 Interview with James Sackey, World Bank, Freetown, 2 May 2005.
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World Bank disbursed approximately $47 million in direct budget support, PRSP financing 
and specific project funds, the omission of gender issues from such a large percentage of 
overall donor funding is problematic.
Many of the issues pointed to so far illustrate the failure to provide the necessary funds and 
resources for the UN agencies to address gender issues. Structurally, these agencies were also 
not well-designed to prioritise gender issues, given their limited expertise and technical 
knowledge of the issues. While these explanations carry some weight, they are also reflective 
of a deeper and more problematic bias within the peacebuilding process. Even if adequate 
resources were in place, it is not clear that the UN would have been more effective in 
integrating gender, since the very premises of how this should done are based on liberal 
feminist strategies of adding women in, rather than taking the gendered dynamics of 
peacebuilding into account. The next section of this chapter will now turn to exploring some 
of these premises to demonstrate how the liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminist 
approaches to peacebuilding shaped the discourse in a specific way that resulted in the 
sidelining of gender issues in post-conflict Sierra Leone.
5.3 Mainstreaming or sidelining gender? Analysing the discourse and 
structures of the UN in Sierra Leone
This chapter has presented an analysis of the key UN peacebuilding policies and the 
structures and mandates of the different agencies. The purpose of this chapter was to explore 
how gender issues were discursively and structurally integrated into the UN’s work in Sierra 
Leone. Overall, the analysis is not encouraging and provides some explanation for why the 
UN’s record in gender-sensitising the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone was so poor. The 
actual implementation of its peacebuilding activities within the three key pillars of 
establishing security, governance reform and economic reform will be discussed in more
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detail in chapter 6, but this final section will first provide some explanation for the failure of 
the UN to prioritise gender in the peacebuilding priorities in Sierra Leone.
The previous sections of the chapter have raised a number of key problems linked to the 
liberal underpinnings of both gender mainstreaming and peacebuilding that can be 
summarised into three areas, each of which will be briefly discussed below. First, the UN’s 
conceptual approach to the liberal peace provided little space for the inclusion of gender- 
differentiated priorities. As a result, gender issues have been incorporated into the discourse 
in a limited way, focusing on women’s needs as opposed to gendered dynamics. Second, 
following from this point, gender issues were repeatedly deprioritised, reflected in the 
marginal place these issues occupied in the policies and structures of the UN agencies. Third, 
too little effort was made to engage the local population in articulating the peacebuilding 
priorities, reflecting the externally-driven, top-down nature of the liberal peacebuilding 
process.
As this chapter presented, these problems manifested themselves in the all-too-common 
structural constraints in relation to gender mainstreaming. Collectively, they led to the 
‘adding-on’ of gender issues (understood as women’s issues) to peacebuilding policies, and 
despite claims of mainstreaming gender the resources and priority accorded to these issues 
have not been commensurate with the task. As argued earlier in the thesis, this is in line with 
the limitations of liberal feminism. The remainder of this section will now turn to an analysis 
of these issues before exploring the implementation of the UN’s peacebuilding activities in 
the next chapter.
However, before proceeding a caveat is necessary at this point. It does not necessarily follow 
that simply because gender issues or women’s rights are not mentioned within these policies 
and strategic frameworks that they were not taken into account at all, and were subsequently 
excluded from the peacebuilding process entirely. Field research confirmed that the presence
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of key individuals sensitive to these issues made a difference on a small scale. For example, 
there have in particular been some encouraging signs of progress in bringing gender issues to 
the table since the PBC has been active in Sierra Leone, largely due to connections with the 
global advocacy networks around the Commission’s work.148 Nevertheless, without 
strategically prioritising gender issues early on, allocating resources and identifying indicators 
and benchmarks that should be achieved, and developing gender-sensitive policies then it is 
unlikely that such ad hoc progress will be sustainable.
5.3.1 The UN’s discourse around peace and gender issues
Despite the existence of many international commitments in relation to gender and 
peacebuilding, most notably SCR 1325, the UN’s policies in Sierra Leone largely fail to 
reaffirm or expand on these issues. Poverty reduction and human security are still massive 
challenges in Sierra Leone, and were even more so during the case study period. Whilst they 
were mentioned as priorities of the UN and GoSL as articulated in the policy documents, too 
little effort was made to analyse the community-level dynamics and relationships in Sierra 
Leone, or to distinguish between the different needs of different groups within the population 
in relation to poverty and security. A more thorough gender analysis would have helped to 
ensure that some of these dynamics and the access to resources and power of men and women 
and children were taken into account. There is little evidence of such an analysis being 
applied by those drafting the policy documents, and as a result the local population tended to 
be treated and referred to as a homogenous group, with little detail about how they would be 
engaged in and affected by the various measures outlined in the policy documents.
There was also little reflection in the policies of the many gender-related insecurities that 
continued to persist in Sierra Leone, particularly the endemic gender-based violence that was 
characteristic of both the conflict and peacebuilding phases. During the course of this
148 An example o f such progress were the national and regional consultations held in Sierra Leone on 
the PBC and SCR 1325 during 2008, led by UNIFEM with support from the headquarters in New 
York.
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research, women’s organisations repeatedly highlighted GBV as one of the main concerns of 
women throughout the country.149 Despite this, and aside from a few mentions of 
discriminatory legislation and the need for better access for women to healthcare and the 
justice system following incidences of sexual violence, GBV does not emerge as an element 
of the conflict analysis in any of the policies from the I-PRSP through to the Compact. This 
reflects the gender-blindness of the liberal peacebuilding approach, where issues of stability 
and restoration of state authority were prioritised over individual security needs in the 
consolidation of peace.
As has been illustrated, the UNDAF, PRSP and PCS all highlight women’s needs in relation 
to the social sector, but do not integrate a genuine consideration of gender dynamics in 
relation to the political, security or economic-related aspects of the transition to peace. If 
donor agencies themselves fail to prioritise gender equality, then it is likely that existing 
patriarchal values will be reinforced and transferred into the nascent institutions of the post- 
conflict society. As Enloe points out, if it is men in militarised roles who are in charge of the 
transition to peace, then the whole discourse of the reconstruction agenda can become 
couched in those terms and the militarisation of society is perpetuated, exacerbating any 
gender inequalities (Enloe, 2002: 25-26).
Addressing women’s needs in relation to access to education and healthcare can be less
challenging than tackling underlying stereotypes and assumptions that exacerbate the
marginalisation of women. The following quotation aptly sums up some of the pitfalls of the
discourse on gender issues in the UN’s peacebuilding policies visible in Sierra Leone:
There is an inherent danger in labelling gender issues as ‘soft’: this increases the risk 
of their being considered trivial, as possible to postpone and even as luxury items -  in 
stark contrast to concerns described as ‘hard’ security issues, which are seen as 
urgent, rational and requiring expertise and unique skills. As a result of such 
labelling, the second category is likely to receive considerably more attention and 
resources that the first. Therefore, a major challenge is to describe and frame gender 
issues as urgent and rational and to ensure that personnel assigned to handle
149 Focus group discussion with local women’s organisations, Bo, 20 July 2007.
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intervention issues have necessary gender skills and gender knowledge (Olsson et al, 
2004: 52).
A gender, as opposed to a women-focused, analysis may also help to better understand the 
dynamics around male youth unemployment, household poverty, and the opportunities for 
reconciliation at the community level in Sierra Leone. While gender equality is highlighted as 
a ‘cross-cutting’ issue by almost all of the relevant policies, the reality is that gender issues 
tend to be understood as women’s issues. An outcome of the focus on women is that there is 
also a tendency to not see them as agents of change but rather as passive recipients. Most of 
the policies that mention support for women focus on their roles as victims or the particularly 
marginalised and vulnerable, rather than their ability to be empowered as actors in the 
peacebuilding process. This is an issue that will be returned to in the conclusion of the thesis.
5.3.2 The gendered politics o f  prioritisation
The second trend evident from the analysis of the discourse and structures of the UN in Sierra 
Leone is the fact that gender equality and women’s empowerment were not seen as key to 
how peace and security were defined. This reflects what I call the ‘gendered politics of 
prioritisation’. Although it was at times acknowledged as a cross-cutting issue, in analysing 
the policies themselves it becomes clear that gender equality was not perceived as linked to 
the other broader objectives of the transition to peace in Sierra Leone. As a result, it was 
dropped from the post-conflict agenda at the earliest stage. The process of setting the 
peacebuilding priorities in Sierra Leone reflected the attitude of the UN that gender equality is 
something that can be postponed, when all the other ‘more important’ concerns have been 
dealt with (Abdela, 2004: 89-92).
The allocation of resources, in particular donor funding, to the various aspects of the 
peacebuilding process reflected the way in which the international community prioritises 
issues. As this chapter argued, gender issues received very little priority. This is not a problem
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that is unique to Sierra Leone, but rather is indicative of broader trends. Rao illustrates this 
point well:
In 2002, UNIFEM’s resources totalled $36 million. In comparison, UNFPA’s budget 
for the same year was $373 million; the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ budget was $64 million and UNAIDS’ budget was $92 million. UNICEF’s 
budget in the same year totalled $1,454 million. The message is clear: investment in 
women is of the lowest order. Most mainstream agencies cannot even track how 
much money they spend on women rights and the achievement of gender equality 
(2006).
It is not easy to isolate the exact figures spent on women-specific programming as well as the 
gender-related component of broader thematic activities. However, interviews with different 
individuals working for UN agencies in Sierra Leone confirm that the budgets allocated were 
small, unreliable and difficult to access.150 Therefore, although the UN’s policy statements 
around gender issues in Sierra Leone may indicate a certain degree of commitment to the 
issues, the reality is that the resources required to turn the commitments into practice were 
simply not there. As one UN official pointed out, “[SCR] 1325 is useful in the Sierra Leonean 
context because it provides the legal framework for greater involvement of women, the 
greater recognition and involvement of women. But what is needed is to pour the resources 
into making that greater involvement a reality. If you want women to be involved you have to 
empower them. It takes resources to empower them.”151
Belief in a trade-off between stability now and equality later is widespread, and leads to 
gender equality being framed as a ‘long-term luxury’ that can be focused on after other more 
immediate concerns are dealt with (Pankhurst, 2004: 3). However, as Pankhurst points out, 
“negative peace [can] be achieved in conditions of extreme gender inequality with no 
‘efficiency imperative’ to push for change, and sexual politics not sufficiently developed to 
make it a problem not to change” (2004: 13). Thus, the separation of the two objectives in 
post-conflict contexts can be rationalised by donors as ‘unnecessary’ resulting in gender 
issues being put to the side, to be addressed after more immediate imperatives have been dealt
150 Interview with various UN officials in 2005 and 2006.
151 Interview with Jebbeh Forster, UNIFEM, Freetown, 27 June 2006.
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with. In particular, tokenistic approaches need to be resisted. “The UN needs to make it 
[gender mainstreaming] mandatory. The perception is that you can live without it [...] people 
see gender as a choice and this is a problem.”152
5.3.3 Key internal obstacles to gender mainstreaming
The issue of organisational obstacles to mainstreaming gender is not new. Despite the long 
history of the women in development, gender and development, and gender mainstreaming 
movements, the policy-practice gap in terms of actually implementing gender-related rhetoric 
is a consistent feature of the development field. The peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone is 
no exception. Research in the country repeatedly demonstrated the consistent failure of the 
UN agencies to take gender issues on board, or to accord them any priority or centrality to the 
peacebuilding process.
The UN approach to peacebuilding dictates a hierarchy of issues, usually defined by the 
external actors working in their different silos, and this leaves little space for developing more 
context-specific, or gender-sensitive, responses. This can be seen in the decisions that were 
made in relations to structure, budgeting and positioning of the gender affairs staff. According 
to UNAMSIL’s gender advisor, there was no continuous mechanism to help foster gender 
mainstreaming, and there was little capacity to address it.153 Furthermore, the shoestring 
budget of her office and the fact that there was only one gender advisor was in direct conflict 
with the massive mandate of ensuring that UNAMSIL adopts a gender perspective.154 
According to another official working with UNDP, “personally, I think that mainstreaming 
means just drop it”.155
152 Interview with Theresa Kambobe, UNAMSIL Gender Advisor, Freetown, 25 May 2005.
153 Ibid.
154 According to Kambobe, the budget for the gender unit is approximately $20,000, a tiny figure when 
contrasted with the estimated $1.5 million a day price-tag for UNAMSIL.
155 Interview with Bauke van Weringh, UNDP Transition Support Team, Freetwon, 4 May 2005
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The UNIFEM advisor in Sierra Leone was limited by the lack of funds and resources, as well 
as being marginalised within UNDP and UNCT decision-making processes. For example, the 
various reports and submissions by the UNCT to the Secretary-General and other UN bodies 
were only shared with UNIFEM at a stage where it is too late for the required changes to be 
made so that a gender perspective could be integrated.156 The case of the UN Gender Theme 
Group also demonstrates the lack of political will and perceived ‘unimportance’ of gender 
issues.
While limited resources are a problem, it is also one of technical capability and commitment, 
and accountability of senior management to integrate gender issues. For example, although 
one male UN worker attended the GTG, on the whole the gender focal points in Sierra Leone 
were female staff members who do not possess the authority to influence decision-making 
within their organisation.157 In order for the GTG to be truly effective the Resident 
Representative, or at least senior-level managers within each of the agencies would need to 
attend. As stated by one civil society activist, “the problem with UN agencies is that unless 
someone is pushing for change [in relation to gender issues] then nothing will happen”.158
According to a senior UN official in UNAMSIL, efforts to promote women’s empowerment 
by the mission were nominal, in part due to the lack of capacity and manpower. “I can say 
this was a major weakness on our part [...] we did not give it the attention that it requires. But 
you know as in everything, there is a time for things. Sometimes it is a question of demand 
and supply also.”159 From 2004 and onwards, delegations from New York, including the 
DPKO senior gender advisor, periodically made trips to Sierra Leone, and this high-level 
support also assisted UNAMSIL to make more effort to integrate the resolution into the
156 Interview with Jebbeh Forster, UNIFEM, Freetown, 27 June 2006.
157 This is based on observation of these meetings in 2005. Paul Sengeh, a Monitoring and Evaluation 
Officer, was one of UNICEF’s two gender focal points at that time.
158 Interview with Yasmin Jusu-Sherrif, Marwopnet, 26th May 2005.
159 Interview with Gebremehdin Hagoss, Chief Peace and Governance Section, UNIOSIL, 29 June 
2006.
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mission’s work. These lessons also apply to the other UN agencies where structural 
placement, leadership and accountability are key to support the gender focal points and to 
enable them to have a concrete impact.
In addition to the financial resource constraints, the lack of human resources and technical 
capacity within the UNCT and broader donor and national community was a significant 
obstacle to effective gender mainstreaming. Aside from a few training workshops and 
distribution of resource packs and manuals, very little support or capacity-building was 
available to UN staff. The UNIFEM programme officer and UNAMSIL and UNIOSIL gender 
advisors were over-stretched and unable to meet the demands of integrating gender into the 
highly complex and multi-dimensional peacebuilding environment.
Furthermore, as a DFID evaluation of its work in Sierra Leone points out, “because of the 
conflict it is difficult to get access to reliable data for gender planning: until late 2004, 
poverty data from 1988 was being used” (Johnston 2005: 26). This lack of sex-disaggregated 
data and historical marginalisation of women from the public sphere and formal economy 
means that very little information about their political, economic and social status relative to 
men is available. Without this information it is difficult to plan and implement gender- 
sensitive programmes effectively, even were the policies and resources to do so are in place.
5.3.4 The failure to engage the local population
All the policies and strategies outlined in this chapter emphasised the importance of local 
ownership over the peacebuilding process. The UN’s policies should therefore be reflective of 
the national priorities that were identified with the GoSL and civil society organisations. 
However, as the assessment of civic engagement around the PRSP showed, the views of the
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population, and particularly of women, were not effectively sought out and integrated into the 
policy frameworks.160
Although some UN agencies are operating throughout Sierra Leone, there is a predominance 
of activities in Freetown and the district capitals and not enough sensitisation or outreach was 
done to ensure that the local population was aware of and able to engage in the identification 
of priority issues. It is notable that none of the UN bodies operating in Sierra Leone had 
gender advisors or focal points that were active at the district level. The limited gender 
capacity that was available to the UN system was concentrated in Freetown, and the resulting 
lack of awareness of these issues meant that few rural women were informed about or 
engaged on donor policies (Castillejo, 2008: 8).
The PCS and the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework both demonstrate the difference that 
can be made when civil society, including women’s organisations, are engaged in 
consultation processes during the policy drafting phase. There is consequently evidence that 
the peacebuilding discourse has evolved over time in Sierra Leone to incorporate the 
provisions of SCR 1325 and a more holistic understanding of how gender issues related to the 
overall peacebuilding process. However, even though these latter policies did include mention 
of gender equality and women’s empowerment, as chapter 6 will show, too often this 
remained a rhetorical rather than a real commitment.
This chapter has demonstrated the failure to integrate gender issues into the peacebuilding 
priorities or to mainstream gender throughout the structures and policies of the UN agencies 
in Sierra Leone. I have also argued that both the liberal feminist and liberal peacebuilding 
approaches, in particular their top-down and problem-solving natures, go some way to 
explaining these failures. The analysis will now turn to the implementation of the UN’s
160 Personal interview with Alpha Sankoh, ActionAid, 28 April 2005. See also ActionAid Sierra Leone, 
n.d.
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peacebuilding activities, considering each of the areas of security, governance and economic 
reform in turn. By exploring how and why gender issues were marginalised from these 
processes, the gendered biases and assumptions inherent in the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus will be unpacked. Furthermore, it will also shed light on the limitations of the 
UN’s liberal feminist approach to mainstreaming gender in peacebuilding.
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CHAPTER 6. LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING APPLIED: A 
GENDER PERSPECTIVE OF THE UN’S 
PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES IN SIERRA LEONE
There is evidence to show that women’s specific needs are often neglected in early 
recovery periods, on the grounds that, when ‘everything is urgent’, women’s 
concerns can be postponed to a less desperate moment. This approach relegates 
gender equality and women’s rights to a ‘special needs’ category, instead of 
recognizing that gender profoundly shapes the needs o f the entire population. Neglect 
of women’s needs (in particular for physical security, productive asset and income 
control, and access to decision-making) can impose serious costs on recovery, 
undermining the credibility of efforts to assert the re-rule o f law, and slowing 
economic recovery.161
Following on from the previous chapter’s focus on describing the key UN actors, policies and 
priorities in relation to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone from 2002 onwards, this chapter will 
turn to the actual programmes and activities that were implemented. Taking a thematic 
approach, it will cover the different pillars of the peacebuilding process led by the UN in 
Sierra Leone from 2002 until 2007, in order to determine to what extent, and how, gender 
issues were incorporated into these efforts. The chapter will also address the women and/or 
gender-specific initiatives undertaken by the UN, and the specific challenge of limited 
national capacity to further understand the limits of liberal feminist approaches. As the above 
quote illustrates, if gender issues are not integrated into the reconstruction process from the 
outset, the very sustainability and success of peacebuilding will be undermined.
The areas covered in this chapter include security and justice reform (DDR, SSR and justice 
sector reforms), governance reform (elections and decentralisation), and economic reform 
(poverty reduction and macroeconomic reforms), which have all been important emphases of 
the post-conflict recovery process in Sierra Leone. These thematic areas are indicative of the 
‘liberal peacebuilding’ emphasis on stability, democratisation and marketisation, as applied in 
Sierra Leone and other countries.
161 “Promoting gender equality in recovery and peacebuilding: Planning and financing, monitoring and 
accountability”, Consultation for the UN Secretary-General’s Report on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
and Early Recovery. Co-hosted by UNIFEM, UNDP and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, 28 
January 2009.
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Although the UN and other actors implicit in liberal peacebuilding tend to adopt a sectoral 
approach to peacebuilding, the reality is that these processes cannot be neatly divided up into 
different pillars or spheres. Economic issues, particularly poverty and unemployment, have 
clear consequences for security and stability, just as security, both physical and economic, are 
needed to enable the population to engage meaningfully with the political process. Therefore, 
although this chapter separates these processes in line with the taxonomy of peacebuilding 
used by the UN and other international actors, this division is assumed to be artificial and the 
interlinkages between the different sectors will be highlighted where particularly relevant, and 
further serves to demonstrate the limitations of liberal peacebuilding.
6.1 Establishing security
The three focus areas in relation to the justice and security sector reform (JSSR) process in 
Sierra Leone have been identified as DDR, SSR and transitional justice, particularly in 
relation to sexual violence and other human rights abuses committed during the conflict. 
These are all major programmes and reforms that necessitated the engagement of a broad 
range of stakeholders, and were rolled out throughout the country, although in some areas 
more successfully than others. Whilst there is a fairly extensive literature on the failures to 
integrate gender into the DDR process (de Watteville, 2002; Farr, 2002; Mazurana and 
Carlson, 2004; Schroven, 2006) and on the need for justice for survivors of the widespread 
sexual violence during the war (Amnesty International, 2006; Barnes, Albrecht and Olson, 
2007; Human Rights Watch, 2003) there is to date no study that considers the establishment 
of security, incorporating all aspects of SSR, DDR and transitional justice, in Sierra Leone 
from a gender perspective.
This section will consider each of these three areas in turn, concluding with a brief assessment 
of the security that has been, according to the UN, ‘successfully’ been established in Sierra
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Leone. Despite the insights of human security and feminist approaches that point to gender- 
differentiated security concerns (McKay, 2004), this section will argue that they have not 
been successfully addressed in the context of Sierra Leone.
6.1.1 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
As part of the peace negotiations and subsequent peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, a 
large-scale DDR program was launched with the support of the international community from 
1999-2002.162 The government’s National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (NCDDR) set up an Executive Secretariat in 1998 to oversee and monitor the 
implementation of the DDR process in the country. Although the DDR process was officially 
managed by the NCDDR, UNAMSIL was involved in disarming and demobilising the 
combatants, UNDP was involved in the reintegration programs, and the World Bank managed 
a multi-donor trust fund that financed the demobilisation process as well as supporting 
recovery and reintegration efforts through its community-driven development projects (Zhou, 
2009b: xviii). Another body, the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation (NCRRR)163 was mandated with the coordination of emergency and medium- 
term recovery efforts, particularly focusing on the community level.
SCR 1325 calls on all actors implementing peace negotiations to acknowledge special needs 
of women and girls in the context of DDR (UN, 2000d: para 8a and 13). However, as the 
peace accords were being negotiated in 1999, the reality was that little attention was being 
paid to the many female combatants and those associated with the fighting forces. This can 
partly be attributed to die fact that the Lomd Accords do not contain any specific provisions 
about gender and the DDR process, although as previously noted in chapter 4 they do mention 
the specific needs of women and girls in relation to reconstruction, rehabilitation and
162 The DDR process is estimated to have cost $100 million, far exceeding the original budget of $33.6 
million, the majority of which was administered through the World Bank (NCDDR, 2004: xii-xiii).
163 The NCRRR was succeeded by the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which was 
created by an Act of Parliament in 2001. NaCSA’s mandate is to build physical and social capital, 
support poverty reduction and sustainable development.
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development.164
UNAMSIL’s original mandate as set out in SCR 1270 and subsequent extensions of the 
peacekeeping mission affirm the UN’s support for the DDR process but fails to mention any 
specific issues in relation to women and girls, although children are mentioned as a 
category.165 The DDR process officially ended in February 2004, and according to official 
statistics the total number of individuals that went through the process was 71,043 (GoSL, 
2005a: 2).166 Of this number, it was stated that 4,751 were women and 6,787 were children. 
According to these statistics, girls numbered only 506.167
However, subsequent research has demonstrated that the presence of women and girls in 
fighting forces is often hidden by official numbers, and their real contribution and the impact 
that their involvement has on their future prospects for successful reintegration is 
overlooked.168 More detailed investigation of the DDR process in Sierra Leone has shown that 
while only 506 girls are recorded as having been demobilised, the actual number of girls 
associated with fighting forces during the conflict is estimated to be around 12,056, or 12% of 
total combatants (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004: 3).169 Conciliation Resources also estimates 
that up to 10,000 women fought with or were associated with the RUF, and of these, as many 
as 9,500 may have been abducted (1997). Therefore, this would indicate that the DDR 
process failed to reach and benefit the majority of girls and women who were involved in the 
conflict. Mazurana and Carlson’s research found that although the total number of 
participants increased with each phase of the DDR process, the proportion of females
164 Lom£ Accords, Article 28, para 2.
165 UN, 1999a.
166 These numbers can be further broken down as follows: a total o f 72,490 individuals were disarmed, 
71,043 of these were demobilized (including all the disarmed children), and 61,161 received reinsertion 
support.
16 The statistics on women and girls in the fighting forces are based on the findings of Mazurana and 
Carlson (2004): 2.
168 For further discussion of the gender dimensions of the DDR process in Sierra Leone see Mazurana 
and Carlson, 2004; Ollek, 2007; Schroven, 2006.
169 This figure is based on Mazurana and Carlson’s estimate of a total number of 137,856 combatants, 
48,216 of whom were children.
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remained at a relatively constant, and marginal, level (2004).
There are many reasons for the exclusion of women and girls from organised DDR processes. 
Possession of a weapon was often a pre-requisite for admission into the DDR sites, yet few 
women had a gun or ammunition of their own. Awareness-raising and sensitisation 
campaigns conducted during and in advance of the DDR processes failed to reach girls and 
young women and subsequently few were aware of the opportunities and benefits offered by 
these programs (Barnes, 2005). Fear, insecurity and intimidation were also further barriers to 
their participation. Many of the girls were used as sexual slaves during the conflict and 
suffered horrific physical, mental and sexual abuse at the hands of their abductors. As a result, 
many did not perceive the DDR camps to be a safe environment and were worried that they 
could suffer further harm if they entered into the process.170 There were also no women in the 
disarmament sensitisation committee (Coulter, 2005a: 4), which could have made it more 
difficult to reach out to the female ex-combatants.
Women and girls who did not go through the DDR process in Sierra Leone faced a number of 
ongoing problems and had specific needs that required targeted programming initiatives. 
Many of the girls and young women who were abducted gave birth as a result of the sexual 
abuse they suffered during the conflict and were responsible for caring for young children, 
often with no social network to rely on for support. Furthermore, they faced rejection, 
hostility and stigmatisation from their families and communities as a result of having been 
associated with the fighting forces, despite the fact that they were almost all abducted against 
their will.171 They were also often left with a range of health-related and psychological 
problems as a legacy of their time in the bush.
170 Interviews with UNICEF Freetown Child Protection staff members, March 2005.
171 Interview with Viktoria Jarr, Project Supervisor, Caritas Makeni, 14 March 2006.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, female ex-combatants faced massive socioeconomic 
challenges and were often unable to secure even the most basic needs such as food and 
shelter. The fact that so few of the girls associated with the fighting forces completed a basic 
education before they were implicated in the conflict further exacerbated their difficult 
situation.172 While young women and girls rarely pose a threat in terms of an increased risk in 
violence, if they are not empowered and provided with the tools to sustain a livelihood then 
the overall processes of community development, reconciliation and peacebuilding may be 
less sustainable. The sustainability of any peace is dependent on the engagement and 
participation of the local population and their willingness to invest in the future. If they are 
excluded from their families, lack the skills or access to resources to earn a living and make 
an economic contribution to their community and wield no power in decision-making then 
they will not be able to support a peacebuilding process (Anderlini, 2007; Meintjes, Pillay and 
Turshen, 2002).
It is also important to question the extent to which women and girls perceived that the DDR 
process would have even been beneficial to them. MacKenzie suggests that none of the 
former combatants that she interviewed indicated that they wanted to be part of the process, 
and that the process did not meet their needs such as looking after and providing for children 
bom during the war (2009: 250). However, the interviews carried out for this research pointed 
to the fact that while some former combatants may not have wanted to be part of the process, 
this was most often due to incorrect perceptions about the aims and objectives of DDR as 
opposed to believing that they would be better off without the support of a reintegration 
programme.
172 During interviews carried out in Makeni and Kono in March 2005, the lack o f formal education and 
skills was repeatedly cited by girl ex-combatants as a major obstacle to their ability to return to civilian 
life and earn a sustainable income. Personal interviews, Makeni (14-16 March 2005) and Kono (29 
March-1 April 2005).
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Despite the much-lauded ‘successful’ DDR process in the country it appears that the UN 
failed to ensure the integration of gender issues despite its repeated commitments to do so. 
The evaluation of UNAMSIL’s gender work found that more effort should have been made to 
integrate ex-combatant women and girls, the various toolkits and manuals that exist to guide 
policymakers should have been used173, and women should have been better integrated into 
structures like the NCDDR (Date-Bah, 2006: 40). Notably, the 2003 evaluation of UNAMSIL 
by DPKO barely mentions the needs of women and girls, except for noting them as a ‘special 
group’, and fails to make any specific recommendations on how they could be better served 
by the DDR process (UN DPKO, 2003a: 26-7). This reflects the fact that they tended to be an 
invisible group in the DDR process, and where addressed, their needs were an ‘add-on’ to the 
main task of DDR which was demobilising the male combatants.174 Again, this resonates with 
the assumptions of liberal feminism.
To illustrate some of the limitations of the UN’s assistance to women and girls in the DDR 
process, two projects will be briefly discussed. First, given the massive obstacles facing girl 
ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, UNICEF put in place a project that specifically targeted their 
needs in a number of key areas. This project, known as the Girls Left Behind Project (GLB), 
was launched in March 2002. According to the initial guidelines and standards drawn up for 
the project, it was designed to be a “one-time short-term intensive intervention” to be 
completed by the end of March 2004.175 Operating in Bombali and Kono Districts, this project 
was implemented by two partners: Caritas Makeni in Makeni and Kamakwie, and 
Cooperazione Intemazionale (COOPI) in Koidu Town.176 These implementing partners then
173 For example, Douglas et al., 2004; Farr, 2002; Anderlini and Conaway, 2004; UNDDA, 2001 and 
2003.
174 A similar point has been observed in relation to the DDR processes in the Great Lakes Region 
(Schroeder, 2005: 6).
175 See “Guidelines and Standards for the Girls Left Behind Project (girls that were abducted)”, 
UNICEF Sierra Leone 2002. On the basis of requests by the implementing partners and the ongoing 
needs o f the beneficiaries, the project was extended until the end of 2005.
176 It is important to note that until 2004, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) was also an 
implementing partner for the GLB project in Koidu. Although Caritas Makeni operates in both Makeni 
and Kamakwie, only beneficiaries living in the Makeni area were interviewed.
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linked up with grassroots organisations and training centres who also carried out activities to 
support the reintegration of the girls and young women.
The GLB project was designed to have a number of different impacts (social, economic, and 
psychosocial) and targeted both the individual and community-level (Barnes, 2005). Although 
it did bring specific advantages to the beneficiaries, the limited scope of the project and the 
massive socioeconomic challenges facing these girls meant that the types of interventions that 
UNICEF designed were not sustainable in the long-term (ibid). In addition, although 
important, these small-scale projects that targeted specific groups of women did not solve the 
problem of the continued marginalisation of gender issues from the mainstream DDR process, 
through which the majority of funding is channelled. The total budget of the GLB project was 
very small in comparison to the total expenditure of the DDR process which was estimated at 
$100 million (NCDDR, 2004: xii-xiii).
Second, the UNDP Reintegration Opportunities Programme provided skills training, toolkits 
and a ‘reinsertion benefit’ to ex-combatants to assist their reintegration, up until June 2004.177 
However, there were many flaws in this and other reintegration projects where there was no 
prior analysis of what types of training to provide.178 The marketability of training is 
particularly important in a post-conflict economy with high unemployment rates such as 
Sierra Leone. There was also little support for ex-combatants returning to their communities, 
and those communities were also not involved in the reintegration projects.179 Finally, the 
sustainability of the employment opportunities was limited, exacerbated by the fact that many 
beneficiaries sold their toolkits for quick cash leaving them unable to earn a sustainable
177 For more details o f this project, see http://www.unddr.org/countrvprogrammes.php?c=60. The main 
elements of the reinsertion and reintegration programme was to provide reinsertion benefits, short-term 
employment opportunities and skills training programmes, and referral and counselling services to 
enhance reintegration into the community (NCDDR, 2002: 8). 54,439 people went through the 
reintegration programme receiving support and skills training in different areas (Vocational training 
and apprenticeship: 28,901; Formal education: 12,182; Agriculture: 9,231; Job placement: 444; Others: 
364). See http://www.unddr.org/countrvprogrammes.php?c=60.
178 Interview with Dr Salua Nour, GTZ, 17 January 2008.
179 Interviews with Alpha Sankoh, ActionAid, 28 April 2005 and Viktoria Jarr, Caritas Makeni, 14 
March 2006.
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livelihood. According to a senior UNDP official, “the choice of name, Reintegration 
Opportunities Programme, was inaccurate as it was not properly addressing reintegration 
from the perspective of community strengthening and involvement but solely focussing on the 
immediate needs of the ex-combatants, without contributing to the rehabilitation or creation 
of sustainable institutions. It was more of a time-buying concept” (Ljunggren and Molly, 
cited in Kaldor with Vincent, n.d.: 18).
It is now recognised that women played a largely unrecognised role in supporting 
reintegration at the community level, through maintaining a domestic base and discouraging 
ex-combatants from returning to the influence of their commanders (Molloy, 2004: 18).180 
The focus on the formal DDR process meant that these vital roles that women were fulfilling 
at the community level were not capitalised on, despite the potential they offered for 
strengthening the reintegration of combatants following the end of the conflict. The focus, as 
evidenced by the emphasis on young men in DDR programmes, is usually on meeting the 
needs of those who were involved in the fighting and who present an immediate threat to the 
resumption of armed violence.
However, the reality is that those who suffered need to benefit from the dividends of peace as 
well. According to one UN staff member, “The people whose lives were shattered by war 
need to be rebuilt. You can’t just protect or keep paying those who fall foul of the law”.181 
The final evaluation of the DDR process found that “the political imperatives [of the DDR 
process] were at odds with optimal program implementation, and political imperatives carried 
the day” (NCDDR, 2004: xii). The lack of gender-sensitivity was a further victim of the 
political imperatives and as a result the process was carried out in a gender-blind fashion. 
This links to critiques to the top-down approach of the UN resulting in a failure to address the 
real needs of the people, especially women. Although the UN eventually added some women
180 The role o f women in informally supporting reintegration of ex-combatants and the displaced in 
their communities will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
181 Interview with Jebbeh Forster, UNIFEM, Freetown, 16 July 2007.
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in to the DDR process, such a liberal feminist approach fails to challenge the political 
imperatives and the dominant discourse and practices.
It is indicative of the failure to recognise the centrality of gender issues to peacebuilding, that 
the NCDDR’s final report on the process notes that “there are two ways of incorporating 
women and girls into DDR programs: by adopting a gender-neutral approach or a gender- 
sensitive one. NCDDR adopted a gender-neutral approach, and it is widely agreed that 
females did not fully benefit from this” (NCDDR, 2004: ix). In reality, it is not possible to 
take a gender-neutral approach, since any action will affect men and women differently given 
their different status, roles and access to and control over resources, even if this impact is 
unintentional. The failure to differentiate between these factors can result in a perpetuation of 
inequalities or can exacerbate the marginalisation of vulnerable groups, in this case women 
and girls. Clearly, adding a few women in did not change the power dynamics or structures 
of DDR, which, as has been shown, marginalised women and gender concerns.
The reintegration phase of the DDR process also played a particular role in re-affirming 
traditional stereotypes of both men and women (Schroven, 2006: 82-3). While women 
received minimal benefits and skills training in female-dominated trades such as gara tie- 
dyeing and soap-making, men were expected to assume the role of head of household and 
received provisions for their families on this basis. However, they faced many similar 
challenges in finding gainful employment, compounded by the loss of identity and place 
within the militarised, masculine hierarchies of the fighting forces. For example, male former 
ex-combatants in Bo found that the skills-training programmes were too short in duration or 
not targeted for viable employment opportunities, leaving them unemployed and struggling to 
reintegrate into their communities.182 As a result, many turned to riding motorbike taxis to 
earn a living, and established a Bike Riders Association to provide support and combat 
negative perceptions within the community, many of whom initially felt threatened by the
182 Focus group discussion with members of the Bo Bike Riders Association, Bo, 21 July 2007.
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young men. Therefore it was also difficult for men, especially young men, to counter 
assumptions that they were a volatile and potentially violent group who could not be 
effectively reintegrated into the community.183
Although their roles in fighting forces during the conflict, as combatants or otherwise, may 
have resulted in shifts in power dynamics between men and women, it is not clear that in the 
post-conflict phase women have greater opportunities. According to MacKenzie, the roles of 
women during conflict have been depoliticised and as a result they have not been targeted as 
primary beneficiaries by the DDR process in Sierra Leone (2009a: 257): “the reintegration 
process for men has been emphasized as vital to the transition from war to peace while the 
reintegration process for females has been deemed a social concern and has been moralized as 
a return to normal” (ibid: 259). Furthermore, “eliminating women from the category of 
soldier and security priority also removes them from significant policy discourse” (ibid: 257). 
In Sierra Leone, women and girls were not seen as ‘real’ soldiers, and ensuring their 
involvement in the DDR process was not seen as a security issue or one with implications for 
the broader peacebuilding process.
Schroven suggests that the DDR process reveals many different ‘gendered categories’, such 
as ex-combatant, bush-wife or victim, and that women could choose which to identify 
themselves with (2006: 111-114). The consequence, however, was that these categories were 
still depoliticised by the DDR process and so did not enable them to challenge dominant 
approaches and attitudes towards gender issues. Where they were acknowledged, women 
were just seen as victims needing protection and an opportunity was missed apply a true 
gender analysis to the process, thereby challenging and potentially transforming essentialised 
roles of men and women in post-conflict Sierra Leone. “It becomes obvious that women were 
not totally excluded from the DDR in Sierra Leone but given certain roles and possibilities 
not matching the expectations of gender mainstreaming policies within the UN system”
183 Ibid.
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(Schroven, 2006: 118). This is a clear illustration of the add women and stir approach 
discussed in chapter 3.
The evidence therefore supports the argument that the DDR process in Sierra Leone failed to 
target both men and women, with serious consequences for the reintegration of women and 
girls into society. This is despite the fact that the need to include women and girls in these 
processes is explicitly mentioned in SCR 1325, and the relevant UN agencies were already 
beginning to issue guidelines about how to address this need.184 According to a UN official 
who was closely involved in the DDR process, “One unequivocal admission by all 
stakeholders in the delivery of the peace is that the process failed women, not only as 
beneficiaries but also as participants with a huge potential to deliver an improved peace 
process” (Molloy, 2004: 16).
In the case of DDR, therefore, women’s needs were overlooked and they did not benefit from 
the process. The UN only supported the formal DDR process, with the result that although 
women’s organisations did step in to fill some of the gaps they did not receive adequate 
support, given that they were largely working informally. This point will be picked up on 
again in chapter 7, where the contributions of women’s organisation will be assessed in more 
detail. The result was that by seeing women as victims rather than actors in the DDR process, 
they were only added in as an afterthought rather than being seen as central to the process of 
re-establishing security through DDR.
6.1.2 Security sector reform
Security sector reform was a key priority in Sierra Leone, entailing reform of the various 
security actors and structures to enhance transparency, effectiveness and accountability.185 
The SSR process was explicitly linked with poverty reduction and was implemented in
184 For example, see UN DDA, 2001.
185 For a more detailed description of the security sector, see Albrecht and Malan, 2006: 114-115.
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support of pillar one of the PRSP (Albrecht and Malan, 2006: 114). UNAMSIL initially 
assumed responsibility for security in Sierra Leone following the conflict, but this 
responsibility was transferred back to the government following the departure of the 
peacekeeping force in December 2005.
SCR 1325 and the Lome peace agreement do not make any specific references to SSR or its 
gender dimensions. However, during the 2007 open debate on SSR, the UN Security Council 
affirmed gender equality as one of the fundamental principles guiding SSR processes (Hanggi 
and Scherrer, 2007: 4). SCR 1436 on UNAMSIL was the first time the UN Security Council 
referred specifically to the strengthening of the security sector in the context of a 
peacekeeping mission, although the police and judicial reform had previously been mentioned 
(Hanggi and Scherrer, 2007: 11). UNAMSIL therefore did have an explicit mandate to 
support SSR in Sierra Leone.
Very few of the existing analyses of the SSR process in Sierra Leone incorporate a gender 
perspective, making it difficult to assess the impact of these reforms on gender roles and 
relations. Although actors in the security sector generally exclude gender issues from 
consideration, security has a gender dimension and security actors impact directly on gender 
roles and relations (Bastick and Valasek, 2008; Sjoberg, 2010; Tickner, 2001: 61-64). 
Elements within the army and police committed sexual violations during the conflict, and 
both institutions remained dominated by and biased towards men. The militarised culture 
within the security sector exacerbated and institutionalised sexual and gender-based violence, 
making it even more challenging to deal with these issues in the rank and file of the RSLAF 
and SLP in the peacebuilding phase. Although it is not always seen as such, violence against 
women is also a critical issue that needs to be addressed by SSR (Vlachova and Biason, 
2003).
Women have traditionally been excluded from the security sector, and it is not clear that the
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SSR process has opened the door to their participation or to the integration of gender 
perspectives into the work of the key structures. As part of the SSR process, the Provincial 
Security Committees (PROSECs) and District Security Committees (DISECs) were set up as 
regional forums for local stakeholders to discuss security concerns, and to provide an entry 
point for civil society input.186 From the beginning women were underrepresented on the 
PROSECs and DISECs and it is not clear to what degree women’s civil society groups have 
been systematically engaged (Barnes et al, 2007: 23). The PROSECs and DISECs could act 
as a useful channel to transmit gender-related security concerns to the government, but they 
appear to rarely consider gender issues.187 There is therefore a gap in awareness among the 
local population about the potential benefits of the SSR process, and a significant need for 
training of the members of the security committees on gender issues and GBV in particular. 
This is a direct result of the top-down way that SSR was implemented in Sierra Leone, and 
has an impact on how security was conceptualised and what needs were prioritized in the 
post-conflict phase.
The focus on formal SSR reforms not only resulted in a failure to adequately incorporate the 
security needs and perceptions of people living in rural areas, but it also overlooked informal 
security threats and provision. For example, groups of young men, also known as the ‘area 
boys’, are emerging as vigilantes within their communities and can pose a significant security 
threat, but they are not being engaged in the SSR process.188 These perceptions of exclusion 
and marginalisation can have serious consequences for the long-term sustainability of the 
peace in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, while some advances are being made in legislation and 
awareness about human rights as well as training of the police, the justice sector infrastructure
186 Reports from the DISECs and PROSECs are channelled up to the Office of National Security. For 
more information, see Albrecht and Malan, 2006: 118-121.
187 Interview with Rosalind Hanson-Alp, Conciliation Resources, 17 July 2007.
188 Interview with Jeanette Eno, ENCISS, 17 July 2007.
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and capacity is not necessarily keeping up with these reforms and access to justice for men 
and women alike and rule of law across the country were still lacking.189
Despite the fact that gender issues have been largely left out of the SSR process, there were 
two areas where some effort was made by the UN to support gender-sensitive reforms: 
training and the establishment of the Family Support Units (FSUs). First, some human rights 
issues have been integrated into the retraining of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
(RSLAF) and the SLP.190 UN agencies were responsible for running a number of training 
sessions with members of the RSLAF and SLP. For example, in May 2007, UNIOSIL along 
with UNIFEM, UNICEF and UNDP held a workshop on SCR 1325 to build the capacity of 
middle career officers in the RSLAF to respect and respond to human rights issues in the 
course of their work.191 A key problem is assessing the impact of these kinds of training, and 
if there is no follow-up, and support in the form of technical guidance and resources then the 
likelihood of the officers taking the issues on board is limited. The SLP now has guidelines 
outlining what should be done if an allegation of physical or sexual assault or sexual 
exploitation of children is received, but comprehensive guidelines on the full range of gender 
issues is still lacking.
Second, the Family Support Units within the SLP were established in 2001, initially with a 
focus on domestic violence but they have now expanded out to deal with other incidences of 
sexual violence.192 As of July 2006, FSUs were established in 26 locations across the country,
189 Presentation by Kadi Fakondo (Assistant Inspector General, SLP) at a workshop on SSR, Freetown, 
16 January 2008.
190 Reform of the RSLAF was lead by the British-led International Military Advisory and Training 
Team (IMATT), which was tasked with rebuilding the RSLAF into an effective, professional and 
democratically accountable force. The SLP reforms were lead by DFID through the Commonwealth 
Community Safety and Security Project.
191 “UNCT holds sensitization workshop on gender, democracy and human rights for middle career 
officers of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF)”, Reliefweb, 28 May 2007. 
http://www.reliefWeb.int/rw/rwb.nsf7db900sid/LSGZ-73PGLF?QpenDocument&querv=gender 
women&cc=sle&rc=l fAccessed 28/9/08]
192 The FSUs were established largely on the initiative of Kadi Fakondo, Assistant Inspector-General of 
the SLP, who was working in Kissy at the time and identified domestic violence as a problem that the 
police had little capacity to address.
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including eight in the Freetown area. The FSUs have a memorandum of understanding with 
the MSWGCA and also work in partnership with INGOs and local NGOs for health, medical 
and psychosocial support services. UNAMSIL has been involved in the provision of some 
gender training to FSU staff (UNSG, 2003b: 12).
Another key element of the FSU’s work was community outreach to inform the population 
about the consequences of GBV and to raise awareness about the role and responsibility of 
FSUs, as well as the need to press charges against perpetrators. Trained social workers 
provided by the MSWGCA were supposed to be stationed in every FSU to ensure that women 
and children were not re-victimized in the interviewing process. However, due to lack of 
capacity in the MSWGCA, as of 2007, social workers were only attached to about 30% of the 
FSUs, although this rose to 75% in Freetown.193 The SLP received training alongside 
MSWGCA officials, and in 2007 SLP officials went to Liberia to train police there in the 
criminal investigation of sexual violence cases. Despite some improvements, insensitivity and 
lack of response to GBV has remained a problem (Refugees International, 2004). There is 
also a need to ensure that all SLP officers, not just those affiliated with FSUs, are able to 
identify and address all incidents of sexual violence appropriately.
Whilst an important step, there are still many limitations to the FSUs. For example, although 
the FSUs aim to maintain confidentiality, the limited office space in many police stations, 
particularly upcountry, means that interviews often take place in full view of the public. This 
puts the victim at risk of stigmatisation and may deter some individuals from reporting GBV- 
related incidents. Furthermore, the FSUs are over-stretched, lacking even basic office 
supplies, and they are not able to cover all rural areas where many of the crimes are 
committed (Barnes et al, 2008: 24). FSU officers are also involved in family mediation which 
can be positive, but can also encourage families to settle their differences informally, which 
may not be in the interest of the victim. Though this may inadvertently reinforce social
193 Interview with Jeneba Koroma, MSWGCA, 13 June 2006.
198
pressure and stigma, it may reflect the fact that there are no alternative options for victims to 
seek protection, shelter and sustenance outside the home and illustrates that while they are a 
positive initiative, the FSUs are under-resourced.
To compensate for some of these obstacles, community-based organisations in Bo and 
Kenema have procedures for accompanying the survivors to the FSUs to report the crimes if 
they come to their drop-in centres for assistance. The staff of these organisations have built up 
relationships with the FSU officials which enables them to access the proper assistance more 
quickly and effectively, and also reduces the likelihood of requests for payment or bribes 
passing hands. Although the reform and training of the SLP as part of the FSUs workplan is 
important, it is only a minority of the population who actually feel the presence of the SLP in 
rural areas.
According to the SLP’s annual crime report for 2005, sexual offences count for only 2.8% 
(SLP, 2006: 12). Given the widespread sexual violence that has been documented, these 
figures seem to indicate a relatively low level of reporting or follow-through by the police 
since a higher figure would have been expected. Furthermore, there is no mention of the need 
to tackle sexual violence in the SLP’s Draft Medium-term Strategic Plan for 2006-2008, 
indicating yet again the deprioritisation of these issues (SLP, 2005). The SLP does have an 
accelerated training programme and a formal quota system with the aim of increasing the 
number of women to 30%, but obstacles such as a lack of confidence in the SLP, corruption 
and favouritism continue to prevent women from joining the new community-based policing 
force. As of the end of 2007, only 1,550 out of 9,200 police personnel (less than 17%) were 
female (UNSG, 2007b: 4).
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DFID has led reform of the SLP, and evaluations of their two programmes in support of 
police reform demonstrate the consistent lack of gender sensitivity af heitr efforts.194 It has 
therefore been important that UNIFEM and the UNAMSIL gender advisor lhave also worked 
with the SLP to ensure that officers have access to some gender trailing. DNGOs such as the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) that set up three sexual assaiit aid referral clinics in 
Sierra Leone have also played an important role in facilitating interface between the SLP’s 
FSUs and victims of sexual violence, whilst also supporting the work of 'community-based 
organisations.
The case of Sierra Leone illustrates the fact that during the peacebuilding process it is 
generally the external actors -  principally the UN -  who determine tbe point at which the 
security of a population has been achieved. Rarely do these actors consult with the local 
populations to attain a better understanding of how they define their ovn (insecurity, with 
the result that externally imposed notions become the standard points of reference. Here 
again, it is possible to see the impact of the liberal peacebuilding approach. The SSR process 
in Sierra Leone, despite the emphasis on human security in the peacebuilding rhetoric, has 
tended to focus on issues of national security, strengthening the core formal structures of 
security provision, and has failed to fully integrate men and women’s perceptions of security. 
Hanggi and Scherrer find that “the extent to which gender issues are mainstreamed into SSR 
activities on the ground still largely depends on the level of cooperation between the gender 
section and the various entities of the mission involved in such activities [...] cross-cutting 
activities such as gender mainstreaming are still rarely part of, or at least linked to, integrated 
missions SSR programmes” (2007: 11).
194 DFID was one of the leading agencies in supporting the SSR process, and despite trying to address 
security in a holistic way they have also acknowledged that their security work in Sierra Leone also 
failed to integrate a gender perspective. Having identified this as a gap, in mid-2007 they were 
planning to engage a gender expert to identify potential openings for future work. This information was 
obtained during a personal interview with Rebecca Stringer, DFID, Freetown, 17 July 2006.
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The analysis above has shown that the SSR process focused on the formal security institutions 
and actors. The result was that it did not necessarily address the security needs of the broader 
population, particularly in rural areas where men and women had little access to these formal 
structures. The efforts of the UN to add some women in did not succeed in changing which 
security needs were addressed or prioritised, nor did these efforts recognise the fact that the 
security structures themselves continued to be an ongoing source of insecurity for many 
women.
6.1.3 Justice sector reforms
As noted in Chapter 4, the coexistence of formal, customary and Islamic law makes for a 
complex legal environment, with the majority of the population resorting to customary 
structures for justice-related issues. Justice sector reform has been a key priority of the 
peacebuilding process, given the role that the lack of accountability and access to justice 
played in the conflict. The Lome Peace Agreement stipulated the creation of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a Human Rights Commission (HRC). These 
mechanisms were designed to deal with the massive human rights abuses that had occurred 
during the conflict, and the serious violations that were still occurring in some parts of the 
country.
UNAMSIL was mandated to support law enforcement in the country, and several UN 
agencies took on justice sector reform as a priority. Although gender-specific justice issues 
were not mentioned in either the Lome peace accords or UNAMSIL’s mandates, SCR 1325 
calls on all parties to adopt gender-sensitive measures that “ensure the protection of and 
respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the 
electoral system, the police and the judiciary” (UN, 2000d: article 8c). There were two areas 
where specific efforts were made to advance the rights of women and to ensure that a gender 
perspective informed the transitional justice process in the country. These were in the work of
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the TRC and the reform of discriminatory legislation, and each will be discussed in further 
detail in this section.
The TRC Act instructed that special attention should be given to the issue of sexual violence 
(GoSL, 2000a: 6.2.b). Women were also encouraged to participate and testify before both the 
TRC and the Special Court of Sierra Leone.195 Similarly, efforts were made to sensitise 
women about the truth and reconciliation process and to train women to act as testimonial - 
takers. Victims of GBV were given the opportunity to testify in private, although some 
women did prefer to speak openly about the abuses that they had suffered. In addition to the 
testimonies, individuals and organisations were also invited to make submissions to the 
thematic hearings on women and children. These documents constitute a vital source of 
information about the impact of conflict on women, particularly with respect to GBV.196
However, although the TRC was mandated to specifically investigate crimes against women, 
the Commission’s staff had little knowledge or experience in these issues (Ben-Ari and 
Harsch, 2005: 2). According to UNIFEM’s regional programme director for Anglophone 
West Africa, “One commissioner said he went to a community where he was leading a team 
of recorders that were collective testimonies. The women did not come out, only the men 
came. When they were asked why, the men said ‘we can speak for the women’” (Florence 
Butegwa, quoted in Ben-Ari and Harsch, 2005: 3). This illustrates the importance of 
understanding gendered power dynamics, and the impact that they can have on the 
implementation of peacebuilding activities. Simply removing the obstacles for women’s 
participation is often not enough to transform discriminatory attitudes and practices.
195 The Special Court of Sierra Leone, established jointly but the UN and the GoSL, is mandated with 
trying those deemed to bear the greatest responsibility for the war-related violence that occurred in 
Sierra Leone from 30 November 1996. For more information, see http://www.sc-sl.org.
196 See TRC Report (2005), Appendix 2.
http://www.trcsierraleone.org/pdfyAPPENDICES/Appendix%202%20-%20Submissions.pdf.
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UNIFEM and UNAMSIL’s gender advisor actively supported the TRC and were involved in 
the Women’s Task Force that was set up in 2001 to support the Commission in upholding its 
responsibility to pay special attention to the issue of sexual violence. For example, in April 
2003, UNIFEM and Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights carried out the first 
workshop on gender-based human rights violations for the TRC Commissioners. This 
workshop covered issues such as the impact of the conflict on women, the need for gender- 
sensitivity in taking the testimonies of women and girls, and the skills necessary to deal with 
victims, witnesses and perpetrators of gender-based crimes.197
On the one hand, UNIFEM’s work to ensure that women were able to testify and that gender- 
related crimes were considered by the TRC had a positive impact and enabled women to 
break their silence about GBV and allowed their voices to be reflected in the findings of the 
Commission (Ben-Ari and Hirsch, 2005: 1). On the other hand and despite these efforts, there 
was still considerable reluctance to testify and fears of retribution amongst much of the 
population, including girls and women (Denov, 2006: 335).
The TRC report was submitted to the President on 5 October 2004, with it being finalised and 
distributed in both print and electronic form in the latter half of 2005. The TRC report 
provides an excellent, in-depth overview of the status of women.198 However, the problem 
was in the implementation of the recommendations that the Kabbah (and subsequently 
Koroma) government, despite successive commitments to do so, had yet to take any action on 
by the end of 2007.199
197 “UNIFEM and Urgent Action Fund support peace-building process in Sierra Leone” Reliejweb, 17 
April 2003. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-
64CUB8?OpenDocument&query=gender women&cc=sle&rc=l {Accessed 24/9/08]
198 The specific recommendations on women are organised into the following categories: Women 
Affected by the Armed Conflict, Domestic Violence, Sexual Violence, Sexual Offences under 
Customary Law, Police, Prosecutors and Judicial Officers, Discrimination against Women, Minimum 
Age of Marriage of Girls, Skills Training and Economic Empowerment, War Widows, Education, 
Access to Justice, HIV/ AIDS, Gender Commission, Political Participation and Access to Power, 
Developing Leadership, Achieving Equality, and The Most Vulnerable.
199 Although no efforts were made to implement the TRC recommendations within the time period of 
this research, in mid-2008 a grant from the Peacebuilding Fund to support the implementation of a
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The second area of justice reform where specific attention was paid to gender issues was the 
reform of discriminatory legislation. Following the end of the war, the government set up a 
Law Reform Commission (LRC) of seven Commissioners.200 The LRC was designed to 
evaluate the laws of Sierra Leone and bring them up to date to reflect the current situation in 
the country, as well as enhance links between the central justice system and customary law. In 
July 2003, UNIFEM and UNICEF supported the MSWGCA, the IRC and the LRC to hold a 
three-day workshop entitled “Building a Women’s Law Reform Agenda” 
(MSWGCA/IRC/LRC, 2003). Given the existence of discriminatory legislation, women’s 
activists and other representatives of civil society had for some time been calling for reform, 
and the workshop was convened with the intention of developing a plan of action to initiate 
such a process. As a result six key areas for action were identified including education and 
training, violence against women, and succession and inheritance (MSWGCA/IRC/LRC, 
2003).
Reforming the legislative structures in Sierra Leone is absolutely critical in terms of 
supporting gender equality, since laws that uphold the rights of women will give them the 
tools they need to protect themselves. This kind of legal reform process sits well within the 
liberal feminist approach that prioritises formal equality in the law. However, the process 
cannot stop here since the formal law in Sierra Leone only has limited reach and accessibility. 
Limited awareness of laws and legal processes is exacerbated by low literacy rates, and 
therefore the wide dissemination of the reformed laws amongst the local population as well as 
judges, magistrates and lawyers is a necessary step.201
reparations programme as part of the TRC recommendations was agreed. This one-year, $3 million 
grant, goes some way towards kick-starting the implementation of the recommendations, but despite 
commitments to the contrary the government of Ernest Bai Koroma has been slow to begin the process.
200 During the case study period, only one o f the LRC Commissioners was a woman.
201 Interview with Amie Tejan-Kella, IRC, Freetown, 5 July 2006.
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The challenge of regulating uncodified customary law practices and changing attitudes 
towards GBV specifically and discrimination against women in general also remains critical: 
“The fact that the state in Sierra Leone has traditionally relegated those issues of most 
importance to women to the ‘private’ sphere and the control of customary authorities has had 
profound implications for women’s rights and participation in governance” (Castillejo, 2008: 
3). This approach echoes the emphasis of liberal feminist approaches on removing barriers 
such as discriminatory legislation. However, by focusing on law reform the UN agencies did 
not devote adequate attention to questions of capacity for implementation and the obstacles 
presented by cultural and gendered power dynamics on any new rights that women were 
afforded under the law.
The Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights (PCHR) and several civil society 
organisations, including Lawyers Commission for Legal Assistance (LAWCLA), Lawyers 
Yearning for Equality, Rights and Social Justice (LAWYERS) and Marwopnet have been 
leading the efforts to advocate for reform of laws that are particularly discriminatory towards 
women, including those on customary marriages, property inheritance and sexual offences. 
While the LRC indicated support for reforming laws that discriminate against women, their 
actual commitment and political will for moving this agenda forward was limited. The 
international community and women’s groups played a critical role in pressuring the 
parliamentarians and advocating for the law reform process to move forward. Although the 
process of drafting these bills constitutes a significant achievement, it was hampered by a lack 
of coordination. Both the PCHR and civil society groups drafted versions of the same bills 
under parallel initiatives, which then needed to be harmonised. The three new gender bills 
were finally passed by Parliament just before it disbanded for the elections in June 2007, 
following sustained advocacy and lobbying by women’s organisations.202
202 The ‘Gender Bills’ refers collectively to three key pieces of legislation: the Domestic Violence Act, 
the Devolution of Estates Act, and the Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act.
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Another important step forward was the drafting of the first-ever country report to be 
submitted in line with the requirements of CEDAW in May 2007. The process of drafting the 
CEDAW reports resulted in a number of key activities related to the establishment of new 
structures, the collection of data, and training related to combating discrimination against 
women.203 For example, two workshops were convened by the UN Division for the 
Advancement of Women (DAW) in 2005 to educate and support the line ministries in 
implementing the Convention, which raised awareness about CEDAW and GBV within the 
government.204 The government has also received $49,500 from UNIFEM and $50,000 from 
UNDP in contributions towards completing the report. UNDP supported the legislative debate 
and processes leading to the adoption of the gender bills, as well as financing the production 
of the CEDAW shadow report through the Sierra Leone Association of NGOs (SLANGO).205
As already alluded to, there is a contradiction in the emphasis that donor-supported justice 
sector reform places on the formal sector and the reality that most people in conflict-affected 
regions rely on informal justice mechanisms. It is estimated that as much as 80% of the 
population relies on customary justice mechanisms (PBC compact: 5). In Sierra Leone, “local 
justice and governance in [rural and peri-urban] areas are delivered less by formal, modem 
state structures -  the most ‘local’ of which are the local courts and local councils -  than by a 
complex network of institutions ranging in formality and sources of authority” (Manning, 
2009: 127). This has problematic implications for the liberal peacebuilding consensus that 
relies heavily on channelling peacebuilding activities through the formal sector.
Even where more modem structures have been established, such as the local councils, they 
can still reflect traditional power structures and norms, which are often discriminatory 
towards women (Manning, 2009: 127). According to a UN official, only $20,000 was
203 See CEDAW (2006) p. 20-22.
204 See DAW (2005) Implementation o f CEDAW: Report o f  a Training Workshop, 4-8 April 2005, 
Freetown, Sierra Leone.
205 Interview with Jamesina King, Human Rights Commission, Freetown, 19 July 2007.
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allocated to local courts out of the $4 million justice sector reform project being financed by 
the PBF.206 This had particular implications for women, since domestic violence, property 
rights and other issues specifically affecting women were often relegated to customary law 
and informal justice mechanisms, despite the existence of the new legislation. Regardless of 
reforms that have been put in place to increase women’s rights, their access to justice in rural 
areas is still extremely limited with serious implications for their physical and human 
security.
There is a key challenge in linking up progress made in areas such as the new gender bills 
with the reality outside of Freetown. While these statutory changes have taken place, 
enforcement is another issue altogether and local courts or customary courts often make 
rulings on issues relating to domestic violence that are supposed to be outside of their 
jurisdiction (Castillejo, 2008: 11). Indeed, few structures are in place to support realisation of 
the new laws, and grassroots women are not always aware of the new legislation or how to 
pursue their rights in the formal courts of law.207 The local courts need support to develop the 
capacity to deliver justice as outlined in the gender bills, but few resources are available for 
this purpose within the UN-driven peacebuilding process. Women themselves also need to 
understand the laws to benefit from them. This is where the UN should be ensuring that it is 
working with organisations and women’s networks operating at the community level, often 
informally, since they provide access to marginalised groups and can bring insight to the 
kinds of reforms that would be needed to improve access to justice for gender-related crimes. 
However this kind of engagement with the informal level does not sit easily within the liberal 
peacebuilding approach, a point that will be returned to in the conclusion of the thesis.
This section has discussed the process of justice sector reforms in Sierra Leone. The emphasis 
in the language around these reforms has tended to focus on the protection and vicitimisation
206 Interview with Jebbeh Forster, UNIFEM, Freetown, 16 July 2007.
207 Interview with Barbara Bangura, Freetown, 16 July 2007.
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of women, as opposed to access to justice or questions of reconciliation. Furthermore, the 
focus has been on formal legal reforms at the expense of a more holistic gender justice. 
However, as this section has shown, this is not always culturally appropriate since in Sierra 
Leone, more often than not it was the informal justice system that mattered most to women 
(Sriram, 2009: 119-122).
6.1.4 Security reform, gender mainstreaming and the liberal peacebuilding consensus 
When looking at the issues from a gender perspective, it is problematic that peacebuilding in 
Sierra Leone has been widely lauded as a success story. This section has shown that persistent 
gender-based insecurities remained, women and girls were left out of the DDR and SSR 
processes, and access to justice continued to be limited and fraught with obstacles. While the 
JSSR reforms were theoretically underpinned by principles of human security, gender was 
still one of the biases that undermined these principles. This was characteristic of the problem 
where women and gender issues remain in the domestic private sphere, and the public sphere 
remains dominated by the ‘real’ security threats. “The overarching fact is that in failing to 
formalise the gender perspective in peace negotiations as well as in the implementation, the 
process has failed to capitalise on the significant strengths of women, initially as a deterrent to 
the spoilers and to ensure that benefits contribute to the strengthening of community security, 
the base of the security triangle” (Molloy, 2004: 19).
Security, peace and justice are gender-blind concepts within the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus. While women were not perceived to be part of the process of establishing security 
in Sierra Leone and were depoliticised into the private sphere, in fact they played important, 
if invisible, roles in contributing to security. A more gender-sensitive understanding of the 
process of re-establishing security that acknowledged some of these roles could have perhaps 
led to a more sustainable result. It was however difficult for women to negotiate a place in the 
security reform, because as a gendered process, the discourse and implementation of policies 
relegate them to the sidelines.
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Furthermore, the efforts at mainstreaming gender into JSSR amounted to little more than 
enabling a small number of women to go through DDR, training the police and military in 
human rights issues and recruiting more women into these forces, and efforts to reform 
discriminatory formal legislation. These were all activities that fall comfortably within a 
liberal feminist approach and do not necessitate any real challenging of gendered security 
discourses and practices. They also complemented the broader liberal peacebuilding activities 
being led by the UN, and as a result gender was only integrated into JSSR in a minimal way.
6.2 Governance reform208
This section of the chapter will explore how gender issues were integrated into the broad area 
of post-conflict governance reform. Recognising the importance of integrating gender issues 
into governance reforms, UNDP prepared a document outlining quick entry points to enable 
field staff to “understand and respond to social norms, culture, beliefs and other factors that 
are normally removed from technical discussions” (UNDP, 2007a: 6). It highlights how to 
ensure inclusive participation and gender equity in processes such as elections and how to 
strengthen responsive government institutions through decentralisation and reforms in public 
administration. In the case of Sierra Leone, it is clear that while certain efforts were made by 
UN actors to engage women and integrate gender-sensitivity into these processes, the small- 
scale and limited resources allocated to these efforts meant that these principles were not fully 
integrated or respected. Efforts were ad-hoc, and a strategic vision placing gender equality at 
the heart of governance reform was absent.
For example, UNDP launched a governance project in June 2002 that was designed to support 
the governance-related priorities within the I-PRSP and the NRS (UNDP Sierra Leone, 
2002b). However, again, gender issues were not effectively integrated throughout, and
208 For a good overview of governance reform as it relates to gender issues, see Goetz, 2009a.
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women were marginalised from formal spheres. The failure of the international community 
and the GoSL to engage women in governance issues is linked to the failure to ensure 
women’s representation and the integration of gender issues in the relevant clauses of the 
Lome Peace Accords. The peace negotiations are one of the first, and key, opportunities to 
address gender issues, and if missed out at this early stage then it can be difficult to 
reintroduce them at a later stage in the peacebuilding process.
The closest mention made in SCR 1325 relating to governance is in reference to the need to 
increase women’s representation in decision-making at all levels, clearly reflecting the liberal 
feminist underpinnings of the resolution that were already discussed in chapter 3. Given that 
SCR 1325 forms the basis for much of the UN’s efforts to integrate gender into 
peacebuilding, the fact that this reductionist approach to gender and governance is then 
replicated in the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone is no surprise.
This section will examine how women’s participation and gender issues were incorporated 
into the national elections in 2002 and 2007 and the local elections held in 2004, and in the 
decentralisation process launched in 2004. It will demonstrate how governance reforms as 
envisaged by the liberal peacebuilding consensus in fact have very different impacts on men 
and women. Despite elections or decentralisation presenting an opportunity to adapt 
structures to make them more accountable and responsive to women’s political preferences 
and needs, the reality is that women remain marginalised in both these processes, and the 
pronounced benefits of these reforms do not reach all members of the population equally. 
This failure to recognise and address the gendered impacts of governance reform has negative 
consequences on the peacebuilding process. As argued by Goetz, “if governance reforms are 
undertaken without an understanding of the governance deficits that undermine women’s 
rights and capacity to participate in public decisions, it is possible that they will reproduce 
gender biases and patterns of exclusion in the management of public affairs” (2009b: 244).
210
6.2.1 Local and national elections
Although women’s right to hold public office and participate in political life is enshrined in 
the 1991 Constitution, they have been largely absent from the political scene in Sierra Leone. 
Prior to and during the conflict, only a few women succeeded in taking on senior roles within 
the government or were Paramount Chiefs.209 As outlined in chapter 4, the only peace process 
in which women were able to participate was the Lome negotiations held in 1999.
Free and fair multi-party elections that returned President Kabbah to power were held in 
Sierra Leone in May 2002. Women’s political participation, although an important area of 
gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding, is difficult when few female candidates present 
themselves for election. In Sierra Leone, the lack of capacity for women to effectively 
participate in the formal political sphere, both as candidates and as an informed electorate, 
was a major obstacle. Along with this lack of capacity was also the issue that women’s 
domestic responsibilities and the traditional patriarchal social relations prevented them from 
having the self-confidence to play an active role in the country’s politics.210
The UN supported a number of capacity-building workshops, tried to raise awareness about 
the elections, and encouraged the government to provide gender-friendly polling stations that 
would enable women to exercise their right to vote. Prior to the national elections, UNFPA 
supported the Network of Women Parliamentarians (NEWMAP) to carry out education and 
awareness-raising. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the British Council 
supported a national NGO, the Fifty-Fifty (50/50) Group211, to conduct training workshops
209 Paramount chiefs are considered the highest authority in each of the 149 chiefdoms throughout the 
country. The Chieftancy Act o f 2009 states that women are permitted to run for Paramount Chief in all 
chiefdoms in Sierra Leone. However, to date, very few women have been successful and they have 
been in the predominantly Mende south of the country, while the Temne in the north did not allow 
women to assume these positions.
210 Interview with Christiana Solomon, Freetown, April 29th 2005.
211 The 50/50 Group is one of the leading Sierra Leonean organisations supporting women to engage 
more effectively in politics and decision-making at all levels, and it has received support from a range 
of international donors. Among other activities, the 50/50 Group provides training to women 
candidates in skills such as lobbying, advocacy and political campaigning; mentors and supports 
women candidates and politicians through workshops and roundtable discussions; publishes training
211
with potential women candidates. During the elections, forty-six women ran for parliamentary 
seats and seven of the eight political parties fielded women candidates. Eighteen women were 
successful and subsequently became members of parliament (14.5%), including three Cabinet 
Ministers and three Deputy Ministers. There was also one presidential candidate. This 
compared favourably with the previous elections in 1996 when only 5 women became 
members of parliament (6%) including two Cabinet Ministers and two Deputy Ministers.
Whilst this number is still low, the progress from the 1996 to the 2002 elections demonstrates 
the positive impact that training, awareness-raising and capacity-building have had on 
women’s overall political participation. According to Christiana Thorpe, “the rebel war years 
were catalytic to development in the social advancement of women in post war Sierra Leone”, 
and this also translated into some gains in political representation (2006: 4-5). This marked 
increase in women’s representation provides some support to the argument that the post- 
conflict period can create space for more women being able to move into the public sphere 
(Pankhurst, 2004). Nevertheless, it not clear that this will lead to a transformation in the 
structures themselves.
Indeed, despite the efforts that were made, some observers have suggested that the same elite 
individuals were in fact restored to positions of power following the 2002 elections, and that 
little success was achieved in making political participation more broad-based (Hanlon, 
2005). Furthermore, the resources that were devoted to democracy assistance in the country 
have been relatively limited (Sesay and Hughes, 2005). While UNIFEM and the gender 
advisor of UNAMSIL supported women’s organisations to raise awareness among women 
voters and train women candidates, this support was limited and Freetown-focused due to the 
capacity constraints of these offices discussed in chapter 5. The urban/rural divide was also
manuals, leaflets and other materials to support women entering general and local elections; sensitises 
voters around women’s representation in politics; and lobbyies political decision-makers about the 
need to support and select women candidates (Thomas, 2005: 3-4).
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exacerbated by the top-down approach and focus on the formal sector reinforced by liberal 
peacebuilding.
As part of the decentralisation process, the first local government elections in 32 years were 
held throughout the country on 22nd May 2004.212 As a result of these elections, nineteen local 
councils were established within Sierra Leone’s four administrative regions.213 The 
government included provisions in the Local Government Act to have at least 50% female 
representation in the District and Ward Development Committees (GoSL 2004a: 95(2)c). The 
Ward Committees are intended to facilitate local participation and the articulation and 
representation of community interests within the local government system. The Local 
Councils are the highest political and administrative authorities and as such, this is where 
more equitable representation of men and women would be particularly important, although 
the responsibilities of these councils will only be increased gradually as their capacity is built.
According to an independent team of experts, “approximately 10% of all candidates standing 
for election across the country were women, and in general women seemed satisfied with 
their status as voters”, although the report also mentions that this falls short of the 30% target 
that is generally recognised as being gender equal (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004: 15- 
17).214 Following the Local Government elections, 10% of elected Councillors, 5% of Local 
Council chairpersons, and 7.4% of Paramount Chiefs were women. In all, this meant that 
women occupied 12.7% of all council seats (Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 86). However, despite 
the new legislation and election of some women to the local councils, they were still 
marginalised in decision-making (Human Development Report, 2007: 55).
212 As UNAMSIL was originally to drawdown at the end of 2004, these local elections were organised 
rapidly following the signing of the Local Government Act to benefit from the presence of the 
peacekeeping troops (Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 86).
213 Each of the thirteen districts and six major towns in Sierra Leone has an elected local council. Each 
district is further divided into wards, and each ward has a seat on the council.
214 Of the 1,115 candidates approved to run in the elections, 107 were women.
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Despite the 50% quota in the Local Government Act and even where the gender quotas were 
realised, this did not necessarily carry over into a gender equal impact in decision-making. In 
many cases, women were still beholden to their husbands or male family members and often 
did not have the ability or the desire to speak out independently. Whilst SCR 1325 and liberal 
feminist approaches emphasise the importance of women’s participation, what is in fact 
important is the effective participation of women. This is a more difficult change to bring 
about as it requires changing attitudes and structures as well as practices. In the rural areas 
outside of Freetown, women are particularly disadvantaged. In some parts of the country, 
particularly the North, they have even fewer rights that in the capital, and with a literacy rate 
of around 20%, even less awareness of gender issues.
This quota was intended to help women attain some level of decision-making authority within 
their communities. According to a female leader of a Ward Development Council in Kono 
district, elections had to be held three times before the quota of female candidates was 
reached.215 It is clear that continued support and training is necessary to ensure that their 
participation is effective. In the end, according to data provided by the NEC from 2006, only 
48 out of a total 474 elected local councillors were women. Some of the barriers to women’s 
participation in public life that could explain the low level of women include a lack of 
education or financial and political resources, heavy domestic workloads, a lack of mobility 
and negative cultural attitudes (Castillejo, 2008: 6; Oxfam, 2008: 7). Too often, women 
candidates were also put forward by political parties as a token gesture in districts where they 
were unlikely to win, and anyway lacked die capacity to campaign and win votes.216
In 2007, Sierra Leone began preparations for the second national elections following the end
215 Personal interview, Koidu Town, March 30th 2005.
216 Interview with UNIFEM, 16 July 2007. It is worth mentioning that in the 2008 local elections, 
although outside the timeframe of this thesis, resulted in a higher level o f women’s participation. 
Women won 18.9% of their seats in these elections, an increase o f more than 6% compared to the 2004 
results (Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 105). This indicates that while slow and fraught with obstacles, there is 
a trend towards a greater acceptance of women playing a role in formal politics in communities 
throughout Sierra Leone.
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of the conflict. The presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 11 August, 
followed by a presidential run-off on 8 September 2007. These elections were widely lauded 
as a success, and were seen to restore confidence in the legitimacy of the democratic process 
in Sierra Leone (Crisis Group, 2008: i). Notably, the National Election Commission, the body 
in charge of the electoral process, was headed by a woman, Christiana Thorpe. Thorpe has a 
long legacy of activism on women’s rights in Sierra Leone and so there was much 
anticipation that her position would facilitate the inclusion of women and gender issues in the 
2007 elections. However, the number of women in parliament decreased following these 
elections, falling to 16 seats from 18 seats in the previous government, and none of the parties 
fielded a female candidate for president. UNDP and UNIOSIL provided technical and 
financial support for the elections, and several women’s groups such as the 50/50 Group 
provided specific training and capacity-building for women candidates.
However, in addition to the limited number of women active in local and national politics, 
there is also the challenge of getting both male and female politicians to take on gender- 
sensitive issues. There was some effort to engage with the Women’s Wings of the main 
political parties in Sierra Leone to encourage them to adopt gender-sensitive political 
agendas, but the impact was minimal. According to Gladys Gbappy-Brima, “women’s wings 
are like chicken wings; they are the parts that nobody wants”. As a result they have not 
always been an effective vehicle for promoting gender-sensitive politics. Indeed, female 
politicians have been more likely to adopt the agenda of their political party rather than an 
explicitly feminist agenda.217
This section has shown that while the UN supported efforts to provide training and 
awareness-raising enabling some women to seek public office, it is not clear how sustainable 
or transformative this adding in of women will be. The case of Sierra Leone would seem to 
affirm the argument that liberal feminist approaches are not well suited to challenge decision­
217 Interview with Christina Solomon, Freetown, 29 April 2005.
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making structures that have a history of excluding and being discriminatory towards women. 
Reflecting this, according to the 2007 Sierra Leone Human Development Report, women’s 
participation in good governance, poverty reduction and development is “not yet adequate” 
(2007: 74).
6.2.2 Decentralisation
Prior to the war in Sierra Leone, the patrimonial ruling style of successive governments 
caused politics to become increasingly centralised geographically in Freetown and amongst 
the elite of the country. This led to the alienation and marginalisation of vast numbers of the 
population, and the failure of public service delivery at the local level. Networks of 
chieftancies had always been part of the traditional Sierra Leonean authority structure, but 
these were gradually destroyed during the conflict as chiefs fled their communities or were 
attacked by the rebel fighters. The decentralisation of government has been a focus of UNDP 
and World Bank assistance for governance reform in Sierra Leone.218 Donors placed 
extensive support behind the decentralisation process due to the fact that the exclusion and 
entrenched poverty of the rural population was acknowledged as one of the main roots of the 
conflict.
One prerequisite for effective decentralisation is capacity and resources at the local level to 
implement governance reforms. In the case of Sierra Leone, social development was so low 
and the war-related destruction and corruption so prevalent that this capacity did not exist at 
the time when reforms were being initiated (Zhou, 2009b: xviii). This meant that even after 
the fighting ended, essential public services were still not reaching masses of the population, 
and men and women had to do without adequate health and education services, revenue 
collection was ineffective, and there were challenges with reinstating the chieftancy system in 
a more democratic and accountable way (Olonisakin, 2008).
218 For an extensive review of the decentralisation process in Sierra Leone, see Zhou 2009a.
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The legislation on decentralisation and local government in Sierra Leone was adopted in 
2004, and the National Decentralisation Programme was planned to last for four years from 
June 2004-June 2008. Through funding from the World Bank, the Institutional Reform and 
Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) set up a Decentralisation Secretariat to coordinate and 
monitor the process from within the Ministry of Local Government and Community 
Development (MLGCD). The IRCBP had a budget of $25 million over four years from its 
establishment in May 2004, funded by the World Bank.219 The Decentralisation programme in 
Sierra Leone involved reforms in four key areas: political, administrative, fiscal, and 
functional reforms linked to service delivery (UNCT, 2004a: 2).
The effective working of local government structures is dependent on efficient functioning at 
the national level, both in terms of resources being channelled down to the community level 
as well as the necessary large-scale infrastructure being in place for service delivery (Human 
Development Report, 2007: 49). One of the major concerns around the decentralisation 
process in Sierra Leone is how the traditional system of paramount chieftancies (traditional 
authorities) relates to the local government bodies (elected councils), and in particular around 
issues such as taxation and collection of revenues.
There are also questions around where authority and accountability lie in relation to access to 
justice, which for most Sierra Leoneans is still sought through customary mechanisms. The 
way in which most people come into contact with local government is through the provision 
of services, so involving them in the design and implementation of these services can be an 
effective way of increasing participation and accountability levels, both of which are low in 
Sierra Leone. Gender roles and relations play an important role in mediating access to 
services, as well as the extent to which women are able to engage in the structures of local 
governance. Despite this, little gender analysis was carried out in the context of
219 This grant was supplemented by a further $25 million from DFID and the EC to be administered 
through an IDA-managed trust fund (Zhou, 2009b: xxi).
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decentralisation and women were not engaged in priority setting around service delivery. 
Again the reinforcing of the rural/urban divide by the liberal peacebuilding approach was also 
problematic in the context of decentralisation.
UNDP supported decentralisation through activities such as the restoration of paramount 
chiefs, provision of assistance to the NEC for local elections, supported local government and 
decentralisation of the line ministries out into the districts, provision of $2 million of core 
funding through its Interim Governance Project (Human Development Report: 73). The UN 
Country Team established UN District Teams that were intended to support capacity-building 
of the local councils, funded out of a $4.5 million Transition Initiative Fund (Human 
Development Report: 80-81). Local participation in the decentralisation reforms was not 
realised, largely due to the top-down approach taken where the UN agencies, donors and 
government line ministry representatives dictated the design and implementation of the 
transitional projects. This in turn is indicative of the top-down and externally-led liberal 
peacebuilding and liberal feminist approaches.
A significant part of the decentralisation process was focused on building the capacity of local 
council structures and elected representatives, largely funded and supported by UNDP and the 
World Bank. Civic education was also a component of this process, but the planning and 
activity matrices do not indicate that special measures were taken to sensitise and educate 
women in relation to the services that were available or the roles that they could play in the 
process of local governance (UNCT, 2004a). It appears that there was a belief, similar to that 
articulated by the NCDDR in relation to DDR referred to in the previous section, that 
decentralisation could be carried out in a gender-sensitive way. However, the assumption that 
all community members would be involved and be able to engage was misplaced, and the 
reality was that gender as well as age and status in the community defined which voices were 
part of the decentralisation process. Again, liberal feminist approaches may not be well- 
placed to target these kinds of barriers.
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The UNCT led by the Resident Representative and the network of TSTs were designed to link 
the activities of the UNCT with UNAMSIL to ensure a smooth drawdown process, as well as 
contribute to the implementation of the NRS.220 The TSTs focused on work at the district 
level, to encourage the different agencies operating throughout the country to set priorities in 
line with the needs of the different communities and not to duplicate activities. However, 
certain parts of the country (particularly in the east where up to 90% of houses were destroyed 
during the conflict) had much greater needs than others, and decisions had to be made about 
how to balance the needs of different regions, as well as build the capacity of local actors to 
actually implement and administer the projects. There was a sentiment amongst some district- 
level TST staff that despite the claims that priorities should be set at the community-level, in 
actual fact the staff in Freetown made the decisions without even visiting the areas that are 
being affected.221 Thus despite the attempt to counter the urban focus of liberal peacebuilding, 
in reality the process continued to be driven top-down, rather than engaging the priorities and 
needs of rural populations.
Often women are so occupied with earning a livelihood and taking care of domestic 
responsibilities that they have little time to participate in decision-making processes and their 
input is only ensured if particular effort is made to consult them. This is a time and resource­
intensive process to which donors and implementing agencies are unlikely to be willing to 
commit, given the demands of funding cycles and the tendency towards quick-impact 
projects. Some efforts were made to integrate gender issues into the work of the TST, but 
according to the director, “personally I think that mainstreaming means just drop it”.222 This , 
reflects the attitude dominant amongst many of the UN staff interviewed that a token gesture
220 Interview with Bauke van Weringh, Head of TST, Freetown, May 4* 2005. According to van 
Weringh, until November the relations between UNCT and UNAMSIL were ad hoc and minimal.
221 Interview with G. Jojo, UNDP TST, Kenema, 29 March 2005.
222 Interview with Bauke van Weringh, Head of TST, Freetown, May 4* 2005
219
of including a few women or a few sentences on gender as a ‘cross-cutting theme’ would be 
enough to fulfil the gender mainstreaming requirements articulated in the policy documents.
Local government is typically involved in providing services like health, education and water 
and sanitation to communities. Women therefore often have specific interests in the adequate 
and efficient functioning of local government as the key caregivers within the household. 
There could be an opening to bridge the informal and formal at the local government level, by 
drawing in women’s collectives and organisations that operate within the community but may 
not traditionally have many links with formal governance or administrative structures.
Involving women in local government can help to provide them with the skills and knowledge 
that would enable them to be politically involved at district or national level, as well as 
empowering them in community decision-making structures. Educational barriers are less of 
an issue at the local council level, as meetings are held in indigenous languages. This could 
also present an opportunity for the UN to push beyond its traditional liberal approaches to 
peacebuilding and gender mainstreaming. However, the discriminatory attitudes and 
perceptions of men, particularly community leaders and elders, as well as women themselves 
need to be transformed.223
Despite formal measures to change the ways in which decisions were made or how the local 
population was represented, difficulties remained in ensuring that both men and women have 
equal voices, opportunities and resources. “Even where traditional power structures have been 
broken, the problem of historical bias and ignorance remains. The biases of gender, plus a 
reluctance to examine new ideas and ways of understanding constitute another impediment to 
effective local decision-making” (Human Development Report, 2007: 84).224 This points to 
the limitations of a reductionist understanding of governance as representation, since
223 Interview with Christiana Solomon, Freetown, 29 April 2005. A similar view was also articulated 
by Yasmin Jusu-Sherrif (Marwopnet) during an interview in Freetown, 7 M y 2006.
224 The same view was echoed by G. Jojo, TST staff member, Kenema, 29 March 2005,
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something more than greater numbers of women would be required to shift traditional and 
cultural attitudes about gender roles and relations. It appears that liberal feminist approaches 
may be insufficient for the ambitious ends of reshaping liberal peacebuilding in a more 
gender-sensitive way.
The findings of a recent World Bank study of the decentralisation process are telling when it
comes to the superficiality of attempts to engage women in local governance:
Often youth and women leaders are brought into meetings only to speak to visitors—r 
in part, it seems, to satisfy the visitors concerned with gender equity—or when some 
contribution is required from them. Even when respondents say they are included in 
decision-making, a deeper investigation often reveals that they have been informed 
rather than consulted or truly involved. In at least some cases, the position of 
“women’s leader” is formally constituted and even filled by election, but in others it 
is more a matter of a preferred spokesperson. As one 36-year-old female community 
member from a small village in Moyamba District explained to a researcher, 
“Women are not organized in that structured manner that you think. Most often when 
visitors come, the chief calls me and [another woman] to represent the women in the 
village. I think they call us because they have realized that we are bold, we are 
presentable, and we can speak in public.” (Manning, 2009: 116).
Furthermore, public perception surveys have illustrated significant gender and generational 
gaps in civic participation and self-perceived influence on local governance (Zhou and Zhang, 
2009: 99). As Paris argues, the institutionalisation of certain norms is necessary for 
democratisation processes to be successful. Similarly, in traditional rural settings in Sierra 
Leone where the patriarchal and unaccountable chieftancy system dominated, changing 
norms and values that create space for women to participate meaningfully in democratic 
governance will take a long period of time. However, these informal structures are not easy to 
target through liberal peacebuilding or liberal feminist methods.
Decentralisation is an opportunity to make governance structures more accessible to women 
and also can provide space to ensure that they are engaged in making the decisions about 
service delivery that will have a great effect on them (Castillejo, 2008: 4). However, it is clear 
that more than quotas, and more than this kind of liberal feminist solution, are needed to 
ensure that women are able to have a constructive impact on local-level governance (Goetz,
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2009a: 17). Research carried out by the World Bank found that the benefits of 
decentralisation primarily accrued to the villages and communities of elected local councillors 
(Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 104). It would further be expected that the benefits would first go to 
the power-holders and decision-makers within the community, few of whom are women. It is 
possible therefore that while there is an overall benefit to the population through 
decentralisation, it is experienced by the population in a very uneven way that can be brought 
into light by using a gender perspective. It is particularly important to find a way around this 
to ensure that women are able to participate in the decentralisation process: “if women can 
play a role in local government, then they will have a stake in it. This is the only way that 
things will change.”225
6.2.3 Governance reform, gender mainstreaming and the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus
Women’s experience of governance is framed by the interface between formal and customary 
governance systems, in particular the relegation of domestic and community issues to the 
customary sphere and the barriers they face in accessing the formal spheres of political life 
(Castillejo, 2008: 13). In contrast, almost all of the UN’s efforts in support of governance 
reform were focused on the reconstruction or transformation of formal governance structures.
As Goetz argues, state institutions even when reformed as part of the ‘good governance 
agenda’ can in fact end up ‘governing women’ and reproducing the various forms of 
subordination to with they are subjected (Goetz, 2009b: 239). This results in entrenching their 
status as second-class citizens. Furthermore, the double burden of caring for dependents and 
also earning a living also makes it even more difficult for women to engage meaningfully in 
politics and decision-making, as they often have little time to engage in meetings and
225 Participant at a workshop on “Making SCR 1325 work for women”, organised by International 
Alert and GEMS, 10 March 2009, Bo.
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workshops that provide an opportunity for mobilising action at the community level (Richards 
et al, 2004: iii).
The tension between formal and informal authorities and institutions in Sierra Leone 
underlies all efforts at governance reform, but is an ever-present dimension of the liberal 
peacebuilding process. This tension is then further influenced by complex gender relations 
and power dynamics, which if not incorporated into the analysis that guides governance 
reform risk undermining these broader efforts. However, the formal and informal systems 
should not be seen as in endless conflict with one another, but rather can coexist and build on 
each other to shape a more democratic, transparent and accountable Sierra Leone.
6.3 Poverty reduction and economic reform
Economic reform is an integral aspect of the liberal peacebuilding consensus, as it is widely 
held by the UN and other donors that economic liberalisation and the opening up of markets 
creates the conditions necessary for building sustainable peace. However, critics of the liberal 
peacebuilding approach argue that the failure to acknowledge and integrate bottom-up 
contributions to peacebuilding and the lack of a social contract based on ideas of welfare and 
justice in fact undermines economic development and any efforts to build sustainable peace 
(Richmond and Franks, 2009: 106-7). The case of Sierra Leone demonstrates that the donor- 
guided push for macroeconomic stability has often been prioritised at the expense of job 
creation and overall social welfare, thereby creating the conditions for ongoing conflict. In 
such contexts there is a tension between the expectation of economic reform to bring a peace 
dividend, and the reality that the liberal peacebuilding model fails to address inequalities and 
poverty that undermine conflict.
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As already highlighted in chapter 3, economic issues were notably absent in the discussions 
around SCR 1325 and other policy commitments related to gender and peacebuilding.226 
Nevertheless, there is a critical link between gender equality, economic security and the 
broader peacebuilding agenda, which certainly merits greater attention in the future.227 As this 
section will argue, women in Sierra Leone faced specific challenges in relation to economic 
insecurity and poverty and have rarely benefited from the economic reforms supported, and in 
some cases initiated, by the UN and other donors. Exacerbating this is the fact that women’s 
economic security was not seen as relevant to the broader processes of building peace and 
security, and was often delayed until a country has moved into the ‘long-term development’ 
phase.
While liberal peacebuilding has resulted in some improvement in human rights and a move 
towards a more democratic political culture in some contexts, it has rarely resulted in tangible 
or sustainable development or economic benefits for the populations of post-conflict countries 
(Salih, 2009: 133). This is particularly the case in Sierra Leone, where most donor emphasis 
in the years following the conflict was placed on reforming the security forces and supporting 
national and elections. Efforts at poverty reduction and broader economic reform did not 
receive the same attention, and it was only in 2005 with the adoption of the PRSP that these 
processes were underway in any concerted manner.
As a result, in comparison with the preceding sections on security and governance reform, the 
information and analysis in this section on gender and economic reform covers a more limited 
time period. While there have been some gender-sensitive economic reforms, particularly in
226 UNDP’s eight point agenda to empower and protect women in crisis situations was adopted in 2007 
and is one of the few policy commitments that makes specific reference to economic issues. The 
agenda states, “women must be given equal opportunities to livelihoods, including access to land and 
credit. Rebuilding in key sectors such as transportation, shelter and health care must specifically benefit 
women”. However, this document was only adopted at the end of the time period covered by this 
research, and so it is not possible to determine whether or not this new policy has had any impact on 
UNDP’s programming in Sierra Leone. See http://www.undp.org/cpr/we do/8 pa.shtml.
227 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore these links, but this is a research area that I plan 
to pursue in the future.
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the areas of localised service provision and micro-credit initiatives, the vast majority of 
economic reforms in Sierra Leone were designed and implemented with little analysis of the 
role that gender roles and relations play. Furthermore, although widespread poverty was 
acknowledged as being one of the underlying causes of the conflict, the initial focus on 
establishing physical security throughout the country and the elections in 2002, 2004 and 
2007 also meant that economic reform did not receive as much attention at the outset.
This section will explore the impact that the limited economic reforms have had on men and 
women in Sierra Leone, focusing specifically on two issues. The first is the UN’s 
involvement in poverty reduction, using the examples of microcredit lending and job creation 
schemes. Secondly, the section will conclude with a brief consideration of the gendered 
impact of macroeconomic reforms, and the problematic nature of the liberal peacebuilding 
and liberal feminist approaches to these issues.
6.3.1 Poverty reduction
The key economic indicators for Sierra Leone paint a bleak picture of a country struggling 
with endemic poverty, weak economic and governance structures, and limited possibilities for 
economic development. According to the findings of the 2004 Population and Housing 
Census that formed the basis for the analysis in the PRSP, more than 70% of Sierra Leoneans 
live below the poverty line of less than $1 per day, and more than 25% cannot meet the basic 
food needs of their households (Winnebah et al, 2006: 10-11). Food insecurity, poor 
infrastructure, low rates of education, and the challenge of getting economic growth to meet 
employment and social needs in a fragile post-conflict context are just some of the economic 
challenges facing the government (GoSL, 2005b: vii). Since the early 1990s, Sierra Leone has 
consistently placed near or at the bottom of the UN’s Human Development Index. Despite 
years of peacebuilding reforms, this is still the case and in 2007 Sierra Leone only ranked 
higher than one country, Niger.
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Through the MDG process and the PRSP, the GoSL committed to eradicating both extreme 
hunger and extreme poverty. Sierra Leone was granted significant debt relief in 2002 under 
the enhanced HIPC Initiative, which freed up much-needed resources for the poverty 
reduction programmes (UNSG, 2003a: 13). The ‘pro-poor sustainable growth’ approach of 
the PRSP is under-pinned by the neoliberal development principles of achieving 
macroeconomic stability through low inflation and strict fiscal deficits, most commonly 
witnessed in the approach of the World Bank and IMF. These are in turn key elements of the 
liberal peacebuilding approach to economic reform. Although not acknowledged by the actors 
driving the process in any meaningful way, these issues all have a gender dimension. Indeed, 
gender roles and relations and traditional power structures play a key role in mediating the 
extent to which men and women are able to exit the poverty trap.
Chapter 4 provided an overview of the effects of poverty in Sierra Leone, both a principal 
cause and consequence of the conflict, on women’s insecurity, vulnerability and 
disempowerment. The war not only deepened the endemic poverty in the country, but the 
resulting widespread displacement, increase in the number of women-headed households and 
changes in women’s workloads further reduced their ability to participate in decision-making 
within the community and the formal political sphere. Customary laws, particularly in relation 
to property and inheritance rights, further discriminate against women and played a major role 
in increasing women’s economic insecurity (Pankhurst, 2008: 18-21). Compounding these 
problems was the fact that the economic value of home-based work was not acknowledged, 
particularly in relation to provision of services in the household, and there was therefore a 
disconnect between how productive and unpaid (reproductive) work is represented in PRSPs, 
including that of Sierra Leone (UNDP, 2006: 23).
Furthermore, women’s employment prospects are constrained by cultural stereotypes and 
practices that inherently limit the options open to them in Sierra Leone. As a consequence, 
many women are pushed into the informal sector, and rely on petty trading or subsistence
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agriculture for the livelihoods of themselves and their households. Nevertheless, it is 
important to acknowledge that Sierra Leonean women have played an integral role in the 
economy and development in the country (Abdullah et al., 2010: 40), even if not in the formal 
sector.
Poverty in Sierra Leone therefore has a gendered face, which is not uncommon (Baksh, 2005: 
82). Looking at the issues of poverty reduction in Sierra Leone from a gender perspective 
draws attention to many relevant issues and should have been a key principle of PRSP 
process in the country. However, broadly speaking and as already mentioned in chapter 5, 
there was a lack of participation and specifically of women’s voices in the PRSP process.228 
One INGO reported that they were only given two days to make substantive contributions on 
how a gender perspective could be better integrated, and that the perception of most INGOs is 
that they have been sidelined from the entire process in general.229
This failure to fully gender-sensitise the PRSP had consequences for donor programmes that 
then used the PRS as the framework for their activities, and was one of the underlying causes 
of the failure to effectively reach women through poverty reduction efforts. The donor-funded 
government analysis of poverty in Sierra Leone based on the findings of the 2004 Population 
and Housing Census was largely gender-blind and included little sex-disaggregated data or 
analysis on the relative poverty of men compared to women (Winnebah et al., 2006). Despite 
some lip service to gender issues in the PRSP and LIN policies (UNDP Sierra Leone, 2002a: 
3), exploring the case of microcredit initiatives and job creation schemes are instructive for 
considering the real impact of poverty reduction efforts on men and women. It is to these two 
areas that the analysis will now turn.
228 Interview with Sybil Bailor, ENCISS, Freetown, 11 January 2008.
229 Interview with Kirsty Baughman, Gender Coordinator, Oxfam. Freetown, 22 February 2005.
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During the period 2002-2007, the UN, bilateral donors and several INGOs supported a range 
of microcredit and village savings and loans schemes throughout Sierra Leone. For example, 
UNHCR worked with 32 women’s organisations and trained 1000 women and youth in 
livelihood skills in 2002 (Gender profile, n.d.: 12). UNICEF also funded small training and 
income-generation schemes with reintegrated female ex-combatants during 2004 and 2005, as 
described in 6.1.1. In 2003, UNDP signed a project agreement with the GoSL and the UN 
Capital Development Fund for the development of a pro-poor financial sector in Sierra Leone 
during the period 2004-2009. According to a mid-term evaluation of this project, “gender 
issues were not specifically addressed in the project design; no information was provided on 
the number of women in the potential microfinance market or on the number of women being 
reached by MFIs [microfinance institutions] before the project, and no specific gender-related 
targets were set” (Duval and Bendu, 2006: 19). Regardless, it appears that the project had 
some success with all the microfinance institutions funded by the project reporting that the 
majority of their clients were women. However, again, the liberal feminist solution of adding 
a few women in will not necessarily result in a sustainable transformation in their economic 
security.
However, despite the examples of success of some of these projects, due to logistical 
challenges and lack of resources and capacity these initiatives are usually localised to a few 
communities and are not set within a broader strategic plan of economically empowering 
women and their households. According to one NGO activist, support to women or 
communities working in collectives would be more effective.230 Despite the UN calling for 
more support for cooperative enterprises and economic empowerment as well as income 
generation (UNSG, 2005a: 13), the evidence appeared to be that there was no systematic 
investment in these types of activities.
230 Personal interview with Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, 11 January 
2008 .
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In post-conflict contexts, “there is a tendency to slot women into micro-credit while men gain 
access to larger credit -  although women require more than micro-credit for SMEs [small and 
medium enterprises], particularly urban educated women” (Zuckerman and Greenberg, 2004: 
10). Of UNDP’s total budget of $12,158,543 for 2004, only $182, 626 was allocated to 
microfinance initiatives, and the total amount for poverty reduction and human development 
was also small at only $1,334,680 (Kaldor with Vincent, n.d.: 20-22). This reinforces the 
argument made earlier that economic issues, particularly poverty reduction, were not given 
the same priority focus as the security sector or governance reform programmes.
There are many examples in Sierra Leone of small-scale micro-credit projects, osusus231 and 
other revolving credit schemes. Osusus in particular have tended to be the most popular way 
for women to mobilize capital (Abdullah et al., 2010: 41). While some of these types of credit 
loan schemes have the support of the UN or INGOs, many are organized at the grassroots 
where women have come together collectively to address their economic insecurity. 
According to CARE Sierra Leone who have been working on small income generation 
projects with women, village savings and loans programmes have proven to be more 
sustainable than microcredit grants.232 This is because the revolving loan schemes often have 
contingency funds that can help absorb shocks such as illness, whereas otherwise women may 
need to spend all their savings and profits to deal with such eventualities.
Although microcredit initiatives are often an innovative solution to providing women with 
income-generating opportunities, they should not be seen as a panacea for women’s economic 
insecurity. It is important to link microcredit initiatives to additional activities focused on 
addressing the other practical and immediate needs women have in relation to earning a 
subsistence income. For example, microcredit projects should be combined with other efforts 
such as training and enabling women to have more access to property and credit as part of a
231 Osusu in Sierra Leone are forms of community-based rotating credit clubs.
232 Interview with Brian Larson, Country Manager, CARE, 14 January 2008.
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strategic process to change the division of labour and open up economic opportunities for
women.
While training and microcredit initiatives have been successful in terms of addressing poverty 
and lack of skills at the household level, the challenge of translating these localized, small- 
scale activities into societal transformation remains. Whilst they are ‘quick-fixes’ for the UN, 
and enable them to tick the gender box, the reality is that it is only be properly engaging with 
men and the informal, community-level actors that the impact of these activities can be 
sustained. It is also important to be realistic about the fact that women may not always want 
to collaborate and may also be vulnerable to corruption or failure to pay back loans.233
Furthermore, little is being done to challenge the traditional division of labour, despite the 
many new roles that women took on during the war and have sought to continue in the 
peacebuilding phase. ‘Economic illiteracy’ is another major challenge for women, and 
particularly those living in rural areas. Even those who do receive microcredit loans often do 
not understand the principles of developing a sustainable business, or what profit and capital 
are.234 To be effective, microcredit schemes need to incorporate additional training and donors 
should ensure that market analysis and a plan for long-term sustainability have been done 
prior to enlisting women in these programmes (World Bank, 2005: 90).
Donors should not just look at the number of microcredit loans granted, but they should also 
focus on impact. One of the key problems is that in taking a liberal feminist approach, the UN 
tends to focus on getting the number of loans as high as possible, as opposed to focusing on 
how the loans then transform the economic security of the female recipients. The number of 
loans granted is easier to report on than the impact the loans have had. As acknowledged by a 
World Bank official, “changes happen at the community level in places and through dynamics
233 Interview with Barbara Bangura, GEMS, Freetown, 14 January 2008.
234 Interview with Sybil Bailor, ENCISS, Freetown, 11 January 2008.
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that we don’t have access to.”235 This again points to the gap between formal economic 
reforms that are initiated by the international community and the local-level, informal 
initiatives that fall in the gap, and these issues will be revisited in more detail in chapter 7 and 
the conclusion of the thesis.
The second area of poverty reduction relevant to this thesis is job creation. UNDP’s interim 
recovery project highlights job creation as a key priority, and the project provided training to 
youth as well as 200 small group income generating projects. While the project 
documentation mentions the specific economic needs of women, there is no specific gender 
analysis in the project activities, and yet evidence shows that these job creation schemes have 
often failed to benefit women.236 Within the context of the UNDP country programme 
document (2004-2007), the goals in relation to livelihood opportunities for women and youth 
were relatively limited. The aim for UNDP was to have 400 youths and/or women managing 
income generating activities via micro-financing, implying that the project was designed to 
only target a very limited number of people (UNDP, 2003: 6). In this case, the gender 
mainstreaming box might get ticked but it is questionable what real impact this will have.
Job creation can be a challenge in any economy, but in post-conflict contexts there is the 
additional problem that the economy itself is depressed, and opportunities are few and far 
between. The solution of the UN and other donors has been to support training and small 
grants in specific trades, however if there are no means with which to apply the skills, it is 
still difficult to earn a living (Humphreys and Richards, 2005: 36). MacKenzie’s research on 
reintegration programmes in Sierra Leone confirms this point: “the lack of market assessment 
meant that trades were chosen for females based on gendered ideas of what women should do 
in the marketplace rather than an assessment of trades that would allow women to make
235 Interview with James Sackey, World Bank, Freetown, 2 May 2005.
236 Presentations by Catherine Greenwood and Sybil Bailor at a workshop on “Integrating women’s 
priorities into peacebuilding processes: Experiences from Sierra Leone and Burundi”, organised by 
International Alert, London, 25-29 February 2008.
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money and succeed in the marketplace” (2009b: 212). Another fact compounding the problem 
of job creation, particularly among youth, was the urbanization of much of the population 
during the war, and the fact that few wanted to return to agricultural work in the post-conflict 
phase. UNDP supported some small-scale pilot projects to get youth to return to crop-growing 
and other agricultural jobs but these were only a ‘drop in the ocean’ (Kaldor and Vincent, 
n.d.: 24).
High youth unemployment has been identified as one of the major ongoing sources of 
insecurity in Sierra Leone (UNSG 2007b: 1), and so youth have been specifically targeted for 
employment schemes. Due to customary practices, women are often married young in Sierra 
Leone at which point they cease to be considered as ‘youth’, and as a result they miss out on 
employment opportunities. “Labour intensive programmes don’t incorporate women. Youth 
schemes target youth clubs but women are married, they might already have families, and so 
they can’t be part of these groups and they get overlooked.”237 Youth is therefore a highly 
gendered category, and youth unemployment is seen as a ‘male issue’. High youth 
unemployment also has consequences for governance, with many of these young people 
failing to engage in political processes due to feelings of disenfranchisement and 
marginalisation.238
Job creation is therefore one area where a gender analysis is particularly important, at times 
requiring a focus on men rather than women. For example, the lack of viable employment 
opportunities or even the barest means of survival can increase the vulnerability of women 
and girls and lead them to turn to prostitution or become victims of sexual exploitation and 
abuse. Furthermore, unemployment can undermine young men’s sense of identity in their 
community, and this can often contribute to violence against women, particularly forms of 
domestic violence as the frustration is taken out on women in the household (World Bank,
237 Interview with UNIFEM representative, Freetown, 16 July 2007.
238 Interview with Valnora Edwin and Christian Lawrence, CGG, 17 July 2007.
232
2005: 89). This was repeatedly cited by several NGOs as an important concern of the local 
population that was not being given adequate priority by the donor community.239
Despite their important roles in the agricultural sector, women also often miss out on credit
and development programmes: “dissemination of seeds, tools, technology, and other
agricultural start-up packages often miss the women farmers’ strategic role in subsistence and
market agriculture” (Zuckerman and Greenberg, 2004: 11). According to Abdullah et al., in
Sierra Leone the reasons why women are often denied access to land or agricultural extension
services are frequently gendered (2010: 41). However, it is possible to change the way that
aid is provided to ensure that both men and women are able to benefit. An interesting
example is cited by the World Bank,
[w]hen CARE in Sierra Leone decided to offer seeds to all adults, and not via 
household heads (as it had done previously), it was surprised to discover the extent to 
which seed requirements changed. Offered an independent choice, the women’s (and 
young men’s) requests for groundnut seeds rose compared to rice. Groundnuts in 
Sierra Leone are recognized as a woman’s crop, which also has important 
empowering potential since it offers women the possibility of engaging in petty 
trading (2005: 103).
The issue of gendered employment opportunities also extends to other sectors. For example, 
much of Sierra Leone’s wealth comes from alluvial mining. At first glance, this seems to be 
an industry dominated by (largely young) men who spend their days sifting the sand and 
water in the hopes of finding a large diamond or gold, many of whom were combatants 
during the war. However, looking more closely, it is possible to see the many women and 
girls who support the work of the miners, offering food and small items for purchase around 
the margins of the mines, transporting materials to and from the mines or earning an income 
through prostitution. Many women are engaged in the prospecting of alluvial goldmines and 
therefore make an important contribution to this sector, perhaps representing up to 90% of
239 Participants at a focus group discussion held in Bo, 20 July 2007..
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those engaged in these activities.240 Nevertheless, their needs are not recognized in the 
majority of job creation or income generation programmes targeting this sector.
According to the World Bank, in most post-conflict settings far fewer women are formally 
employed as compared to men (2005: 90). This is partly due to the fact that informal jobs are 
easier to find for women who are uneducated or have little capital to start their own business, 
but also because the obstacles and limited opportunities of finding work in the formal sector 
that they face. The failure to provide adequate employment opportunities in the post-conflict 
phase can also be linked to the return to pre-conflict traditional stereotypes seen in other 
sectors, where women are expected to maintain the forms of domestic and informal labour 
expected of them. While it was acceptable for them to be trained in and return to trades such 
as gara tie-dying and soap-making, they did not receive support to continue the new roles that 
they assumed during conflict, for example in the agricultural sector. This can then make it 
difficult for women to acquire the skills, capital and networks that they need to begin their 
own business or take up a trade that will lead to employment in the formal sector.241 This 
reflects the tendency to focus on traditional forms of employment for women as opposed to 
using these job creation schemes as an opportunity to challenge gendered stereotypes.
It is clear from the analysis in this section that while poverty in Sierra Leone has a female 
face, most of the funding and project activities in support of poverty reduction are gender 
blind. The projects that did exist targeting women tended to be small-scale and did not 
provide sustainable solutions or income-generation prospects for women and the households. 
The next section will now turn from die issue of poverty reduction to the broader question of 
macroeconomic reform.
240 “Sierra Leone eyes a golden future”, BBC News, 20 August 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/business/5262960.stm
241 Interview with Daniele Gridel, Coordinator, COOPI, Kono, 31 March 2005.
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6.3.2 Macroeconomic reforms
In the early years of the peacebuilding process and with the support of the international 
community, the GoSL was able to maintain macroeconomic stability, increase GDP (albeit 
from a low starting point) and initiate some improvements in public sector resource 
management (UNSG, 2002a: 9). During the time period in which this research was carried 
out, Sierra Leone continued to perform badly in terms of overall economic development and 
poverty reduction, although the country did manage to record modest economic growth of 
around 6-7% real GDP per year. Although there was some regeneration in the mining and 
agricultural sectors, the beginning of trade liberalisation and the government’s fiscal capacity 
increased, employment in the formal sector remained a challenge and economic growth did 
not trickle down to the majority of the population (Brown et al, 2005: 7-8).
Throughout this period the government was highly dependent on foreign assistance, with 50% 
of the budget being donor-funded in 2005 (UNSG, 2005a: 9). By 2007, over 50 percent of 
total health expenditures, 75 percent of agriculture expenditures and 76 percent of the total 
budget for education came from donor sources (Zhou, 2009b: xxvi). Therefore, one of the 
main priorities of the GoSL and international community was the strengthening of the 
economic management capacity of the government, particularly in revenue collections and 
macroeconomic management (Zhou, 2009b: xviii). The World Bank financed two Public 
Sector Management Support projects to support these goals.
Two of the key forums for engagement between the UN and other international actors and the 
GoSL are the Consultative Group (CG) Meetings and the Development Partnership 
Committee (DEPAC) meetings. The reports of the major CG meetings held in 2002,2005 and
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2006 demonstrate the almost complete marginalisation of gender issues from the issues being 
discussed by the main donors and government actors.242
The documentary research and interviews carried out for this thesis demonstrate the extent to
which gender issues were marginalised from macroeconomic reform process. This is not
unique to Sierra Leone, and the exclusion of gender issues from post-conflict economic
reconstruction has recently been analysed in detail by UNIFEM (UNIFEM, 2008: 91-97),
showing that only a small percentage of economic assistance has a specific gender
component. The focus of economic assistance on the formal, macroeconomic sector also
makes it difficult for women to access these funds:
Macro-level policies for the post-war context tend to ignore what women are trying to 
do, unless they are intended to stop them doing it. For instance, many women 
continue with war-time economic strategies involving small-scale trade in the 
informal economy; such strategies tend to be ignored as being unsustainable or 
unimportant, rather than being evaluated as providing an important service, let alone 
the potential for successful business growth (Pankhurst, 2008: 16).
This problem is linked to the fact that women’s economic insecurity is not seen as a priority 
and is delinked from the broader peacebuilding process. Given the extent to which women are 
marginalised from the formal economic sector, they are unable to exert much influence over 
reforms in this area. Nevertheless, even for women living on a subsistence income, the 
macroeconomic reform agenda introduced by the UN and other donors as part of the 
peacebuilding process has significant gendered implications. Despite the lack of information 
about gender and economic reform in Sierra Leone, three important issues or lessons learned 
can be extrapolated from the experience in the country, and these will be described briefly 
below. Indeed, while there is little information to present on gender and the economic reform 
process, it is an issue to which the donor community should devote considerably more 
attention.
242 See the World Bank website
http ://web. worldbank. org/extemal/default/main?menuPK=367855&paeePK= 141155 &piPK= 141124&t 
heSitePK=367809 for links to the documents from the 2002, 2005 and 2006 CG meetings.
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First, women need access to proper sources of credit, not just the small amounts available 
through ad hoc UN or NGO-supported microcredit schemes. They need to be supported to set 
up and administer small and medium enterprises, which necessarily involves a reform of the 
legal system to enable women to access land, credit, property and other inputs such as 
agricultural extension services. Understanding the needs of women in relation to access to 
capital and resources as opposed to small-scale micro-credit loans is therefore an important, 
but overlooked, element of macroeconomic reforms.
Second, the failure to integrate gender issues into macroeconomic reform processes could be 
ameliorated through the introduction of gender budgeting measures. The need for gender 
budgeting was repeatedly cited by many people interviewed for this research, but it is also 
clear that expertise is lacking in this regard.243 Had gender budgeting principles been applied, 
it is more likely that gender issues would have figured into the budget allocations of UNDP, 
UNAMSIL and other key donors, as well as the government departments that were 
coordinating infrastructure rehabilitation, public service delivery, job creation and other 
elements of the economy recovery process.
Finally, donors such as the UN need to find a way of reaching those who are economically 
active in the informal sector, and divert more funds to small and medium enterprises rather 
than just the private sector elites who receive much of the benefits of macroeconomic 
reforms. Despite the important roles that women play in the informal economy, and 
particularly in subsistence agriculture, according to UN data from 2005, women’s economic 
activity was only 55% of that of their male counterparts.244 Women also play a key role in 
industries such as fisheries, where approximately 60% of the labour force is women engaged
243 Interviews with Jamesina King, HRC, 19 July 2007 and Nana Pratt, CSPEC focus group, 18 July 
2007.
244 UNDP HDR, 2005. http://hdr.undn.org/statistics/data/countries.cfin?c=SLE
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in cleaning, selling and processing fish.245 However, it is not clear that the UN’s liberal 
peacebuilding approach is well-suited for targeting these kinds of informal activities.
In 2003, it was estimated by the UN that the informal sector accounted for two thirds of the 
total labour force, rising to 70 percent of the urban labour force (UNCDF/GoSL, 2003: 2). 
There has been little focus on private sector development in Sierra Leone, or support for small 
and medium enterprises. Where private sector development programmes did exist, they 
tended to focus on the elite business community, mining sector and diaspora capital.246 In 
reality this only represents the tip of the iceberg of the private sector in Sierra Leone, and the 
vast informal and small-scale private sector is left out. “There is a big part of the economy 
that is not on the radar of the donors, but 90% of the population is working in this area 
[informal sector]. But the problem is that they are not really able to secure their survival.”247 
It is difficult for small enterprises to access the capital or guarantees that are needed to benefit 
from microcredit opportunities.
According to some critics of the liberal peacebuilding process, “the neoliberal component of 
the liberal peace model allows for security to take precedence over everyday life, however, 
reducing the responsibility of international actors, agencies and donors to actively work 
towards dealing with poverty, the lack of jobs and opportunities, and the deficiencies in 
public services, broadly defined” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 170). The tendency for the 
UN to work through specialized agencies, despite the “Working as One” policy, and to divide 
the various elements of peacebuilding into silos further exacerbates this problem.
245 Interviews with Rebecca Stringer, DFID and Edwin and Lawrence, CGG, 17 July 2007.
246 Dr Nour, GTZ, 17 January 2008
247 Ibid.
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6.3.3 Economic reform, gender mainstreaming and the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus
The exclusion of gender issues from the economic reform process in Sierra Leone is all the 
more remarkable given the fact that economic insecurity was so frequently highlighted as the 
major concern of women during the course of this research.248 However, the way that the 
liberal peacebuilding project is conceptualised and implemented does not lend itself to 
dealing with the localised, context-specific and individual economic security needs. 
Nevertheless, reality does not play out in silos, and the economic insecurity facing women in 
Sierra Leone has serious implications for other issues. According to WIPNET’s focal point in 
Bo, “justice is out of reach for many people because of their poverty, especially for women. 
And nothing is being done, nothing.”249 According to another participant in the same 
workshop as the WIPNET focal point, “women are less secure than men because they are not 
economically empowered.” For the average Sierra Leonean, therefore, economic insecurity 
impacts on justice and security despite the UN’s tendency to see these issues in discrete 
boxes.
Rather than being able to effectively address economic insecurities and poverty, it seems that 
the liberal peacebuilding approach has further marginalised the poor, many of whom are 
women (Salih, 2009: 137). Economic issues are not perceived as security concerns, just as an 
individual’s capacity to engage in government is not seen to have an economic dimension. In 
reality, however, all are inter-connected, and to delay or postpone the focus on poverty 
reduction and economic issues can have major lasting in consequences. “Economic projects 
are seen more as development rather than peacebuilding. But does this matter anyway? I
248 For example during the focus group discussions held in Freetown on 19 July 2007 and in Bo on 20 
July 2007.
249 Participant at a workshop on “Making SCR 1325 work for women”, organised by International 
Alert and GEMS, 10 March 2009, Bo.
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mean what does peacebuilding mean to rural people anyway?”250 When looking at the issues 
through a gender lens these consequences become even clearer.
As Castillejo points out, socioeconomic rights are critical for women to enjoy civil and 
political rights in Sierra Leone (2008: 12), but the reality is that the financial costs of 
accessing justice and others services is prohibitive and leaves women excluded from the 
benefits of the reforms that are taking place in the formal sphere. Failing to address women’s 
economic insecurity can. therefore undermine and have a negative impact on efforts to 
empower women in other spheres. The UN’s attempts to integrate gender into the post- 
conflict economic opportunities failed to challenge the traditional division of labour, and 
similarly women’s productive roles in the economy, which largely fall in the informal sphere, 
continued to be unacknowledged. The result was that resources and the benefits of economic 
growth were not distributed equally between the population, and women in particular 
appeared to miss out on these opportunities.
6.4 Women-specific programming by the UN
Although gender equality was framed as a cross-cutting issue in most of the policies 
discussed in the previous chapter, the reality was that very few programmes had either 
promoting gender equality or addressing the needs of women as a clear component. The 
previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated the limited way in which gender was 
integrated, and the different impacts the various dimensions of the peacebuilding process 
have had on men and women. However, there are also some examples of UN programmes 
that were more specifically designed to target women or deal with gender and peacebuilding 
issues. Most of these programmes were carried out by UNIFEM or the UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL 
gender advisors. It is important to remember that having gender as a cross-cutting issue and
250 Brian Larson, CARE country director, 14 January 2008
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actually having the capacity to ‘do’ it are two different things. The extent to which this 
capacity existed throughout UNAMSIL and other UN agencies is minimal.
UNAMSIL established a radio station in the country to transmit news, music and information 
about the peace process to communities throughout Sierra Leone as well as to provide a 
forum for raising awareness on a variety of issues. A programme on gender issues and 
women’s human rights was a regular weekly fixture of Radio UNAMSIL and this seems to 
have been an effective way of reaching the population and discussing potentially 
controversial issues such as rape and domestic violence. Representatives from the UN 
agencies as well as local women participated in these broadcasts, which are credited with 
having played a role in raising awareness about women’s rights, particularly related to sexual 
violence (Date-Bah, 2006: 23). Radio UNAMSIL also spearheaded specific campaigns, such 
as one on violence against women in 2002 that coincided with the global campaign “16 Days 
of Activism” around ending violence against women.251 In 2002, UNAMSIL collaborated 
with an NGO, Physicians for Human Rights, to undertake extensive research into the war- 
related sexual violence that women and girls had been subject to.252 This report became a 
useful advocacy tool for both the UN and other members of the international community and 
draws attention to the critical need for documentation of women’s human rights abuses in 
post-conflict contexts.
The UN gender advisors also played an important role in introducing a range of UN, 
government and civil society actors to SCR 1325 and other gender-related human rights 
instruments through training and sensitization workshops throughout 2004 and 2005. Several 
government officials indicated that these trainings were the first time that they had been made
251 “Sierra Leone: Campaign on violence against women launched”, Reliejweb, 26 November 2002. 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64D59C?OpenDocument&query=gender 
women&cc=sle&rc=l {Accessed 24/9/08]
252 Physicians for Human Rights report
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aware of SCR 1325, and that they found them incredibly useful.253 UNIFEM and the 
UNAMSIL gender advisor were involved in a gender training for senior UN staff members in 
2004, including those at die peacekeeping mission, which revealed that many were not aware 
of the gender policies that exist or the gender-differentiated impact of their programmes.254 
However, from the analysis of the security, governance and economic reforms earlier in the 
chapter it is clear that SCR 1325 was rarely referred to or used in designing or implementing 
activities within these three pillars, indicating the limited impact that it has had on the ground.
Indeed, despite trainings that new military personnel and some civilian personnel within 
UNAMSIL received on SCR 1325 and human rights, significant resistance to gender issues 
remained within the mission. Despite having been issued copies of the DPKO Gender 
Resource Package and the training efforts of the gender advisor, awareness of the content of 
the resolution appears to have been relatively low, and the internal trainings were of too short 
a duration to have much impact. Gender issues often continued to be perceived as 
unimportant by some UNAMSIL officials, and the gender advisor believed that she was able 
to have more impact through training outside of the mission than within it.255
The advisory and consultative role that the gender advisors played in relation to women’s 
organisations was another important area. Although UNAMSIL did not have any regular and 
institutionalised meetings between mission staff and local women’s organisations as occurs in 
other missions such as the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the gender advisor herself did 
play a key role in this regard. She acted as an important advocate inside the UN system for 
women’s organisations and was a point of contact within the bureaucracy of UNAMSIL, even 
if this collaboration was largely ad hoc.256 This was repeatedly mentioned by women 
peacebuilders as critical to their ability to access the formal corridors of the UN and provided
253 Interviews with two programme officers from the MSWGCA, Freetown 22 June 2006.
254 Interview with Jebbeh Forster, UNIFEM, Freetown, 13 June 2006.
255 Interview with Theresa Kambobe, UNAMSIL, Freetown, 25 May 2005.
256 Interview with Gebremehdin Hagoss, UNIOSIL, 29 June 2006.
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them with the needed support for their peacebuilding work, and the gender advisor was 
unanimously praised for having been accessible and supportive.257 Given that women’s 
organisations are often active in the informal sphere and can face obstacles to accessing key 
decision-makers and international representatives, such a channel is vital to making the work 
of these groups more visible.
As pointed out by the UNAMSIL gender advisor, “it is of utmost importance that the Mission 
constantly consults with women’s organizations in order to positively respond to the concerns 
of its stakeholders to give them a voice and promote credibility and ownership” (Kambobe, 
2005). However, many of the women’s organisations that exist in Sierra Leone are located at 
the community-level in rural areas and can therefore be difficult to identify and support. 
Although UNAMSIL did have contingents throughout the country which played an important 
role in rebuilding infrastructure and providing security to communities, they did not 
systematically engage with local people, in particular women’s organisations who may have 
had less access to the peacekeepers and various UN agencies. This meant that the support that 
the UN was able to provide to some of the women’s groups and other actors in Freetown was 
out of reach of those living in rural areas.
UNIFEM seems to have been guided by SCR 1325, and UNIOSIL to a lesser extent, but on 
the whole the UN’s activities do not seem to have been greatly influenced by the existence of 
the resolution. Nevertheless, in 2006, the UNCT did have an action plan on the 
implementation of SCR 1325. This plan was developed in response to a request by the 
Security Council during a meeting about UNIOSIL on 7 September 2006 (UNCT, 2006). The 
plan focuses mainly on training and integrating a gender perspective into the various ongoing 
reforms, for example by including women in the JSSR, TRC and electoral processes. It also 
highlights the role of women’s organisations and the need for ongoing and regular 
consultation with civil society. However, the plan does not include allocation of resources,
257 Various interviews in Freetown during 2005-2006.
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which made the subsequent implementation of its ambitious set of activities problematic. It is 
also demonstrative of the failure of the gender mainstreaming process in Sierra Leone that 
while this plan existed, there is not a single mention of SCR 1325 or gender perspectives in 
the UNIOSIL’s workplan for 2006. Therefore, while the action plan is a useful document in 
itself, these issues still remained marginalised and were not properly integrated into the ‘real’ 
activity matrices of UNIOSIL or other UN actors.
One example where women’s organisations and the UN have overcome some of the obstacles 
in engaging with one another is advocating for the integration of gender issues into the work 
of the PBC. This success has largely been due to INGOs such as International Alert and the 
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) acting as an interface 
between the UN and other donors and women’s organisations, although there has still been an 
emphasis on dialogue and partnership with Freetown-based organisations as opposed to those 
working at the local level. In 2006 a nascent network of peacebuilding organisations 
identified eight priority areas for the PBC, one of which was gender mainstreaming.258
For example, on 10-11 January 2007, a national consultation on enhancing women’s 
engagement with the PBC was held in Freetown with the objective to feed women’s 
perspectives into the development of the Peacebuilding Compact. From this consultation, 
gender-based violence emerged as the most significant threat to women’s human security in 
Sierra Leone, and participants in the consultation identified a number of strategic 
recommendations to address this and other problems. The national consultation was followed 
by two district-level consultations, which also identified issues relating to GBV, economic
258 See WANEP (2006). This ad-hoc network developed into the Civil Society Peacebuilding 
Engagement Committee (CSPEC) which has led on coordination and dialogue with the PBC and PBF.
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insecurity, land rights, and unequal decision-making and traditional structures that result in 
women having little say in resource allocation or priority-setting at the local level.259
Civil society organisations such as Marwopnet also had the opportunity to meet with and 
present statements to members of the PBC in Freetown and New York throughout 2007. 
However, even though engagements with the PBSO have been largely positive, women still 
face the challenge of transforming attitudes in their communities. “Because women are 
generally not part of the discourse as a whole on peacebuilding, during the rural consultations 
with the PBSO many of them were afraid to speak. The men were threatening to not let them 
attend the meeting.”260 Therefore, while some of the women-specific projects in particular 
may have resulted in creating some space for women to renegotiate gender roles and 
relations, the reality is that “de facto gains have not been translated into de jure changes in 
women’s status: women have taken on responsibility but have not been granted power” (El- 
Bushra, 2004: 163, emphases in original).
While having these women-specific projects may be necessary, it seems that there was little 
true gender mainstreaming. Instead, women-specific projects have ended up being 
‘ghettoised’ and further removed from the main policies and reforms that were driving the 
peacebuilding process. Their impact was therefore limited.
6.5 National-level capacity for gender mainstreaming
The weakness of the government in addressing and supporting gender equality in Sierra 
Leone was a further obstacle to efforts linked to adopting a more engendered approach to 
peacebuilding in the country. Whilst the UN has been a key peacebuilding actor in Sierra 
Leone, and the liberal peacebuilding consensus drove most of the policies and programming
259 See Report on National Consultation for Enhancing Women’s Engagement with the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone, January 10-11, 2007, Freetown, Sierra Leone: 13-14 
(unpublished report).
260 Interview with UNIFEM, Freetown, 16 July 2007.
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in the country, the GoSL also had a key role to play. Although there has been an institutional 
mechanism to deal with gender issues since 1988, the Gender and Children’s Affairs division 
only began recruiting a core of professional staff in December 2003. With the support of the 
international community, the MSWGCA was able to undertake a number of useful initiatives 
such as preparing the country’s first CEDAW report, lobbying for legal reforms, raising 
awareness of gender issues throughout the government through a system of gender focal 
points, and providing some expert input into the PRSP process.
However, capacity and resources are so limited, and progress so slow that the donor 
community is has been increasingly frustrated with the failure of the MSWGCA to move 
forward. Sierra Leone is by no means unique in the marginalisation of the national women’s 
machinery, and research has shown that this is common across many developing countries. 
As Goetz argues, “the creation of a new bureaucratic structure with no leverage in the system, 
no incentives to offer, no means to execute a vast mandate, is a blueprint for building a 
gender ghetto” (Goetz, 2009b: 247).
The MSWGCA developed two comprehensive gender policies which were passed by 
Parliament in 2000: the National Policy on Gender Mainstreaming and the National Policy on 
the Advancement of Women. These two policies and subsequent official statements about the 
position of women indicate that the government recognises gender inequality as an important 
issue in Sierra Leone, but it is not clear that the political will to actually implement the 
policies exists. Interestingly, these policies are quite far-reaching and also acknowledge the 
role of discriminatory practices and traditions, and the inequalities in access to control over 
resources that men and women have based on their gender roles.
Despite the impressive rhetoric, the two policies have not been efficiently distributed and 
therefore are not well-known, if at all, across the government’s different ministries and 
departments. For example, the Governance Reform Secretariat was not using the gender
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policies in their ongoing work on reforming the civil service due to a lack of awareness.261 
According to the Sierra Leone CEDAW report, the policies have not been publicized or 
implemented, and the sectoral gender experts that were established were not functional 
(CEDAW (2006) p. 29 para 10.6.3-4).
The lack of crossover and collaboration between the Gender Department of MSWGCA and 
other government ministries is a serious obstacle to ensuring that gender issues are 
incorporated into the various aspects of political, social, economic and legal reform in Sierra 
Leone. For example, MSWGCA representatives did not sit on the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee overseeing the implementation of the PRSP, although the Chief Social 
Development Officer (from the MSWGCA) is a member of the National Technical 
Committee.262 The MSWGCA was only represented on the Pillar Three working group of the 
PRSP focusing on human development, and was tellingly not a member of the other two 
which deal with promoting good governance, peace and security and promoting pro-poor 
sustainable growth. According to representatives of the MSWGCA, gender focal points have 
been assigned in each of the government’s line ministries, although it is unclear who these 
focal points are and whether or not there have been regularly scheduled meetings between 
them. Furthermore, given that it is often the most junior female member of staff who is 
allocated the ‘gender focal point’ responsibility; it is unlikely that they are able to provide the 
skills to support their ministry’s attempts at gender mainstreaming.263 The MSWGCA was 
also supposed to have a network of gender advisors deployed to each of the districts, however 
this has been repeatedly delayed due to the lack of resources available to support their 
assignment outside of Freetown.264
261 As of mid-2007, the ministries under review included the MSWGCA, the Ministry o f Justice/Office 
' of the Attorney-General, and the Ministry o f Internal Affairs. Interview with Emmanuel Gaima, 
Decentralisation Secretariat, Freetown, 13 July 2006.
262 See “Implementation and Framework for the PRSP” Encyclopaedia Sierra Leone 2007. 
http://www.daco-sl.Org/encvclopedia/2 coord/2 lview.htm [Accessed 30/9/08].
263 Interview with Hawa Musa, MODEP, Freetown, 26 June 2006.
264 Interview with Susan Sesay, MSWGCA, Freetown, 22 June 2006.
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The international community has supported the MSWGCA and sought to strengthen its ability 
to spearhead efforts to promote gender equality. For example, on two separate occasions the 
Commonwealth Secretariat funded external consultants to provide technical assistance for 12- 
month periods.265 While they were effective in providing guidance to the Ministry in terms of 
strategic planning and gender training, it is not clear if this type of support has had a 
sustainable impact. The institutional memory often disappears with the departure of the 
consultant, leaving behind sophisticated and extensive plans and strategies that there is simply 
no capacity or political will to implement.
Similarly, several donors such as UNIFEM have provided funds, material resources and 
trainings to MSWGCA staff, but have seen little outputs as a result of their efforts. The 
weakness of the MSWGCA is a problem for the UN, since responsibility and accountability 
for the peacebuilding process ultimately lies with the government. With a lack of capacity at 
the national level it means that there is less likelihood of any gender-related reforms being 
sustained. Indeed, finding the balance between the role of the UN and the need for the 
government to take ownership over the peacebuilding process, despite its capacity limitations 
can be difficult (Kaldor with Vincent, nd: 19).
However, the fact that the government is so limited in terms of capacity on gender issues 
could be an opportunity to push beyond the liberal peacebuilding focus on formal structures. 
The UN and other donors were beginning to look for ways to bypass the MSWGCA, but still 
support gender-related reforms in Sierra Leone.266 An example of this is the development of 
the Sierra Leone National Action Plan on the implementation of SCR 1325. The UN and 
several INGOs have been actively supporting civil society organisations to engage in the
265 The first consultant was hired in 2000 and helped to develop the MSWGCA’s two gender action 
plans, and the second consultant provided expert advice on integrating gender issues into the country’s 
PRSP in 2004.
266 Interview with DFID official, Freetown, July 2005.
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process of developing priority actions for the plan, and arguably have been playing more of a 
lead role than the GoSL.
UN discourse on capacity often refers to the formal, state-level, but as chapter 7 will 
demonstrate, many women’s organisations and networks are untapped resource. If the UN 
recognised civil society as a different kind of national-level capacity, then in fact weak 
government capabilities in this area could be an opportunity not only for these organisations 
to get support, but also a way for the peacebuilding process to better build on informal 
structures and actors.
6.6 Challenges in integrating gender into UN peacebuilding activities 
in Sierra Leone
As demonstrated through the analysis in this chapter, the UN has faced many challenges and 
limitations in the process of integrating gender into its peacebuilding work. This section will 
conclude with a brief summary of these key challenges, which will also provide insight into 
the gendered dimensions of liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. These issues will also be 
returned to again in more detail in the conclusion of the thesis.
First, the different needs that men and women had in relation to the peacebuilding process, 
and the different ways that they were impacted by the UN-led reforms were not 
acknowledged. Despite the critical roles that women played during the conflict and the fact 
that the peacebuilding process also has a gendered impact: “sadly they are the sector least 
consulted in developing the peace and the sector to least benefit directly from the programmes 
associated with the peace process” (Molloy, 2004: 19).
For example, the DDR and SSR processes were designed and implemented in a way that 
failed to acknowledge women’s gender-differentiated security needs, with the result that
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many of the insecurities that they faced persisted in the post-conflict phase. Governance 
reforms that sought to restore service delivery and reorient decision-making to the local level 
did not reach rural women effectively. Whilst the UN tried, through its liberal feminist 
approach to gender mainstreaming, to ensure that some space was created for women to 
engage in governance, they arguably failed to challenge the dominant power structures or 
gender relations in a way that truly empowered them. Arguably, many men also did not 
benefit from peacebuilding, particularly as a result of the focus on the formal state institutions 
that few people had access to, but their exclusion was less systematic than that experienced by 
women. The economic reforms also tended to ignore the informal economic roles that women 
played. Emphasis was placed on giving them access to small-scale microcredit, as opposed to 
more sustainable employment opportunities or credit schemes to support their engagement in 
non-traditional activities. The result of this failure to recognise and address the gendered 
impact in peacebuilding has resulted in a gendered virtual peace.
Second, while the UN policies and rhetoric may emphasise gender mainstreaming, the reality 
of its programming is that it tends to focus on women rather than taking a true gender 
approach. The UN displayed a reluctance to place gender issues at the front and centre of 
peacebuilding initiatives, instead preferring to ghettoise them in ‘women’s projects’, if 
addressing them at all. SCR 1325 and gender policies can be incredibly useful advocacy tools 
for women in post-conflict contexts throughout the world, as well as for gender focal points 
within the UN and other organisations. However, in terms of resulting in concrete progress 
they have been less effective.
SCR 1325 in particular appears to encourage a certain degree of tokenism due to its broad 
prescriptions that are informed by liberal feminist assumptions. For example, whilst ensuring 
that a certain minimum percentage of decision-making roles or beneficiaries of a project are 
women is a laudable goal, for example as seen in UNDP’s micro-credit projects, it can be 
counter-productive. This encourages UN staff to ‘tick boxes’ in terms of conceiving the idea
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of mainstreaming as a measurable action rather than a process of structural change. As a 
result, projects that target women are often confused with achieving gender equality.
The team of donors reviewing implementation of SCR 1325 across four peacekeeping
missions, including that of Sierra Leone, found that
none of the missions visited showed evidence that gender was successfully 
mainstreamed across the mission. Recognition had increased but gender was still not 
generally considered a priority. In many cases a number of misconceptions still 
existed, for example, there was a widespread tendency to view gender as ‘women’s 
issues’ rather than as relations between the sexes. Gender mainstreaming was often 
interpreted as gender balance and gender was often considered an ‘add on’ to a policy 
once it had been developed rather than integral to its development (Multi-donor 
Review, 2006: 8).
Despite having transformative potential and in theory linking in to changes in organisational 
culture, structures and resources allocations (Strickland, 2003: 9), it seems that gender 
mainstreaming as applied by the UN was rarely used as a tool to challenge power dynamics 
and gender relations and identities. As one interviewee aptly pointed out, “gender 
mainstreaming needs to be seen as a process of transformation, not just a technical 
exercise.”267 However, as the case of Sierra Leone has shown, the dominant liberal 
peacebuilding approach of the UN overshadowed any potential for transformation and instead 
of integrating gender into all aspects of programme design and implementation, too often 
gender was left out or added on only at the last moment.
The tendency towards adopting tokenistic approaches to integrating gender should be resisted, 
but doing so requires leadership, accountability and resources. As one UN employee stated, 
“the UN needs to make it [gender mainstreaming] mandatory. The perception is that you can 
live without it [...] people see gender as a choice and this is a problem.”268 Gender issues 
need to be incorporated into the mandate, structure and processes of peacekeeping missions 
from the outset.
267 Interview with Jamesina King, HRC, Freetown, 19 July 2007.
268 Personal interview with Theresa Kambobe, UNAMSIL Gender Advisor, Freetown, 25 May 2005.
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Although she is writing about the different context of Afghanistan, Kandiyoti’s comments in
relation to the gender mainstreaming process in that country are instructive:
In a context where the vast majority of women have limited contact with the 
institutions of the state, market or civil society, donor-assisted gender projects can 
easily either miss their target or give rise to unrealistic -  and often thwarted -  
expectations of immediate betterment. A more creative engagement with the 
complexities of the politics of gender, which is laden here as elsewhere with its own 
historical baggage, would mandate a contextual, non-technocratic approach which 
requires temporal horizons, levels of commitment and types of coalition-building 
(including cross-gender coalitions) and collaboration that far exceed the bureaucratic 
blueprints of international aid (2007: 198).
Finally, the preceding analysis has drawn attention to the UN’s focus on the formal 
peacebuilding process in all spheres of security, governance and economic reform. This 
divide between formal and informal efforts is to be expected, as the liberal peacebuilding 
approach has been shown to pay too little attention to local ownership and initiatives, and is 
focused on the liberalisation of formal, state-led governance and economic structures. 
However, as a result, important local-level dynamics and activities that are taking place 
informally are missed out on, and the formal and informal processes exist in parallel with one 
another. This also links into and contributes to the construction of the virtual peace, since too 
few of the benefits trickle down to the grassroots level, and there is a disjuncture between the 
priorities that are defined by the external actors and the needs of the local people on the 
ground.
It is to this last conclusion that the next chapter will turn. Given the limitations of the liberal 
peacebuilding consensus and the dominance of a liberal-informed approach to gender 
mainstreaming it is interesting to explore in more depth what was happening at the local level 
and the types of peacebuilding activities that were being carried out As chapter 4 illustrated, 
women’s groups made important contributions during the conflict, and as the next chapter 
will show this did not stop with the end of the fighting. However, because many of these 
contributions were in the informal sphere and at the community level they were beneath the
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radar of the international community and therefore were not capitalised on by the UN and 
other actors. The next chapter will seek to understand the contrasting approaches of the local 
women’s organisations, making links with the critiques of liberal peacebuilding and liberal 
feminism that draw attention to the need to build more on bottom-up, local dynamics as a 
potential strategy for a more transformative form of peacebuilding.
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CHAPTER 7. TOWARDS A MORE EMANCIPATORY 
PEACE? WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS, GENDER AND 
PEACEBUILDING IN SIERRA LEONE
As outlined in chapter 4, in the immediate aftermath of the war, women in Sierra Leone made 
important contributions to the processes of social and economic recovery in their 
communities. As the fighting ceased, women were often the first to return to resettle their 
communities and they took on the building of dwellings, production of food and other forms 
of labour and income-generation, as well as advocating for non-violence and reconciliation. 
Women’s peacebuilding efforts therefore can fill a vital gap in conflict-affected regions where 
there is no option other than working together to address the challenges of building peace, 
where necessary adapting their strategies to the constraints of the power dynamics and 
sociocultural realities that play out at the community level in Sierra Leone. However, local 
actors occupy a problematic space in the liberal peacebuilding model where priorities and 
actions are defined externally and administered in a top-down manner, and they are too often 
ignored by the formal peacebuilding process.
Since 2002, the number of women’s organisations269 throughout the country has increased, 
and they have continued to play important roles at both the community and national levels. 
There is great diversity in the nature and scope of women’s organisations, with networks and 
organisations operating at the regional and national levels down to small grassroots 
organisations active in rural communities. While some of these groups, particularly those 
engaged at the national level, do receive some funding from INGO and occasionally LIN 
sources, the amounts are small and they do not constitute a sustainable investment in, or an 
acknowledgement of the value, of the work that the women’s organisations are doing.
269 The term ‘women’s organisations’ is used to capture a wide range of civil society, community-based 
and grassroots organisations and networks. There is an immense diversity of membership, focus, 
approach and methods used by these different groups, and they therefore cannot be easily categorised. 
The organisations described in this chapter range from those that are formally registered NGOs active 
at the national level down to informal community-based networks that work in rural areas.
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Working directly with women’s organisations and supporting them to develop sustainable 
activities can strengthen and bring legitimacy to attempts to build peace and contribute to the 
attitude shift required to end violence (Anderlini, 2007). Furthermore, their vision of what 
constitutes peace itself can often differ from the liberal ideal as outlined in the UN documents 
discussed in chapter 2. The traditions and patriarchal culture of Sierra Leonean society have 
meant that women have historically been able to wield little influence and hold few roles in 
the formal, public spheres, and they have rarely been perceived as legitimate actors in the 
eyes of male leaders. Women’s organisations have therefore had to negotiate space to 
challenge stereotypes and attitudes that discriminate against women, and this has also helped 
to shape their approaches to issues such as gender equality, peace and security at the 
community level. As pointed out by de la Rey and McKay, approaches to peacebuilding 
should be understood as culturally-specific and gendered (2006: 141).
One of the reasons why women’s organisations have such little power is that they are not 
accorded the status of legitimate actors who hold valid knowledge and expertise by the UN 
and other proponents of the liberal peacebuilding consensus (Sending, 2009). As this chapter 
will show, this is a flawed perception, as women’s organisations have much to offer both in 
terms of supporting the UN’s peacebuilding work as well as pushing the boundaries of what 
‘counts’ for the liberal peacebuilding consensus. Local actors, particularly women’s 
organisations, can help external actors gain a better understanding of the contextual and 
complex nature of gender roles and relations as well as identify peacebuilding needs and 
dynamics at the local level. However, regardless of their possible insights, “women’s 
peacebuilding actions and areas of focus are often unrecognised by the broader national and 
international community because women have little power within these structures” (de la Ray 
and McKay 2006: 150).
The need to adopt more bottom-up and locally owned methodologies and ontologies of peace 
has been argued for by several critics of the liberal peace project (Donais, 2009; Sending,
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2009). More emancipatory approaches, as outlined by Richmond (2005: 214-222) represent 
an effort to reinscribe peacebuilding from the bottom up. Such approaches resonate with 
elements of the liberal peace, but simultaneously create more space for engagement between 
external and local actors and place more of a priority on social justice and the primacy of 
bottom-up approaches to the ‘civil peace’. According to Richmond, “if a sustainable peace is 
to be constructed, there can be no exit until both locals and internationals have agreed that 
such a version of peace has actually been achieved” (2005: 220). If this statement is to be 
accepted as holding some truth, then the questions still remain of who gets to define that 
peace, who is involved in building or achieving it, and whether or not the experience of that 
peace is equally shared. According to one women’s rights activist in Sierra Leone, “the UN 
doesn’t make enough effort to find out what is going on locally, but these are the entry points. 
The UN will never be able to come in to a country, figure it all out, fix it and leave. You need 
to look at what is going on here to find the solutions, and then you support those solutions. 
That is how you make it sustainable.”270
In contrast to the previous focus on the UN’s approach to integrating gender into its 
peacebuilding activities, this chapter will now turn to the work of women’s organsations in 
Sierra Leone, analysed in the context of the particular dynamics of gender equality and peace 
at the community level in the country. As I will argue, the contributions of women’s 
organisations and networks were largely overlooked, with consequences for both the 
sustainability of liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone as well as the nature of the peace that 
was being built. The purpose of this chapter is to determine what sustainable peace looked 
like from their perspectives and whether or not their approaches could provide an entry point 
leading towards a more gender-sensitive, emancipatory peace than that possible within the 
confines of the UN’s liberal feminist approach to gender mainstreaming.
270 Personal interview with Gladys Gbappy-Brima, 16 January 2008, Freetown.
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First, the chapter will provide some contextual background to the traditions and other socio­
cultural factors that shape and influence the terrain of both gender issues and peacebuilding in 
Sierra Leone. Secondly, it will briefly outline the focus, activities and impact of a selection of 
women’s organisations and networks.271 Third, the chapter will outline a framework that can 
help to understand the kind of peacebuilding work that women’s organisations have carried 
out in Sierra Leone, as well as other places. Finally, the rest of the chapter will focus on 
analysing how the different strategies and approaches used by women’s organisations not 
only support and deepen the three pillars of the liberal peacebuilding process, but also push 
the boundaries of the liberal peacebuilding consensus itself. It will also make links with the 
specific social and cultural dynamics in Sierra Leone which can shed some light on why their 
activities have evolved in the way they did. In emphasising transformative strategies and 
bottom-up approaches, women’s organisations reflect the potential for moving towards a 
more emancipatory peacebuilding model. The possibility that this could lead to a more 
sustainable, gender-sensitive and less virtual, peace has important implications for how the 
international community approaches these issues in Sierra Leone, and in other post-conflict 
contexts.
By juxtaposing an account of the activities of women’s organisations and local perspectives 
on gender and peacebuilding with the previous analysis of the liberal feminist approach of the 
UN, this chapter will feed into the conclusion which considers the possible alternatives to the 
UN’s liberal feminist approach to mainstreaming gender in peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, 
and the challenges and opportunities in bridging the gap between formal and informal 
processes. Indeed, the failure to capitalise on women’s involvement in peacebuilding in
271 For the purposes of this thesis, it was necessary to select a limited number of organisations to 
explore in more detail. In choosing which organisations to focus on, a number o f criteria were 
identified that enabled me to narrow down the scope to eight organisations and networks. First, the 
organisations had to explicitly have either a women or gender-focused mandate. Second, they had to be 
active at the national as well as local level (and in the case of WIPNET and Marwopnet, also at the 
regional level). Third, the organisations all had to have at least one person serving as coordinator or 
director of activities, as opposed to being a loose network of individuals. Fourth, the organisations had 
to demonstrate an engagement in the peacebuilding, either at a conceptual or practical level. Finally, 
the organisations had to be accessible so that I could carry out first-hand research with members.
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informal, local spheres has been a critical shortcoming of the UN’s engagement in Sierra 
Leone, and of liberal peacebuilding strategies more broadly. Whilst bridging this gap is 
fraught with difficulties, it will be an essential step in the move towards a more emancipatory, 
sustainable and locally-legitimate peace.
7.1 Contextualising gender and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: power 
dynamics at the local level
One of the main critiques of both liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminism is their tendency 
towards universalistic assumptions and approaches (Newman, 2009: 43-43). To avoid this 
and to strengthen the argument made in this thesis that women’s organisations at the local 
level offer an alternative, and more legitimate and sustainable, model for building peace in 
Sierra Leone, it is therefore necessary to situate these organisations in the specific social and 
cultural context of the country. This requires acknowledging the cultures, traditions, and 
power dynamics at play that mediate and influence the roles they play and the types of 
activities that they are able to undertake in order to identify the specific factors that have 
shaped their approaches. Whilst it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to cover all of these 
dynamics in detail, it is important to flag some key aspects of the local level dynamics that 
will be returned to throughout this chapter and which have already been alluded to in chapters 
4 and 6.
Secret societies occupy an important place in Sierra Leonean society (men belong to Poro and 
women to Sande). They are the mechanism through which boys and girls are initiated into 
adulthood and they continue to be a site of power and influence in all aspects of community 
life. Secret societies also play a specific role in relation to shaping the meaning and practice 
of gender identities, roles and relations in Sierra Leone (Schroven, 2006: 23-24). The 
initiation rites are an important site of teaching young men and women their ascribed gender 
roles in society, which are then entrenched through the traditional practices of these societies
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(Ferme, 2001). In particular, the women’s secret societies act as a network to control 
women’s productive and reproductive capacities, and have the power to impose social rules, 
fines and other punishments, which maintain women in a subservient position (Schroven, 
2006: 24).
In addition to the secret societies, religion also plays a strong role in social life in Sierra 
Leone, where the population largely follows either Islam or Christianity. Geography and 
ethnicity also play a strong role in defining social dynamics. These factors all shape the 
largely hierarchical and male-dominated traditional structures, which are the site of justice 
and conflict resolution within the community (Manifesto 99, nd: 19). Although many of the 
traditional structures of social relations were destroyed by the war, they have since been 
rebuilt, and continue to shape the environment in which women’s organisations are 
advocating for greater rights and empowerment.
As mentioned in chapter 4, customary law applies widely throughout the country, and since it 
is not codified, its interpretation and enforcement hinges on the attitudes and beliefs of the 
paramount and section chiefs, religious leaders and local heads of the secret societies. Whilst 
some efforts have been made to transform attitudes and raise awareness of women’s rights in 
the post-war period, the terrain of social, cultural and religious life in Sierra Leone continues 
to pose specific challenges for women’s empowerment and their ability to claim their 
rights.272 Given the importance of both the secret societies and religion to daily life in Sierra 
Leone, particularly in the rural areas, local women’s organisations have therefore by necessity 
had to engage with these groups in order to carve out the space to carry out their work. This is 
in contrast to the UN and other international actors, who have failed to engage with religious 
and traditional leaders in any meaningful way on questions relating to gender equality, and 
therefore have overlooked the impact of these crucial dynamics and relationships.
272 Interviews with Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, 11 January 2008 and 
Jeanette Eno, Director, ENCISS, Freetown, 17 July 2007.
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As has already been illustrated in chapters 5 and 6, the peacebuilding activities carried out by 
the UN focused mainly on the urban centres of the country. Given the limited capacity of 
UNIFEM, and UNAMSIL/UNIOSIL in relation to gender issues, and the constraints facing 
the MSWGCA, little attempt was made to extend the programs and projects addressing 
gender inequality beyond Freetown and the district capitals. Some INGOs were operating 
projects in rural areas, such as the International Rescue Committee’s support for the Rainbo 
Centres, however these were the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, awareness of the 
peacebuilding process, the obligations of the government with regards to the provision of 
security and governance and economic reform, and the activities of the UN agencies in these 
areas was not widespread (Street et al, 2007: 16). This left a significant area of the country 
where the international community and the formal peacebuilding activities were not reaching, 
and local women’s groups and other civil society organisations stepped in to bridge the gap, 
often out of necessity.
There can be major differences in the priorities and needs of women living in urban or peri­
urban areas as compared to in the rural parts of the country, and the limited mobility of many 
people due to poverty can easily lead to the exclusion of rural populations. The rural/urban 
divide can be a source of tension, and although some of the women’s organisations described 
in section 7.2 attempt to link up regions, many of the people interviewed outside of Freetown 
highlighted their distance from the peacebuilding process that was largely perceived to occur 
only in the capital region.273
A further aspect of the Sierra Leonean context of note is the patriarchal nature of social, 
economic and political life, as was mentioned in chapter 4. The unequal power dynamics 
between men and women have largely been maintained in the post-conflict phase. There is 
the risk that women experience pressure, or the necessity, to return to pre-war social roles,
273 Focus group discussion, Bo, 20 July 2007.
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and traditional norms and ideas can constrict the ability of women to capitalise on the new 
roles that they may have fulfilled during the conflict (Schroven, 2006: 49-50). In some 
instances, the social and demographic shifts have also lead to new forms of conflict, for 
example in marriage and the division of labour, that also need to be addressed in 
peacebuilding efforts (Richards, 2006).
At the same time, violent conflict did alter the spaces where men and women negotiate their 
roles and relationships, and so the ‘post-conflict moment’ (Cockbum and Zarkov, 2002) 
presented some opportunities. As argued by Abdullah et al, “women’s independent organising 
became a new pathway of women’s empowerment in wartime Sierra Leone, and has opened 
new avenues for women to articulate their demands for equal rights and social justice in a 
postwar situation” (2010: 37). The fact that many women mobilised others at the community 
level and also took on new economic roles during and in the aftermath of conflict meant that 
they began to acquire some of the skills necessary to challenge the status quo. The entry of 
international actors such as the UN and INGOs also facilitated the creation of space for at 
least some women’s groups to grow and develop, and indeed the postwar environment 
witnessed a proliferation of locally-based civil society groups.
There has also been a breaking down of the age-based hierarchies that previously shaped 
social life in Sierra Leone, creating new space for organising, particularly among young 
people and women in the peacebuilding phase (Ferme, 2001: 227), as well as laying the 
ground for new conflicts as outlined by Richards (2006). The post-war social and cultural 
dynamics in Sierra Leone are therefore complex, multi-faceted and ever-changing, and 
influence the shape of the post-war moment for both women and men. Another dimension of 
peacebuilding that has been specific to Sierra Leone is the challenge of reintegrating the large 
numbers of girls and women who experienced various forms of sexual violence during and 
after the conflict. Historically, domestic and sexual violence have been shrouded in a culture 
of silence (Shaw 2005), and husbands across many of the ethnic groups in Sierra Leone have
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traditionally had the right to chastise their wives, including through physical violence 
(Abdullah et al, 2010: 42). The widespread sexual violence directly targeted the norms and 
values of society, leaving a legacy of broken social networks at the community level. This 
shaped the terrain of building peace at the local level in Sierra Leone, and efforts to promote 
gender equality have necessarily had to engage with the complex challenge of reintegrating 
and rehabilitating women and girls back into their communities.
This section has briefly highlight religion and secret societies, the urban and rural divide, 
gendered power dynamics at the community level and the widespread sexual violence as 
having a bearing on the peacebuilding process. Indeed, these issues and others are tied up in 
the historical legacies of sexuality, patriarchy and kinship in Sierra Leone (Ferme, 2001), and 
the challenge of negotiating and engaging with these dynamics is ever-present for women’s 
organisations seeking to transform gender roles and relations and build peace in rural areas in 
Sierra Leone. The liberal peacebuilding model, on the other hand, does not provide space for 
acknowledging, engaging with and addressing these context-specific factors which may offer 
some explanation for the differing approaches of women’s organisations to which this chapter 
will now turn.
7.2 Women’s organisations working for gender equality and peace in 
Sierra Leone
The number of women’s organisations in Sierra Leone has increased significantly since the 
end of the war, in terms of organisations operating at both national and local levels.274 They 
design and implement community-based initiatives to address the needs of women in areas as 
diverse as health, education, income-generation, negotiation and decision-making skills, and 
legal rights, as well as promote peace and conflict resolution at the local level (Thorpe, 2006: 
80-81). Although the work being done by these organisations resonate with different aspects
274 This reflects the general trend across the civil society sector in Sierra Leone (DAI Europe, 2006:
16).
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of the three peacebuilding pillars liberal peacebuilding outlined in chapter 6, more 
importantly they push beyond this limited view of peacebuilding and incorporate a broader 
range of activities and approaches that challenge current liberal understandings and 
essentially amount to a reinscribing of peacebuilding. Their position at the community level 
also requires them, or perhaps enables them, to engage more explicitly with the different 
power hierarchies and structures that continued to persist in post-conflict Sierra Leone. These 
were largely male-dominated, and despite women’s roles as change agents during the war 
many taboos and discriminatory cultural practices remained.275 Women’s organisations 
working for peace therefore had to adapt their strategies in a way that enabled them to 
negotiate these power dynamics, whereas the liberal peacebuilding approach of the UN did 
not acknowledge them at all.
The fact that their work cannot clearly be assigned to one of the pillars is further 
demonstration of the limitations of the narrow and structured top-down approach adopted by 
the UN. In reality, the pillars are inter-related. For example, economic issues are integral to 
the physical security of women and girls, political participation is only possible for many 
women if their household survival needs have first been addressed, and access to justice and 
protection from gender-based violence undercuts all aspects of socioeconomic and political 
empowerment.
This inter-connected nature of peacebuilding, which is an organic and complex process, is 
rarely acknowledged by the UN in its taxonomy of building a liberal peace. Not only do 
women’s organisations not fit neatly into these categories, but they also address other areas 
that push the boundaries of what is considered to ‘count’ in the liberal peacebuilding 
consensus. As will be shown in this chapter, women’s organisations frequently address the 
wider issues of community reconciliation, conflict prevention and gender-based violence,
275 Interview with Memunatta Pratt, Fourah Bay College, Freetown, 21 June 2006.
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none of which have an evident home in the liberal peacebuilding approach, except at its most 
emancipatory extremes.
It is important to note that the activities of women’s organisations are not necessarily framed
as ‘empowerment of women’ or ‘promoting gender equality’, in large part due to the
constraints of the patriarchal environment in which they are operating.276 Nevertheless, the
training, support and capacity-building that women gain through these projects means that
they are in turn better placed to negotiate their rights, their needs such as protection from
violence or economic independence, and their roles within society. As such, women’s
empowerment and gender equality are an integral part of the subtext of the work of these
organisations, and are effective where a more overt strategy of challenging gender dynamics
would not be. This approach may provide more nuance and critical possibilities than
presented by the UN liberal feminist approach. As Barry notes:
Instead of working to promote and advance the rights of women and girls, they now 
directed their resources and energies towards resisting conflict and protecting basic 
rights, including, for example, the right to life and freedom of movement [...] 
Crucially, their responses were grounded in the real and complex priorities of women 
and girls affected by the conflicts. Hence, their new interventions were often 
multidisciplinary and flexible, shifting rapidly to respond to the mounting and varied 
impacts of the violence (2005: 28).
The organisations whose work will be described below are: Grassroots Empowerment for 
Self-Reliance (GEMS), Federation of African Women Educationalists (FAWE), the Fifty- 
Fifty (50/50) Group, the Sierra Leone Market Women’s Association (SLWMA), the Sierra 
Leone Women’s Forum (SLWF), and Women’s Partnership for Justice and Peace (WPJP).277 
Two regional networks are also discussed in a separate section: the Mano River Women’s 
Peace Network (Marwopnet), and the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET). All of
276 Participant in focus group discussion, Bo, 20 July 2007.
277 It is not possible in this thesis to provide an extensive analysis of these organisations, or a detailed 
assessment o f their successes and failures in working in post-conflict Sierra Leone. However, the 
overviews presented in this section represent the insights gleaned from many interviews and in some 
cases, months of working in partnership with these organisations on their gender and peacebuilding 
projects. Some of the obstacles and limitations of these organisations will be returned to in more length 
in the conclusion of the thesis.
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these organisations are based in Freetown, with the exception of WPJP, which is based in Bo. 
Although Marwopnet, WIPNET and WPJP were the only three women’s groups with a 
mandate focused explicitly on peacebuilding issues during this time period, the other 
organisations also indirectly address issues related to overall peacebuilding efforts, and all 
have an explicit focus on women and gender issues.278
7.2.7 Grassroots Empowerment fo r  Self-Reliance
GEMS was launched in May 1998, in response to the situation of women during the conflict 
in Sierra Leone. GEMS is active in the Western Area (Freetown and surroundings), and in 
two chiefdoms of the Northern Region around Makeni. GEMS’ founding principle is that 
“basic social needs are basic human rights”, and it aims to transform the lives of marginalized 
women by fostering self-reliance through development and enabling them to effectively 
participate in decision-making. The founder and coordinator of GEMS, Barbara Bangura, had 
encountered significant discrimination following the death of her husband, particularly in 
terms of issues related to inheritance. According to Bangura, “economic issues are integral to 
everything, that is why self-reliance and development are our starting points”279, and the 
formation of the organisation itself was in a sense motivated by the traditional practices that 
deny women rights. Since 2006, GEMS has gained an increased profile in Sierra Leone and 
has succeeded in obtaining some funding from INGOs and foundations such as the Global 
Fund for Women, but the amounts are limited and the lack of resources was named as one of 
the key obstacles to GEMS’ work by the national coordinator.
GEMS is engaged in a range of different activities, many of which are carried out through 
workshops and trainings in the regions where the organization is active. The focus is on 
raising awareness about women’s rights and training on non-violence, using community
278 Marwopnet and WIPNET are both regional networks that are active across West Africa; however 
most of the activities take place at the national level and the capacity of the national branches o f these 
networks vary significantly.
279 Interview with Barbara Bangura, GEMS National Coordinator, 14 January 2008.
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dialogue as a key tool. This reflects an a focus on informal mechanisms and channels for 
enhancing peaceful relations, using the local level as the site for transformation of power that 
theoretically could then transfer to the national level. Given the focus on economic issues, 
GEMS has also initiated a number of micro-credit initiatives in the regions where it operates. 
However, it was found that the women they worked with were not always collaborative or 
honest, and that the rate of return was poor. As a result, GEMS has now turned to revolving 
loans for agriculture as a solution to this problem. Instead of small amounts of money, women 
receive seeds and eventually pay back in kind. GEMS found that “the agricultural loans 
system was good because it was easy to see the gains from harvest and less tempting for the 
recipients to not fulfil their obligations”.280 This would have been a valuable insight for the 
UN, and speaks to some of the problems with the microcredit projects that were discussed in 
chapter 6.3.
GEMS has also organised many workshops in and around Freetown, focusing on 
peacebuilding and reconciliation and building skills of participants to peacefully resolve 
conflict in their communities. For example in 2003, GEMS organized a two-day workshop on 
peacebuilding and reconciliation in Kroo Bay, which is one of the most deprived slums of 
Freetown. As a result of the workshop, community members established a task force to settle 
disputes.281 Its activities also require women to network and collaborate, thereby 
strengthening the often ad hoc work being done by grassroots organizations in different 
communities, and filling a gap for peacebuilding within rural areas. By focusing on 
establishing community-based networks and giving people the tools to solve their own 
conflicts through alternative dispute mechanisms recognises that local actors also have 
knowledge and expertise in relation to peacebuilding. These alternative mechanisms are often 
better able to work alongside the customary legal mechanisms that are prevalent in rural 
Sierra Leone and are therefore a more realistic channel to achieving justice.
280 Presentation by Catherine Greenwood, Alert workshop Feb 2008.
281 Interview with Barbara Bangura, GEMS National Coordinator, 16 July 2007.
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Since early 2007, GEMS has been extensively involved in a mass advocacy violence-free 
elections campaign, acting as coordinator of the coalition of organisations engaged in this 
initiative. Some of the activities that the coalition initiated included nationwide prayers 
bringing together Sierra Leoneans from diverse political and ethnic backgrounds, dialogue 
with political leaders around issues related to peace consolidation, sensitization through TV 
and radio programmes, and voter education.282 GEMS and other women’s organizations 
played an active role in this campaign largely due to fears that women would suffer 
disproportionately from violence if it occurred during the elections, both in terms of physical 
risk as well as a diminished likelihood that they would be able to participate as voters. This 
campaign also benefited from links with Liberian women, and during August 2007 a Liberian 
“Women Peace Train” travelled to Sierra Leone to display solidarity with the objectives of 
the coalition.283 This campaign focused heavily on raising awareness among men, as the main 
propagators of violence against women. This alludes to the importance of networks that will 
be discussed in more detail in the later sections of this chapter.
GEMS has also played an important role in disseminating and advocating for the 
implementation of the three Gender Bills adopted by parliament in 2007. While these Bills 
represented an important step forward for women’s rights in the country, few women outside 
of women’s activists in Freetown were aware of the additional rights they were afforded by 
these new laws. This illustrates the need to link up the top-down national processes of reform 
with the locally-driven informal channels. Although they have been translated into plain 
English by FAWE and the Lawyers Centre for Legal Assistance (LAWCLA), GEMS argues 
that they need to be simplified and shared with women throughout Sierra Leone, particularly 
those who are illiterate and living in rural areas where there are few services and little access
282 Interview with Barbara Bangura, GEMS National Coordinator, 16 July 2007.
283 Awareness Times, “Sierra Leone Women to Launch Violence-Free Elections Campaign”, 9 July 
2007.
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to justice.284 Critically, officials working in the justice system, both formal as well as 
informal, also need to be sensitized and engaged in efforts to implement the gender bills since 
without their cooperation it is unlikely that women will be able to obtain justice for crimes 
committed against them. “Now the laws are in place, the real challenge is making them 
relevant to the members of communities throughout Sierra Leone and ensuring that they have 
access to justice.”285
7.2.2 The Forum o f African Women Educationalists
The Sierra Leone chapter of FAWE was established in 1995 during the height of the war, and 
focused its efforts on establishing coping mechanisms in conflict for women and girls 
(FAWE, n.d.: 207).286 It was founded by Christiana Thorpe, who later became a Deputy 
Minister of Education and in 2005 was appointed as chairwoman of the National Election 
Commission (NEC). FAWE focuses on education, using it as an entry-point to support work 
in other areas such as addressing the culture of violence amongst youth, issues of 
reconciliation and reintegration, and gender-based violence. By 2005, FAWE had 863 full 
members across 24 branches spread throughout the country (FAWE 2005: 1) and this number 
has continued to grow.287 FAWE’s funding comes in the form of monthly contributions from 
members, as well as some limited support from the GoSL and the international community.
7.2.3 The Fifty-Fifty Group
The 50/50 Group was formed in 2000 to address women’s marginalization and discrimination 
and to promote their participation in public life.288 The motivation for establishing this group 
came from the fact that at this time, women were being excluded from the peace negotiations
284 Interview with Barbara Bangura, GEMS National Coordinator, 14 January 2008.
285 Interview with Barbara Bangura, GEMS National Coordinator, 14 January 2008.
286 FAWE is a pan-African organisation founded in 1992 with its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. 
FAWE has national chapters in 33 African countries.
287 Interview with Eileen Hanciles, FAWE, 23 June 2006.
288 Through their work, the 50/50 Group seeks to address the under-representation o f women in 
decision-making throughout Sierra Leone, with the rationale that “so long as women are unable to play 
a full role in political decision making, policies are unlikely to take into account the reality of women’s 
lives and will fail to meet their needs” (The 50/50 Group, 2004: 2).
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and new post-war governance structures, despite the important roles that they had played 
during the war. Given that women have been historically marginalised in political life, the 
evolution of the 50/50 Group represented an important challenge to the patriarchal structures 
that existed at national and local level. As a campaigning organisation, their activities focus 
on sensitising voters, lobbying decision-makers and providing training and mentoring to 
women candidates and politicians.
When it first began, the group did not have an office, but rather the small number of members 
met at the British Council in Freetown. Over the period of less than a decade, the 50/50 
Group has transformed into a nationally-recognised organization and its name has become 
synonymous with gender equality in Sierra Leone.289 The 50/50 Group defines itself as a non­
partisan campaigning organization that seeks to empower and train women to enter into 
politics, advocate for the removal of barriers to women’s political participation, and change 
the public perception of women in politics (50/50 Group, 2004). There are now active 
branches throughout all fourteen districts in Sierra Leone, and the organization has been 
successful in attracting a modest amount of support from INGOs and other donors.
Examples of the type of work carried out by the 50/50 Group include training over 1000 
women in leadership, communication and advocacy skills prior to the 2002 national elections, 
and over 500 women in similar skills in the lead up to the local government elections in 
2004.290 The majority of the 165 women who ran for election in 2002 were trained by the 
50/50 Group291 As a result of their historic marginalisation from the public sphere, potential 
women candidates had limited skills in campaigning and leadership, and also had little access
289 In Sierra Leone it is common to hear men talking about “that fifty-fifty business” in reference to 
gender equality or women’s rights. While the term is at times used in a disparaging way, it also 
indicates a much greater awareness of these issues, a fact that will hopefully translate into greater 
recognition and respect for women’s rights.
290 Interview with Harriet Turay, 50/50 Group, Freetown, 24 June 2006.
291 “Gender, democracy and post-conflict restructuring in Sierra Leone: An interview with Ms. Abator 
Thomas, Minister of Health and Sanitation”, p.3.
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/Sierra%20Leone%20Interview%20(fin).pdf
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to the financial resources necessary to run for election. The 50/50 group was able to initiate 
this training as well as help women to raise the funds needed. The group has also produced 
training manuals and established a network of more than 20 trainers who can support the 
organisation’s work outside of Freetown.
Education is key to the work of the 50/50 Group, and is seen as vital to the emancipation of 
women and the key to ensuring that women are able to influence and engage in politics and 
decision-making. One of the demands that the group has been making through the “Atlantic 
Declaration” is that 30% of all candidates in national and local elections should be women, 
however progress towards adoption of a quota has been slow. This figure is also problematic 
given the estimated 85% illiteracy rate among rural women, making it unlikely that there are 
enough women with the skills and capacity to fill these positions. Another problem 
highlighted by the president of 50/50 is the lack of available funding for their work in the 
years between elections.292 Whilst donors have been willing to fund training for women 
candidates, this has only been forthcoming in the months immediately preceding an election. 
However, it takes years to build capacity and raise awareness. Programmes in support of 
political participation need to be more long-term if women are to be able to compete on an 
equal footing with men, who were already beginning to prepare and campaign for the 2007 
national elections in early 2005.293
While the 50/50 Group sees itself as representing women and playing a key role in national 
advocacy on women’s exclusion from decision-making, their work is not always seen this 
way by others. Some interviewees suggested that the 50/50 Group is perceived as an elite 
organization that does not necessarily cater to the needs of illiterate women living in rural 
areas, who represent a significant part of the population.294 The tensions of balancing a 
national-level profile and the goal of responding to the needs of the constituency base of local
292 Interview with Harriet Turay, 50/50 Group, Freetown, 24 June 2006.
293 Interview with Christiana Solomon, Freetown, 29 April 2005.
294 Interviews with various civil society representatives in Freetown, February-May 2005.
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women, as well as the difficult task of changing men’s attitudes, are two factors that the 
Group has not always successfully contended with.295 The 50/50 Group is also perceived as 
threatening to some men as a result of the challenge it presents to the gendered division of 
labour and the traditional marginalization of women to the domestic sphere (George- 
Williams, 2005: 70). According to one of the founders of the 50/50 Group, “A few women 
are hostile to the group as they still believe in the myth that politics is a man’s game and they 
fear the violence that is usually associated with it [...] Many 50/50 Group activists are 
accused of being divorced women who want to undermine the family and displace men” 
(Thomas quoted in Braun n.d.). Nevertheless, the 50/50 Group has undoubtedly played an 
important role in raising awareness of women’s political participation, and the membership is 
diverse and growing.
While the 50/50 Group has achieved much recognition in Sierra Leone, at times their 
approach resonates with liberal feminist approaches that focus on removing the barriers to 
women’s participation in decision-making. What perhaps allows this group to push beyond 
these approaches is that they do work with women at the grassroots level, and recognise that 
the transformation of attitudes is a critical element if women are to engage effectively in 
decision-making.296 However, it does appear that the strategies used by the 50/50 Group have 
not always been successful in breaking down the gendered social structures and traditional 
attitudes that permeate and influence women’s access to public spaces in Sierra Leone.
7.2.4 The Sierra Leone Market Women’s Association
As a consequence of their economic marginalisation, women in Sierra Leone have a long 
history of subsistence trading. This type of work has historically been the main source of 
income to cover household needs, but it tends to generate small amounts of money and 
therefore rarely allows for any savings of profits (Steady, 2006: 59). Given that women are
295 Interview with Abimbola Akinyemi, Oxfam, 25 February 2005.
296 Interview with Harriet Turay, 50/50 Group, Freetown, 24 June 2006.
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primarily engaged in the informal economic sector which offers little support and protection 
to workers, women have at different times in the country’s history mobilised themselves into 
collectives and networks to increase their access to loans, support, training and protection. 
One such example is the Sierra Leone Market Women’s Association (SLMWA).
As a result of the specific constraints and discrimination they faced as the conflict in Sierra 
Leone drew to a close, market women came together to begin their own voluntary association. 
The SLMWA is now a registered NGO with full-time staff and a membership of 
approximately 6,500.297 The membership of the SLMWA is diverse, with many members 
being illiterate and from extremely deprived backgrounds, and therefore representing groups 
of women who have been particularly marginalised by the strict gender division of labour and 
gendered access to resources in Sierra Leone. The association received some limited support 
from the UK government and a local NGO to launch micro-credit schemes in 2000, and since 
then their activities have grown. Initially working in Freetown, the SLMWA provided loans 
of Le 100,000 (£20), which were given to groups of approximately 20-30 women across the 
many different markets in the city. Loans had to be repaid gradually on a daily basis, and the 
women were also encouraged to set aside a small amount of their daily earnings to enable 
them to eventually develop a capital base (Solomon, 2005: 266). Since the initial phase of 
lending the SLMWA’s activities have been extended and they now support market women in 
Bonthe, Bo, Kono, Makeni, Kabala and Kambia districts.
Approximately seventy percent of market women are the main breadwinners for their 
families, yet most market women live a hand-to-mouth existence and had little access to 
credit or other resources that would enable them to earn a more sustainable income. They face 
significant domestic problems, and are often away from their homes from 6am until 9pm. 
Market women tend not to have access to capital and so buy stock daily, and only have
297 The term ‘market woman’ can be understood as follows: Among the majority o f rural and low- 
income urban dwelling women, market women describe themselves as the ‘poorest of the poor’. They 
deal mostly in perishable foodstuffs at small local daily markets.” (Solomon, 2006: 463).
272
limited profits which often go toward transport costs or school fees for their children.298 
Interest rates are so high that it is almost impossible for most women to access credit, and 
illiteracy rates are also high among this group. Similar to other marginalized women and 
those living in rural communities, market women rarely go to health clinics because of 
prohibitive costs, and this is particularly visible in relation to the high rates of maternal and 
infant mortality.
Beyond the economic empowerment aspect, the SLMWA also assists members with problems 
such as human rights violations, domestic violence and HTV/AIDS, and provides training in 
leadership skills and food hygiene. The SLMWA has little funding to provide concrete 
support to its members, but it can link women up with one another and facilitate the sharing 
of skills and advice. For example, representatives from the organisation visit and appraise 
women’s businesses and then write references to support market women’s applications for 
bank accounts.299 They can also link women up with a range of other organisations if they are 
facing specific health or legal problems.300 As Solomon points out, it was the close connection 
that the organisation had with communities and households throughout the country that 
enabled it to have “a multiplier effect that contributed to the national development goals of 
creating economic self-sufficiency and improving standards of living” (2006: 466).
According to the members of the SLMWA interviewed for this research, several women 
stated that without the support of the association they would have less access to the means to 
provide food and education to their families.301 A further initiative of the SLWMA was to 
develop an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) handbook in 2007. This initiative stemmed 
from the fact that in absence of access to formal justice mechanisms, market women were 
turning to the leaders of the SLMWA to resolve disputes. The ADR handbook is designed to
298 Focus group discussion with members of the SLMWA, Freetown, 14 January 2008.
299 It is estimated that only about 26,000 people have bank accounts in Sierra Leone.
300 Interview with Marie Bangura, SLMWA, Freetown, 14 January 2008.
301 Focus group discussion with members o f the SLMWA, Freetown, 14 January, 2008.
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be used as a capacity-building tool as well as providing some degree of standardisation in the 
way that intra-market disputes are dealt with, and allows for a fair and speedy resolution of 
conflicts.302 This project received the support of the JSDP, and is an important example of 
how informal peacebuilding mechanisms can supplement and support formal peacebuilding 
reforms.
Given the significant backlog of cases, damaged infrastructure and limited capacity of justice 
officials as well as the high costs of accessing the formal justice sector, finding alternative 
strategies to support justice sector reform was critical in Sierra Leone. By developing a 
manual to provide some standardisation and providing training to communities in the 
Western, Southern and Eastern regions of Sierra Leone throughout 2007, the SLMWA played 
a vital role in supporting conflict resolution at the community level at the same time as 
relieving pressure on the formal justice sector. Such initiatives require a relatively small 
amount of funding, but can have a multiplier effect in tackling key peacebuilding challenges 
at the grassroots and community levels.
The diverse activities that the SLWMA carries out on behalf of its members can represent a 
microcosm of the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone. Although the organisation is 
primarily focused on the provision of economic opportunities, it also brings other security and 
governance-related benefits to its members. According to the chairwoman of the SLMWA, 
there is now evidence that market women are more able to play a role in decision-making in 
their households, making them less vulnerable to issues such as domestic violence and 
empowering them in their communities.303 This network of women could therefore act as an 
important inroad for the international community to access and support women both 
practically and strategically, particularly the most illiterate and impoverished groups of 
women that the LIN often finds it difficult to reach.
302 “SLMWA Launches ADR Handbook”, Concord Times, 23 May 2007, Freetown.
303 Interview with Marie Bangura, SLMWA, Freetown, 14 January 2008.
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7.2.5 Sierra Leone Women’s Forum
The SLWF was formed in 1994 with the motto of “empowerment, equality and development” 
and is the most developed national network of women’s organisations in Sierra Leone. 
According to their leaflet, “the vision of the SLWF is a Sierra Leone free from violent 
conflict, where good governance prevails, and where women, from the majority of the 
population, have equality of opportunities in all spheres of life. Another objective is the 
empowerment of women to meaningfully contribute towards the attainment of durable peace 
and sustainable development of the nation.” The main areas of the SLWF’s work are 
coordination, leadership, networking and information-sharing. During the conflict, “the 
Forum’s strategy was to build alliances horizontally through a consultative and democratic 
process with women’s associations and the women’s wings of political parties. This served to 
enhance their base of solidarity and to strengthen their position as a pressure group and a 
women’s movement for peace and development” (Steady, 2006: 46). However, the vision and 
goal of the SLWF, like many of the other organisations already mentioned, pits it against the 
traditional structures of power in Sierra Leone that do not provide women with equality of 
opportunity in any spheres of life. By building on the changes in gender roles and relations 
during the conflict, in theory the SLWF created some space to give women a platform for 
collectively advocating for their rights.
Its membership includes business women, professionals, members of parliament and the 
government, and community-based organisations. It has a National Assembly comprising 85 
representatives from throughout the country, a small National Secretariat, and Executives at 
various levels, although the links between Freetown and the provinces are not necessarily that 
strong.304 The SLWF has received some specific funding for projects, including the holding of 
a consultation to ensure women’s interests were taken into account during the poverty 
reduction strategy (PRS) process. In 2005, Oxfam funded SLWF under their capacity-
304 Interview with Rosaline McCarthy, Freetown, 4 July 2006.
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building programme to provide for the training of finance and IT staff. During 2007, the 
SLWF were also planning to develop a project on social inclusion focusing on engaging and 
sensitising chiefs and other traditional authorities on gender issues, but as of the end of the 
case study period it had yet to receive any funding.305 This reflects the problem that even 
where the women’s organisations recognise and have the intention to engage with the local- 
level power dynamics, it can be difficult to obtaining the necessary funds given that the UN’s 
liberal peacebuilding agenda leaves little space for acknowledging these issues.
The country-wide network and broad-based membership of the SLWF could theoretically be 
an excellent entry point for accessing women throughout the country, as well as being a focal 
point for gender-related projects at the community level. However, before that is possible it 
was clear from the many interviews carried out in Freetown and Bo that the SLWF would 
need to better reflect the diversity and interests of Sierra Leonean women in order for it to 
legitimately represent them in the peacebuilding process.306 The organisation also clearly 
needed significant financial, technical and administrative support to enable them to organise 
more effectively, and to bridge the urban/rural divide that prevents rural women from feeling 
that their interests are being represented.
The range of member organisations of the SLWF, a national umbrella network of women’s 
groups, and previously of the SLWMP, reflects the multidimensional nature of women’s 
groups. Although the SLWF acted as an umbrella group and provided an important 
networking forum, “each member group maintained its autonomy [...] the women were 
bound together by solidarity in the fight against injustice, under-representation of women in 
decision-making positions, poverty and underdevelopment.”307 Whilst the SLWF remains one 
of the main women’s networks in Sierra Leone, it is not clear that their membership base
305 Rosaline McCarthy during roundtable with CSPEC, Freetown, 18 July 2007.
306 Several interviewees stated that the SLWF is seen as an elite organisation, and that it doesn’t have 
enough support at the community level to be seen as a network that is really representative of women 
throughout the country.
307 Steady (2006): 46.
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reaches effectively into the districts, and the lack of capacity and resources constrains their 
activities and their reach into rural areas, and potentially ultimately their peacebuilding 
potential.
7.2.6 Women’s Partnership fo r  Justice and Peace
The Women’s Partnership for Justice and Peace (WPJP), a women’s organization based in 
Bo, was established in 2006. According to the founder, one of the key motivations for 
establishing WPJP was the need to create a space for women to come together and identify 
their needs and interests at the community-level through a participatory methodology.308 
Disillusioned with the over-concentration of donor efforts in Freetown and the ongoing 
invisibility of the work being done by women’s organizations, Gbappy-Brima sought to 
establish an organization in Bo to support the social, economic and political empowerment of 
women and girls in the adjacent rural areas. The main focus group for WPJP’s activities are 
individual girls and women between the ages of 15-45 living in poverty in rural and semi- 
urban areas as Well as smaller grassroots organizations in these communities that are working 
for non-violence, peace and poverty reduction.
WPJP works in four key areas: girls’ education and empowerment, supporting women’s 
economic security, combating GBV, and building the capacity of women to be more effective 
voters. For example, WPJP has supported more than 100 girls in two rural schools located in 
Taiama and Njala (Bo district), mobilized women to engage in income generating activities 
such as food production and petty trading, supported a monthly women’s peace dialogue 
forum, and acquired land and buildings for technology centres and library facilities. In Bo, 
WPJP established a Women’s Human Rights and Resource Centre which has become an 
important venue for women to come together to receive skills training, but also a place where 
they can access information about their rights and receive support from other women in the 
community.
308 Interview with Gladys Gbappy-Brima, 16 January 2008.
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This Centre has also been recognized by some men as a valuable resource, who acknowledge 
that prior to this initiative “women did not have anywhere to go, but it is important that there 
is some space for them”.309 According to the national coordinator of WPJP, “there are many 
small women’s groups in Bo, but the problem is that they don’t have strong leadership that 
would enable them to come together and develop an agenda. This stops us from thinking 
about things systematically.”310 Therefore, through its workshops and community peace 
forums WPJP also seeks to foster more collaboration and networking amongst the different 
small women’s groups in Bo district, with the belief that through collective action a 
transformation in the patriarchal social relations may be possible.
WPJP uses education as an entry point, largely through the Girl Empowerment and Education 
Programme (GEEP). By educating girls, the objective is to provide them with the skills and 
information necessary to make more positive choices in their lives and to open up more 
opportunities. According to Gbappy-Brima, this also empowers them to become change 
agents in their community, supporting WPJP’s second objective which is to transform the 
structures and practices that contribute to gender inequality and discrimination against 
women. Although WPJP explicitly focuses on women and girls, the organisation 
acknowledges the importance of also working with ‘like-minded’ men who can then play an 
important role in sensitizing other men within the communities in which they live.
As a relatively new organization, WPJP has received most of its funding from member 
contributions or small donations from individuals, particularly in the Netherlands where the 
director has some links. Increasingly, WPJP is being supported in some of its activities by 
INGOs such as International Alert, but this support tends to be tied to specific projects 
identified by the funders and does not necessarily provide money that can be used towards the
309 Male participant at the focus group discussion held in Bo, 20 July 2007.
310 Interview with Gladys Gbappy-Brima, Freetown, 16 January 2008
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core costs of the organization. As it does not have an office in Freetown, WPJP also has the 
challenge of achieving visibility to the UN and other larger donors who rarely support 
women’s organizations working outside of the capital region. This challenge links into 
critiques of liberal peacebuilding as being top-down and elite-focused, and the difficulties in 
ensuring that the focus of the UN’s activities also reaches the grassroots level.
7.2.7 Regional networks: Women in Peacebuilding Network and the Mano River 
Women ’s Peace Network
In addition to the organisations operating at the national level, there are also two women’s 
peacebuilding networks that have been active across the region. Conflicts in West Africa, 
including that in Sierra Leone, have important regional dimensions both in terms of causes 
and consequences. In recognition of this fact, some women saw the value in collaborating 
across regional borders to establish a platform for regional peace, building on the work that 
they and their organisations were individually doing at the national level. The value of a 
regional approach to peacebuilding is that these networks can help to empower and build the 
capacity, as well as increase the leverage, of the work that women’s organisations are doing 
in their own countries. It also provides important opportunities for women to learn from one 
another, share experiences, and potentially develop new strategies for dealing with the 
challenges of peacebuilding in West Africa. Given its focus on state institutions, the liberal 
peacebuilding approach is not well-suited to address and target the regional dimensions of 
conflict, and as a result the UN’s peacebuilding activities rarely build on regional initiatives, 
such as those of WIPNET and Marwopnet that are outlined below.
WIPNET was established in 2001 as a programme of the West Africa Network for 
Peacebuilding, a regional civil society organisation based in Accra, Ghana. The rationale for 
WIPNET was that few women in the region had the capacity to become involved in 
peacebuilding of any kind. The goal of WIPNET was “to use ‘women’s peace activism’ to
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promote social justice. Women’s peace activism was defined not just as antiwar activism, but 
as the deconstruction of structural forms of violence existing in everyday society” (Ekiyor 
and Gbowee, 2005: 134). Following an initial meeting in Accra attended by two women from 
Sierra Leone, WIPNET developed a training manual and identified trainers in West Africa 
who could continue the work at the national level.311 Once back in Sierra Leone, Bangura and 
Gbappy-Brima then trained a further twenty women (five from each region) in Kenema, all of 
whom were representatives from gender-sensitive women’s organizations, who could then go 
on and set up community-based chapters of WIPNET throughout the country.
WIPNET is perhaps best known for the role of its Liberian members in the Mass Action for 
Peace campaign, which took place in 2003. Given that the war in Sierra Leone was almost 
over by the time that WIPNET was established, the organisation has been more involved in 
peacebuilding, as opposed to conflict resolution, activities. As of mid-2007, the network had 
twenty-seven different women’s groups who were members across the country. WIPNET has 
been most active in Southern Sierra Leone, where is a coordinator in Bo who arranges open- 
air meetings every Wednesday, and community-based peace groups have been set up so that 
women have somewhere to go to discuss their concerns and receive support from other 
women in the community.312 The organisation’s work in Sierra Leone has been to a smaller 
scale than in Liberia and other countries throughout West Africa, although in addition to the 
in-country programmes several of the Sierra Leonean members have also regularly attended 
the regional meetings and are active at that level.
WIPNET largely relies on funding through WANEP, although each country chapter of the 
network had to raise money for its focal points. Due to limited funding the position was often 
filled on a voluntary basis. According to Gbappy-Brima, who was for a time the country focal
311 The two representatives from Sierra Leone were Barbara Bangura and Gladys Gbappy-Brima. Their 
exposure to SCR 1325 at the initial WIPNET training and their subsequent involvement in the national 
chapter of WIPNET were important factors in shaping their approach to peacebuilding in their own 
NGOs.
312 Interview with Gladys Gbappy-Brima, Freetown, 16 July 2007.
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point, the fact that WIPNET was a programme within a larger organisation was a significant 
challenge: “it’s not easy to push for women’s empowerment or women’s equality in male- 
dominated organizations. I have found that very frustrating. They think ‘she’s here again with 
her women talk or her gender talk’. They still see WIPNET as something outside, as 
something not very important.”313 Externally, however, WIPNET has a strong reputation and 
some NGOs such as the Danish Refugee Council support the work of the network.
In contrast to WIPNET’s focus on community-level mobilisation and empowering grassroots 
women, Marwopnet evolved to play a role at the elite level. The network developed out of a 
joint regional initiative of women peacebuilders in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea in May 
2000, supported by the Geneva-based INGO, Femmes Africa Solidarity (FAS). Marwopnet 
has a national chapter based in Sierra Leone and principally adopts an approach of lobbying 
and advocating for peace at the highest levels. They also implement income-generation and 
skills training projects through the national chapters and on the initiative of individual 
Marwopnet members. For example, Marwopnet members have been actively monitoring the 
ongoing conflict in Yenga at the border between Sierra Leone and Guinea, which is a 
potential conflict flash-point in the future.314 Guinea is seeking to consolidate authority in the 
region and is reportedly harassing civilians, particularly women who cross the border at 
Yenga for trading activities, and these female traders are particularly vulnerable to sexual 
violence.
Marwopnet is “a combination of all the strategic partnerships and networks of women in 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone to ensure successful implementation of their platform for 
peace” (Solomon, 2005: 178). However, not only does Marwopnet work with members of 
civil society across the MRU, but they also actively seek to engage members of the political 
elite with the result that they are regularly invited to participate in consultations, meetings and
313 Interview with Gladys Gbappy-Brima, Freetown, 26 June 2006.
314 Interview with Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, Marwopnet, 26 May 2005.
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summits with the MRU and ECOWAS. Indeed, it was due to the efforts of Marwopnet that in 
July 2001, the leaders of the three MRU countries came together for the first time to discuss 
the need to control the wave of fighting sweeping across the region. It is therefore an 
important actor at the regional level, and has even had some success in bridging the gap 
between women’s peacebuilding work and the formal political process.
This overview of some of the women’s organisations involved in community-based and 
national-level peacebuilding work is not intended to be exhaustive or definitive. By providing 
a brief sketch of the goals of these organisations and the types of activities which they are 
engaging in it is already possible to see the different levels and areas of action that they target 
as compared to the UN’s peacebuilding efforts. The discriminatory social structures and the 
forms of gendered power relations at the local level can constrain the impact of the work that 
these organisations are doing. However, at the same time, the desire to transform the role of 
women in Sierra Leone is a powerful motivating factor for all of these organisations and as 
the next section will demonstrate, even within the confines of the context, women’s 
organisations have sought to challenge or at the very least, negotiate space around the 
gendered social dynamics.
7.3 Pushing the boundaries of the liberal peace: Bottom-up and 
gender-sensitive perspectives
In addition to supporting some of the same priorities as the liberal peacebuilding approach, 
women’s organisations also adopt different methods with an emphasis outside of the formal 
structures of the state. These methods are defined more on the needs of the population as 
opposed to the exigencies of an externally mandated liberal approach, and therefore may go 
some way towards pushing the boundaries of liberal peacebuilding. This section will focus on 
the ways in which women’s organisations in Sierra Leone force a rethinking or reframing of 
the liberal peace pillars of security, governance and economic reform.
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The analysis presented in chapter 6 has already argued that the UN-led reforms under the 
three main pillars of security, governance and development liberal peacebuilding largely 
excluded women and failed to adequately employ a gender perspective. The result was a 
gendered virtual peace in Sierra Leone which was not experienced equally by men and 
women, and the blueprint approach used by the UN that did not pay adequate attention to the 
specific dynamics of the local context. Women’s organisations could in fact be a valuable 
resource for not only supporting but also expanding the remit and nature of the pillars, and 
offering an alternative or counter to liberal peacebuilding. Rather than emphasising top-down, 
formal processes, women’s organisations have instead emphasised human security, gender- 
sensitive governance and economic empowerment. These concepts are complementary to the 
values espoused by the international community, but too rarely turned into practice in 
peacebuilding processes.
7.3.1 Fostering human security
As detailed in chapter 6.1, the security reforms undertaken by the international community 
have focused on the state and the formal provision of security and justice. Despite the 
sometimes contradictory rhetoric within the liberal peacebuilding approach, security in 
practical terms is taken to mean an absence of armed violence, or negative peace, and little 
attention has been given to gendered insecurities. Correspondingly, the liberal feminist 
approach of the UN has been to support gender and human rights training for the police and 
army, and efforts to encourage more women to be integrated into the key security structures. 
The UN has also supported the reform of discriminatory legislation, and some training of 
paralegals and other justice providers and support for women’s increased access to formal 
justice structures.
It seems that in practice, broader issues related to human security rarely informed the security 
reform process. Although the post-conflict phase implies a transition out of violence and the
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beginning of the peacebuilding phase, it is rarely peaceful for those who live in the daily 
reality of a country emerging from years of war. From her experiences as a gender advisor in 
UN missions such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, Puechguirbal reaffirms this statement: “In terms 
of security, I find it really interesting that at the United Nations “security” means that we 
secure the UN staff, and then we secure the UN assets, and eventually we secure the 
population [...] What is the security concept for the UN? Security is a very broad concept, 
and in my experience I’ve seen that on the ground the population is expecting more than the 
UN means by it” (Puechguirbal and Enloe 2004: 4).
We have seen that the activities of women’s organisations in Sierra Leone frequently focused 
on social issues, with the main objectives being securing a livelihood or improving the living 
conditions in households and communities. According to Porter, “how many women 
understand peace processes differs from the norm -  typically it includes attending to practical 
material needs that further a sense of security. It is hard to feel secure if you are starving, your 
shack has been destroyed or your water source is polluted” (2007: 26). This was repeatedly 
confirmed during the field research, particularly in focus group discussions and workshops 
held outside of Freetown.315. Customary traditions and the division of labour also meant that 
the economic security of women living in rural areas was precarious, making a more holistic 
approach to livelihoods and basic needs central to their perception of physical security as 
well. Human security, not national security or stabilisation, was therefore a central objective 
of organisations such as GEMS and WIPNET
Women have faced specific threats to their physical security as well as pressure to resume 
traditional gender roles, and there has often been a backlash against any new space that they 
have attempted to carve out for themselves during the conflict.316 Women also face specific 
challenges from returning male ex-combatants and legal and economic obstacles to their daily
315 Focus group discussion held in Bo, 20 July 2007; Makeni and Bo Alert workshops March 2009.
316 Focus group discussion held in Bo, 20 July 2007.
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lives, in addition to increased levels of crime and domestic violence (Karame 2001: 23-4). 
Indeed, for most people, the official end of the conflict and the ensuing DDR process, post­
conflict elections and development efforts did not necessarily equate to peace or security. As 
one Sierra Leonean woman pointed out, “when there is a high level of wife-beating and 
gender-based violence there is no peace.”317 According to another civil society representative, 
“You can’t be at peace when you’re working out where to get water from or how to send your 
kids to school”.318 How peace and security are defined, and by whom, then become very 
important questions. Women’s organisations in Sierra Leone appeared to be more open and 
receptive to these alternative definitions, challenging the narrow approach adopted by the UN 
that too often leads to a virtual peace.
Women’s organisations have sought to ensure that women can play a role in defining peace 
and security. Some organisations such as Marwopnet, through their connections with INGOs, 
have been able to participate in international fora such as the PBC meetings where these very 
questions are discussed.319 At the other end of the spectrum, the community-based workshops 
organised by WPJP and other organisations provide a forum for women to learn about their 
rights, issues related to access to justice, and the obligations that the government has towards 
them. At the same time, rural women can identify their needs and priorities which the leaders 
of the larger organisations presented in this chapter can channel back up to policymakers in 
the GoSL and UN. On a more localised level, the SLMWA has provided a degree of security 
to market women in different towns throughout Sierra Leone by educating them about their 
rights and in some locations also providing physical protection.320 The Freetown bias of the 
UN has therefore to a certain extent been overcome, although there is still a disconnect 
evident between rural and urban areas even in the work of these women’s organisations.
317 Hannah Koroma, Women against violence and exploitation society, focus group discussion in Bo,
20 July 2007.
318 Rosaline McCarthy, SLWF, 4 July 4 2006.
319 For example, Nana Pratt (Marwopnet) was invited to deliver a statement at the PBC’s Informal 
Country-Specific Meeting on Sierra Leone, “Discussion on the Annotated Outline o f the Sierra Leone 
Compact”, held in New York on 9 May 2007.
320 Focus group discussion with members of the SLMWA, Freetown, 14 January 2008.
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Supporting reintegration is another area where women’s organizations have been particularly 
active, particularly because of gendered practice that prevented women in Sierra Leone from 
undergoing the traditional cleansing rituals that would have facilitated their return into 
community life (Schroven, 2006: 53). The UN has focused on the disarming and 
demobilization of combatants, in other words the ‘DD’ of DDR, at the expense of the critical, 
and longer term, process of reintegration. Women’s organizations tend to have better 
networks and access to the communities throughout the country than UN officials, and have 
therefore initiated programmes that offered sustained and holistic support to returning and 
reintegrating populations, particularly for girls and women who were involved in the fighting 
forces. One survey found that 55% of the study population believe that women in the 
community had played a significant role in their reintegration, as compared to the 20% and 
32% who believed traditional leaders and international aid workers respectively had played a 
similar role (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004: 23).
In addition to providing skills training, these organisations also initiated community 
mediation, health and psychosocial support services, literacy programmes and provided other 
support as basic as providing food and shelter to women and girls who had no support from 
their families or community members.321 This seems to indicate a more holistic approach to 
reintegration, and one that is more in line with the ideals of human security.
Women’s organisations complement the liberal peacebuilding focus on the formal sector by 
linking up with and filling gaps in the informal sector, particularly in relation to access to 
justice and training Paramount Chiefs and other community leaders who dispense customary 
justice to the majority of the population outside Freetown. But their activities also seem to be 
informed by a broader definition of human security that recognizes the multiple and complex 
gendered security threats that exist in post-conflict contexts. Their activities are often defined
321 Interviews in Kono and Makeni, March 2005.
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by the needs of the communities in which they are working, enabling a bottom-up approach to 
security, as opposed to one defined in national security terms, or a reform process that is 
targeted solely on the formal security apparatus of the state.
7.3.2 Building capacity fo r  gender-sensitive governance
The liberal peacebuilding approach to governance reform places emphasis on the holding of 
post-conflict elections and the restructuring of governance structures at local levels. In Sierra 
Leone, the UN has attempted to integrate a gender perspective into these processes, with the 
liberal feminist approach leading to a focus on women’s representation in formal governance 
structures. Less attention has been paid to the more difficult issues of how effective, and 
prepared, women are to take on these public roles, the degree to which they are subsequently 
able to influence decision-making, or how the various different layers of governance play out 
at the local level. According to Abdullah et al, “[women’s] access to political office has been 
based on tokenism and the benevolence of male leaders” (2010: 38). Any efforts to engage 
women politically therefore need to recognise and transform the patriarchal dynamics that are 
still prevalent in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Women’s organisations could potentially be used 
as a platform for enhancing women’s political engagement, and this began to be the case 
during the war years, as was seen in chapter 4 in the account of the SLWMP.
A further problematic assumption of the liberal feminist approach is that elected women will 
inherently represent their female constituents and ensure that gender issues are brought into 
the political sphere. However, this is not necessarily the case, and according to the findings 
from this research, political affiliations in Sierra Leone quickly trump any affinity women 
may feel to a broader gender agenda.322 The challenge of politically empowering the many 
women who are illiterate, uneducated and living in rural areas is immense, as is ensuring that 
they have access to improved services and infrastructure at the community level.
322 Interview with Christiana Solomon, 29 April 2005.
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As noted in chapter 6, the local elections in 2004 and the process of decentralisation were 
intended to bring politics and service provision closer to the population. However, the failure 
to fully recognise and engage with the persistent inequalities and discriminatory norms and 
structures that existed in Sierra Leone meant that women were often marginalised from these 
processes. Had the UN been more effective at integrating a gender analysis into its 
programming, then some of the power dynamics and patriarchal traditions that excluded 
women from formal governance structures may have been identified. Despite, or perhaps as a 
result of, the failure of the UN to concretely address the need for supporting women at the 
local level, many women’s groups and small community-based organisations were fulfilling 
this function.
For example, along with WPJP, the Forum for Women’s Empowerment and Development in 
Bo is an example of a locally-based organisation that is filling this gap.323 This organisation is 
a network of 100 women’s organizations based throughout nineteen different chiefdoms 
(fifteen in Bo and four in Pujehun), and their goal is to increase women’s role in community 
decision-making as well as local politics. Their activities include training women in 
leadership and how to be active stakeholders in their communities, including training women 
as observers for the 2007 national elections. They also train women in administration and 
basic business skills required for the effective management of small organizations, as well as 
working with women in Bo district to educate and sensitise them about their rights through 
workshops, radio programmes and leadership training. If funded, these types of activities can 
have a multiplier effect, where training a few key community leaders makes it possible to 
reach a much greater proportion of grassroots women. It is these women who need to be 
empowered to participate in decision-making at the community level and get their voices 
heard by the new ward development councils and other similar structures that were set up as a 
result of the decentralisation process.
323 Bo focus group discussion, 20 July 2007. Regina Kamara, WIPNET; Sophie Alieu, Forum for 
Women’s Empowerment and Development; Hannah Koroma, Women against Violence and 
Exploitation Society.
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Many of the women’s organisations interviewed indicated that they also try to address issues 
relating to gender-based violence, which they perceive as critical to empowering women and 
enabling them to feel secure, participate in decision-making and achieve some degree of 
independence and agency.324 Emphasising this point, one participant in a focus group 
discussion held in Bo in 2007 said, “women have worked so hard for peace for so long, but 
now how do they continue because there is no peace in the home, no peace in their hearts.”325 
This comment referred to the high prevalence of domestic violence and gender-based 
violence more generally throughout many communities in Sierra Leone, that is still occurring 
despite the fact that ‘peace’ has supposedly been established.
Women’s organisations such as WPJP and FAWE work with community structures in 
addition to the formal political ones to carve out space for women to empower them to engage 
in decision-making in the home. This contributes to the transformation of discriminatory 
attitudes related to women’s roles in public life, and also empowers women to engage more in 
making decisions about themselves, their children and their community life. Given the 
importance of secret societies, customary and religious institutions and traditional leadership 
structures, raising the awareness of key influential figures within the community is a critical 
for initiating momentum around changing attitudes and practices on violence against women 
and gender roles and the division of labour.326
This level of empowering women in decision-making in the home and community is 
particularly difficult for the UN to do given that most agencies tend to work through 
government structures, or with women’s organisations based in Freetown, such as the 50/50 
Group. Women’s organisations that have links with grassroots associations or that are 
themselves active in rural areas are therefore able to act as an important linkage between the
324 Interview with Barbara Bangura, GEMS, Freetown, 16 July 2007.
325 Sally Kargbo, SLWF, focus group discussion in Bo, 20 July 2007.
326 Interview with G. Jojo, UNDP Transitional Support Team, Kenema, 29 March 2005.
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UN’s focus on formal political structures and the often missed out local-level decision­
making bodies. In this case, the liberal structures and approach could be translated into 
something more far-reaching by linking up more effectively with organisations that have 
networks down to the local levels.
7.3.3 Addressing women ’s economic insecurity
A central pillar of the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone has been the liberalization of the 
economy and broader efforts to address the endemic poverty and high levels of 
unemployment experienced in the country. Of all the areas of peacebuilding, this is the one 
where gender issues have been least addressed, for the reasons already discussed in chapters 3 
and 6.3.This research has found that economic insecurity is one of the most common concerns 
of women in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The economic hardships that they faced led some 
women to engage in rebel forces or to engage in exploitative relationships (Abdullah et al, 
2010: 41), but it also created some space for women to engage in economic activity. Solomon 
has demonstrated how women were able to take advantage of trading goods on the black 
market (2006), and Utas has also written about the economic opportunities that can be created 
in conflict-affected regions where the rules of peacetime do not apply (2005). Although 
women were economically active before, during and after the conflict, it was largely in the 
informal sphere, making their contributions less visible to the UN and other international 
actors. Therefore, the reality of women’s poverty and exclusion from economic opportunities 
has not been tackled effectively by the UN.
Broadly speaking, the liberal feminist approach to gender mainstreaming has been to ensure 
that some of the employment generation and micro-credit schemes initiated by the UN also 
benefit women. This was important and provided some support to women, but generally only 
on a small scale and individual level. The UN-supported programmes have failed to challenge 
the gendered division of labour, which is a very important factor in efforts to address gender 
inequality. In Sierra Leone, women are marginalized from the formal economy and as a result
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are pushed into jobs in the informal sector, most frequently working in traditional trades such 
as gara tie-dying or soap-making (Abdullah et al, 2010: 40). Combined with the traditions and 
cultural norms that can make it difficult for them to access land and credit, this means that 
women are rarely able to escape the poverty trap or to achieve a degree of sustainable 
economic security.
Almost all of the women interviewed during the course of this research, even five years after 
the end of the war, highlighted economic security as the single most important factor for their 
security and one of the keys to their ability to negotiate and transform gender roles and 
relations leading to more equality in the home and society. Recognising this, many women’s 
organizations involve microcredit initiatives as part of their activities, but then use these as an 
entry point to then start building other skills and empower women. For example, for GEMS, 
the dimension of economic empowerment is critical to the other issues that they work on and 
in fact women’s economic independence is inseparable from their ability to engage in 
political life or peacebuilding more broadly.327 Given that women in Sierra Leone are so often 
involved in informal economic work such as petty trading, these organisations are also 
responding to the fact that women struggle to obtain credit and access employment 
opportunities that may be made available through the formal peacebuilding process. Whilst 
the UN also engages in these types of activities, the fact that the women’s organisations more 
frequently use the model of osusus, and are more embedded in the community makes them 
more effective and sustainable. It is possible that the various osusus and micro-credit schemes 
that evolved at the community level capitalised on and were a natural extension of the trading 
and economic networks that some women formed during the war when they took up new 
economic activities (Schroven, 2006: 52).
327 Presentation o f Catherine Greenwood, Workshop at International Alert workshop, London, 
February 2008.
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To date, there are few examples of women’s organizations, or any international actors, who 
have been able to break down the barriers to women’s participation in the formal economy. 
Indeed, while women’s organisations systematically prioritise the need for a sustainable 
livelihood as a precursor to other dimensions of empowerment, their approaches tend to 
address the practical needs of women, but not necessarily the strategic dimensions of their 
economic marginalisation. However, while they may not succeed in providing sustainable 
economic security for women, the fact that these issues of household level welfare are 
addressed at all represents a significant divergence from the liberal peacebuilding model.
Engaging more with these organizations and using them as an entry point for security, 
governance and development reforms would enable the UN to better meet the needs of the 
communities in which they are working, by ensuring that their programmes are locally- 
defined and owned, as well as informed by a gender-sensitive approach. On the other hand, in 
addition to acting as an entry point, women’s organisations push the boundaries of the liberal 
peacebuilding approach by including a wider range of perspectives, values and needs and 
engaging at levels where the UN is simply unable, or uninterested, in reaching. By working 
with these actors there is therefore not only the possibility to strengthen peacebuilding, but 
also to transform or reorient it in a more holistic, bottom-up way. The next section will now 
consider the different strategies used by women’s organisations that push beyond the liberal 
peacebuilding consensus and liberal feminist approaches to addressing the challenges of 
gender inequality.
7.4 Different strategies, different outcomes? A framework for 
understanding women’s peacebuilding activities
Whilst the liberal peacebuilding project is preoccupied with a reconstruction of state 
structures, women’s organisations focus more on the transformation of relationships and 
power dynamics at the local level. Rather than seeking to create an ideal liberal version of
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peace that Richmond has argued ends up being virtual rather than real, women’s organisations 
focus on engagement with women and men at the grassroots levels to determine the needs and 
the multiple meanings and dimensions of peace in Sierra Leone. These locally-rooted 
approaches are more in line with the emancipatory version of liberal peacebuilding and may 
allow for more scope for transforming gender roles and relations than what is possible within 
the confines of the UN’s liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminist approaches.
While the diversity of the nature and scope of work being done by women’s organisations 
makes it difficult to categorise, El-Bushra (2003: 42-8) has proposed a useful framework for 
assessing the different ways in which women’s organizations contribute to peace. Although 
the organisations described in this section work at different levels, with different stakeholders, 
and their goals are varied, some similarities can be identified in the strategies that they 
employed. It is important to keep in mind the specificities of the particular social and cultural 
context in which women’s organisations exist in Sierra Leone, as this is the background and 
frame of reference for their activities. This context and the associated power dynamics have 
often constrained the possibilities for transforming gender roles and relations and building 
peace at the community level. Nevertheless, as illustrated in section 7.3, women’s 
organisations have challenged and pushed the boundaries of what gender and peace mean and 
are for women in Sierra Leone, thereby also pushing the boundaries of the liberal approaches 
to peacebuilding and gender mainstreaming.
In this final section I elaborate on this framework and present some of the key components or 
elements of the approaches used by these women’s organisations. In summary, the focus 
areas of these organisations according to this framework are: livelihoods; non-violence and 
conflict resolution; advocacy; leadership training; outreach and capacity building. I also argue 
that their approach to gender equality is an important differentiating factor, and so towards 
the end of the section I adapt and add to the framework. Together, these characteristics would
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appear to support a situation of women’s peacebuilding work closer to the emancipatory end 
of Richmond’s peacebuilding spectrum.
First, many women’s organizations begin with a focus on survival and basic needs. The work 
of GEMS and SLMWA demonstrates this through their emphasis on establishing sustainable 
livelihoods and providing women with the means to ensure economic security. In the case of 
the SLMWA, while the main activity was the provision of small loans, it “also transformed 
the perceptions of the women about themselves and contributed to an understanding of self­
development” (Solomon, 2006: 466). Many of the grassroots organizations that provide 
women with access to healthcare and trauma counselling in the context of reintegration 
support also fall within this category. In describing some of the challenges facing women 
living in Kailahun, one INGO governance advisor stated,
the women’s organisations in this area have not really been able to come together. 
For these women, livelihoods are the most important thing and until they have access 
to basic needs they will not be able to devote time and energy to other issues. Most 
importantly, it is necessary to raise awareness because most women do not see the 
links between their poverty and vulnerability and decisions that are made concerning 
their welfare.328
A focus on survival and basic needs is clearly in line with the social justice emphasis of more 
emancipatory forms of peacebuilding (Pugh, 2009: 84-86), and is an important counter to the 
liberal approach that focuses on the formal, macroeconomic level. However, it is important to 
echo the caution of McKay and Mazurana that, “coping mechanisms and resilience 
demonstrated by women [...] should not be mistaken as empowerment itself’ (quoted in 
Schroven, 2006: 119). In Sierra Leone, this orientation was due to necessity, rather than an 
overt acknowledgement by the organisations themselves of the need for a human 
security/social justice approach.
Second, despite their marginalization from the formal peacebuilding process, many women’s 
organizations support peacemaking, which includes activities linked to getting women’s
328 Interview with Abimbola Akinyemi, Oxfam, 24 February 2005.
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issues on the table at peace negotiations as well as community reconciliation and training in 
non-violence and conflict resolution. This can occur at high levels to get gender issues into 
peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction, such as the work done by Marwopnet, but 
it takes place more commonly at the informal community level in the case of the peace 
forums initiated by WPJP. Women’s organisations have also been involved in many 
workshops and consultations, which provide an opportunity to identify priority issues for 
women, highlight the gender dimensions of the UN-led peacebuilding process and then 
negotiate and advocate for these issues to be taken on board. For example, after being elected 
as a member of the PBF National Steering Committee in January 2007, Marwopnet was able 
to use this position to advocate for a more gender-sensitive approach.
Both the SLMWA and GEMS developed alternative dispute resolution strategies that could 
offer some potential for dealing with ongoing conflict and violence at the community level. 
Such strategies could be effective in also dealing with some of the gendered security issues 
that are not addressed by the SSR process. In particular, their closer engagement with 
traditional and religious leaders provides a useful avenue into negotiating and transforming 
the discriminatory practices and culture of violence that places women’s physical security at 
risk. If the UN heard and listened to these different methods of conflict resolution and 
prevention then it is possible that the priorities of die peacebuilding process might shift.
Third, many women’s organizations undertake advocacy, either lobbying on specific issues 
such as legislative reform, or national campaigns to raise awareness about women’s rights and 
to advocate for the inclusion of gender issues in policymaking. All of the organizations 
surveyed in the previous section undertook advocacy work, with some of the most effective 
examples being where they worked through networks of members such as WIPNET. Of all 
the strategies, this is perhaps where women’s organisations in Sierra Leone have received the 
most support from the UN, at times in order to directly apply and advocate for the 
implementation of SCR 1325. This is perhaps unsurprising since this is also the area which
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resonates most with the UN’s liberal feminist approach. Nevertheless, the advocacy of groups 
such as FAWE or GEMS is not just focused on breaking down the barriers to formal equality 
in public structures, but rather also addresses violence against women and the need for 
community reconciliation; issues that were not prioritised by the UN.329
UNIFEM and the UNAMSIL gender advisor supported campaigns such as the passage of the 
three gender bills and for increasing the number of women active in national and local level 
politics. However, their support was focused on activities carried out in Freetown, leaving the 
women’s organisation to bridge the gap between women’s rights and policy-making at the 
national level and the reality facing Sierra Leoneans in the rural areas. SCR 1325 is one issue 
that has captured the attention of donors, and many are now rushing to fund advocacy and 
awareness-raising campaigns that are focused around the resolution.330 Although by 2007 
things were beginning to change, historically, very few women, even amongst the educated 
elite who were directors of many of the NGOs described here, were aware of the resolution or 
how it was relevant to the situation of women in Sierra Leone.
Fourth, many organizations undertake training of women in leadership skills to enable them 
to play more effective roles in politics and decision-making, both nationally as in the case of 
the 50/50 Group, or more locally as in the case of WPJP. Related to this is the fact that most 
of these organizations, perhaps with the exception of the 50/50 Group, acknowledge that a 
transformation in gender relations will be necessary before women can be fully empowered in 
a gender equal society, and so they at times work closely with men. This sets women’s 
organisations slightly outside of the liberal feminist approach that tends to focus on bringing 
women into existing formal structures without necessarily looking at the underlying 
patriarchal structures and dynamics that contribute to women’s exclusion and ongoing gender
329 Interview with Eileen Handles, FAWE, Freetown, 23 June 2006.
330 For example, in November 2006, International Alert received a grant of approximately £900,000 to 
support a three-year project on the implementation of SCR 1325 in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia 
from the Danish government.
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inequality, or the lack of capacity and skills that prevent them from playing more active roles 
even when the barriers to access have been removed. For women’s organisations in Sierra 
Leone, the dynamics around family life, secret societies and religion made engaging with men
331a necessity.
Finally, women’s organizations often play a key role in grassroots outreach and the rebuilding 
of communities in the peacebuilding phase. This is perhaps the area where women’s 
organisations and the other smaller local-level groups they work with play the most 
significant, and invisible, role. Activities in this area can include small income-generating 
schemes, women’s support centres, skills-training programmes, health clinics, among others. 
The small organizations and training centres involved in the GLB project are an example of 
groups supporting this kind of work. This work is so important because it goes some way to 
filling the gap that is left due to the UN’s focus on formal structures and urban areas, as well 
as meeting the needs of both women and men which may not otherwise be addressed due to 
the nature of the gendered virtual peace.332
Related to this concept of outreach are the multidimensional linkages that women’s 
organisations create, from national to local and across regions. For example, organisations 
such as Marwopnet communicate women’s priorities from the grassroots up to the highest 
levels of decision-making. Their regional approach also means that they are able to learn from 
strategies and experiences of women in other countries, and apply them in Sierra Leone.333 
Regional networks can also strengthen and build momentum around peace, as was illustrated 
by the Liberian women’s ‘peace train’ that came to Sierra Leone during the 2007 elections to 
advocate for non-violence. The regional dimension of conflict and peacebuilding does not 
tend to feature strongly in the liberal peacebuilding approach, but for women’s organisations
331 Interview with Rosaline McCarthy, SLWF, Freetown, 4 July 2006.
332 Interviews with Manama Hadih, Adama Komba and Louis Smith, Koidu Town, 30 March 2005.
333 Interview with Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, Freetown, 7 July 2006.
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developing these cross-linkages with women represented an important source of solidarity 
and knowledge-sharing.
I would argue that there is a critical element missing from El-Bushra’s framework, and that is 
that women’s organisations tend to adopt a gender-sensitive approach to their work, in 
contrast to the liberal feminist focus on women only. Interviews with women in Sierra Leone, 
both activists and those who are not explicitly involved in peacebuilding, demonstrated that 
an understanding of gender roles and relations is critical to their understanding of how 
women’s position within society can be changed. The founder of the Sierra Leone chapter of 
FAWE makes the important point that “as we live in a traditionally male dominated society, it 
would be like preparing for a stillbirth of the organisation if provision for male participation 
were left out especially the participation of the Paramount Chiefs who are the traditional 
rulers” (Thorpe, 2006: 64). Indeed, it could be argued from the evidence that the approach of 
women’s peacebuilding organisations is more ‘gender-focused’ than that of the donor 
agencies operating in the country.
It seems that local women accord greater recognition to the crucial role the men play in 
buying into the empowerment of women and in leading the attitude shift necessary for gender 
equality to become accepted. This could be explained by the fact that they are more familiar 
with the particular gender dynamics of the country and therefore more aware of the 
limitations that the patriarchal culture and attitude place on women’s efforts, making 
engagement with men a critical aspect of success.334 As demonstrated previously in the thesis, 
however, the liberal feminist approach of the donor organisations meanwhile assumes that 
women can simply be brought into the structures that already exist without a specific shift or 
significant transformation in power dynamics between men and women. What many women’s 
organisations in Sierra Leone are seeking is social transformation, rather than the technical 
approach to achieving gender equality favoured by the international community..
334 Focus group discussion with civil society representatives in Bo, 20 July 2007.
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The relationships between men and women were critical in shaping social dynamics in post­
war Sierra Leone. As outlined in the introduction, the conflict between the new roles and 
responsibilities women assume during war and the retrenchment of traditional practices as 
men return and seek to reassert old power dynamics has been well documented, and the case 
of Sierra Leone is no exception (Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen, 2002). Outside of Freetown, 
most decisions are made by men, often in traditional settings such as Poro, which women are 
unable to access.335 This points to the fact that gender relations are mediated by culture, and 
working only with women or failing to fully contextualise their experiences as a function of 
both gender and culture will result in ineffective programming at best, and possibly even a 
backlash against gender issues. While being interviewed for this research, Jamesina King 
shared an example that illustrates this point. “There was a case where over 100 men sat in a 
bush in a secret society in the East of the country, and they wouldn’t accept or vote for 
women candidates. You know, they just wouldn’t accept the idea even through it was in a 
region where dynamic women candidates came from. There was little the women could do. 
These are the attitudes that we need to fight against.”336 In Sierra Leone, women’s 
organisations at the community level were better positioned, and better equipped, to address 
and engage with these attitudes than the UN.
According to a statement submitted to the TRC, “male patriarchy and cultural beliefs 
persisted to the extent that women who form 50% of the population continued to languish in 
silence while their male counterparts exercised power over them and forged ahead.”337 Where 
they have been involved or engaged in sensitisation efforts, their roles in supporting women’s 
empowerment have been important. This was particularly the case for paramount chiefs and 
community and religious leaders who have in some areas been able to encourage
335 Interview with Christiana Solomon, 29 April 2005, Freetown.
336 Interview with Jamesina King, Human Rights Commissioner, 19 July 2007.
337 Sierra Leone Women’s Forum (n.d.) The situation o f Women and Girls in the Pre-conflict, Conflict 
and Post Conflict Sierra Leone, Submission to the TRC Hearings on Women and Children, May 2003. 
TRC report: 221.
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transformation in traditional attitudes and the gendered division of labour. For example, one 
chief interviewed during this research reported that sexual exploitation and abuse and 
domestic violence within families had been problems in the community, but due to 
sensitisation via radio he now knew the proper response mechanism and was able to refer the 
cases to the authorities rather than resolving them through the customary system.338 Another 
example is a workshop organised in December 2007 by the Kenema-based coalition on 
women’s rights, where they brought together Paramount Chiefs from the Eastern region to 
raise their awareness about the three new gender bills that had recently been passed into 
law.339 Engaging the Paramount chiefs and other religious and community leaders and 
training them in their responsibilities for implementing the new legislation is critical, largely 
because such a great proportion of the population accesses the customary justice system, 
particularly for issues relating to women’s rights.
UNAMSIL, and the international community more broadly, tended to interpret gender 
equality as women’s rights, which is a frequent problem linked to the liberal feminist 
approach. Donor interventions, perhaps unintentionally, reinforce the role of women as 
victims, since so many of the projects to assist them are targeted in this way. This may not 
affect the type of assistance they need or receive, but it can have a big impact on the way in 
which they are perceived within their communities. Mentioning women as a ‘vulnerable 
group’ requiring protection is the easiest and most common way of ticking the gender 
mainstreaming box in project reports and evaluations. However, this leads to a mentality of 
perceiving women as victims, rather than seeing them as actors with the power to change then- 
own situation (Helms, 2002). The full complexity of women’s roles and identities during
338 Interview with Chief Nabi, Lewabu Community, Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District, 12 April 2005. 
However, it is worth noting that despite the Chiefs assertions the overall perception of most o f the 
women’s organisations interviewed was that far too few of the GBV-related cases go through the 
proper channels, and that there are still problems with sensitising men in the community about 
women’s rights. Nevertheless, he was aware of the various health, police and justice services that were 
available to victims of domestic or sexual violence indicating that the sensitisation had had some 
impact.
339 Concord Times, “Paramount Chiefs School on Gender Laws”, 5 December 2007, Freetown.
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conflict and peacebuilding need to be recognised, and situated within the specificities of 
Sierra Leonean traditions and gendered dynamics at the community level.
7.5 Conclusion
As outlined in the previous section, underlying most of the work being carried out by 
women’s organisations is a greater concern with human security, social justice and economic 
empowerment, than that evident in the work of the UN. All of these factors contribute to a 
more gender-sensitive and sustainable vision of peace, and one that is unlikely to be realised 
within the confines of orthodox or conservative liberal peacebuilding approaches. Several 
women interviewed during, the course of this research emphasised this need for the 
transformation of the structures and practices of society, as opposed to simply reconstructing 
or maintaining the status quo with a few extra women added in for good measure. According 
to Porter,
build[ing] peace requires culturally meaningful dialogue and reflection on what 
constitutes peace and security within different cultures, nationalities, ethnicities and 
for different groups of people, including men and women [...] in order to promote a 
peace that meets everyday needs, social, political and economic structures as well as 
relationships need transformation and thus the process of peacebuilding encompasses 
democratic principles of participation, rights, social justice and equality (2007: 33).
From the analysis presented in this chapter, it can be argued that these women’s organizations 
working in Sierra Leone demonstrate some or all of these values. The UN’s liberal feminist 
approach operates on the assumption that once the barriers to women’s participation are 
removed, for example through quotas or other mechanisms, then they will be able to have an 
impact on peacebuilding. However, a participant interviewed as part of a focus group 
discussion in Bo put it differently: “If you’re poor you don’t feel safe and you won’t be a 
good peacebuilder in the community.”340 Reflecting these challenges, the work of women’s 
organizations is therefore more in line with the emancipatory idea of peacebuilding as 
outlined by Richmond, than what is exemplified by the UN approach, and is more of a
340 Participant at the focus group discussion held in Bo, 20 July 2007.
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process that relates to all aspects of welfare and justice, as opposed to a technical solution 
devised and delivered by outsiders.
Whilst this chapter has suggested that women’s organisations represent an opportunity for 
emancipatory peacebuilding, it is important to be wary of presenting women’s peacebuilding 
work unproblematically or uncritically. It can be easy to fall into the trap of making 
essentialist assumptions about women’s peacebuilding roles, based on a standpoint 
perspective. These groups often face significant challenges both in terms of their own 
legitimacy, sustainability and wider impact, and do not universally present a contrast to the 
UN’s approach of liberal feminism. Nevertheless, engaging more with these organisations 
would provide the UN with a greater degree of ‘input legitimacy’, one of the elements of the 
framework for measuring the success of efforts to mainstream gender in peacebuilding 
outlined in chapter 1. The contribution, potential and real, of women’s organisations to bring 
about a more gender-sensitive peace in Sierra Leone will be returned to in more detail in the 
next chapter.
It is also important to recognise the potential down-side or danger that in seeking to 
collaborate with the UN and engage in the peacebuilding process, these organisations will be 
co-opted. Whilst this thesis argues for more interaction between the formal and informal 
spheres, what could in fact happen is that rather than transforming the UN’s approach and 
forcing these actors to rethink how they define and implement peacebuilding, the women’s 
organisations could have to conform to the liberal peacebuilding model and become 
institutionalised into this kind of approach.
It is clear that engaging with women’s organizations is not a panacea, but failing to recognise 
their contribution equally risks the perpetuation of a gendered virtual peace. The fieldwork 
carried out for this thesis demonstrated the depth, complexity and innovation of women’s 
peacebuilding work in Sierra Leone, that did more often than not offer something different to
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the liberal solutions to violent conflict and gender inequalities. The challenge for the UN and 
other actors therefore is to find a way to build on and recognise this work without resulting in 
the depoliticisation of women, taking away their agency or resorting to essentialist 
assumptions about their roles (Helms, 2002). It is also important to note that despite offering 
an important counter to the liberal feminist approach of the UN, the women’s movement in 
Sierra Leone “was not able to fully use the opportunities created by the war to advance a 
women’s agenda for gender equality and empowerment in the post-conflict reconstruction 
process” (Abdullah et al, 2010: 44). The gendered power dynamics in Sierra Leone, some of 
which were highlighted in die beginning of this chapter, shaped and limited the possibility of 
local actors to transform Sierra Leone society and traditions along more gender equitable 
lines, even if their activities recognised and engaged with these dynamics to a greater extent 
than the UN and other international actors did.
Richmond and Franks suggest that the international community should behave as an ‘enabler’ 
for local dynamics to emerge and shape the peace being built, rather than leading on top- 
down ‘international engineering projects’ (2009: 183). This resonates with the work of 
women’s organisations such as WPJP who attempt to act as intermediaries, providing this 
linkage between the bottom-up, local peace dynamics, and the technical capacity and liberal 
underpinnings of the UN. Arguably, their approach to peace and security differed from the 
concept of the liberal peace that is defined in Western terms. If the formal peacebuilding 
policies and practice were informed by these perspectives then the resulting activities may be 
more successful in providing opportunities to empower women and challenge discriminatory 
structures, practices and values that result in the perpetuation of gender inequalities in Sierra 
Leone. These insights would not only be useful for efforts to integrate gender but also to the 
peacebuilding process more broadly, and they present a challenge to the solutions put forward 
by the dominant liberal feminist approach of the UN. Most importantly, however, this might 
enable the creation of something more than a gendered virtual peace.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS
Despite the general consensus that Sierra Leone has moved out of the post-conflict phase and 
into long-term development, the peace that has been built in the eight years since the end of 
the conflict remains fragile and uneven. Although armed violence has ceased, there have been 
two rounds of successful national elections and decentralisation is proceeding apace, a closer 
examination of these peacebuilding reforms reveals a different picture. At the end of 2007, 
women remained marginalised and excluded from formal economic and political life and 
gendered insecurities such as sexual violence remained rife. Furthermore, the absence of 
gender analysis from the policies and programmes of the UN has meant that too frequently, 
women have been marginalised from the benefits of the peacebuilding process and the gender 
dimensions of these processes remain unacknowledged. The liberal peacebuilding focus on 
formal structures and top-down peacebuilding reforms missed the opportunity to engage with 
and support the work of local women’s organisations who were also seeking to build a more 
gender equal peace.
This thesis has sought to make both an empirical and theoretical contribution to the study of 
gender and peacebuilding. In answer to the research agenda set out at the beginning of the 
thesis, it can be seen that the liberal feminist approach to gender mainstreaming resulted in 
the UN failing to engage and empower women in a meaningful way and it has made little 
contribution to a transformation in gender roles and relations in Sierra Leone. In short, for the 
majority of Sierra Leoneans it remained a virtual and gendered peace. There are three main 
conclusions that can be extrapolated from this research, and each will be discussed in detail in 
this final chapter.
First, the policies developed by the UN to guide its activities in Sierra Leone reflected a 
specific understanding of what constitutes peace, and led to the prioritisation of certain issues 
over others in the peacebuilding process as demonstrated in chapter 5. Local actors were not
able to influence the externally-defined discourse around peacebuilding, and gender issues in 
particular were not seen as relevant to the central objectives of achieving stability and 
development in line with the concept of an ideal, liberal peace. Rather than recognising that 
men and women define and experience peace and security in different ways, the UN adopted 
a one-size-fits-all approach that narrowed the parameters and nature of peace in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone.
Second, I argue that not only has a virtual peace been built in Sierra Leone, but it is also 
gendered. Applying a feminist lens to the peacebuilding process in chapter 6 exposed the 
different ways that men and women were engaged in and were affected by the peacebuilding 
reforms carried out by the UN in Sierra Leone. Women in particular have failed to gain from 
the peace dividend, as gender-related needs and insecurities were all too frequently pushed to 
the bottom of the list of the UN’s priorities. The UN achieved only limited and ad hoc 
successes in mainstreaming gender into its peacebuilding work which can, in part, be 
explained as a function of the liberal feminist underpinnings of its approach. Furthermore, the 
predominance of this liberal feminist approach can be understood as an extension of the 
liberal peacebuilding consensus given that it reflects many of the same biases and 
assumptions, and at the same time is subject to many of the same limitations and critiques.
Finally, one of the keys to moving towards not only a more effective gender mainstreaming 
approach, but also a more legitimate and emancipatory form of peacebuilding, may lie in the 
important work being carried out by women’s organisations at the margins of the informal 
sphere in Sierra Leone. As argued in chapter 7, these organisations reflect alternative 
understandings of peace and security that call for a transformation in gender roles and 
relations in the post-conflict space, and demonstrate more ownership and legitimacy than the 
UN’s liberal peacebuilding approach. By necessity, women’s organisations tend to be more 
grounded in the local context, and while this means that they face the challenge of operating 
within the constraints of the specific social and cultural dynamics in Sierra Leone, it also
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provided them with the possibilities to adopt a more nuanced approach to gender-sensitive 
peacebuilding. The analysis presented in chapter 7 outlined how their strategies offer an 
alternative and address some of the critiques levelled at liberal feminist and liberal 
peacebuilding approaches in chapter 2.
As outlined in chapter 1, Moser and Moser’s framework (2005) proposes the three measures 
of success as adoption of gender-related terminology, putting gender-related policies into 
place, and the eventual implementation of these policies, to which I have added the fourth 
dimension of legitimacy. Chapter 4 illustrated the important roles that women played in 
bringing an end to the conflict, networking and building a momentum for peace, and actively 
resisting and adapting to the negative effects of the ongoing violence. Despite this, other than 
some attempts by UNIFEM and the gender advisors working for the other UN agencies, little 
was done to support and create a space for women’s ongoing peacebuilding work to inform 
the UN-led reform processes. This opens up questions of legitimacy, both in terms of how the 
implementation of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone effectively met the needs of these groups 
(output legitimacy) and in terms of how they were able to participate in the peacebuilding 
process itself (input legitimacy).
Based on these three central findings, the thesis will conclude by assessing the success of the 
peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, in particular which dimensions of the liberal 
peacebuilding, and liberal feminist, project could be preserved at the same time as moving 
towards a more emancipatory form of peacebuilding. Paris highlights the following challenge: 
“if both the heavy footprint and the light footprint are problematic, what is the ‘right’ 
footprint?” (2010: 343). Arguably, the right footprint to support gender and peacebuilding lies 
somewhere in between the formal and informal discourse and approaches, and moving the 
one-size-fits-all, top-down approach to something that is more responsive to and driven by 
locally-contextualised strategies in line with the principles of human security and social
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justice. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that despite its limitations, liberal 
peacebuilding may still offer promise as a framework for building a gender-sensitive peace.
8.1 What kind of peace is being built?
The first main finding of the thesis is that peace and security in Sierra Leone have been 
conceptualised in specific ways that have excluded and devalued gender issues, suggesting 
that the first criteria of the adoption of gender-related terminology has not been met. The UN 
defined peace in Sierra Leone in liberal, universalist terms, which failed to capture the 
complexities and differences in the peacebuilding priorities of men and women at the local 
level. In chapters 2 and 3 ,1 suggested that feminist critiques can add depth and substance to 
debates around liberal peacebuilding by asking questions about what and who counts. 
Examples of policies such as the PRSP and PBRS seem to reinforce the point that women and 
gender did not count, since other than making passing references to gender issues or more 
commonly ‘women’ as a homogenous group, little attempt was made to understand the 
gender-differentiated insecurities and vulnerabilities that existed in post-conflict Sierra Leone.
Comparing the peacebuilding priorities articulated by the UN through the key policy 
documents outlined in chapter 5 with the focus of the women’s organisations highlighted in 
chapter 7 also points to the differences between the liberal peacebuilding discourse and local 
priorities in the post-conflict context. Given that the UN’s policies directly informed the 
security, governance and economic reform processes, it appears that it was these external 
actors who were defining and describing peace in Sierra Leone. This lack of participation of 
local people in the process of defining the post-conflict agenda meant that it did not fully 
respond to women’s needs, and was not necessarily perceived as legitimate in their eyes.341
341 The failure to fully acknowledge and integrate perspectives from civil society was mentioned 
several times during the roundtable held with civil society groups in Freetown, 19 July 2007. This is 
also echoed in Street et al, 2007.
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Pankhurst has suggested that “where the question of pursuing greater gender equality does 
arise at the point of a settlement, it is not uncommon for it to be seen as neither essential, nor 
urgent in peacebuilding” (2004: 3). In Sierra Leone, not only was it not seen as essential or 
urgent, but it appears that gender was not even seen as relevant at a conceptual level. As an 
example, the language in the PBRS around peace consolidation focused on stability and the 
restoration of state authority and strengthening of formal institutions. Local women’s groups, 
on the other hand, were shown to approach peace from a perspective of human security, 
reconciliation and social justice. The examples cited in chapter 7 illustrated that women’s 
organisations prioritised a different set of issues such as addressing gender-based violence, 
economic security and the role of reconciliation in community-based reintegration. However, 
these bottom-up approaches and priorities rarely reach prominence within the UN’s liberal 
peacebuilding agenda (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 182-3), and the case of Sierra Leone 
reinforces this point. There is clearly a mismatch between the UN’s vision of what peace in 
Sierra Leone looks like and the perspective of local actors, and as the next section will 
demonstrate, the absence of gender in the peacebuilding terminology and discourse resulted 
in an absence of gender in practice.
In the case of liberal peacebuilding, there is evidence that the discourse has expanded to 
recognise women’s needs and rights, however too often this was in an uncritical and 
unproblematic way. This makes it difficult to demonstrate success within the parameters of 
the Moser and Moser (2005) framework. Indeed, from the empirical evidence presented in 
this thesis, it is apparent that gender was frequently taken to mean women when it was 
included in the peacebuilding policies. For example, although the Compact highlighted 
gender equality as a cross-cutting issue, the activities listed in the implementation matrix 
relate more to women specifically, and do not address the more complex issues of 
transforming gender roles and relations. This is in contrast with the organisations presented in 
chapter 7 that adopted a more holistic approach to gender equality. Their different strategies 
appear to have evolved in part due to the necessity of engaging with the patriarchal culture,
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making it necessary to perceive gender issues not just as about women, but also in relation to 
male roles and identities.342
There is also the deeper problem in that assigning the issues as ‘women’s issues’ leads to the
perception that they are not relevant to the central security, political and economic concerns
of peacebuilding. This can be understood as a by-product of the liberal feminist orientation of
the UN. As Cohn argues,
the impact of gender discourse [...] is that some things get left out. Certain ideas, 
concerns, interests, information, feelings, and meanings are marked in national 
security discourse as feminine, and are devalued. They are therefore, first, very 
difficult to speak [...and] second, they are very difficult to hear, to take in and work 
with seriously, even if they are said” (1993: 231).
It is acknowledged that ensuring gender equality is a lengthy, sensitive and time-consuming 
process. Furthermore, women’s needs and priorities can change frequently according to the 
context which requires flexibility in analysis and approach, but UN structures often prevent 
this. The UN and other donor agencies have clearly played an important role in setting the 
agenda in post-conflict Sierra Leone, and in large part the government responds to what it 
perceives the desires of donors are.343 In this respect, it is even more important that the UN 
begins to recognise the centrality of gender issues to other aspects of the transition to peace in 
Sierra Leone. The majority of UN staff interviewed were able to cite the fact that ‘gender 
equality is a cross-cutting issue in all of our projects’, but understanding of what this actually 
means was limited. The case study of Sierra Leone illustrated that the UN and other external 
actors displayed a reluctance to place women front and centre of reconstruction initiatives, 
preferring to ghettoise them in ‘women’s projects’, if at all, and failing in their stated policies 
that claim gender equality is a priority issue. This also alludes to challenges in meeting the 
second criteria for measuring success of putting gender-related policies into place (Moser and
342 Interview with Lucinda Asmara, WILPF Sierra Leone, 20 June 2006.
343 Interview with Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET), May 
26th 2005. For example, the PRSP reflects donor priorities in Sierra Leone and is clearly written with 
an international donor audience in mind.
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Moser, 2005) which was explored in detail in chapters 5 and 6 and will be returned to in more 
detail in the subsequent section.
The UN has been criticised for perceiving and acting as if gender equality is something that 
can be postponed, until after all the other ‘more important’ concerns have been dealt with 
(Abdela, 2004: 89-92). Clearly, gendered assumptions inform what key actors believe 
‘matters’ in terms of securing peace. By looking at who is making the decisions, and whose 
viewpoints are feeding into these decisions, it may be possible to determine where donor 
priorities in peacebuilding lie. As pointed out by Mackay, “A ‘peace’ that neglects the interest 
of a large part of the community or that supports, reconstructs or in some cases strengthens 
the inequalities in the power structure [...[ can not truly be called a peace worth having -  and 
is unlikely to be sustainable” (2004: 107). Thus, there are consequences for the whole 
peacebuilding process, beyond the under-representation of women. The challenge then 
becomes to reorient them through feminist analysis to be more inclusive and gender-sensitive. 
The women’s organisations covered in chapter 7 go some way towards revealing what more 
gender-sensitive and context-specific peacebuilding priorities might look like in Sierra Leone. 
However, because they are not necessarily perceived as legitimate actors with the expertise 
and ability to influence the processes and places whereby peace was defined, the notion of a 
liberal, universal -  and gender-blind -  peace prevailed in Sierra Leone.
8.2 A gendered virtual peace in Sierra Leone
This thesis has made the case that the UN adopted a liberal feminist approach to women’s 
exclusion from peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, which plays some role in explaining why it 
failed to successfully integrate gender into its policies and programmes. The problem was 
largely perceived as the absence of women from existing formal structures, and that if they 
were given a more explicit role then positive change would occur in terms of their ability to 
participate in and influence conflict prevention and reconstruction activities. However, this
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approach made it possible for the UN agencies to create the illusion that they were addressing 
gender issues whilst doing little to change the structural aspect of gender inequality, or to 
address the inability of women to retain any real power or resources to influence decision­
making within Sierra Leone.
According to the framework outlined in chapter 1 (Moser and Moser, 2005), for gender issues 
to have been successfully integrated into the peacebuilding process by the UN, the existence 
and effective implementation of gender-related policies would need to be evident. Given that 
this thesis has argued that women were left out of the policy and planning around 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, and gender-related needs and interests were not seen as 
relevant to the broader goals of the peacebuilding process, this does not appear to have been a 
success. Due to their different access to power, resources and opportunities, men and women 
did not benefit to the same extent from the reform process, and nor were they able to engage 
equally. The assumption that all members of a population will necessarily engage in and 
benefit from peacebuilding reforms is therefore flawed, and in many ways women lost out 
and continued to experience high levels of insecurity and political and economic 
marginalisation, despite assertions that the overall situation had improved. This encapsulates 
what is meant by a gendered virtual peace, a term that I have developed and used throughout 
this thesis.
There are several key empirical examples from the case studies that are instructive and 
support this second conclusion of the thesis. In chapter 6, the analysis of the implementation 
of security, governance and economic reforms drew attention to the fact that these reforms 
often failed to recognise their gendered impact and dynamics. For example, as argued in 
chapter 6.1, women and girls were almost completely excluded from the DDR process, and 
failed to benefit from the training and reinsertion packages that should have helped them to 
reintegrate into their communities. Once this oversight was acknowledged, some projects 
were designed to target them and fill this gap, but the majority of women associated with the
311
fighting forces remained invisible and had little support from the international community. 
The specific cultural context of Sierra Leone made their transition back into community life 
even more difficult, given the stigma and discrimination associated with having been part of 
the fighting forces or having been subject to sexual violence during the conflict. This created 
a gap that was often filled by local organisations, who had more of a focus on reconciliation 
and reintegration at the community level, such as WPJP. These approaches were indicative of 
a deeper understanding of the specific context and attitudes that returning populations 
encountered, and allowed these organisations to develop more nuanced initiatives to 
community-based reintegration. In the same vein, the decentralisation process that was 
designed to improve public service delivery and engage people in decision-making at the 
local level failed to prioritise or meet the needs of women, and their civic participation and 
access to services remained limited.
As Olsson and Skjelsbaek point out, even when they are gender-blind, peace operations 
inevitably have unintended consequences on gender roles and relations in the societies where 
they are being carried out (Olsson et al., 2004). By consciously asking questions about who is 
being affected and how, and how men’s and women’s needs and interests differ, negative 
consequences could surely be better managed. Where some effort was made by the UN and 
other stakeholders to integrate a gender perspective into the reform process presented in 
chapter 6, it tended to result in a tokenistic approach of adding some women in without 
properly assessing the structural barriers that continued to marginalise them from the 
peacebuilding process. This thesis argues that in Sierra Leone it can be concluded that the 
liberal peacebuilding (and liberal feminist) approach to peacebuilding has not resulted in a 
successful articulation or implementation of gender-related policies.
The liberal peacebuilding focus on the formal sector also meant that the UN did not 
necessarily reach the majority of women who are marginalised to the informal sphere with 
little access to the formal institutions that are the site of the peacebuilding reforms. For
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example, as part of the broader justice and security sector reform process, UNIFEM and the 
UNAMSIL gender advisor sought to ensure better protection for women, particularly from 
GBV. They focused their efforts on supporting the reform of discriminatory legislation, and 
although important results were achieved with the passing of the three new gender bills in 
2007, the impact this had on women in rural areas was negligible. A greater recognition of the 
urban/rural differences and of the particular social and cultural traditions of Sierra Leone 
could have led to a more nuanced response by the UN. This is necessary since up to 85% of 
the Sierra Leonean population only have access to informal justice systems that are governed 
by customary law, and this is particularly relevant for issues relating to violence against 
women. Whilst the UN’s attempts to ensure that new laws were in place in the formal justice 
system, the reality was that few people were aware of or protected by these laws, and GBV 
continued to be a major problem affecting women throughout the country. The norms and 
practices relating to gender roles and relations remained unchallenged and discriminatory 
practices continued despite the new legislation.
Another example that illustrates this point was the focus on microcredit initiatives as part of 
the poverty reduction efforts. Although this was one area where specific efforts were made to 
target women, the actual budgets allocated and scope of the projects was so limited that only 
a very small number of women were able to benefit from this support. Furthermore, these 
loans were used as a ‘quick-fix’, where the number of women assisted could be recorded and 
then used as evidence of mainstreaming gender, despite the fact that at the same time women 
were being left out of bigger projects focused on larger credit and support for SMEs. As I 
argued in chapter 6, although microcredit projects can be an innovative way to create income - 
generating opportunities for women, they are not a panacea for addressing women’s 
economic insecurity. Furthermore, the way in which these projects were designed did not 
necessarily draw on the community-based networks that women had formed, or associations 
such as the SLMWA that were able to provide additional support to women beyond simply 
small amounts of credit. This reflects the limitations of problem-solving approaches of liberal
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peacebuilding where blueprint solutions are applied, regardless of the nature of the specific 
context or challenges, and the opportunity to build on and deepen successful bottom-up 
approaches is missed.
Another important insight supported by this research has been that as long as the liberal 
feminist approach reduces gender mainstreaming to a women-focused, integrationist and 
problem-solving tool, then the marginalisation of women from peacebuilding can be 
perpetuated and the gendered structures and relations of society and institutions left 
unchallenged (Vlachova and Biason, 2003: 25). This limitation was illustrated in chapter 6.2 
in relation to the decentralisation process that aimed to enable women to participate in 
decision-making structures. The 50% quota for women in the local elections of 2004 may 
have resulted in more women taking up seats in local councils, but it did not succeed in 
changing the attitudes of men or ensuring that they were able to make meaningful 
contributions to local politics. Women’s organisations such as WPJP made more explicit 
attempts to engage men and community leaders, recognising that in the patriarchal culture of 
Sierra Leone, their support for advancing the rights and opportunities open to women was 
necessary. Without these efforts, men often resisted the changes to gender roles and relations 
such as increased representation of women in public life, as was seen in the local elections in 
one village in Kono described in chapter 6.2.344
There may be a pragmatic reason why a liberal feminist approach has been easier to 
implement in peacebuilding contexts as opposed to a more transformative agenda. By 
challenging the patriarchal structures and the underlying inter-relationship between 
militarism and masculinity, feminist approaches to conflict and peacebuilding have the 
potential to destabilise the assumptions on which mainstream understandings of the world 
are based, a fact which may explain the quite significant resistance that these approaches 
continue to encounter. The liberal feminist approach to gender mainstreaming fits more
344 Personal interview, Koidu town, 30 March 2005.
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neatly within the notion of a universal and ideal peace, characteristic of the UN’s liberal 
peacebuilding model. Anything more critical would challenge the very basis of the concept 
of external actors being able to build peace in conflict-affected contexts. This could go 
some way to explaining why the UN tends to support the recruitment of women into the 
police during SSR processes, as opposed to considering alternative strategies for policing or 
security provision that may offer better protection for women. An example of such a 
strategy highlighted in chapter 7 is the conflict resolution carried out by the SLMWA when 
problems arose either between their members or involving the local community.
According to Hudson, “much of the progress associated with [SCR] 1325 reflects an additive 
and integrative approach to the international security agenda rather than a transformative and 
deeply critical approach to the way that the UN does security. Women's concerns, problems, 
and rights are still largely an afterthought, rather than an internalized and institutionalized 
change” (H. Hudson, 2009: 22). Indeed, this thesis has presented similarities between the 
critiques of liberal peacebuilding and the critiques of the way in which gender and the 
women, peace and security agenda have been mainstreamed (or not) into international peace 
and security policy. What results, and this could be applied to both the liberal peacebuilding 
and liberal feminist orientations, is an “ahistorical, apolitical, de-contextualised and technical 
project that leaves the prevailing and unequal power relations intact. This normalization is 
happening at both the level of discourse and material practice” (Mukhopadhyay, 2007: 135- 
6).
In reality, peacebuilding is not value-free and is an inherently political process, meaning that 
it will always be flawed if reduced to a technical solution (Newman, 2009: 42). This was 
particularly apparent in Sierra Leone where despite claims that the UN’s peacebuilding efforts 
in Sierra Leone have been a success, the analysis in this thesis -  and particularly 
demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6 -  has demonstrated the extent to which the peacebuilding 
process failed women. Indeed, when assessed against Moser and Moser’s framework, it is
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clear that the policies and structures that were put in place to mainstream gender into the 
peacebuilding process resulted in a tokenistic ‘adding-in’ of women, with the result that 
efforts at implementation were also flawed, and based on a problem-solving, non- 
transformational approach. Despite these limitations, there were some small, localised 
projects such as UNICEF’s work to reintegrate girl combatants or UNIFEM’s gender training 
workshops that were successful in achieving some positive results as illustrated in chapter 6. 
Although not widespread or systematic, these examples illustrate that it is possible to put in 
place gender-sensitive policies as in the case of the FSUs (see chapter 6.1.2), reform 
legislation to provide more de jure protection for women’s rights (see chapter 6.1.3) or to 
raise awareness of gender issues among the population through radio programming (see 
chapter 6.4). The implication is that even within the confines of the liberal approach it is 
possible to identify peacebuilding ‘successes’, which can then be built upon.
One explanation for the difficulties that the UN faced in Sierra Leone could be its tendency
to, at an ad hoc level, integrate gender issues into existing structures and processes through
frameworks such as SCR 1325 which contributes to turning a gender perspective into a
problem-solving instrument rather than a critical lens (Whitworth, 2004: 120). This is one of
the main paradoxes surrounding the attempts to engender peacebuilding practices. In order to
engage with the dominant structures and processes of peacebuilding, it is necessary to ‘speak
the language’, thereby dulling the ability of feminists to bring any real structural changes
about. As Sandra Whitworth convincingly suggests, it is not clear that anything beyond the
technical solutions and problem-solving approach would be compatible with the UN system.
In order to be ‘heard’ within this context, arguments must be presented in a 
way that adopts the language of the UN, accommodates itself to UN-produced 
understandings of peace and security, and is alert to the hierarchies, protocols, 
and ‘stories’ by which UN personnel define themselves [...] Trying to insert 
gender into the dominant discourse of peacekeeping being produced within a 
UN context significantly limits the possibilities of critique (Whitworth, 2004:
120).
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The major international organisations have adopted an ‘add women and stir’ approach, 
focusing on bringing women into existing peacebuilding structures and processes and making 
their social, economic, and political roles more explicit and visible. Certainly this has a value, 
and even if all that is achieved is making women more visible in peacebuilding contexts then 
this could be seen as some sort of a success, and could create the space for reform of provide 
a basis for an eventual challenging of the discourse and practice of peacebuilding. However, 
as the case of Sierra Leone has shown, the UN’s liberal feminist approach ultimately made it 
unable to respond reflexively and appropriately to the challenge of promoting gender 
equality, given the failure to problematise the categories of women/gender and the one-size- 
fits-all, ad hoc approach to integrating women into the peacebuilding process. This was 
exacerbated by the divide between the UN’s gender-related activities in the formal sector and 
the women’s organisations working informally, which further reduced the possibilities for the 
peacebuilding process to take on a more nuanced approach. “In short, [...] actually living up 
to the gender mandate is an uninviting proposition that generates uncomfortable situations 
and offers all too few rewards. Not surprisingly, the operative maxim seems to have become 
‘add women and do NOT stir’” (von Braunmuhl, 2002: 65).
8.3 Bridging the gap between formal and informal approaches to 
peacebuilding
It appears that despite some limited examples of isolated success, the UN has largely failed in 
its efforts to mainstream gender in the peacebuilding process, in terms of the gender- 
sensitivity of its discourse, policies and implementation (Moser and Moser, 2005). This thesis 
has argued that this failure can largely be explained by drawing on the critiques in both the 
liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminist literature. Given the shortcomings of the top-down, 
liberal approach of the UN and international community, this thesis also considered what 
could be learned from the rich and varied work being carried out at the grassroots level by 
local women’s organisations in Sierra Leone. Critics of liberal peacebuilding have suggested
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that local actors may offer the potential for transformation or a more emancipatory approach 
to peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2005), and have been overlooked by liberal 
peacebuilders.
In analysing the case of Sierra Leone, chapter 7 presented the work being done by 
organisations such as GEMS, WIPNET and the SLWMA and suggested that they push 
beyond the traditional UN-defined areas of security, governance and economic reform to 
support more organic, bottom-up processes of peacebuilding. Their approaches are informed 
by the social and cultural context in which they are operating, and they more explicitly 
engage with and negotiate the different forms and levels of power in the post-conflict society. 
In terms of advancing gender equality, this meant working within the confines of customary 
law, patriarchal family relations, and traditions such as the secret societies to challenge the 
existing gender roles and relations. For many women, building peace in Sierra Leone also 
necessitated transforming the post-conflict gender order. The UN, on the other hand, failed to 
engage directly with gender dynamics, opting instead to add women in to existing structures 
such as the microcredit activities (see chapter 6.3.1) or increase their quantitative 
representation through quotas (see chapter 6.3.2), resulting in little more than a tick-box 
approach (Bames, 2010b: 131).
Bridging the gap between women’s groups and the ‘formal’ peacebuilding processes such as 
DDR schemes or decentralisation can be difficult and time consuming, but failing to engage 
with informal actors compromises the legitimacy of any peacebuilding process Indeed, there 
is an artificial divide between the top-down, donor-led process of gender mainstreaming and 
the work that women’s organisations were doing at the local level, often informally. This 
resulted in the loss of expertise, knowledge and resources that could have contributed to the 
transformation of gender roles and relations, and also prevented women from benefitting fully 
from peacebuilding processes. Addressing this problem and adopting more bottom-up
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methods could be one way of beginning to move beyond the liberal feminist approach 
towards something more in line with an emancipatory vision of peacebuilding.
This research has shown that the UN’s peacebuilding activities were largely targeted at the 
formal security, political and economic sectors. For example, efforts focused on training 
women as candidates for national and local elections overlooked the fact that increasing the 
number of female politicians and councillors did little to change the discriminatory practices 
that excluded women from the public sphere. Similarly, reforming the security sector to 
include women as police officers and in the army and providing training in human rights and 
gender issues was an important step, but only went half-way in that the majority of the 
population, and particularly women, had little access to the security or protection of these 
actors. Furthermore, such measures do not change the masculinist culture of these security 
institutions which stubbornly resist gender-related security concerns such as gender-based 
violence as a key concern (Barnes, 2009a; Vlachova and Biason, 2003).
One important shortcoming of the UN’s engagement was therefore the failure to capitalise on 
Sierra Leonean women’s deep involvement in peacebuilding in informal, local spheres. The 
UN most often engaged with the elite civil society actors concentrated in Freetown, reflective 
of the urban-rural divide in Sierra Leone and the tendency of donors to work with the most 
easily accessible individuals and groups, regardless of whether they are fully representative of 
all groups in society or not. Nevertheless, some of the organisations such as WIPNET and the 
50/50 Group had networks throughout the country and given their ability to reach both the 
formal and informal spheres, had they received more support from the UN then they may 
have been able to bridge the gap between these levels. For example, the training and support 
that the SLMWA provided to market women throughout the country could have been one 
way to make the microcredit projects initiated by the UN more far-reaching and sustainable.
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The insights from this thesis coupled with the analysis of the problems associated with the 
liberal peacebuilding model point to the need for both formal and informal peacebuilding 
(Paris, 2010: 363). The challenge is to link them up so that they do not occur in separate 
spheres but rather strengthen and build on each other, thereby also increasing both the input 
and output legitimacy of peacebuilding. However, the liberal peacebuilding predilection for 
focusing on formal structures makes this difficult. Informal initiatives are the key not only to 
the sustainability of peacebuilding, but can also make security, governance and economic 
reform processes more responsive to the needs of local people and can be a way of increasing 
the participation of the local population in identifying priorities, capacities and interests.
The UN tended to view men and women as separate homogenous groups, and as a result the 
needs of different groups within the population were not adequately analysed or addressed in 
the main policy documents such as the NRS or the PRSP. This links back to the need to 
understand the complex and multiple roles women play in post-conflict contexts, rather than 
simply assuming that they are a vulnerable group in need of protection. Given the frequent 
criticisms of a lack of legitimacy and ownership that are often levelled against the UN, it is 
important that space is provided for dialogue between the local population, especially at 
community level, and the formal institutions that are being supported through peacebuilding. 
This case study of Sierra Leone suggests that working more closely with women’s groups 
could be one way of achieving greater accountability and more bottom-up approaches to the 
issues. However, despite the need to bridge the gap between formal and informal activities, 
even if more efforts had been made by the UN to ensure input legitimacy within the 
peacebuilding process, there would have been a number of important obstacles to overcome.
A first challenge is that most international organisations are based in Freetown, although 
some also do have offices in the regional centres. This makes it difficult for the UN to access 
the people living in large parts of the country, and from chapter 6 it was evident that they had 
difficulty in accessing, seeing or hearing what was happening at the grassroots level in Sierra
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Leone. Organisations that do exist in rural areas, particularly those working at the community 
as opposed to district levels, tended to be ad hoc and operate independently with very little 
support outside of the members themselves. Furthermore, the low levels of literacy and 
education amongst women in Sierra Leone, particularly in the rural areas also influenced the 
types of assistance they needed and the degree to which they had sustainable capacity.
This top-down outsider perspective can often lead to the situation where funds are given to a 
few organisations that are able to register on donor radars and are therefore assumed to be 
legitimate, at the expense of others that may represent a wider group of stakeholders or 
perspectives. This resonates with some of the critiques of liberal peacebuilding that were 
highlighted in chapter 2 related to the fact that these approaches do not accord local actors 
with the same level of expertise or legitimacy as the UN actors driving the process. In reality, 
however, the women’s organisations described in chapter 7.2 could certainly be argued to 
possess both the expertise and legitimacy that puts them in a strong position to determine the 
gender-differentiated needs and interests of different groups within the local population. The 
problem for them however is in achieving visibility and recognition in the eyes of the UN and 
other donors with whom they have very little contact.
Second, there is also the challenge that some women’s organisations may compromise their 
own objectives and goals for transformation in order to access the funds necessary for 
implementing their peacebuilding activities. Women’s organisations, like any other NGOs, 
have to fall within donor priorities if they have any hope of receiving support. As a result, 
“their agendas, projects, and activities are likely to be determined not by their own assessment 
of needs or their organizational capabilities and strengths, but by the priorities and concerns 
of the international donor community” (Kumar, 2001: 211). This cooptation of local 
organisations and the dilution of bottom-up approaches is another consequence of the liberal 
peacebuilding approach. In the case of Sierra Leone, there are several women’s organisations 
providing training for women in politics and awareness-raising around the gender bills and
321
SCR 1325, which is in part in response to the availability of donor funding for these 
activities.
The process of accessing funding from the UN, donor governments and some INGOs can also 
require specific programme design skills and the use of tools such a ‘results-based 
management’ that may not be familiar, or applicable, to those working for women’s 
organisations (El-Bushra, Adrian-Paul and Olson, 2005). As one Freetown-based civil society 
activist argued, “donor structures don’t make it easy to address gender issues. Women’s needs 
change all the time and so it is necessary to be flexible, but the project cycle makes flexibility 
difficult to achieve. People spend too much time squeezing into boxes that are not meant for 
them so indigenous capacities don’t have die chance to develop.”346 A parallel can be drawn 
here with the emergence of the liberal feminist approach of the UN agencies. It is possible 
that gender mainstreaming had to lose or adapt some of its critical focus in order to become a 
strategy that was feasible within the confines of the UN, a point that was already alluded to in 
chapter 8.1.2.
A third constraint is that although the number of women’s organisations increased 
exponentially following the end of the conflict and much progress was made in terms of 
raising awareness about women’s rights and opening doors to them politically, economically 
and socially, these organisations faced ongoing stigma and marginalisation, from both women 
and men. According to one interviewee, “men felt that when it comes to politics they feel that 
they should be the leaders, it’s the culture, the upbringing, the background. Some of them 
don’t even understand that women can even play a role.”347 As argued in chapter 7, women’s 
organisations were better placed than the UN to understand and negotiate with these forms of 
resistance given their familiarity with the cultural context. Nevertheless, these power 
dynamics were still a major obstacle and at times even these local organisations were not
345 Interview with donor government representative, Freetown, July 2007.
346 Interview with Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, Marwopnet, Freetown, 26 May 2005.
347 Interview with Lucinda Asmara, WILPF Sierra Leone, Freetown, 20 June 2006.
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always successful in overcoming them. The resistance can also come from women 
themselves, as once the uniting experience of conflict dissipates, it can be difficult for 
women’s organisations to continue actively advocating for women’s rights. According to 
Jeanette Eno,
the women are tired [...] because we’re hearing the same old rhetoric, time and time 
again, [and] nothing tangible seems to be moving forward. Women’s situations, their 
quality of life don’t seem to be improving in relation to some of the commitments 
that have been made at the international level and even at the national level. Now, 
until women have seen some difference [...] they’re not interested” (quoted in Barry, 
2005: 82).
Liberal feminist approaches that fail to fully consider gender dynamics, especially in relation 
to changed gender relations and division of labour, can unintentionally exacerbate this 
resistance (Olsson et al., 2004).
Another limitation is that women’s peacebuilding work is often seen as an extension of their 
domestic or care-giving responsibilities, thus devoiding it of political legitimacy (Pupavac, 
2005). According to one activist, men were supportive of the work that women were doing 
through the SLWF until they began to challenge them at a political level.348 Experience from 
countries around the world shows that “women who work for peace at the grassroots level, 
often at the peak of atrocities and instability, create a local sense of community, but they 
rarely reach national prominence” (Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen, 2002: 10). This has direct 
consequences on their visibility and the extent to which the international community can 
access and support their work. It also has consequences in that the UN and many INGOs may 
support small-scale or localised programmes that empower women economically or 
politically, but these projects are still seen as addressing private issues and are not linked up 
strategically with broader economic or governance reforms. Placing too much emphasis on 
the importance of women’s informal contributions to peace processes can in fact serve to 
reinforce the marginalization of women to the NGO and informal sphere whilst paying lip- 
service to the important work that they are doing (Hudson, 2010: 259).
348 Interview with Rosaline McCarthy, Freetown, 4 July 2006.
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Fundamentally, it seems that it comes down to the questions of who does what, who gets
recognised for doing what, and who receives the support for doing what in post-conflict
societies (Porter, 2007: 23). Where support for women’s organisations does occur, it often
happens too late to have an impact. It should not always be left until the aftermath, but rather
women’s needs and priorities need to be integrated and resourced from the very outset.
According to one Sierra Leonean woman who works for a UN agency, women and their roles
in society have changed, but the institutions and mechanisms are not in place in Sierra Leone
to accommodate those changes:
women have learned new skills, they have made a major contribution to 
conflict in terms of supporting their families and communities, women have 
also made efforts to build peace, and women have gone out in the ways that 
they knew and have made something happen. But at the end of the day what did 
they get from this? They were still not really invited to sit at the table and 
anyway not many women have the skills to do that in Sierra Leone compared to
349men.
The peacebuilding activities being carried out by women’s organisations rarely require 
massive amounts of money, but do require more time and sustained engagement to identify 
and build up the necessary relationships. The fact that many women’s organisations operate at 
the grassroots level and have extensive reach throughout the country means that they have the 
potential to play an important collective role in influencing conflict dynamics and fostering 
efforts to consolidate peace. They can also be a channel for enhancing the input legitimacy of 
the peacebuilding process, by enabling more direct participation of the local population. 
However, the increasing fragmentation and limited capacity and resources of these 
organisations needs to be overcome, and the alternative strategies that they adopt to engender 
peacebuilding activities need to be better understood. This challenge of bridging the gap 
between formal, UN-led peacebuilding initiatives and the informal activities of local 
organisations is particularly stark in Sierra Leone.
349 Interview with UN representative, Freetown, July 2006.
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It is important to recognise that deep cleavages, divides and differences are present in any 
group of women or men within society, and Sierra Leone is no exception. Given its uncritical 
orientation, the liberal feminist approach may not be able to provide the tools for recognising 
these challenges, or problematising the relationships amongst women as well as between 
women and men. It is then also not well-equipped to effectively target peacebuilding 
interventions in a way that does not exacerbate unequal power dynamics or perpetuate 
exclusionary hierarchies (Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2009: 594; Paris, 2010: 359). 
This points to the need to be cautious of the risk of ‘romanticising the local’, whereby local 
actors are seen as an unproblematic panacea for the challenges of building peace (Newman, 
2009: 47). A balance needs to be found between recognising the need for a more legitimate, 
locally-driven peace and the necessary resources and expertise that international actors can 
bring. If this balance can be found then it is possible that the legitimacy of the peacebuilding 
process, in terms of input through participation and output through more effective 
implementation, will be increased and the likelihood of a gendered virtual peace decreased. 
The final section will now consider what this would mean in terms of a move towards a more 
emancipatory vision of peacebuilding, and whether or not some aspects of the liberal 
feminist/liberal peacebuilding project should be saved.
8.4 The potential for emancipatory peacebuilding
To repeat the analysis presented in chapter 2.2.2, two conclusions could be drawn about the 
future of liberal peacebuilding, and, by extension, liberal feminist approaches to 
mainstreaming gender in peacebuilding. On the one hand, the concepts, practices and 
approaches of liberal peacebuilding are flawed and limited by their problem-solving technical 
nature, thereby challenging the whole project of liberal peacebuilding. On the other hand, 
there is an argument that although the liberal framework in which peacebuilding is carried out 
is imperfect, there are strategies that could lead to a more inclusive and sustainable peace 
within the confines of the liberal peacebuilding approach. The purpose of this thesis has been
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to explore the UN’s experience with liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, specifically 
examining how gender has been integrated into its policy and practice. Through the case 
study analysis, I have also contrasted the liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminist 
approaches of the UN with the locally-rooted and context-specific experiences and 
approaches of women’s organisations and networks working for peace at the community and 
national levels in Sierra Leone. The question remains of what the potential is for moving 
towards a more emancipatory approach to peacebuilding.
According to the critiques that were presented in chapter 2 and then illustrated through the 
case study of Sierra Leone, both liberal peacebuilding and the liberal feminist approach to 
gender mainstreaming are constrained by being Western-biased and non-transformative, 
thereby limiting the very gender equality and sustainable peace that these processes are trying 
to achieve. Indeed there is a plethora of stringent critiques of the way in which the 
international community addresses gender issues, and countless others recommending 
strategies to overcome the obstacles and negative effects.350 In theory, emancipatory 
approaches can escape the critique of being western-biased, and it is their very context- 
specificity that makes them more universally applicable. However, there are also pragmatic 
reasons for continuing within the framework of the liberal model, which theoretically is broad 
enough to accommodate some reforms and could enable or allow space for locally-driven 
processes to emerge.
Providing more opportunities for women’s organisations to influence the setting of priorities 
in peacebuilding and enabling the UN and other international actors to be influenced by 
alternative perspectives in terms of programme design and delivery may help to find some 
middle ground between the top-down (liberal) and bottom-up (emancipatory) approaches to 
peacebuilding. This could help to encourage recognition that the international community’s
350 For example, see Charlesworth, 2005; Eyben, 2010; Goetz, 1997; Kabeer, 1994; Mukhopadhyay, 
2007; Walby, 2005.
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approaches to security, governance and economic reform that have dominated peacebuilding 
are not the only ones, and that locally-defined values and approaches to gender, peace and 
security are not only relevant but necessary. Blueprint approaches cannot accommodate the 
complexity of the processes and power dynamics that play out at the local level, and this is 
where local women’s organisations have a clear entry point. The challenge is in finding a 
balance where local actors do not just fit into the liberal model, but the model itself 
emphasises local agency, social justice and human security. This points to the need to rework 
and rethink the liberal peacebuilding approach, creating space for something more bottom-up 
and legitimate to emerge (Paris, 2010: 363).
This is not to suggest that the liberal feminist model should be abandoned. On the contrary, 
the gender mainstreaming approach adopted by the international community has led to 
important advances in the situation of women and reduction of gender inequalities throughout 
the world. However, it is necessary to consider more carefully how this model feeds into the 
policies and programs donors design to deal with gender issues in post-conflict contexts. 
While a liberal feminist approach can be the most effective in an environment of limited 
resources and political constraints, the gendered nature of peacebuilding interventions 
requires constant questioning and indeed, significant transformation, of attitudes and 
structures that may be difficult to achieve through such methods. Bureaucratic obstacles, such 
as those highlighted in chapter 5.2, are all too commonly assumed to be at the root of the 
failure of the international community to address gender issues. On the contrary, this thesis 
has argued it is not only these obstacles, but also the way in which the overall gender agenda 
has been constructed can be inherently limiting. Even with major funding and dedicated 
donor staff it is not clear that gender equality in post-conflict contexts could be realized.
Nevertheless, this should not lead to a complete discarding of the liberal feminist, or liberal 
peacebuilding, approach (Paris, 2010). Although liberal feminists have been criticised for 
focusing on the public sphere at the expense of the private, the two are clearly inter-related.
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As such, changes in the public sphere may actually shift and shape individual consciousnesses 
ultimately leading to transformations in gendered frameworks through cultural and social 
changes. Thus, liberal feminist theory may actually have a more far-reaching and radical 
impact than it would at first appear, and may allow space for more interaction between the 
formal and informal which would inevitably lead to more bottom-up and contextualised 
approaches.
Indeed, it is impossible to deny that adding women, although not the radical strategy that 
many feminists argue for, has some kind of an effect on the masculine structures and 
discourses from which they have been excluded (Zalewksi, 2002: 30). There is an argument 
for using the tools that exist in more creative and ultimately transformative ways, thereby 
leveraging the liberal approach for transformative change in both the nature of peacebuilding 
and mainstreaming gender (Subrahmanian, 2007: 119). Similarly, Paris argues that liberal 
peacebuilding provides more space than is acknowledged for a diversity of approaches and 
strategies to engage in conflict-affected contexts (2010: 339-340), which echoes the 
arguments that are made about gender mainstreaming having the potential to result in a more 
radical shift. As he points out, “the tools of critical analysis could just as easily be used to 
explore alternatives within liberal peacebuilding” (2010, 339).
One area worthy of future research would be to explore exactly how the middle ground or 
interplay between top-down and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding could work in 
practice, and specifically how local actors can engage with the international community’s 
gender agenda to arrive at a more transformative, holistic approach to addressing women’s 
marginalisation and gender equality in peacebuilding. The work of the PBC/PBF 
demonstrates the impact that a small degree of participation and input from local actors can 
have at the policy level, but it is still unclear how a more emancipatory approach would look 
in practice. Exploring this is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it would be an interesting 
future research project. Authors such as Pugh (2005b) and Richmond (2007) have alluded to
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the need for more emancipatory approaches, but beyond suggesting that ‘local participation’ 
and ‘social justice’ or ‘human security’ approaches are necessary, they do not offer any real 
alternatives (Paris, 2010: 356). In chapter 7, through the examples of the work of several 
women’s organisations, I have demonstrated what these approaches look like in practice, and 
how they bring a different perspective to the liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminist 
approaches. Building on this and comparing different experiences across countries would be 
valuable in fleshing out a model or deeper understanding of a more emancipatory 
peacebuilding, and might point to the conditions and processes under which such approaches 
might be possible.
This thesis concludes that while limited and having largely failed to engender peace in Sierra 
Leone, the liberal peacebuilding approach and the closely linked liberal feminist strategies 
should not be entirely discarded. The focus on security, governance and economic reform 
should be retained, but more effort devoted to blurring the lines between the pillars, and 
incorporating less tangible and quantifiable dimensions of building peace such as 
reconciliation and household level economic security. The international actors implementing 
the liberal peace should find more ways to identify, support and build on locally-rooted 
initiatives by channelling funding, partnering and providing opportunities to learn from and 
respond to the priorities and needs they represent.
As Meyer and Priigl point out, “the significance of international documents is not that 
governments will automatically implement them but that national and local groups can use 
them to hold their governments accountable. In this sense, what appears as universal 
standards can be adapted and used in local contexts to further specific emancipatory agendas” 
(1999: 13). This is especially relevant in the case of peacebuilding where gender relations are 
in flux, and new spaces for re-negotiating gender roles potentially open up. In these situations 
it may be possible for these local actors, as well as a more sensitised international community 
to bring about concrete change through the limited tools available. Focusing more on this
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level and the ways in which local women’s organisations have reinscribed liberal 
peacebuilding and transformed their communities along more gender-sensitive lines may 
provide some insight into how to support an engendered -  and real -  peace in conflict- 
affected contexts.
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